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liusband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOIC
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOIC,
DANIAL T. CASTLE and C A T H ~ R N E
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A.,

1
1

TRIAL MEMORANDUM
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1

Defendants/Co~~nterplaintiffs.
\

Defendants - Counterplaintiffs (herein sometimes referred to as Green) submit the followillg
Trial Memorandum.
I.

NOTICE REQUIREMENT - BOUNDARY BY AGREEMENT.
Like adverse possession, boundary by agreement requires notice of the fence which is claimed
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to be the boundary, sufficient to put a bona fide purchase? on notice that such an agreement may exist.
In Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112,268 P.2d 35 1, at page1 17, the Court indicated the type of notice a
claimed boundary fence would need to provide.

16-81 As indicated in Campbell v. Weisbrod, supra, such arz agreed
boundary wvuldnlso be bbinding upon c i successor in interest of tlze
s e l h , who purchased with notice of the agreement. The boundary,
which defendants claim, was clearly marked by "a tight beard
fencei1,four orfivefeet in height, and the area On defeeulrlnrzts'side
of the ferzce was planted to lawn, shrubbery and trees. This would
constitute aotice to an intendiitg purchaser, of defendants'
possession. One buying property in the possession of a third party is
put on notice of any claim of title or right of possession by such third
party, which a reasonable investigation would reveal. N a w a &
Meridian Ir?. Dist. v. Bri~es,27 Idaho 84, 147 P. '75;Nelms v. Miller,
56 N.M. 132,241 P.2d 333; Waltrip v. CathcaM,.207OM. 404,250
P.2d 43; J. R. Garrett Co, v. States, 3 Cal.2d 379, 44 P.2d 538;
Marlenee
Page
118

v. Brown, Cal.App., 128 P.2d 137; Three SixtVFive Club v. Shostak,
104 Cal.App.2d 735, 232 P.2d 546; 55 Am.Jur., Vendor and
Purchaser, § 712; 66 C.J., Vendor and Purchaser, $ 1012. Moreover,
pi.&litiffPauileytestified in effect thaihe saw the fence and knew of
defendants' occupaixy of the disputed &ea before he contracted to
buy the south half. Ifstrch facts are suflcieittly established, the
pla21ztiffs would not be inrzocentpurclzasers,and their rights would
be subject to the same defense available against their grantor.
(Emphasis Added.)
The fence that Weitz claims demarcates the boundary by agreement provides no such notice
to Green, a bona fide purchaser. Green has testified he saw ao fence when he pwchased his property
from Rogers. In fact, Green did see the pink IDL marlcer that marked the NE corner of his property.
Green therefore talces his property free of any claim of boundary by agreement by Weitz.
A boundary by agreement can be fixed by either an express agreement, or proved
circumstantially by surrounding circumstances and conduct of tile parties. There certainly is no express
agreement claimed by Weitz.
The recent Idaho case that deals with facts very similar .to ours is Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho
492, 50 P.3d 987 (2002). With facts eerily parallel to ours, both the District Court and the Idaho
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFSTRIAL MEMORANDUM
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.

.

Supreme Court found a substantial fence in the condition as when it "was hastily put up to contain
cattle" was not a boundary fence. Both courts further found that no express or implied agreement
existed, and neither the parties nor their predecessors in interest had acquiesced to the fence
representing the boundary between the properties. In Cox, at page 492, the COLIITstated,
Although the first element necessary to prove boundary by agreement
was met, the district court found that there was no evidence in the
record to support the appellants' contention that the fence line
constituted a subsequent agreement or acquiescence by the parties or
that there was an absence of evidence regarding the circumstances of
the fence's original location. In fact, the opposite was true-a previous
owner, Nina, provided evidence of the circ~cmstnhcessurrou~zlding
the erection of tl2e feiice, which denio~lstratedthat the fence was
hastily put up to contain cattle. Her testifiroizy showed that the
purpose of the fence was not to establish a boundnry between the
properties. She stated that no agreeinenl existed between the
Anderson family and the neighboring landowners to treat the fence
line as the boundary. Appellants urge this C o w to adopt the theory of
bour~daryby acquiescence as a separate theory that does not require
the element of an agreement. However, Idaho case law demonstrates
that an agreement, either express or implied, must exist to establish a
boundary by agreement or acquiescence. Although the actual
boundary was uncertain, appellants are unable to establish the
existence of an express or implied agreement to treat the fence as the
boundary. Appellants' testimony shows that, even during the time
they were making the improvements, the fence was still being used to
contain cattle; appellants h e w this because they damaged the fence
while worlting, allowing cattle to escape. Nina testified that her
family used the land outside the fence to access recreation areas
and that fzerfamily never treatedthe fence cis the bourtrillry to the
properfy. AAKidavits from predecessors iil interest submitted by the
appellants also do not reveal any express or implied agreement to
treat the fence as a boundary. (Empliasis Added.)
As in the Cox case, Weitz believing or claiming the old fence was a boundary is not
sufficient to establish boundary by agreement when Rogers never treated the fence as being the
boundary to their property. Further, Rogers will testify that Rogers used their land outside the fence
to access other recreatioil areas on Moscow Mountain and to harvest timber.
Weitz has claimed specific usage ofthe disputed area, and that such usage somehow entitles
then1 to own the disputed area up to the fence remnants. Weilz misunderstands the type of usage
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required to establish notice such that the owner of property is alerted that someone else claims
ownership of his property, and thus is treating the fence as a boundary. The case of Herrmann v.
Woodell, 107 Idaho 916,693 P.2d 1118 discusses the type of usage required to give notice to an
owner that an ownership claim is being made against his property. The Court stated at Page 921:
Further, the Herrmanns and their predecessors had possessed,
cultivated and grazed the land up to the fence. A witness for the
Herrmanns testified that in 1927 and 1928, when he and his father
leased the land, which is now owned by the Herrmanns, they grew
hay and grazed horses right up to the fence line.
In an argument where boundary by agreement is alleged, with the agreement being proved
circumstanTially by alleging that there was acquiescence in a fence being a boundary, what must be
shown by the plaii~tiffis not mere acquiescence in plaintiff's use of the land being claimed, but
acquiescence by the owner in specific uses by plaintiff cry to thefence - uses such that the owner's
silence is logically accepted as acquiescence in ihe fence being a boundary that separates the uses by
each party up to thefence. Thus, the use by the party claiming boundary by agreement must put the
owner on notice that the use is sucli that it rises to a claim of ownerslup, with the fence as the
boundary for the different ownerships. Tllis use rising to a claim of ownership must actually go up

to thefence

- for

example, farming up to the fence; building up to the fence; landscaping up to the

fence. The use itself must let the owner know that the user is claiming ownership of owner's
property up to the feace, with the fence serving as a bo~lndarybetween ownerships. Then
acquiescence could be circumstantial evidence that an agreement to set the boundary existed.
If use rising to a claim of ownership is not present, silence by the owner only shows
permissive use ofthe properly by the claimant. Roge~swas nice enough to permit Weitz, and others,
to hike, snowmobile, ivountain bike, snowshoe, etc., on their property. Such use on the perimeter
trail would never be a use that would put Rogers on notice that any such user was clainling
ownership of Rogers' property up to tlzefence. So while Rogers acq~~iesced
in such recreational use
of their property, they certainly did not acquiesce in the old fence remnants being a boundary. The
acquiescence must be in the fence being a boundary, not in the mere existence of the fence.
For Weitz to prevail on a boundary by agreement claim, the uses by Weitz on the north side
of the fence remnants must have been such to p ~Rogers
~ t on notice that the fence was claimed as the
boundary by Weitz. And, those uses must have made use of the fence as the boundary, i.e., Weitz

used the property up to tlze fence, delineating the fence as the boundary. Tile circunlstantial
evidence must show that Weitz treated the fence as being the boundary, and used the land up to tlze
fence, and all along thefence, in a manner that alerted Rogers to that claim.
Instead, the "use$ claimed by Weitz have no bearing to the fence.
Weitz has claimed to utilize the perimeter trail over many years for recreational purposes.
The perimeter trail does not travel along the fence. Its use by anyone would not alert Rogers
that such a user claimed to own Rogers property up to and all along thefence!

k The radio shack is nowhere near the fence. Its use by anyone would not alert Rogers that
such a user claimed to own Rogers property up to and all aloag tlzefence!

9 Weitz taking firewood from the disputed area is not a use up to thefence. Such activities by
anyone would not alert Rogers that they claimed to ownRogers property up to and nll along
thefence!
The use by claimant must be such to put the owner on notice that the claimant actually claims
ownership of the property up to the fence, and the use must be along the entire line of the fence.
The use itselfmuslsfdemarcate thefence ns being the boundary. That is the type of notice required
to the owner. Furtheymore, if it were otherwise, every claim for a prescriptive easement within an
area would turn illto a claim of boundary by agreement up to the nearest fenceline.
The Herrmml case also addressesthe bona fide purchaser status of Green. The Court stated at
page 92 1:
[12,13] An agreed boundary is binding upon a successor in interest of
the seller, who purchased with notice of the agreement. Paurley v.
supra. A boundary marlred by a fence, with the land on the
Herrmau~s'side of the fence being grazed and cultivated would
constitute notice. Mr. Woodell testified that he wallced all over the
property and noticed the barbed wire fence. Therefore, the Woodells
were on notice of the agreed boundary. Accordingly, we hold in this
case that the line marked by the fence constitutes the lawful boundary
between the adjacent properties according to the doctrine of boundary
by agreement.

In the case at bar, the opposite is true. Green had no notice of any fence, and therefore even had
there been an agreed boundary with Rogers, it would not be binding upon Green, who purchased
without notice of any claimed agreement.
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Persvn v. Favreau, 119 Idaho 154,804 P.2d 327, is an "adverse possession case. Iiowever, as
by the Court
Weitz has asked the Court to quiet title to the disputed property in Weitz, the disc~~ssion
at pages 157 and 158 regarding Persyn's adverse possession claims as they related to
"improvements," "open and notorious hostile intes~tlt,"
"burden of proof," and "notice" requirements
are appropriate to our case.
[3] The district judge held that the fence did not constitute a
substantial ei~closureunder LC. 5 5-210(1). Be was persuaded that
tlzefence had not been erected by Persyn or PerSyn 's grantors ahd
that ii3purpose never was to enclose nrtypart of Persyn 'sproperty:
See Loomisv. Union Pacific Railroad Compa~ip~
97 Idaho 341, 5.14
P.2d 299 (1975); Schuttqnv. Beck, 757P.2d 1139 (Colo.App.1988).
When the Cowity owned the property now belonging to the Favreaus,
the County perlnitted an employee to erect the fence to coistain the
employee's horses within the property owned by the County. At no
tivae was the fence regarded as tlte boundnry between the two
pdrcels.
[4] The district judge also ruled that' the sctions of Persyn's

predecessor in clearing brush from the fence area a ~ mnintnirzirzg
d
tB:efence up until 19'79,and any aciions by Persyn tlzereafir, were
insal3pfieient to be covlsirlered "improvemet.ltV~rsrequired by I,C 8
5-ZIP@). Finally, tlie districtju&ge concluded that neither Persyn nor
her predecessors "in any way indicated an open and notorious Izostile
intent which brougl$th6me to the [Fnvrem/or their predecessors
in title tlzat [Persyn]w m chiming title to tlze real estate in dispute."
The last issue raised by Persyn was essesltially one of notice.Persyn
contended that the existence of the fence line imparted notice of an
adverse claim, such that when the Favreaus bought the property in
1983, they had a duty to inquire as to the extent of such claim because
the fence line was sot on the survey line. The district court made a
finding that after 1979, fltefence felt into disrepair, wit12 ~ u t l of
z
tlze barbed wire and many of the posts down nt the time Favreaus
6ouglzt the anjacent property. Then, in its coilclusions of law, the
district court rejected Persyn's argtunent and authority as unfounded.
It has long been held in Idaho that "theparty seeking to quiet title
ngairzsf aitotlzer mast succeed on the strengtlz of his own title, and
ilut on tlze weakness of tlznt of his adverSary." pin cock.^. Pocatelio
Gold & Cup~erMil~eaCo.,
100 Idaho 325,331, 597 P.2d211,217
(1979) (citations omitted). Per'syn cnnnot sort to pro~~iizg
her
arlve?sepossessio~zclaim by transferring the burden ofproof to tlze
party against whom the claim is 6eing nznde.
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The decree of the district court in favor of the Favreaus and against
Persyn is affirmed. (Emphasis Added.)
11.

NOTICE REQUIREMENT - PTUESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT.

/

A boiia fide purchaser without notice of a prescriptive easement claim talces his propelty fiee
of any such claim. See ICaupp v: City of Hailey, 110 Idaho 337,715 P.2d 1007.
The Court states at 340 - 341,
[2] As previously mentioned, proof of the Kaupps' knowledge is
necessaq to establish a prescriptive easement. The court found the
presence of a manhole in a city street and the occasional use of this
manhole were sufficient to impute lcnowledge to the landowner of a
concealed pipeline buried under the property. We disagree. We believe
tlze mere existeftce of tlze manhole does not create a duty to inquire.
This case also raises another issue which should be considered on
remand. No prescriptive easement can be acquired if the use, instead of
being adverse, is with the permission of the subservieilt landowner.
107 Idaho at 803, 693 P.2d at 449; Memll v. Penrod, 109
Idaho at 51,704 P.2d at 955. (emphasis Added.)
The Court in Baxter v. Crahey, 135Idaho 166,16 P.3d263, also discQssedthereqtireinents for
prescriptive easement, citing

and

m,supra. IIIw,the Court stated:

(At 173)

[17]The Baxters argue that Esterholdt, the Craneys' predecessor in
interest, ha&tictual lcnowledge tliat the Baxters' cattle usedtrails on land
east of the fence to reach the spring for water. The district court,
however, noting that there was conflictingtestimony that the trails were
also used by deer and elk wandering off the BLM lands, concluded that
tlze Baters failed to provide clear and convincing evideizce tlznt tlze
tmik were sufficiatt to put Esterhold? on notice of their use as a
means for the Baxters' cattle to get to tlie spring. We agree.
The record, however, indicates that Esterholdt was ill and was oidy able
to visit the property two or three times per year. Because a landowner
need only Maintain reasonable supervision over lzis property, see
110 Idaho at 340,715 P.2d at 1010, we agree with the district
cowt that the presence of the tvnils on Esfe~lzolrlt'slarzrl, witlzout
nzore, was insuffient foplace EsferIzoldtorz notice of their use by the
Baxters' cattle.
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(At 174)
It is therefore logical to assume that even if Esterholdt was on notice
that the Baxters' cattle were crossing his land to reach the spring, he
was simply being neighborly by allowing the fence to be moved and
giving the Baxters' cattle access to water. Because a prescriptive right
camot be established where the use was permissive, see Hmter v.
Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998), we reject the
Baxters' assertion.
1221The Baxters also contend that the Craneys tookpossession of
the land with knowledge of the easement. As evidence of their
knowledge, the Baxters point to testimony that the Craneys inspected
the land prior to their purchase and obseived the trails. An
examination of the relevant testimony in the record, however, merely
establishes that the Craneys were aware of the hails at the time of
purchase. The Craneys' mere appreciation of the abundant trails,
witlzoztt more, is insufficient to estnblish that the Craneys wereput
on notice of aprescriptive easenzent across their land Accordingly,
because the district court's decision is supported by substantial and
competent, although coi~flicting,evidence, this Court will not disturb
its conclusion. See Hunter, 131 Idaho 148, 9.53 P.2d 588 (1998).
(Emphasis Added.)

Rogers and Green did not have actual or imputed lmowledge of any prescriptive easement cclailn
by Weitz, or anyone else, prior to purchasing his property. It was not until Weitz b~zlldozedthe trail
across Green's propel@ that he became aware of any claim by Weitz. Green is a bona fide purchaser,
without notice of any claim of prescriptive easemeBt by Weitz.
111.

DOWN FENCE.
In Standall v. Teater, 96 Idaho 152,525 P.2d 347, in an action to quiet title, the Cotut refi~sed

to allow a downed fence to establish an adverse possession claim, stating at pages 155 and 15G,
The trial court found that the barbed wire fence was down. The record
fully sustains the trial court's determination that Uie bbared wire fence
the Teaters contended bounded the area claimed by them was down
and cattle could cross and recross the area. This finding, supported by
substantial, competent, although conflicting evidence, will not be
disturbed by this court.
As stated in Griffel v. Remolds, 136 Idaho 397,34 P.3d 1080, at 397,
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Furtliermore, because the fences were no longer in existence wheli
Stegelmeier purchased his land, the plaintiffs cannot rely on the old
fence lilies to prove an agreement but must meet their burden of proof
with other evidence.
These cases hold that a claimant can not rely upoii a fence that is "down". Weitz should also be
precluded from asserting m y clainls based upon a feehce that, by their own testimony, has not been
maintained since the mid 1970's or earlier. This domed fence could in no way impart any notice or
Green is a bona fide purchaser,
knowledge of any claim by Weitz to Green prior to his p~~chase.
without knowledge of any claims by Weitz.
IV.

MEANDERING CATTLE FENCE.

Althoughad-

117 Idaho 614,790 P.2d 395, is an adverse possession case, the

Court discussed the nature of a meandering barbed wire fence. It is appropriate for our case, as it
sets out the reason for the requirement of an enclosure -to indicate the extent of the adverse claim.
The Court stated at page 619,

[lo, 111One of the findings made by the district court, which was not
challe~igedon the appeal i n m was that the Capps never built or
maintained any enclosure around the subject pfoperty. See I.C. $9 5 20S(2), 5-210(1). The court noted that the evidence showed a
meabdering barbed wire fence on the property, built by employees of
the defendants' predecessor, Burton, to separate livestock. It is well
settled that persolls claiming title by adverse possessioll inust
establish-as one of the elements of such claims-that they construc?ed
or maintained an ei~closureon the di~~utedpardel'of
land to incltcnte
the extent o f their cl~irn.Loomis v,. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 97
Idaho 341,544 P.2d 249 (1975); Christle v. Scog 1loIdaho 829,718
P.2d 1267 (Ct.App. 1986). A fence erected by a neighbor fo? the
pLEpose of containing live~toclcor to restrain livestock f ~ i enteriilg
a
the neighbor's property will not suflice to satisfy the enclos~tre
requirement for adverse possessioll by a claimant adjacent to the
neighbor's property. (Emphasis Added.)
In Henmann v. Woodell, 107 Idaho 916, 693 P.2d 1118, at page 921, the Court stated
regarding Woodell's claim:
they contend the fence was constructed by their predecessors-ininterest in order to lceep animals from the roadway. This implies that
the fence was erected as a barrier and not as a boundary to divide the
adjacent properties. Therefore, if this assertion were proven, the
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presumption of an agreement would be overcome and a bounday by
implied agreement or acquiescence could not be found.
The natnse of the disputed fence in our case exactly rnatchiig the description from the
Wyoining case cited below shows that it was constructed as a barrier, not a boundary. Thus 110
presumption or implication arises. See ICimball v. Turner, 993 P.2d 303; 1999 Wyo. LEXIS 196,
copy attached hereto for the convenience of the COW,with relevant portions l~ighlighted.
V.

TIMBER TRESPASS.
DeEendantslCounterplaintiffsare entitled to the costs to place their property into the same

condition it was immediately prior to the trespass by PIaintiffslCounterdefendants.
See Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,862 P.2d 321. Also see Raide v. Dollar, 34
Idaho 682, 203 Pac. 469; pow ell,^. Sellers, 130 Idaho 122, 937 P.2d 434, copies of which are
attached hereto for the convenience of the Court, with relevant portions highlighted.
VI.

SLANDER OF TITLE.
DefendantslComterplaintiffs are entitled to recover all damages resulting from

PlaintiffslCouriterdefendafitsslmder of title.

See Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 691,8 P.3d 1234 and Ray1 v. Shull Entemrises Inc., 108
Idaho 524,700 P;2d 567, copies ofwhich are attached hereto f6r the conveaience of the Court, with
relevant pottions highlighted.
DATED this 31d day of October, 2005.

&A+

Robert M. ~ a g v a s f l/
Attorney for 6kendants - Counterplaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby celtif'y that on this 31d day of October, 2005, I caused a true and corlect copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM to be served on the following in the ]Banner indicated below:
( ) Overnight Mail
( ) U.S. Mail
( ) Facsilnile

Charles A. Brown
Attoriley at Law
P.O. Box 1225
Lewiston, ID 83501

DQ I-Iand Delivery

AJ'VfiA-

Robert M. Magyar
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75 Idaho 112; Paurley v. Harris; 268 P.2d 351

--"-----

---

Page 112 .---

.-----"-

PAURLEY et ux. v. HARRIS et ux.
[Cite as Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 1121
No. 7927.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
March 16, 1954.
Action in ejectment arising out of a boundary dispute between adjoining landowners. The District Court of the
Third Judicial District, Ada County, Charles E. Winstead, J., entered judgment of ejectment for plaintirfs, and
defendants appealed, claiming error in action of court in striking certain affirmative allegations from answer and
in rejecting certain ofrered proof. The Supreme Court, Taylor, J., held that defendants' pleading of fraud or
mistake was sufficient to permit admission of offered evidence to effect that the parties' vendor, and

her agent, at time sale to defendants was proposed, pointed out division line as contended for by defendants, and
that stakes were driven to mark the line.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
Keeton, J., and Beclwith, District Judge, dissented.
~
.-*--

page 114

---------..---.

Fairchild & Fairchild, Boise, for appellants.
Par01 evidence may be resorted to, not to vary the words ofthe grant, but to show from the situation and
condition of the subject-matter what meaning the parties attached to the words used, especially in matters of
subsequent made description and declaration of the grantor. Devliil on Real Estate Third edition, Vol. 2, Sect.
1015 A, Page 1937.
A boundary line may be established by adjoining landowners, when they so agree upon a boundary line,
enter into possession, and improve the lands according to the line thus accepted, and they will not thereafter be
permitted to claim the line agreed upon is not the true line, although the statute of limitations has not attached.
Devlin on Real Estate, Third edition, Vol. 2, Sect. 1086. McNanara v. Seaton, 82 Ill. 498; Cutler v. Callison, 72
Ill. 113; Ebert v. Wood, 1 Bin., Pa., 216,2 Am.Dec. 436; Houston v. Sneed, 15 Tex. 307,308; Sneed v. Osborn,
25 Cal. 619; Sawyer v. Fellows, 6 N.H. 107,25 Am.Dec. 452.
Where a boundary is established by agreement, followed by acquiescence and possession, and particularly
possession lor the full statutory period for establishing title by prescription, the line thus established determines
the location of the estate and establishes the tnie line of division. Mulder v. Stands, 71 Idaho 22,225 P.2d 463.
Where a boundary line is pointed out, staked, or marked out by monuments plainly visible, the purchaser is
entitled to take as so indicated to him. Taylor v. Reising, 13 Idaho 226,243,89 P. 943.
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If a purchaser of real property has notice of defendants' claim to the property and his equity therein, such
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purchaser cannot be considered to be an innocent purchaser for a valuable consideration. Froman v. Madden, 13
Idaho 138,88 P. 894.
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Maurice 13. Greene and Raymond D. Givens, Boise, for respondents.
Mutual mistake between one party and the agent of another does not show mutual mistake in the absence of
a showing of the authority of the agent to make the stipulation claimed to be omitted. 45 Am. Jur., Reformation,
Sec. 56; Mills v. Schulba, 1950, 95 Cal.App.2d 559,213 P.2d 408.
The motion to strike is the proper method of reaching matter in an answer setting

up no defense to an action or containing recitations and negotiations prior to the execution of a written
agreement in absence of pleading of ambiguity. Brown v. Jones, 49 Idaho 797,292 P. 235; Cowen v.
Harrington, 5 Idaho 329,48 P. 1059; Fraliclc v. Mercer, 27 Idaho 360, 148 P. 906.
Par01 evidence may not be admitted to vary the terms of a written agreement in the absence of allegation of
fraud or mistake. Udelaviiz v. Ketchen, 33 Idaho 165, 190 P. 1029; Milner v. Earl Fruit Co., 40 Idaho 339,232
P. 581.
TAYLOR, Justice
Lots 1,2 and 3 in Bloclc 2 of Lover's Lane addition to Boise City constitute a parallelogranam, the lines of
which do not run true north and south or true east and west. The side lines on the east and west run some few
degrees to the east of true north and to the west oftrue south. The lots were owned by one Lillian Ferrell. On
June 30, 1947, she entered into a contract with the defeiidants for the sale to them of the north one-half of the
property, described in the contract as the "North One Half of lots 1,2, and 3 * * *.." March 10, 1950, she
contracted to sell to the plaintiffs the remainder, described as the "South Half of Lots 1,2, and 3 * * *." About a
month after entering into possession. some time in July or August, 1947, the defendants erected a board fence
on what they claim to be the dividing line between the property purchased by them and that retained by tlte
seller. This fence is somewhat to the south of a line, drawn parallel to the north and south end lines of the
parallelogram, which would divide the property in equal parts.
Plaintiffs, claiming to this center line, brought this action in ejectment to obtain possession of the area lying
between the fence and the center line. After certain denials and admissions, the defendants in their answer
allege their contract, a description of the property claimed by them thereunder, then follows lengthy allegations
concerning prior occupancy of the respective tracts, and negotiations between defendants and the former owner
leading up to the sale. They further allege that prior to their contract there was no division line, mark or
monument separating the two portions of the property; that the owner Fenell, acting through an agent,
represented to them that the dividing line was located as now claimed by them; and that the agent pointed out
and indicated the course of the division line; that they believed, and relied on, these representations in
contracting to buy; that almost immediately after taking possession they built the fence referred to, leveled the
ground, planted lawn, trees and shrubbery thereon and have since continuously occupied same; that at the time
plaintiffs contracted to purchase the south onehalf of the property they h e w that defendants occupied .and
claimed the property enclosed by the fence; that defendants' contract of purchase was drawn by the

owner Ferrell; that the description of the property therein contracted for is erroneous and does not properly
describe the property sold to them; that the mistake went unnoticed by defendants; that they believe the mistake
was mutual and, if not, then, in that event, the seller perpetrated a fraud upon them.
1160
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On plaintiffs1motion the court struck from the answer paragraphs four through eighteen, containing the
foregoing and other affirmative allegations, on the ground that the same are immaterial, sham and frivolous. On
the trial, defendants offered evidence to the effect that MIS. Ferrell, accompanied by a real estate agent, came to
their house and proposed the sale; that she and her agent pointed out the division line to be established, and that
stakes were driven to mark the line. The court sustained the objection that this offered evidence was
incompetent; involved matters merged in the contract; and that the contract could not be varied by such proof.

[I, 21 The strilting of the affirmative allegations from the answer and the rejection of this offered proof
presents the controlling issue on this appeal. The general rules applicable are not in question. Oral stipulations,
agreerneilts and negotiations, preliminary to a written contract, are presumed merged therein, and will not be
admitted to contradict or vary its plain terms. Hurt v. Monumental Mercury Mining Co., 35 Idaho 295,206 P.
184; Milner v. Earl Fruit Co., 40 Idaho 339,232 P. 581; Larsen v. Buys, 49 Idaho 615,292 P. 239; Fidelity
Trust Co. v. State, 72 Idaho 137,237 P.2d 1058. Fraud or mistake may be shown, in any case, to void or reform
a contract. Udelavitz v. Ketchen, 33 Idaho 165, 190 P. 1029; Gould v. Frazier, 48 Idaho 798,285 P. 673;
Advance-Rumely Thresher Co. v. Jacobs, 51 Idaho 160,4 P.2d 657; Creem v. Northwestern Mut. Fire Ass'n, 56
Idaho 529, 56 P.2d 762; Utilities Engineering- Institute v. Criddle, 65 Idaho 201, 141 P.2d 981.
[3,4] Although burdened and commingled with much that is sham and redundant, we think defendants'
imperfect pleading of fraud or mistake was sufficient for the admission of the evidence offered, and should not
have been stricken.

"The particular rule applicable here is that where the seller and the buyer go upon the land and
there agree upon and mark the boundary between the part to be conveyed and the part to be retaine8
by the seller, .the line thus fixed controls the courses and distances set out in the deed executed to
effectuate the division agreed upon." Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82, at page 89, 245 P.2d
1052, at page 1057.

[5] Applying that rule here, and assuming that defendants' proof would establish the [acts, if the former
owner and the defendants went upon the property prior to the execution of the contract, and there agreed

upon a dividing line which was marked upon the ground, and the defendants thereafter contracted to buy,
relying upon the agreed boundary, took possession, and occupied and enclosed the property up to the line
agreed upon, and such possession was known to the seller, who acquiesced therein for a considerable period of
time, such a state of facts would support the conclusion that the seller is bound by the dividing line agreed upon,
even though it varies from the description written in the contract. Atwell v. Olson, 30 Wash.2d 179, 190 P.2d
783; Arnold v. Hanson, 91 Cal.App.2d 15,204 P.2d 97; Angel1 v. Hadley, 33 Wash.2d 837,207 P.2d 191;
Lake, for Use and Benefit of Benton v. Crosser, 202 Okl. 582,216 P.2d 583; Nebel v. Guyer, 99 Cal.App.2d 30,
221 P.2d 337; Frericks v. Sorensen, 113 Cal. App.2d 759,248 P.2d 949; Pacific Gas & Electric Co, v. Minnette,
115 Cal.App.2d 642,252 P.2d 642; Appeal of Moore, 173 Kan. 820,252 P.2d 875; Millikin v. Sessoms, 173
N.C. 723,92 S.E. 359; 170 A.L.R. Annotation 1144. Cf. Mulder v. Stands, 71 Idaho 22,225 P.2d 463; Edgeller
v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006.
What is here said of acquiescence by the seller is not to be construed as a holding that such acquiescence
alone for the period here involved would be sufficient to establish title by "acquiescence". See Lewis v. Smith,
187 Okl. 404, 103 P.2d 512. Draper v. Griffin, 61 Cal.App.2d 281, 142 P.2d 772; Willie v. Local Realty Co.,
110 Utah 523, 175 P.2d 718; Needham v. Collamer, 94 Cal.App.2d 609,211 P.2d 308; Dragos v. Russell, Utah,
237 P.2d 831; Martin v. Lopes, Cal.App., 164 P.2d 321; Id., 28 Cal. 2d 618, 170 P.2d 881. Here the seller's
acquiescence is merely regarded as competent evidence of the agreement and of the fraud or mistalte by reason
of which the contract, subsequently drawn by the seller, did not conform to the agreement. Edgeller v. Johnston,
74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006; Mello v. Weaver, 36 Cal.2d 456,224 P.2d 691; Crook v. Leinenweaver, 100
Cal.App. 2d 790,224 P.2d 891; Rahlves Rahlves, Inc., v. Ainbort, 118 Cal.App.2d 465,258 P.2d 18.
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[6-81 As indicated in Campbell v. Weisbrod, supra, such an agreed boundary would also be binding upon a
successor in interest of the seller, who purchased with notice of the agreement. The boundary, which defendants
claim, was clearly marked by "a tight board fence", four or five feet in height, and the area on defendants' side
of the fence was planted to lawn, shrubbery and trees. This would constitute notice to an intending purchaser, of
defendants' possession. One buying property in the possession of a third party is put on notice of any claim of
title or right of possession by such third party, which a reasonable investigation would reveal. Nanpa &
Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Briggs, 27 Idaho 84, 147 P. 75; Nelms v. Miller, 56 N.M. 132,241 P.2d 333; Waltrip v.
Cathcart, 207 Okl. 404, 250 P.2d 43; J. R. Garrett Co. v. States, 3 Cal.2d 379,44 P.2d 538; Marlenee
1
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v. Brown, Cal.App., 128 P.2d 137; Three Sixty Five Club v. Shostak, 104 Cal.App.2d 735,232 P.2d 546; 55
Am.Jur., Vendor and Purchaser, § 712; 66 C.J., Vendor and Purchaser, § 1012. Moreover, plaintiff Paurley
testified in effect that he saw the fence and knew of defendants' occupancy of the disputed area before he
contracted to buy the south half. If such facts are sufficiently established, the plaintiffs would not be innocent
purchasers, and their rights would be subject to the same defense available against their grantor.
We find no merit in other assignments made.
The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. Costs to appellallts
PORTER, C. J., and THOMAS, J., concur.
KEETON, Justice (dissenting).
The fact that the plaintiff Paurley saw the fence now claimed by defendants to be the boundary line dividing
the land would not in my opinion put the plaintiffs on inquiry as to the agreement, if there were one, between
the common grantors and defendants as to what the true boundary line should be. In other words the boundary
fence claimed by defendants to be the boundary would not in itself be sufficient to establish knowledge of
plaintiffs that an agreement as to the boundary line existed, if it did. The fence alone would not establish the
hue line dividing conterminous properties.
In Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82,245 P.2d 1052, the boundary line in dispute was not only uncertain,
but it could not be, and was not, determined with certainty. Hence, this court held that the agreed boundary
controlled. Such is not true here. The true line in dispute in the present situation could be, and was, established.
Hence, I think the judgment should be affirmed.
BECKWITH, District Judge (dissenting).
Reluctantly, but most earnestly, do I dissent. The facts contained in the majority opinion are sufficient for
this dissent, with this additional notation. The agreement between Mrs. Fenell and the defendants was made
June 30, 1947. Harris built the fence about August of 1947. The complaint was filed December 4, 1950 (thee
years, six months).
For sixty-three years this court has consistently maintained and supported the rule that a boundary line
established by agreement by conterminous owners, followed by acquiescence and possession for the full
statutory period of time required to acquire title by prescription, operates to establish the true line of the
respective estates. Idaho Land Co. v. Parsons, 3 Idaho, Hasb.,
Page $19

-------1162

Page 5 of 6
3
450,31 P. 791; Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, 105 P. 1066; O'Malley v. Jones, 46 Idaho 137,266 P. 797;
Kesler v. Ellis, 47 Idaho 740,278 P. 366; Woll v. Costella, 59 Idaho 569, 85 P.2d 679; Mulder v. Stands, 71
Idaho 22,225 P.2d 463; Edgeller, v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006.
-,

Conversely, that such an agreement existing for only two years and four days, does not make the line so
established binding or conclusive upon owners of land abutting thereon. Woodland v. Hodson, 28 Idaho 45, 152
P. 205, cited with approval in Carnpbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82,245 P.2d 1052.
While Campbell v. Weisbrod, supra, decided in 1952, and upon which a majority opinion rests, announced a
new rule, that where a buyer and seller agree and mark the boundary, the line thus fixed controls the courses and
distances set out in the deed subsequently executed to effectuate the division agreed upon. While the rule as
announced does not require any lapse of time by acquiescence therein by the parties, the court in this case
leaves no doubt that there must be, in addition to the agreement, an acquiescence by the parties for in explaining
the rule the court says there must be both an agreement to fix the boundary, and that the seller must acquiesce
therein for a considerable period of time to be estopped, and what has been said of acquiescence by the seller is
not to be construed as a holding that such acquiescence alone for the period involved would be sufficient to
establish title by "acquiescence", but that the seller's acquiescence is regarded as competent evidence of the
agreement. All of the authorities cited in the majority opinion to support the above rules of law were cases
involving a period of acquiescence for more than five years, our statutory period of time required to establish a
prescriptive right, $5 5-207 and 5-210, I.C., except the case of Draper v. Griffin, 61 Cal.App.2d 281, 142 P. 2d
772, in which the line was established four years, m~dNeedham v. Collamer, 94 Cal.App.2d 609,211 P.2d 308,
where the line was established for a like period of four years, which cases were decided on the rule that where
the property is improved to such an extent that a substantial loss would result if the position of the line was
changed, both parties would be estopped to have the line changed, which are not the facts in this suit. Appeal of
Moore, 173 ICan. 820,252 P.2d 875, where the line had been established for seven years, the court in citing
Steinhilber v. Holmes, 68 Kan. 607,75 P. 1019, a case where the line had been established for fourteen years,
did announce the rule that where the parties agreed and acquiesced in an established line, even though the
period of acquiescence falls short of the time fixed by the statute for gaining title by adverse possession, it
becomes an established line. All of the authorities cited by the majority opinion on these rules support this
dissent rather than the majority opinion.
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The court has by the language used in the opinion in announcing the above rules, namely, where seller
acquiesced therein for a considerableperiod of time, and that "seller's acquiescence is merely regarded as
competent evidence of the agreement", has for all effects overruled all of the cases of this court for the past
sixty-three years, which required agreement followed by acquiescence for at least five years to estop either
party, including Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006, decided November 3, 1953, which
corrected the error in Campbell v. Weisbrod, 73 Idaho 82,245 P.2d 1052, by re-establishing the former
precedent. In effect the court announces that henceforth three years, six months of acquiescence is a
considerable period of time, sufficient to estop one of the parties from ejecting the other.
The only reason to incorporate such a phrase in the opinion as "who acquiesced therein for a considerable
period of time" (emphasis added), was to leave the law so flexible that it would take care of any future
conditions and it most certainly will, because it destroys all security of real property titles in Idaho, and malces
chaos, uncertainty and confusion, concerning real property interests, the law in Idaho. Such a phrase is relative
only and indefinite in itself, because to the very young time passes very slowly, while to those who have
reached that stage in life where the mental and physical faculties begin to slow down, time passes with ever
increasing rapidity, hence what may constitute a considerable period of time, depends entirely upon the outloolc
of the individuals involved, unless it is established by this court that a considerable period oftime must
logically mean five years, as set forth in our statutes of limitations, to establish title by prescriptive rights, which
rule was so definitelv established in Kesler v. Ellis. 47 Idaho 740,278 P. 366, wherein the court said:
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"* * * it is but logical to say that such acquiescence must continue for a period of not less than
five years, thus conforming to the period established by the statute of limitations in cases of adverse
possession." At page 744 of 47 Idaho, at page 367 of 278 P.
1

-

1

The opinion sets forth no guidance for the trial courts, and no indication of what this court will hold to be a
considerable period of time necessary to establish estoppel by acquiescence in fi~turelitigation of this nature. It
has always been, and I venture to say still is, the prerogative of a trial judge to exclude all incompetent evidence
from a case, The trial court was correct in excluding from evidence any and all offered testimony regarding the
oral contract and acquiescence of the parties, first, for the reason that the contract being oral and made prior to
the execution of the contract to purchase by defendants, is merged in that instrument, and hence, any

such evidence is incompetent, as held by the court. Fidelity Trust Co. v. State, 72 Idaho 137,237 P.2d 1058,
and authorities cited in the majority opinion on this point. Secondly, such an agreement would constitute an
attempt to convey land by an oral agreement in violation of our statute of frauds, and would in itself be void.
Kunkle v. Clinkingbeard, 66 Idaho 493, 162 P.2d 892, based on the long established precedent of this court that
in order to effect an estoppel, the agreement coupled to the acquiescence, must have existed for five full years.
Because the trial court did not base the exclusion of this evidence on the last-mentioned ground, is in itself no
reason for reversing the judgment, because this court in arriving at a correct solution of the case, which agrees
reached by the trial court, will affirm such judgment. Glander v. Glander, 72
with the erroneous conciusio~~
Idaho 195, 239 P.2d 254. What has been said of the evidence in this case is lilcewise applicable to the pleadings
and the motion to strike portions of the answer. The entire answer, including those portions excluded, does not
plead any defense, by estoppel, or otherwise, to this action, under the long-established rule of law above set
forth. Therefore, the matters excluded in the answer are not sufficient as a defense, neither would any evidence
of acquiescence during the period involved be competent evidence to prove estoppel against the plaintiffs,

------The judgment should be affirmed.Lawriter Corporation. All rights reserved.
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137 Idaho 492; Cox v. Clanton; 50 P.3d 987

Michael G. COX and Jennifer Cox, husband and wife, Terry Maupin and Mindy Maupin, husband and wife,
Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants,v. Peggy CLANTON, Thelma Anderson, and Teresa Kruseli, married
women dealing with their sole and separate property, Defendants-Counterclaimants-ThirdParty ComplainantsRespondents. v. Deelane Maupin, and Justin Maupin and Jane Doe Maupin, husband and wife, Third Party
Defendants-Appellants.
[Cite as Cox v. Clanton, 137 Idaho 4921
Supreme Court of Idaho
Boise, May 2002 Term
No. 27020.
July 2,2002.
Neighbors filed quiet title action against title holders, alleging theories of boundary by agreement and
boundary by acquiescence. The District Court, Seventh Judicial District, Jefferson County, Brent J. Moss, J.,
quieted title in title holders. Neighbors appealed. The Supreme Court, Kidwell, J., held that no express or
implied agreement to heat barbed-wire fence as a boundary existed.
Affirmed.
Just Law Office, Idaho Falls, for appellants. Chales C. Just argued.
Hopkins, Roden, Crockett, Hansen & Hoopes PLLC, Idaho Falls, for respondents. Teresa L. Sturm argued.
KIDWELL, Justice.
The Coxes and the Maupins purchased property and made improvements upon land they believed they
owned. A subsequent survey of the property revealed that the appellants did not own the land; the respondents
held title to the disputed property. The appellants filed a quiet title action, and the district court quieted title in
the respondents. The appellants appeal.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The plaintiffs bought parcels of land in separate purchases hom Merlin Sharp (Sharp). Terry and Mindy
Maupin purchased land from Sharp in December of 1998; the Coxes' purchase occurred in February of 1999.
Sharp had acquired the land fiom his parents in 1996, and his parents apparently had acquired it from Julius
Carsten who owned it for approximately thirteen years. The plaintiffs were given recorded deeds to the
property
The defendants received their property by a recorded deed on May 11, 1999, fiom their mother, Nina
Anderson. Nina and her husband Warren owned the land since 1956, acquiring it from Martin Anderson. In
1967, Warren hastiIy erected a fence on their property to contain cattle. It is in substantially the same condition
as it was then, consisting of evenly-spaced steel fence posts with three or four strands of barbed wire connecting
them, and is still used to contain cattle. After observing the property, the district court determined

,
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on either side of the fence was "indistinguishable."
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The plaintiffs believed that the fence represented the boundary between the properties. Acting under that
belief, they graded and graveled a road, bridged a canal, removed trees, and dug a trench in which power and
cable lines were placed. These improvements were made in conjunction with the construction of two homes,
one for Terry's brother, DeeLane Maupin, and one for DeeLane's son, Justin Maupin. Only after having the land
surveyed did the plaintiffs realize that the fence did not represent the boundary line contained in the recorded
deeds, and that the improvements had been made on land they did not own.
The plaintiffs notified the defendants of the problem; prior to that, the defendants were unaware of any
improvements on the land because they rented the land to ranchers. The parties were unable to reach a
compromise on the approximately one-acre strip of land in dispute, and plaintiffs filed an action to quiet title.
The defendants counterclaimed and filed a third party complaint against DeeLane, Justin, and his family for
trespass, conversion, and to quiet title. Both sides filed cross motions for summary judgment supported by
briefs and affidavits. Plaintiffs argued that the boundary line should be the fence line, based on the theories of
boundary by acquiescence, boundary by agreement, adverse possession, or estoppel. Defendants argued that the
boundary lines in all of the recorded deeds should stand, and that the elements required for the above-mentioned
theories were not established. Nina testified as to the circumstances surroundiig the erection of the fence,
stating that the fence was put up hastily to contain cattle. She stated that she and her family had used the land
outside the fenced land and had not treated it as a boundary to the property. She further stated that there was
never an agreement or acquiescence on her part with former neighboring predecessors in interest to change the
boundary lines provided in the recorded deeds.
On August 8,2000, the district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court
found no evidence in the record of an agreement or acquiescence between the parties or their predecessors in
interest to treat the fence as a common boundary. The court found that the plaintiffs had not established the
required elements of the theory of boundary by agreement or boundary by acquiescence. Appellants filed this
timely appeal on October 20,2000.

STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is proper "if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the
affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law." I.R.C.P. 56(c). "When reviewing an appeal from a grant of summary
judgment, this Court employs the same standard used by the district court originally ruling on the motion."
Northwest Bec-Corp v. Home Living Sew., 136 Idaho 835,838,41 P.3d 263,266 (2002) (citing S. Gr@n
Constu., Inc, v. City oflewiston, 135 Idaho 181, 185, 16 P.3d 278,282 (2000)). Where the facts are undisputed
and the district court rather than a jury will be the trier of fact, "summary judgment is appropriate, despite the
possibility of conflicting inferences because the court alone will be responsible for resolving the conflict
between those inferences." Id

ANALYSIS
A. The District Court Did Not Err By P i d i n g That Appellants Had Not Established Boundary By
Agreement Or Boundary By Acquiescence.
Appellants contend that the district court erred by quieting title in the respondents. Their position is based
on the premise that the theories of boundary by agreement and boundary by acquiescence are different, but
related theories. Although Idaho case law treats the two theories interchangeably, appellants respectf 1 ssgsl

YIbb

-

i

(.. 7

--

Page 3 of 4

that the two theories should be separate, as they each have different necessary elements. The appellants cite to
treatises and cases from other jurisdictions to support their position that acquiescence should not he considered
an element of boundary by agreement. The appellants urge this Court to recognize boundary by acquiescence as
a separate theory because public policy has caused a shift away from the necessity of an agreement and towards
more equitable concepts such as good faith and fair dealing. Appellants argue they have established boundary
by acquiescence based on the facts that the fence had been erected in 1967 and had not been moved since that
time, and that the appellants and their predecessors in interest had all believed the fence to be the boundary.
Additionally, appellants contend that they have also met the requirements for boundary by agreement under
current Idaho case law.
"In Idaho, the phrase 'boundary by acquiescence' is often used interchangeably with 'boundary by
agreement,' although the latter more accurately describes the doctrine." Grgel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397,400,
34 P.3d 1080,1083 (2001) (citing Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898,950 P.2d 1237 (1997)). "To prove
boundary by agreement, there must be an uncertain or disputed boundary and a subsequent agreement fixing the
boundary. The agreement need not be express, but may be implied by the surrounding circumstances and
conduct of the parties." Id. (citing Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37,41,794 P.2d 626,630 (1990); Edgeller v.
Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006 (1953)). "[Tlhe long existence and recognition of a fence as a boundary,
in the absence of any evidence as to the manner or circumstances of its original location, strongly suggests that
the fence was located as a boundary by agreement." Cameron, 130 Idaho at 901,950 P.2d at 1240 (citing
Beneficial Life Ins Co. v. Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232,241,270 P.2d 830,835 (1954)). "Acquiescence is merely
regarded as competent evidence of the agreement." Grflel, 136 Idaho at 400,34 P.3d at 1083 (citing Paurley v.
Harris, 75 Idaho 112, 117,268 P.2d 351 (1954)). "[Aln agreement fixing the boundary line, whether express or
implied, is essential to a claim of boundary by acquiescence." Id. at 401, 34 P.3d at 1084 (citation omitted).
In the present case, the district court found that, prior to the survey, none of the parties or their predecessors
.
..z... .
first element necessary to prove
in interest knew the exact location of the boundary lines. Al$ough,the
boundary by agreement was met, the district court found that there was no evidence in the record to supportthe
appellants1contention that the fence line constituted a subsequent agreement or acquiescence by the parties or
that there was an absence of evidence regarding the circumstances of the fence's original location. In fact, the
opposite was true-a previous owner, Nina, provided evidence of the circumstances surrounding the erection a f
the fence, which demonstrated that the fence was hastily-put up to contain cattle. Her testimony showed that the
purpose of the fence was not to establish a boundary between the properties. She stated that no agreement
existed between the Anderson family and the neighboring landowners to treat the fence line as the boundary.
,.st:.

Appellants urge this Court to adopt the theory of boundary by acquiescence as a separate theory that does
not require the element of an agreement. However, Idaho case law demonstrates that an agreement, either
express or implied, must exist to establish a boundary by agreement or acquiescence. Although the actual
boundary was uncertain, appellants are unable to establish the existence of an express or implied agreement to
treat the fence as the boundary. Appellants' testimony shows that, even during the time they were making the
improvements, the fence was still being used to contain cattle; appellants knew this because they damaged the
fence while working, allowing cattle to escape. Nina testified that her family used the land outside the fence to
access recreation areas and that her family never treated the fence as the boundary to the property. Affidavits
from predecessors in interest submitted by the appellants also do not reveal any express or implied agreement to
treat the fence as a boundary.
The district court found that the appellants had not established that an express or implied agreement existed
or that the parties or their predecessors in interest had acquiesced to the fence representing the boundary
between the properties. We affxm the district court's decision.

B. The Parties Are Not Entitled To Attorney Fees On Appeal Pursuant To 1.C.s~12-120(3) or 12-121.
All of the parties have requested attorney fees on appeal. The appellants have requested attorney fees on
appeal pursuant to LC. s 12-121. The respondents have requested attorney fees on appeal pursuant
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120(3) or 12-121.

An award under I.C. s 12-120(3) is justified only if a "commercial transaction comprises the gravamen of
the lawsuit." Browev v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours and Co., 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P.2d 345,349 (1990). In
Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v. Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657,663,962 P.2d 1041,1047 (1998), this Court
declined to award attorney fees under LC. s 12-120(3). Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. involved a dispute
over ownership of real property, and this Court held that it did not "fall within the meaning of a commercial
transaction...." Id. This case minors Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. Therefore, attorney fees on appeal are
not awarded to the respondents under s 12-120(3).
An award of attorney fees under I.C. s 12-121 is proper only when the case was brought frivolously,
unreasonably, or without foundation. Northwest Bec-Corp. v. Home Living Sewice, 136 Idaho 835, 842,41 P.3d
263,270 (2002) (citing Kelly v. Silverwood Estates, 127 Idaho 624,630, 903 P.2d 1321, 1327 (1995)). The
appellants' argument was based on their good-faith belief that the fence line represented the boundary line
between the properties. Their position that boundary by agreement and by acquiescence are two separate, yet
related, doctrines was supported by case law and treatises. This Court is not left with the abiding belief that the
appellants pursued their claim frivolously or without foundation. Therefore, attorney fees on appeal are not
awarded to the respondents under I.C. s 12-121.

IV.
CONCLUSION
The appellants have not established the required elements of boundary by agreement. This Court affirms the
decision of the district court quieting title in the respondents. No attorney fees on appeal are awarded. Costs to
respondents.
Chief Justice TROUT, Justices SCHROEDER, WALTERS and EISMANN concur.
Lawriter Corporation. All rights reserved.
The Casemaker Online database is a compilation exclusively owned by Lawriter Corporation. The database is
provided for use under the terms, notices and conditions as expressly stated under the online end user license agreement
to which all users assent in order to access the database.
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Joe HERRMANN and Thelma Herrmann, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, v.
Arthur A. WOODELL and Neola L. Woodell, husband and wife; James A. Scharfe and Felipa M. Scharfe,
husband and wife; Herbert T. Kerst, a single man; and, Jack K. Trine and Norma Trone, husband and wife,
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents.
[Cite as Herrmann v. Woodell, 107 Idaho 9161
No. 15067.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
January 3, 1985.
Landowners brought quiet title action to establish that existing fence was boundary line between their property
and property owned by neighbors. The First Judicial District Court, Bonner County, Gary M. Haman, J., entered
judgnient quieting title in landowners, and neighbors appealed. The Court of Appeals, Walters, C.J., held that:
(1) evidence was insufficient to establish that landowners paid taxes assessed upon disputed strip of property,
and thus, they did not acquire such property by adverse possession; (2) evidence which indicated that
landowners and their predecessors used land up to fence at least since 1927, and which was inconclusive as to

whether road ever ran outside of fence and whether fence was used as barrier to road, supported finding of
acquiescence in fence as boundary line, establishing an unrefuted presumption that boundary agreement had to
have taken place at some point in past; (3) neighbors were placed on notice of agreed boundary by fence
marking boundary, with land on landowners' side of fence being grazed and cultivated; thus, line marked by
fence constituted lawful boundary; (4) actions of landowners or their predecessors was insufficient to invoke
doctrines of equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel or waiver; and (5) landowners would not be granted equitable
relief by requiring neighbors to either replace or to pay for replacement of fence.
Affirmed.

Steven C. Verby, Sandpoint, for defendants-appellants, cross-respondents.
Steve Smith, Sandpoint, for plaintiffs-respondents, cross-appellants.

---

---,"-

Page 919

--*-.---,--

WALTERS, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal involving a dispute over title to a strip of land. The Herrmanns brought a quiet title action
to establish that an existing fence is the boundary line between their property and property owned by the
Woodells and the other appellants. The Herrmanns based their claim of ownership of the disputed property, an
approximate eighteen-foot wide strip of land on the west side of the fence, on adverse possession or,
alternatively, on agreed boundary by acquiescence. The district court entered judgment quieting title in the
Herrmanns. The Woodells, and the other appellants who claimed legal title to portions of the disputed strip,
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have appealed. They primarily question whether the finding by the trial court-that the Herrmanns were owners
of the disputed property under the theories of adverse possession and boundary by agreement-is supported by
substantial, competent evidence. While we agree that the trial court erred in finding that all of the elements of
adverse possession were established, we affirm the trial court's decision establishing the Herrmanns' ownership
based on boundary by acquiescence or implied agreement.
The relevant facts are as follows. The parties stipulated that for at least twenty-five years before this action
was brought there existed in the same location a fence between the property possessed by the Herrmanns and
the property possessed by the appellants. In December, 1963, the Herrmanns had purchased a 160 acre parcel
described by division of quarter sections rather than by metes and bounds, the description being:
The east half of the southwest quarter and the south one-half of the northwest quarter of section 29,
Township 56 North, Range 2 West of the Boise-Meridian, in Bonner County, Idaho.
In 1975, the Herrmanns filed a plat for the Herrmann Subdivision which included approximately 120 of their
160 acres. A road was constructed to serve the subdivision. Excluded from this subdivision plat was the
Herrmanns' tract of approximately forty acres lying west of the proposed subdivision. Also excluded was the
disputed strip of land between the east edge of the subdivision road and the fence. When the Herrmanns formed
the subdivision they were advised by their surveyor that the quarter section line bisecting section twenty-nine
from north to south, and which had been thought to be the fence line, was actually approximately eighteen feet
west of the fence. Mr. Henmann testified that he disagreed with the surveyed boundary line but decided to
utilize the surveyed metes and bounds description for the subdivision plat filing and retain the land between the
surveyed line and the fence as a "buffer zone" for the subdivision. Subsequently, the Woodells, after obtaining
the preliminary results of their own survey of the disputed boundary, tore down portions of the fence in an
effort to gain access to the Herrmann subdivision road.

[I]The Woodells and the other appellants-contending they are the title holders of the disputed propertyassert that the trial court's finding that the Herrmanns had established ownership of the disputed property by
adverse possession is not supported by substantial, competent evidence. The trial court found that the
Herrmanns met the burden of proof on the non-tax and the tax elements of adverse possession. Our review of
the record convinces us that the court's findings regarding the non-tax elements are supported by substantial and
competent evidence. However, the evidence is insufficient to establish that the tax requirement of I.C. 5 5-210
had been satisfied. This section requires the adverse claimant to have paid taxes assessed upon the property
claimed by adverse possession.
The record establishes that the Herrmanns paid all taxes assessed against their described property. As noted,
the Herrmanns' property is described as the east half of the southwest quarter and the south one-half of the
northwest quarter of section 29. The problem arises from the fact that the county assessor's records have never
shown the eighteen-foot strip to
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be part of the property assessed to the Herrmanns. Rather those records show the disputed property is part of
land described as the northeast and southeast quarters of section 29. A deputy county assessor testified that
taxes on the disputed strip were not assessed to the Herrmanns, rather, the taxes were assessed to the owners of
the property to the east, which would have been the Woodells and the other appellants and their predecessorsin-interest.
There is no evidence in the record from which the trial court could have found that the Herrmanns actually
paid taxes assessed against the disputed property. Therefore, adverse possession is not available to the
Hel~mannsbecause the Woodells and their predecessors-in-interest, who have record title, were assessed the
taxes on the disputed strip.
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[2-41 However, the trial court also quieted title in the Herrmanns under a theory of "boundary by implied
agreement." The doctrine of boundary by agreement does not require payment of taxes as a prerequisite.
Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527,633 P.2d 592 (1981). The doctrine of boundary by agreement requires that
there be a dispute, uncertainty or ignorance of the true boundary line which was resolved by an agreement
establishing the boundary that would be recognized. See Norwood v. Stevens, 104 Idaho 44,655 P.2d 938
(Ct.App. 1982). The existence of an agreement relating to a boundary must be established. Such an agreement
could be established by direct evidence, or could be inferred from the conduct of the parties or their
predecessors, includ'mg long acquiescence in an existing fence line. O'Malley v. Jones, 46 Idaho 137,266 P.
797 (1928); 12 Am.Jur.2d BOUNDARIES § 88 (1964); R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D.
WNITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY, 768-69 (1984) (hereinafter referred to as "the Law of Property"). In
this case, there is no direct evidence of an agreement resolving a dispute, uncertainty or ignorance over the true
boundary, The evidence indicates that the fence has been in existence for so many years that there are no
witnesses available to establish that an actual agreement to fix an unknown or uncertain boundary line occurred.

15-81 However, "[s]uch an agreement may be presumed to arise between adjoining landowners where such
right has been definitely defined by erection of a fence or other monument on the line followed by such
adjoining landowners treating it as fixing the boundary for such length of time that neither ought to be allowed
to deny the correctness of its location." Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,365,262 P.2d 1006, 1010 (1953)
(citations omitted). Further, "[qrom the long existence and recognition of the original fence as the boundary,
and the want of any evidence as to the nlanner or circumstances of its original location, the law presumes that it
was originally located as a boundary by agreement ...." Benejcial Lije Znsumce Company v. Mrakamatsu, 75
Idaho 232,241,270 P.2d 830, 835 (1954); see also Hales v. Frakes, 600 P.2d 556 (Utah 1979); Baum v Defa,
525 P.2d 725 (Utah 1974). Furthermore, the period of acquiescence is regarded as competent evidence of the
agreement. Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112,268 P.2d 351 (1954). In addition, a specific time period of
acquiescence is not required. Trappett v. Davis, supra. In this case, there is no evidence presented as to who
constructed the fence or what function the fence was originally to serve. Acquiescence can then be relied upon
to show that a settlement agreement must have taken place sometime in the past and was memorialized by the
placement of the fence. McKinney v. Kull, 118 Cal.App.3d 951,173 Cal.Rptr. 696 (1981); Kraemer v Superior
Oil Co., 204 Cal.App.2d 642,49 Cal.Rptr. 869 (1966).
[9] There is substantial evidence that the Woodells and their predecessors-in-interest acquiesced for many
years in the fence line being the boundary line. One of the Woodells' predecessors-in-interest testified that he
considered the fence to be the boundary line between the two adjacent properties when he purchased the
property
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in 1951. Evidence was introduced showing that the State Highway Department had placed brass cap
monuments along the fence line. These brass cap monuments were used in subsequent deeds concerning the
property to describe the boundary line between the southwest and southeast quarters of section 29. Further, the
Herrmanns and their predecessors had possessed, cultivated and grazed the land up to the fence. A witness for
the Hemanns testified that in 1927 and 1928, when he and his father leased the land, which is now owned by
the Herrmanns, they grew hay and grazed horses right up to the fence line. In addition, the evidence indicates
that the Woodells made no claims to the disputed property until the survey was completed. See Sorenson v.
Knott, 320 N.W.2d 645 (Iowa App.1982); Hausner v. Melia, 212 Neb. 764,326 N.W.2d 31 (1982) (for a
discussion of acquiescence) and cases collected at 7 A.L.R.4th 53 (1981).

[lo] The Woodells claim the disputed property was once a road open to public use. Based on this assertion,
they contend the fence was constructed by their predecessors-in-interest in order to keep animals from the
roadway. This implies that the fence was erected as a barrier and not as a boundary to divide the adjacent
properties. Therefore, if this assertion were proven, the presumption of an agreement would be overcome and a
boundary by implied agreement or acquiescence could not be found. The Law of Property, supra, 769 n. 36. In
support of this assertion, tile Woodells introduced into evidence a warranty deed, dated in 1914, which
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i conveyed the property in question. The deed resefied a right-of-way in the general location of the disputed
property for roadway purposes. The Woodells further introduced into evidence a photograph taken in 1935
purporting to show a road along the disputed property. Another witness testified that there was a two-track road
on the west side of the fence during the summers of 1948 and 1949, but knew nothing about such a road beyond
those two summers.
{

[ll]However, on cross-examination, the witness who testified as to the 1935 photograph declared that
because of the scale of the photograph he was unable to see a fence line adjacent to the purported roadway and
was, therefore, unable to testify as to the location of the roadway. In addition, a witness for the Herrmanns
disputed the presence of such a road. He testified that in 1927 and 1928 when he and his father leased the land,
which is now owned by the Hemnanns, there was no road. Further, there was no evidence to show that the area
of the purported roadway had not been plowed and cultivated in the years prior to 1934 or after 1949. The trial
judge found from the evidence presented that the Woodells had failed to establish that the road was actually
constructed or the location of the purported road. We will not disturb this finding. The evidence of any road
running along the west side of the fence is inconclusive. Therefore, we hold that the evidence supports a finding
of acquiescence. This acquiescence establishes a presumption, not refuted in this case, that a boundary
agreement must have taken place at some point in the past. The Law of Property, supra.
[12,13] An agreed boundary is binding upon a successor in interest of the seller, who purchased with notice
of the agreement. PaurZey v. Harris, supra. A boundary marked by a fence, with the land on the Herrmanns'
side of the fence being grazed and cultivated would constitute notice. Mr. Woodell testified that he walked all
over the property and noticed the barbed wire fence. Therefore, the Woodells were on notice of the agreed
boundary. Accordingly, we hold in this case that the line marked by the fence constitutes the lawful boundary
between the adjacent properties according to the doctrine of boundary by agreement.
[14JThe Woodells finally contend that the trial court erred by failing to apply the equitable doctrines of
laches, equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel, and waiver. It is claimed that since the FIerrmanns did not include the
disputed eighteen-foot strip of

property in their subdivision plat they cannot now claim legal title to it. It should first be noted that the defense
of laches was raised for the first time on appeal, therefore, we will not consider it. Fairchild v. Fairchild, 106
Idaho 147,676 P.2d 722 (Ct.App.1984). See I.R.C.P. 8(c).

[15-171 For equitable estoppel to apply, the Herrmanns must have made a false representation or
concealment of a material fact with actual or constructive knowledge of the truth. Scott v. Castle, 104 Idaho
719,662 P.2d 1163 (Ct.App.1983). For quasi-estoppel to be applicable, the Herrmanns must have previously
taken an inconsistent position, with knowledge of the facts and their rights, to the detriment of the Woodells.
KTVB, Inc. v. Boise City, 94 Idaho 279,486 P.2d 992 (1971). Finally, for waiver to apply the Henmanns must
have voluntarily and intentionally relinquished their title to the disputed property and the Woodells must have
acted in reliance upon such a waiver and altered their position. Brand S Corp. v. King, 102 Idaho 73 1, 639 P.2d
429 (1981).
1181 However, no evidence was presented to establish these claims. The record indicates that the Herrmams'
actioils were consistent and gave actual, objective notice of their continued claim to the disputed property. In
fact the transcript shows that the Woodells met with the H e n m m s in an attempt to purchase an easement
through the disputed properly. This indicates the Woodells were aware that the Henmanns claimed title to the
disputed property. The record does not present evidence of any false representations, inconsistent conduct or
relinquishment of title to the disputed property by the Hemnanns. They grazed and cultivated the disputed
property, they maintained the fence and, on the subdivision plat, they made a notation of a five-foot buffer zone
around the subdivision. From our examination of the record, we find no allegations of conduct on the part of the
Herrmanns or their predecessors sufficient to invoke the doctrines of equitable estoppel, quasi-estoppel or
4 I "? 0
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waiver. See Curry v. Ada Counly Highway Districf, 103 Idaho 818,654 P.2d 911 (1982)
[19,20] The Henmanns have cross-appealed the district court's failure to grant damages or other relief for
h e Woodells' destruction of part of the fence. However, the Herrmanns' original complaint did not allege that
the Woodells caused the damage to the fei~ce.The trial judge refused to allow a motion to amend the complaint
at the start of the trial. The Henmanns now request our Court to afford the Hemmanns an equitable remedy by
requiring the Woodells either to replace, or to pay for the replacement of, the fence. Equitable relief should not
be invoked to shape a decree which was not reasonably coilternplated by the parties and which involves a
substantial departure from the pleadings and legal theories relied upon by the parties. Shumate v. Robinson, 52
Or.App. 199,627 P.2d 1295 (1981). Therefore, we will not grant equitable relief in this matter.
Judgment affirmed. Costs to respondents, Herrmann. No attorney fees on appeal
BURNETT and SWANSTROM, JJ., concur.
Lawriter Corporation. All rights resewed
The Casemaker Online database is a compilation exclusively owned by iawriter Corporation. The database is
provided for use under the terms, notices and conditions as expressly stated under the online end user license agreement
to which all users assent in order to access the database.
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Margaret J. PERSUN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Eugene J. FAVREAU and Ellen M. Favreau, husband and wife,
Defendants-Respondents.
[Cite as Persyn v. Favreau, 119 Idaho 1541
No. 18097,
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
November 1,1990.
Rehearing Denied Dec. 26, 1990.
Petition for Review Denied Feb. 6, 1991.
Property owner brought quiet title action based on a claim of adverse possession. The District Court of the First
Judicial District, Bonner County, James R. Michaud, J., entered judgment dismissing action, and plaintiff
appealed, The Court of Appeals, Swanstrom, J., held that: (1) adverse claim to disputed area was not "founded
upon a written instrument" within meaning of statute goveming adverse possession claims based on written
instruments; (2) fence did not constitute a "substantial enclosure" under statute governing oral claims of adverse
possession; and (3) actions of plaintiffs predecessor in clearing brush from fence area and maintaining fence,
and any actions by plaintiff thereafter, were insufficient to be considered "improvement" as required by adverse
possession statute.
Affirmed.
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Coolte, Lananna, Smith & Cogswell, Priest River, for plaintiff-appellant. Thomas E. Cooke argued.
Philip Henry Robinson, Sandpoint, for defendants-respondents.
SWANSTROM, Judge.
This appeal followed the dismissal of Margaret Persyn's quiet title action by the district court. The court
held that the elements of adverse possession had not been proven and concluded that a fence line, which was
alleged to be the easterly boundary of Persyn's property, did not establish the hue boundary of Persyn's
property. We affirm.
Persyn contends that the district court applied the wrong statute, I.C. 8 5-210, in analyzing the requirements
for adverse possession. Therefore, we must determine whether Persyn's claim of adverse possession properly is
under an oral claim or if it is a claim under a written instrument which is governed by I.C. § 5-208.(fnl)
Asserting that LC. $ 5-208 is the applicable statute in this case, Persyn raises three subsidiary questions. First,
are the elements of LC. § 5-208 to be read in the disjunctive so that proof of one element is sufficient to prove
possession? Second, has possession by Persyn under I.C. § 5-208 been proven? Third, did the Favreaus have
notice of a1adverse claim and, therefore have a duty to inquire into the nature of the claim when they
purchased the adjoining property? We conclude that the district court's choice of I.C. 5 5-210 was correct. Our
reasons are as follows
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The parties own adjacent parcels of real estate located in Bonner County, Idaho. The Persyl property lies to
the west of the Favreau property. For approximately twenty-four years, a fence existed on what Persyn claims is
the east boundary of her property. The disputed property, a strip varying in width between five and twenty-two
feet on the west side of the fence line, is the subject of Persyn's quiet title action.
The Persyns purchased their property in 1979 from Wilbur and Carolee Merritt, who had acquired the
property from Willie Hoop. The adjacent property was owned by Bonner County until 1980, when the County
conveyed the property to Connolly, who sold to the Favreaus in 1983. When Persyn's husband attempted to
replace some of the fenceposts in 1984, he was told by the Favreaus that he was on their property. Mrs. Persynwho succeeded to her husband's interest-filed suit shortly after this incident, claiming title to the property up to
the fence line.
[I] Persyn argued that she took title to the disputed propextypursuant to a written instrument, callillg I.C. $
5-208 into play. She cites Gage v. Davis, 104 Idaho 48,655 P.2d 942 (Ct.App.1982), in support of her
argument. In Gage, the adverse claimant's deed contained a description of the disputed strip, as did the deed of
the other party who opposed the claim. Unlike Gage, here, there is no overlap of the descriptions of the two
deeds. Persyn's deed describes a parcel in the Southwest Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of section 34. The
Favreaus' property is described as being in the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter of section 34. As
described in the deeds, the two parcels share a common boundary: a segment of the line between the Southwest
Quarter of the Northwest Quarter and the Southeast Quarter of the Northwest Quarter. A recorded survey, over
which there is no dispute, establishes the location of this line. Thus, the Favreaus' deed description includes the
disputed strip but Persyn's deed description does not. The record reflects only that Persyn was told by her
predecessor in title (Merritt) that her property extended east to the fence. Merritt too had been told, when he
acquired the property from Willie Hoop, that he was getting the property up to the fence. Upon these facts the
district court concluded that Persyn's claim of title by adverse possession must meet the requirements of LC. $
5-210. We agree.
A party claiming title by adverse possession may rely upon a written instrument as being "a conveyance of
the property in question." I.C. $ 5-207; I.C. $5-208. "[Illowever inadequate [such a conveyance may be] to
carry the true title to such property, and however incompetent might have been the power of the grantor in such
conveyance to pass a title to the subject thereof, yet a claim asserted under the provisions of such a deed is
strictly a claim under color of title." Wright v. Mattison, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 50, 54, 15 L.Ed. 280 (1856). In
reviewing the evidence before the court below, there is no assertion that Persyn's deed purports to convey the
disputed triangular piece of property. Nevertheless, Persyn's counsel contends that simply because Persyn held a
deed for property adjacent to-but not including-the disputed parcel, the analysis under I.C. 5 5-208 was
appropriate. We disagree.
A comparison of the two statutes which define the distinct claims of title for adverse possession may be
helpful at this point. Idaho Code $ 5-208, a claim under a written instrument, and LC. $ 5-210, possession under
an oral claim, have remained virtually intact since their adoption into the 1881 Idaho Code of Civil Procedure.
The precursor and source of these statutes was the 1872 California Code of Civil Procedure, $ 323 and $ 325
respectively.
The Supreme Court of California in Kimball v. Lohmas, 31 Cal. 154 (1866) distinguished between adverse
possession founded upon a "color of title" and that founded upon a "claim of title."
Adverse possession is of different kinds: First, where the possession is taken by bow and spear
without color of title, but with the intent to claim the fee exclusive of any other right and to hold it
against all comers ...; second, where the possession is taken under a claim of title
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founded upon a written instrument, as a conveyance, or upon the decree ofjudgment ol'a Court of competent
jurisdiction. Tlie first is sufficient to put the Statute of Limitations in motion, and, at the expiration of five years,
vest in the usurper a right, under the statute which is equivalent to title; but until the statute has run he is as to
the true owner a inere intruder, without right. It cannot be said in any just sense that as between him and the true
owner a case of conflicting titles is presented until the statute has run; or that until then there can be, as between
them, any substantial contest as to the title. But as to the other, or second kind of adverse possession, the case is
otherwise. There the possession is accompanied by at least a colorable title, and an actual and substantial
contest as to the title must arise whenever the party out of possession undertakes to assert his rights in any kind
of action, for they occupy the position of coilflicting claimants as to the true title, and not as to the possession
only.

Id. at 159.
We conclude that Persyn's claim to the disputed triangular area west of the fence is not "founded upon a
written instrument" within the meaning of I.C. 5 5-208, because no written instrument purports to give her
actual title to or color of title to the disputed strip. Although the district court made no such specific finding, it
implied the same by proceeding to examine the elements of adverse possession under LC. 8 5-210.
[2] We now hun to the question whether the elements of adverse possession under 8 5-210 were proven by
Persyn. The statutory requirements of adverse possession must be established by clear and satisfactory
evidence. Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441, 690 P.2d 896 (1984). In reviewing the district court's findings, then,
our standard of review is one of clear error, absent which we will not disturb the findings. Gage v. Davis, supra.
[3] The district judge held that the fence did not constitute a substantial enclosure under I.C. 5 5-210(1). He
was persuaded that the fence had not been erected by Persyn or Persyn's grantors and that its purpose never was
to enclose any part of Persyn's property. See Loornis v. Union Paczj?c Railroad Company, 97 Idaho 341,544
P.2d 299 (1975); Sclzutten v. Beck, 757 P.2d 1139 (Colo.App.1988). When the County owned the property now
belongiilg to the Favreaus, the County permitted an employee to erect the fence to contain the employee's
horses within the property owned by the County. At no time was the fence regarded as the boundary between
the two parcels.
[4] The district judge also ruled that the actions of Persyn's predecessor in clearing brush from the fence
area and maintaining the fence up until 1979, and any actions by Persyn thereafter, were insufficient to be
considered "improvement" as required by I.C. 5 5-210(2). Finally, the district judge concluded that neither
Persyn nor her predecessors "in any way indicated an open and notorious hostile intent which brought home to
the [Favreaus] or their predecessors in title that [Persyn] was claiming title to the real estate in dispute."

[5,6] We hold that the decision of the district court was well reasoned and founded upon sufficient
evidence. The burden of showing all of the essential elements of adverse possession is upon the party seeking
title thereunder. Berg, supra at 443,690 P.2d at 899. Furlher, under LC. § 5-210, the claimant must either
substantially enclose the property or cultivate or improve the property to meet the requirements of adverse
possession. Owen v. Boydstun, 102 Idaho 31, 624 P.2d 413 (1981). We agree that Persyn failed in her proof of
adverse possession of the disputed area, satisfying neither the enclosure element nor the improvement element.
The last issue raised by Persyn was essentially one of notice. Persyn contended that the existence of the
fence line imparted notice of an adverse claim, such that when the Favreaus bought the property in 1983, they
had a duty to inquire as to the extent of such claim because the fence line

was not on the survey line. The disbict courl made a finding that after 1979, the fence fell into disrepair, with
much of the barbed wire and many of the posts down at the time Favreaus bought the adjacent property. Then,
in its conclusions of law, the district court rejected Persyn's argument and authority as unfounded. It has long
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been held in Idaho that "the party seeking to quiet title against another must succeed on the strength of his own
of that of his adversary." Pincock v. Pocalello Gold & Copper Mining Co., 100
title, and not on the ~~ealcness
Idaho 325, 331,597 P.2d 21 1,217 (1979) (citations omitted). Persyn cannot resort to proving her adverse
possession claim by transfening the burden of proof to the party against whom the claim is being made.
The decree of the district court in favor of the Favreaus and against Persyn is affirmed. Costs to respondents
Favreau. No attorney fees awarded on appeal.
WALTERS, C.J., and WINMILL, J., Pro Tem., concur.
Footnotes:
1. 5-208. Claim under written Instrument-Possession defined.-For the purpose of constituting an adverse
possession by a person claiming a title founded upon a written instrument, or a judgment or decree, land is
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases:

1. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
2. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
3. Where, although not inclosed, it has been used for the supply of fuel, or of fencing timber for the
purposes of husbandry, or for pasturage, or for the ordinary use of the occupant.
4. Where a known farm or single lot has been partly iinproved, the portion of such farm or lot that may have
been left not cleared, or not inclosed, according to the usual course and custom of the adjoining country, shall
be deemed to have been occupied for the same length of time as the part improved and cultivated.
5-210. Oral Claim-Possession defined-Payment of taxes.-For the purpose of constituting an adverse
possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:

1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure
2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.

Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possessio~lbe considered established under the provisions
of any sections of this code unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period
of five (5) years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid all the taxes,
state, county or municipal, which have been levied and assessed upon such land according to law.
@ Lawriter Corporation. All rights reserved.
The CasemakeriMOnline database is a compilation exclusively owned by Lawriter Corporation. The database is
provided for use under the terms, notices and conditions as expressly stated under the online end user license agreement
to which all users assent in order to access the database.
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Richard KAUPP and Barbara Kaupp, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF HAILEY, Defendant-Respondent
[Cite as Kaupp v. City of Hailey, 110 Idaho 3371
No.. 16068.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
March 3, 1986.
Property owners brought suit against city for dainages and injunctive relief on allegations of trespass and
inverse condemnation upon learning that sewer and water pipelines ran beneath their property. City claimed it
had acquired prescriptive ease-
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ment for lines, and both parties moved for summary judgment. The District Court, Fifth Judicial District, Blaine
County, Douglas D. Kramer, J., granted summary judgment for city, and property owners appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Walters, C.J., held that: (1) presence of manhole in street and occasional presence of city workers
were not sufficient indices of open and notorious use to give landowners constructive notice of adverse use, and
(2) adverse use prescription period would not begin to run until property owners revoked license or city notified
property owners of hostile claim of right.
Vacated and remanded.
Monte R. Whittier, Pocatello, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Michael F. Donovan, Ketchurn, for defendant-respondent.
WALTERS, Chief Judge.
Richard and Barbara Kaupp brought suit against the City of Hailey, seeking damages and injunctive relief
on allegations of trespass and inverse condemnation, when they learned that sewer and water pipe lines ran
beneath their property. In response, the City claimed it had acquired a prescriptive easement for the lines. Both
the Kaupps and the City moved for summary judgment under their respective theories of the case. The district
court entered sumnary judgment in favor of the City. On appeal, the Kaupps contend that the district court
erred in finding that the presence of a manhole adjacent to the Kaupps' property provided sufficient notice of the
City's adverse use of the underground lines. We vacate the judgment and remand for further proceedings.
While performing leveling work on his property in the summer of 1984, Richard Kaupp was informed by a
City official that sewer and water lines running beneath his property would be damaged unless the grading work
was stopped. The Kaupps were unaware that the lines had been placed upon the property. According to an
affidavit filed by the City, the water and sewer lines were buried in the summer or early fall of 1978. The lines
were constructed by the previous owners of the property, Brooks Tessier and Don Valentine. The property was
conveyed to the Kaupps in February 1983. The affidavit of Richard Kaupp indicated that prior to the purchase
of the property, the Kaupps obtained a title report. This report did not disclose the existence of any recorded
easement or restriction concerning the service lines and the City has not disputed this fact. Kaupp further stated
that there are no markers or other monuments which indicate the existence of the lines beneath the surface of
117'8
the property.
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-After hearing, the district court granted summary judgment to the City, finding that the City had acquired a
prescr~ptiveeasement for the lines. Stating that this was a question of first impression, the court declared the
sole issue to be deter(

mined was whether a concealed "pipeline placed under a landowner's property constitutes an open, notorious
use." The court acknowledged that other jurisdictions had divided opinions when confronted with the question
of whether a buried pipeline constituted an open and notorious use. See generally 25 AM.JUR.2d Easements
andLicenses $$60,61 (1966); Annot., 55 A.L. R.2d 1144, at $ 9 (1957). The court found that a manhole
situated four feet from the Kaupps' property line, and located in the street, constituted sufficient notice
concerning "the existence of an underground common sewer." The court also noted that City employees had
used this manhole for servicing the sewer line since 1978. While observing that the element of knowledge is a
question of fact, the court held, as a matter of law, that the manhole and its use by city worlcers "should give
notice to the reasonably prudent purchaser [ofi the potential for underground sewer lines or put him on inquiry
regarding it." Finally, the court determined that the former owners, Tessier and Valentine, possessed actual
knowledge of the buried lines.
The Kaupps assert on appeal that the existence of the mmhole does not constitute sufficient notice of the
City's "open and notorious" use to provide them with knowledge of the City's adverse use. They insist that the
questions of (1) open and notorious use and (2) whether they possessed the requisite knowledge of the adverse
use, present genuine issues of material fact inappropriate for summary judgment. The City contends that it has
met all the elements necessary to establish a prescriptive easement and the Kaupps' suit should now be barred
because the action was commenced after the running of the five-year staiutory period.(fnI)
Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law. I.R.C.P. 56(c). A motion for summary judgment is granted when, on the basis of evidence before the court,
a directed verdict would be warranted or when reasonable persons could not disagree as to the facts. Petricevich
v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,452 P.2d 362 (1969); Riggs v. Colis, 107 Idaho 1028,695 P.2d 413
(Ct.App.1985). That both parties here moved for summary judgment does not in itself establish there is no
genuine issue of material fact. Kromrei v. AID Insurance Co (Mutual), 110 Idaho 549,716 P.2d 1321 (Jan. 29,
1986); Moss v. Mid-American Fire and Marine Insurance Co., 103 Idaho 298,647 P.2d 754 (1982); Casey v
Highlands Insurance Co., 100 Idaho 505,600 P.2d 1387 (1979). A party moving for summary judgment
concedes that no genuine issue of material fact exists under its theory of the case, but does not necessarily
concede that no controverted facts "remain in the event his adversary seeks summary judgment upon different
issues or theories." Riverside Development Co. v. Ritchie, 103 Idaho 515,518 n. 1,650 P.2d 657,660 n. 1
(1982). "The materiality of a fact is determined by its relationship to legal theories presented by the parties."
Blackmon v. Zufelt, 108 Idaho 469,470,700 P.2d 91,92 (Ct.App.1985).
To establish a prescriptive easement, the claimant must "submit 'reasonably clear and convincing' proof of
open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use, under a claim of right, with the knowledge of the owner of the
subservient tenement," for the prescriptive period of five years. Lorang v. Hunt, 107 Idaho 802,803, 693 P.2d
448,449 (1984), quoting West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 557, 51 1 P.2d 1326, 1333 (1973) (footnotes omitted);
Mer~illv. Penrod, 109 Idaho 46,704 P.2d 950 (Ct.App.1985) Hallv. Stuawn, 108 Idaho 111,697 P.2d 451
(Ct.App.1985); I.C. $ 5-203. The owner of the servient tenement must have actual or imputed knowledge of the
adverse use. Webster v. Magleby, 98 Idaho 326,563 P.2d 50 (1977); Smith v. Breen, 26 Wash.App.
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802,614 P.2d 671 (1980). Specific facts must be presented to prove the elements necessary to establish the
prescriptive easement. See Steckleiiz v. Montgomevy, 98 Idaho 671,570 P.2d 1359 (1977). Whether these
elements have been established is normally a question of fact. Smith v. Breen, 614 P.2d at 673.
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(11 The purpose of the requirement that prescriptive use be open and notorious is to give the owner of the
servient tenement knowledge and opportunity to assert his rights. The open and notorious use must rise to the
level reasonably expected to provide notice of the adverse use to a servient landowner maintaining a reasonable
degree of supervision over his premises. See, e.g., Ciiy of Montgomery v. Couturier, 373 So.2d 625 (Ala.1979);
Jones v. Harmon, 175 Cal.App.2d 869, 1 Cal.Rptr. 192 (1959); Thompson v. Schuh, 286 Or. 201,593 P.2d 1138
(1979); City of Corpus Christi v.Krause, 584 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Civ.App.1979). In respect to underground
service lines and facilities, it has been noted:
Where pipes or other conduits as to which easements are claimed are buried underground and
their presence is not physically apparent throughout the prescriptive period, the courts generally
conclude that there is insufficient notoriety of the user to permit prescription to run against the
servient estate. This result is often reached where there is an absence of substantial evidence that
the servient owner had any notice or information of the existence of the facility and its user.
However, circumstances sometimes arise such as to give even buried conduits notoriety adequate to
base a prescriptive easement. This usually occurs where, even though the pipes themselves are not
apparent, there are accessory installations on the surface which are plainly apparent. [Footnotes
omitted.]
25 AM.JUR.2d Easements and Licenses 3 60, at 469 (1966).
Here, the City does not dispute the Kaupps' assertion that they did not have actual lcnowiedge of the sewer
and water lines. Instead, the City attempts to demonstrate that the Kaupps possessed constructive notice of the
City's adverse use based on the existence of the manhole in the street and on the use of this manhole by city
employees to service the sewer line. Thus, the question here is whether the manhole and the occasional presence
of city workers were sufficient indicies of open and notorious use to impute, as a matter of law, that the Kaupps
should have known of the City's pipelines.
Imputed or constructive lcnowledge is the law's substitute for actual knowledge. It is a legally postulated
notice of facts not otherwise perceived and recognized. Such notice may arise from official records and other
documents by which a person is legally bound, from communications to an agent or predecessor in interest, or
from knowledge of certain facts which should impart notice of the ultimate fact in issue. It is this third means of
invoking constructive knowledge which concerns us here. In such situations, extemporaneous facts which are
sufficient to lead a reasonably prudent person upon an inquiry of a possible conflicting interest, will be treated
as providing constructive notice. See 58 AM. JUR.2d Notice $5 2-1 1 (1971). This is also in accord with the
open-and-notorious element of prescriptive easement. RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY 3 458 comments h, i
and accompanying illustrations (1944). When a property owner possesses knowledge of extemporaneous facts
which would reasonably indicate the possibility of an adverse use on the property, the owner is required to
investigate. Annot., 55 A.L. R.2d 1144 (1951) and cases cited therein.

[2] As previously mentioned, proof of the Kaupps' knowledge is necessw to establish a prescriptive
easement. The court found the presence of a manhole in a city street and the occasional use of this manhole
were sufficient to impute knowledge to ihe landowner of a concealed pipeline buried under the property. We
disagree. We believe the mere existence of the manhole does not create a duty to inquire.
w*vp
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Cases in which the circumstantial facts prompted the inquiry duty, typically include situations where indicies of
the buried lines were readily apparent upon the property in question. (E.g., line markers and stakes, above
ground fixtures and controls, and exposed lines themselves.) Accordingly, no prescriptive easement has been
established.
This case also raises another issue which should be considered on remand. No prescriptive easement can be
acquired if the use, instead of being adverse, is with the permission of the subservient landowner. Lorn
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Idaho at 803,693 P.2d at 449; Merrill v. Penrod, 109 Idaho at 51,704 P.2d at 955. The dominant landowner is
aided by a presumption: "proof of open, notorious, continuous, uninterrupted use of the claimed right for the
prescriptive period, without evidence as to how the use began, raises the presumption that the use was adverse
[as opposed to permissive] and under a claim of right." Lorang, 107 Idaho at 803,693 P.2d at 449, quoting West
v. Smith, 95 Idaho at 557, 51 1 P.2d at 1333 (footnote omitted); Merrill, 109 Idaho at 51, 704 P.2d at 955. This
presumption is of no avail to the City in this case because the City's affidavit reveals "how the use began." It
states that the former owners of the property constructed the lines in 1978. As such, the City has not shown that
its use of the sewer and water lines was adverse to the interests of the prior owners. Arguably, the lines were
installed for the specific purpose of permitting the City to use the lines as conduits to transport water and
sewage. If so, then the City's use of the lines could have resulted from an express or implied license granted by
Tessier and Valentine when the lines were installed.
131 As we recently indicated in Bob Daniels and Sons v. Weaver, 106 Idaho 535,681 P.2d 1010
(Ct.App.1984), an easement established by unwritten agreement is merely a license, revocable by the licensor.
See also Howes v. Barmon, 11 Idaho 64,81 P. 48 (1905). Consequently, only upon the Kaupps revocation of
the license or upon the City's notice to the Kaupps of its hostile claim of right, would adverse use begin the
statutory prescription period. Webstev v. Magleby, 98 Idaho at 327, 563 P.2d at 51. Other than the filing of the
instant suit for trespass and inverse condemnation by the Kaupps, there is no evidence in this case that any
license given to the City was ever revoked or that the City notified the Kaupps of its claim. However, this Court
has also recognized that a license may be irrevocable for an extended duration to allow a licensee "who had
made expenditures of capital or labor in the exercise of his license in reasonable reliance upon representations
by the licensor as to the duration of the license," to realize the value of his expenditures. Eliopulos v. Kondo
Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 915,918,643 P.2d 1085,1088 (Ct.App. 1982), quoting RESTATEMENT OF
PROPERTY 5 519(4) (1944). At this juncture in the case, the City has not shown it relied on any
representations made by the previous owners nor has it shown the amount of expenditures dedicated to any
purported license.

The summary judgment is vacated and the case is remanded for further proceedings. Costs to the Kaupps
and no attorney fees on appeal.
BURNETT and SWANSTROM, JJ., concur
Footnotes:
1.The City of Hailey also maintains on appeal that it should have been granted summary judgment on the
Kaupps' claims for trespass and inverse condemnation. Because the district court did not rule on these issues,
we decline to address these issues on appeal.
-*-
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Tracy BAXTER and Sharon Baxter, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. James E. CRANEY and
Darlene (Dollie) Craney, husband and wife, Defendants-Respondents.
[Cite as Baxter v. Craney, 135 Idaho 1661
No. 25549
Supreme Court of Idaho. Idaho Falls, September 2000 Term.
December 15,2000
Claimants brought quiet title suit against adjoining landowners, claiming adverse possession of disputed tract
and boundary by agreement or, in alternative, prescriptive easement over tract. The District Court, Bear Lake
County, Don L. Harding, J., entered summary judgment against claimants on issues of adverse possession and
boundary by agreement and entered judgment against claimants on prescriptive easement claim after bench
trial. Claimants appealed. The Supreme Court, Walters, J., held that: (I) refusal to allow amendment of
complaint to add federal agency as new party was not abuse of discretion; (2) claimant did not show requisite
payment of taxes on disputed parcel to support adverse possession claim; (3) genuine fact issues precluded
summary judgment on boundary by agreement claim; and (4) claimant did not show prescriptive easement to
use land for cattle crossing.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
m
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Myers, Thomsen & Larson, LLP, Pocatello, and Rigby, Thatcher, Andrus, Rigby, K a n & Moeller, Chtd.,
Rexburg, for appellants. A. Bruce Larson argued.
Racine, Olson, Nye, Budge &Bailey, Pocatello, for respondents. Randall C. Budge argued.
WALTERS, Justice
This action was commenced by Tracy and Sharon Baxter against their neighbors, James and Darlene
Craney, to quiet title to certain real property. The district court granted sunnnary judgment in favor of the
Craneys upon the Baxters' theories of title by adverse possession and title tlvough boundary by agreement.
After a trial before the court without a jury, the district court also found in favor of the Craneys and against the
Baxters on a claim of easement by prescription. The district court then entered an order awarding attomey fees
and costs to the Craneys as the prevailing party.
For reasons to follow, this Court affirms the order granting summary judgmentdonthe adverse possession
claim, but we vacate the order for judgment on the theory of boundary by agreement. We also affirm the
judgment denying relief on the Baxters' claim to an easement by prescription. Finally, we vacate the award of
attorney fees and costs in favor of the Craneys, and we remand the action for further proceedings.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

118%

Tracy and Sharon Baxter and James and Darlene Craney are ranchers who own adjacent parcels of real
property in Bear Lake County. The Craneys and the Baxters share a common boundary of approximately onequarter mile in length. The Craneys purchased their land in 1996 and subsequently removed a portion of a fence
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located between the two properties. The Baxters contend that the fence marks the actual boundary between the
two parcels. The Craneys, on the other hand, contend that the fence was put up for convenience purposes and
was only intended to keep cattle from wandering onto a portion of their land. They claim the range line to the
east of the fence forms the boundary between the two properties as established by a number of surveys dating
back to 1882.
The Baxters filed tlus action against the Craneys in November of 1997, claiming ownership of the land east of
the fence but west of the range line under the doctrine of boundary by agreement or by adverse possession. The
Baxters alternatively claimed a prescriptive easement to cross the land Iying to the east of the fence for the
purpose of reaching a spring to water their livestock. Later, the Baxters attempted to anend their complaint to
join the Bureau of Land Management (13LM) as a defendant in the action, asserting that the BLM was an
integral party. The district court, however, refused to allow the Baxters to add the BLM.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Craneys on the issues of boundary by
agreement and adverse possession. The court concluded that the Baxlers failed to present genuine issues of
material fact regarding the existence of a boundary agreement between Tracy Baxter and Grant Esterholdt, the
Craneys' predecessor in interest, or the payment oftaxes as is required for adverse possession. A trial was held
on the issue of whether the Baxters acquired a

prescriptive easement to use the land east of the fence for stock watering. The district court found that the
Baxters failed to prove the elements required for a prescriptive easement and awarded costs and attorney fees to
the Craneys.

ISSUES ON APPEAL
The Baxters raise the following issues on appeal:
1. Did the District Court properly exercise its discretion in denying the Baxters' motion to amend their
complaint to add the Bureau of Land Management as a party?
2. Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment dismissing the Baxters' adverse possession
claim?
3. Did the District Court properly grant summary judgment dismissing the Baxters' claim of boundary by
agreement?
4. Was the District Court's denial of the Baxters' prescriptive easement claim at trial based on substantial

and competent evidence?
5. Did the District Court properly award attorney fees and costs to the Craneys?

ANALYSIS
A. Motion to Amend
[ I , 21 A trial court's decision to deny an amendment to pleadings is reviewed by this Court under an abuse
of discretion standard. See Cook v. State Dep't of Tuansp., 133 Idaho 288,296,985 P.2d 1150, 1158 (1999). In
determining whether the trial court has abused its discretion, this Court applies the three-factor test articulated
in Sun ValleyShopping Ctu., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). The three
factors are: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether t h e 8 3
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court acted within the boundaries of this discretion and consistent with the legal standards applicable to the
specific choices available to it; and (3) whether the trial court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. See
id. at 94. 803 P.2d at 1000.
Rule l5(a) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure provides that leave to amend a complaint "shall be freely
given when justice so requires." Id. See also Cook, 133 Idaho at 296,985 P.2d at 1157. This Court, on a number
of occasions, however, has upheld trial court decisions to deny the plaintiff's amended complaint motion. See
Daivy Equip. Co. of Utah v. Boehme, 92 Idaho 301,304,442 P.2d 437,440 (1968) (holding no abuse of
discretion when the amended complaint was filed five days prior to trial); Jones v.. Watson, 98 Idaho 606,610,
570 P.2d 284,288 (1977) (finding no abuse of discretion in denying a motion to amend filed on the day of
trial); Cook, 133 Idaho at 297, 985 P.2d at 1158 (holding no abuse of discretion for denial of an eighth amended
complaint filed on the morning of trial).

[3] The Baxters attempted to amend their complaint approximately five months after the original coinplaint
had been filed and after the date for trial had been set. The district court concluded that given the amount of
time and money the Craneys had expended in defending the action, "it would be unfairly prejudicial at this point
to allow Plaintiffs the opportunity to add a new party and change the dynamics of the action as it now stands."
This illustrates that the &strict court recognized it had. the discretion to allow or deny amendment of the
complaint. Because Rule 15(a) requires the district court to allow amendments only when justice requires, the
court's decision to deny the amendment was both within the bounds of its discretion and within applicable legal
standards. In addition, the district court displayed sound reasoning for its conclusion. As the court noted, the
issues the Baxters sought to resolve with the ELM were not directly related to their action against the Craneys.
The BLM was neither a necessary party, nor were the Baxters unduly prejudiced by the district court's refusal lo
allow the Baxters to amend their complaint, as the Baxters are not precluded from bringing a separate action
against the BLM. Moreover, the potential likelihood of removal to federal court upon the addition of the federal
agency

to the action would result in the Craneys expending more time and money so that issues unrelated to their case
could be resolved. Accordingly, this Court holds that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it
refused to allow the Baxters to amend their complaint by adding the ELM as a party defendant.

B. Summary Judgment Motion
1. Standard of Review

In an appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is the same as the
standard used by the district court in passing upon a motion for summary judgment. See McDonald v. Paine,
119 Idaho 725, 810 P.2d 259 (1991); Meridian Bowling Lanes v. Meridian Athletic Ass'n., Inc., 105 Idaho 509,
670 P.2d 1294 (1983). Summary judgment is appropriate if the pleadings, affidavits, and discovery documents
on file with the court, read in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrate no material issue of
fact such that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. See I.R.C.P. 56(c); Badell v. Beeks,
115 Idaho 101,102,765 P.2d 126, 127 (1988). The burden ofproving the absence of material facts is upon the
moving party. See Petricevich v. Salmon River Canal Co., 92 Idaho 865,452 P.2d 362 (1969). The adverse
party, however, "may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of his pleadings, but his response, by
affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue
for trial." I.R.C.P. Rule 56(e); see also Anderson v. City ofPocatello, 112 Idaho 176,731 P.2d 171 (1986). In
other words, the moving party is entitled to a judgment when the ilonmoving party fails to make a showing
sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the
burden of proof at trial. See Badell, 115 Idaho at 102,765 P.2d at 127 (citing Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). With this standard in mind, we turn to whether the district court erred
in dismissing the Baxters' claims to title by adverse possession or by the doctrine of boundary by a
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2. Adverse Possession
[4] Idaho Code section 5-210 defines the elements of adverse possessio~lunder an oral claim of right. The
statute provides as follows:

For the purpose of constituting an adverse possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon
a written instnunent, judgment or decree, land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied in
the following cases only:
1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.
2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possession be considered established under the
provisions of any sections of this code unless it shall be shown that the Iand has been occupied and
claimed for a period of five (5) years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and
grantors, have paid all the taxes, state, county or municipal, whicli have been levied and assessed
upon such land according to law.
The burden of showing all of the essential elements of adverse possession is upon the party seeking title
thereunder and every element of adverse possession must be proved with clear and satisfactory evidence. See
Lindgren v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854,949 P.2d 1061 (1997); Berg v. Fairman, 107 Idaho 441,690 P.2d 896
(1984); Loomis v. Union PaciJicRailroad, 97 Idaho 341, 544 P.2d 299 (1975).
The Baxters argue that they presented a genuine issue of material fact supporting their claim of adverse
possession concerning the property, including the payment of taxes on the disputed parcel. The Craneys, on the
other hand, assert that the Baxters failed to fulfill the necessary requirements to establish an adverse use of the
land, and in particular, that there is no evidence that they paid the taxes on the disputed property.

[S]Generally, Idaho Code section 5-210 requires actual payment of the taxes that are assessed with regard
to the disputed property. See Trappett v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527,
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633 P.2d 592 (1981); Fry v. Smith, 91 Idaho 740,430 P.2d 486 (1967); White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 615,428
P.2d 747 (1967); Larson v. Lindsay, 80 Idaho 242,327 P.2d 775 (1958); Balmer v. Pollak, 67 Idaho 494, 186
P.2d 217 (1947). As was noted in Trappett, this Court has, on a number of occasions, "wrestled" with property
disputes involving the payment of taxes. 102 Idaho at 530,633 P.2d at 595. This has resulted in a signilicant
amount of what the Court termed 'Ijudicial gloss" whittling away at a literal application of the tax requirement.
( h l ) Id. The tax rule focuses on the actual payment of taxes as demoilshated by the assessor's valuation. The
Court, however, "has fashioned several exceptions to the general rule which, when applied, have the effect of
satisfying the tax requirement." Id. at 530-31,633 P.2d at 595-96.

[6] The Baxters argue that the "lot number" exception to the tax requirement applies in this case. The lot
number exception states that:
(1)n the case of boundary disputes between contiguous landowners, where one landowner can
establish continuous open, notorious and hostile possession of an adjoining strip of his neighbor's
land, and taxes are assessed by lot number or by government survey designation, rather than by
metes and bounds description, payment of taxes on the lot within which the disputed tract is
enclosed satisfies the tax payment requirement of the . . . statute.

1185

Scott v. Gubler, 95 Idaho 441,443-44, 51 1 P.2d 258,260-61 (1973) (footnote omitted). The Baxters contend
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that the property in question is described by government survey designation and not by metes and bounds.
Without a metes and bounds description, they argue, it is impossible to tell how much properly is being
assessed with any precision. Thus, they claim the payment of the taxes assessed on their property includes all
the property within the inclosure, i.e., on the east side of the fence located between the Craney and Baxter
properties.
.

I

(

This argument, however, ignores the rationale behind the lot number exception. As the Court stated in Flynn
v. Allison, "[tlhe primary reason behind the lot number exception is as follows: when taxes are assessed
according to some generic description, 'it (is) impossible to determine from the tax assessment record the
precise quantum of property being assessed. . . .' " 97 Idaho 618, 621, 549 P.2d 1065, 1068 (1976) (citation
omitted). Were, the Craneys submitted the affidavit of the Bear Lake County assessor, which clearly describes
the disputed property and confinns that the Craneys and their predecessors in interest paid the taxes on the
disputed parcel bounded by the range line. In contrast, the Baxters offered the affidavit of Tracy Baxter. This
affidavit, however, which comprises the Bauters' sole piece of evidence, merely states that Baxter paid the taxes
on his property. There is neither any indication as to the extent of the Baxters' property nor evidence as to what
parcels ofproperty Baxter paid taxes on. Therefore, the affidavit, even when viewed in a light most favorable to
the Baxters, fails to establish a genuine issue of material fact on the required payment of taxes and is
insufficient to overcome the Craneys' motion for summary judgment on this issue.
3 . Boundary by Agreement

[7,8] The doctrine of boundary by agreement has long been established in Idaho law. To have a boundary
by agreement, the location of the true boundary line must be uncertain or disputed and there must be a
subsequent agreement fixing the boundary. See Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898,901,950 P.2d 1237,'1240
(1997); Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37,41,794 P.2d 626,630 (1990). The agreement need not be express,
but may be implied by the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties. See Neal, 130 Idaho at 901,
950 P.2d at 1240; Williamson, 118 Idaho at 41,794 P.2d at 630. The Craneys assert that the Baxters carnot
show that the boundary line between their respective properties is uncertain or has been disputed in the past, or
that there has been any sort of agreement fixing the boundary. In

support of their position, the Craneys presented an affidavit by Ivan Kunz who said that his father had
homesteaded the Craney property in the early 1900's; that he and his brother had helped his father install the
fence prior to 1940 for the purpose of keeping cattle f ~ o mwandering on to their meadow; and that the fence was
not intended or agreed to establish a boundary line. The Baxters, on the other hand, represent that Tracy Baxter
and Grant Esterholdt, the Craneys' predecessor in interest, had an agreement as to the location of the boundary
between their adjoining properties. The Baxters contend that the actual location of the boundary line was
uncertain for a considerable amount of time and that Baxter and Esterholdt orally agreed that the fence
constituted the boundary between their properties.
In support of their argument, the Baxters rely in part on Tracy Baxter's affidavit. In the affidavit, Baxter
relates two separate conversations with Esterholdt-one in 1991 and another in 1992-where Esterholdt
purportedly acknowledged that the fence line constituted the boundary between their properties. When
examining Baxter's affidavit, however, the district court noted that it was "uncomfortable giving serious
credibility to portions of Mr. Baxter's affidavit given their hearsay nature."
The Baxters also offered the affidavits of Marcia Singleton, who is Esterholdt's daughter, and Henry and
Lec Rigby, whose father owned the Craneys' land at one time. Each of these affidavits to some degree supports
the Baxters' contention that the fence line constituted the boundary between the two parcels. Singleton states
that her father considered the fence to be the boundary. She also states that she assumed that the fence line was
the boundaw. The Rigbvs.
- - . on the other hand. both state that the fence was not constructed for convenience
purposes, but was instead treated as a boundary between the two properties. The district court, howev
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-cormnented on the affidavits, stating that it could not "in good conscience give [them] a great deal of
\

j

credibility."
[9,10] We conclude that the district court ened by considering the credibility of the affidavits. Although
affidavits must set forth facts that would be admissible as evidence, see I.R.C.P. Rule 56(e), it is not proper for
the trial judge to assess the credibility of an affiant at the summaryjudgment stage when credibility can be
tested in court before the trier of fact. See Hines v. Nines, 129 Idaho 847,853,934 P.2d 20,26 (1997); Sohn v.
Foley 125 Idaho 168,171,868 P.2d 496,499 (Ct.App.1994). Because the affidavits are sufficient to raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to the presence of a boundary by agreement, we reverse the district court's
order granting summary judgment to the Craneys and remand the case for further proceedings on that issue.

C. Prescriptive Easement Claim at Trial
1. Standard of Review
[ll-141 Appellate review of the lower court's decision is limited to ascertaining whether the evidence
supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the conclusioiis of law. See Conley v.
Whittlesey, 133 Idaho 265,269,985 P.2d 1127,1131 (1999); Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946,
812 P.2d 253 (1991). A trial court's findings of fact in a bench trial will be liberally construed on appeal in favor
of the judgment entered, in view of the trial court's role as trier of fact. See Lindgren v. Martin, 130 Idaho 854,
857,949 P.2d 1061, 1064 (1997); Sun Valley ShamvockResources, Xnc. v. Tvavelers Leaskg Corp., 118 Idaho
116, 118,794 P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). It is the province of the district judge acting as trier of fact to weigh
conflicting evidence and testimony and to judge the credibility of the witnesses. See Abbott v. Nampa School
Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544,808 P.2d 1289 (1991); I.R.C.P. 52(a). Findings of fact that are based on
substantial evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting, will not be overturned on appeal. See Hunter v. Shields,
131 Idaho 148,953 P.2d 588 (1998). I-Iowever, we exercise free review over the lower court's conclusions of
law to determine whether the trial court correctly stated the applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions
are sustained by the facts found. See Whittlesey, 133 Idaho at 269,985 P.2d at 1131; Burns v. Alderman, 122
Idaho

2. Prescriptive Easement

[IS, 161 In order to establish a private prescriptive easement, a claimant must present reasonably clear and
convincing proof of open, notorious, continuous, and unintempted use under a claim of right and with the
knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement for the prescriptive period of five years. See LC. 3 5-203; West
v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550, 51 1 P.2d 1326 (1973). The purpose of the requirement that prescriptive use be open and
notorious is to give the owner of the servient tenement knowledge and opportunity to asserl his rights. The open
and notorious use must rise to the level reasonably expected to provide notice of the adverse use to a servient
landowner maintaining a reasonable degree of supervision over his premises. See Kaupp v. City of Hailey, 110
Idaho 337,340,715 P.2d 1007, 1010 (Ct. App.1986) (citations omitted).
[17] The Baxters argue that Esterholdt, the Craneys' predecessor in interest, had actual knowledge that the
Baxters' cattle used trails on land east of the fence to reach the spring for water. The district court, however,
noting that there was conflicting testimony that the trails were also used by deer and elk wandering off the BLM
lands, concluded that the Baxters failed to provide clear and convincing evidence that the trails were sufficient
to put Esterholdt on notice of their use as a means for the Baxters' cattle to get to the spring. We agree. An
examination of the record establishes that the district court's characterization of the land is accurate. The land in
question is essentially a la1011 or hill. There are a number of trails present on the hillside, all of whch could
either be used by the Baxters' cattle or by wild game. The Baxters argue that their testimony at trial d
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the main trails used by their cattle to reach the spring. The record, however, indicates that Esterholdt was ill and
was only able to visit the property two or three tinles per year. Because a landowner need only maintain
reasonable supervision over his property, see Kaupp, 110 Idaho at 340,715 P.2d at 1010, we agree with the
district court that the presence of the trails on Esterholdt's land, without more, was insufficient to place
Esterholdt on notice of their use by the Baxters' cattle.
[18,19] In addition, the multiple paths do not show any established right of way on a specific trail. As the
Court of Appeals noted in Roberts v. Swim, an easement by prescription "requires a showing by the claimant of
a line of travel without material change or variation." 1I7 Idaho 9, 15, 784 P.2d 339, 345 (Ct.App.1989). Travel
over a tract of land in various directions and courses for the prescriptive period is thus insufficient to establish a
right of way over any particular path. See id. Although the Baxters argue that their testimony at trial illustrated
the particular trails their cattle were using to reach the spring, their testimony also indicates that the lay of the
land makes it difficult, if not impossible, for their cattle to reach the spring without following one of the
numerous trails that zigzag the slope leading to the water. As Mr. Baxter himself noted, his cattle were more apt
to meander up and down the various trails than to travel in a linear fashion up or down the hillside. It is
therefore reasoilable to conclude that the Baxters' cattle were not traveling by means of any particular route.

The Baxters alternatively argue that there is no evidence demonstrating how the fence line that separates the
two parcels was altered to allow their cattle to reach the spring. They assert that the lack of evidence as to how
the use of the disputed property began raises tlle presumption of open, notorious, and continued use for the
statutory period in their favor under I.C. 3 5-203, and contend that the burden then shifts to the Craneys, as
owners of the property, to show that the use was permissive. See West v. Smith, 95 Idaho 550,557,511 P.2d
1326, 1333 (1973).
[20,21] Although it appears reasonable to assume that Baxter himself altered the fence to allow his cattle to
reach the spring, it is true that the record does not indicate how or when the fence was moved. There are,
however, facts suggesting that even if Esterholdt was aware that the Baxters' cattle

were crossing his land to water at the spring, their use of his property was permissive. The property in question
is essentially useless for grazing because of its steep terrain and lack of vegetation. Additionally, Esterholdt did
not lose access to the spring when the fence was moved. It is therefore logical to assume that even if Esterholdt
was on notice that the Baxters' cattle were crossing his land to reach the spring, he was simply being neighborly
by allowing the fence to be moved and giving the Baxters' cattle access to water. Because a prescriptive right
cannot be established where the use was permissive, see Hunter v. Shields, 131 Idaho 148, 151,953 P.2d 588,
591 (1998), we reject the Baxters' assertion.
[22] The Baxters also contend that the Craneys took possession of the land with knowledge of the easement.
As evidence of their knowledge, the Baxters point to testimony that the Craneys inspected the land prior to their
purchase and observed the trails. An examination of the relevant testimony in the record, however, merely
establishes that the Craneys were aware of the trails at the time of purchase. The Craneys' mere appreciation of
the abundant trails, without more, is insufficient to establish that the Craneys were put on notice of a
prescriptive easement across their land. Accordingly, because the district court's decision is supported by
substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence, this Court will not disturb its conclusion. See Hunter,
131 Idaho 148,953 P.2d 588 (1998).

D. Attorney Fees
Finally, we turn to whether the district court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs to the Craneys as
claimed by the Baxters in this appeal. Because we remand the case for further proceedings on the question of
boundary by ageement, we vacate the award and direct the district court to redetermine the issue of the award
of fees and costs upon completion of the proceedings on remand. Nonetheless, we deem it appropriate to
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address an apparent misperception articulated by the district court with respect to its initial attorney fee
detemimation.
i

The Craneys requested, and the district court approved, attorney fees pursuant to I.C. (j 12-120 together with
other costs pursuant to Rule 54(d)(l)(D) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. The district court noted that
both the Baxters and the Craneys are engaged in the businesses of ranching and farming, characterizing each
party as being involved in a commercial endeavor. The district court, however, also summarily concluded that
the relationship between the two parties was of a commercial nature. This simply is not the case. Idaho Code
section 12-120(3) provides that attorney fees may be recovered by the prevailing party in a civil action to
recover on "any co~nmercialtransaction." Id. The term "commercial transaction," as defined in I.C. (j 12-120(3),
includes all transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes. See id. This Court has
previously recognized that "[alttomey fees are not appropriate under LC. (j 12-120(3) unless the commercial
transaction is integral to the claim, and constitutes the basis upon which the party is attempting to recover."
Brower v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 117 Idaho 780,784,792 P.2d 345,349 (1990).
[23] The present case is analogous to others decided by this Court and the Court of Appeals involving the
determination of property rights. See Jervy J. Joseph C.L. U. Ins. Assoc. v. Vaught, 117 Idaho 555,789 P.2d
1146 (Ct.App.1990) (denying attomey fees under I.C. (j 12-120(3) in an action where property owner sought a
judgment coinpelling adjoining property owners to reimburse it for inigation assessments, to record an
instrument establishing an access easement, and to remove a fence hindering its use of the easement and where
after settlement, adjoining property owners breached the settlement agreement); Chen v. Conway, 121 Idaho
1006,1012,829 P.2d 1355,1361 (Ct. App.), opinion on review, 121 Idaho 1000,829 P.2d 1349 (1992)
(determining that a quiet title action involving dispute over the existence of a prescriptive easement was not a
comnercial transaction under I.C. $ 12- 120(3)); Durrant v. Christensen, 117 Idaho 70,785 P.2d 634 (1990)
(holding that an action in which landowners sought adjudication of water rights and a permanent re-

straining order prohibiting the defendant from interfering with their diversion and use of water determined was
11ot based on a commercial transaction as defined in I.C. (j 12-120(3)); Sun Valley Hot Springs Ranch, Inc. v.
Kelsey, 131 Idaho 657,962 P.2d 1041 (1998) (concluding that an action to determine ownership and easement
rights did not fall within the meaning of a coinmercial transaction under I.C. 12-120(3) and therefore attomey
fees were properly denied). Like the above cases, this action is primarily a dispute over property ownership and
easement rights and as such does not fall within the meaning of a comnercial transaction as defined in I.C. §
12-120(3) and as applied by the courts.
E. Conclusion
The order of the district court dismissing the Baxters' claims to title by adverse possession is affirmed, as is
the judgment of the district court denying the Baxters' claim to an easemelit by prescription. We vacate the
district court's grant of summary judgment dismissing the Baxters' boundary by agreement claim and remand
the case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
We also vacate the order awarding attorney fees and costs to the Craneys, and direct the district court to
redetennine the question of the award of attomey fees and costs upon resolution of the claim of boundary by
agreement.
No attomey fees or costs are awarded on appeal
Chief Justice TROUT and Justices SXLAK, SCIJROEDER and ICIDWELL concur.
Footnotes:
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1. The Trappett Court notes that "a good deal of the judicial gloss has evolved mechanically and without benefit
of supporting rationale, a criticism which might well be leveled at the tax payment requirement itself." Id. at
530,633 P.2d at 595.
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Norman S. STANDALL and Anita J. Standall, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Archie TEATER
and Patricia Teater, husband and wife, Defendants-Appellants.
[Cite as Standall v. Teater, 96 Idaho 1521

No. 11308
Supreme Court of Idaho.
July 26,1974.
In an action to quiet title, plaintiffs prevailed in the District Court, Fifth Judicial District, Gooding County,
Charles Scoggin, J., and defendants appealed. The Supreme Court, McFadden, J., held that where defendants
since 1955 had maintained a substantial enclosure around their land, and plaintiffs recognized such as an
encroachment upon their lands acquired in 1962, and defendants were assessed only on land designated as "Tax
6" and not on land described by metes and bounds, and paid all taxes on property assessed to them over the
years, they met the statutory requirement of payment of taxes before claim to land under adverse possession
could be established.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part and remanded.
Samuel Kaufman, Jr., Anderson, Kaufman, Anderson & Ringert, Boise, for defendants-appellants.
Severt Swenson, Jr., Becker, Swenson & Shaw, Gooding, for plaii~tiffs-respondents.
McFADDEN, Justice,
Nonnan S. Standal and Anita J. Standal, husband and wife (plaintiffs-appellants), instituted this action to
quiet title to real
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property owned by them, alleging in their complaint that Archie and Patricia Teater, husband and wife, claimed
an interest in their property. The Teaters (defendants-appellants) answered and counterclaimed alleging that
they owned certain real property described in their counterclaim, basing their ownership of the property on
adverse possession. The trial court, after hearing the case entered findings of fact, conclusions of law and decree
adverse to the Teaters, and judgment was entered quieting title in the Staxdais. The Teaters then perfected this
appeal. We affirm the judgment in part, and reverse in part.
The lands in question are located in the Hagerman Valley in Gooding County. The Standal property is in
Lot 1 of Section 28, Township 6 South, Range 13 East of the Boise Meridian. The Teater property, as described
in their deed is a part of Lot 3, Section 21, Township 6 South, Range 13 East of the Boise Meridian. In their
counterclaim they also assert ownership of property located in Lot 1 of Section 28, claimed by the Standals. The
following is a slcetch of the property claimed by the respective parties, and while not drawn to scale, illustrates
the claims of the parties.
[Please see hardcopy for image]
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In substance the trial court found: (a) In 1951 the Teaters by deed obtained title to their property in Section
21; (b) The Standals purchased their property in Section 28 in 1962; (c) In 1953 the Teaters had an engineer
survey and determine a new description of the land, following which they made a claim to land in Section 28
located within a barbed wire fence, which "was down and cattle could cross and recross"; (d) Xn 1970 the
Teaters had another engineer survey the property "due to the fact that the Defendants [Teaters] were not
satisfied with the survey * * * in 1953 * * *. That at the time the Defendant, Mr. Teater, stated that the Section
line was not in the area determined by Mr. Riedesel [the engineer who surveyed it in 19701 and directed that he
survey a line showed to him by the Defendant, Mr. Teater, which moved the entire October, 1953 survey south
into Section 28"; (e) A chain link fence was constructed by the Teaters, but they testified they never considered
this fence as their boundary; (f) The Standals and their predecessors paid all taxes levied on their property in
Section 28 and the Teaters paid taxes on lands in Section 21 and paid no taxes on lands in Section 28; (g) The
Teaters made no open adverse claim to Tract B until 1970 when they constructed a fence along the boundaries
of the land they claimed, which fence was promptly dismantled by the Standals.
On the basis ofthe findings of fact, the trial court concluded that the Teaters failed to establish their claim to
adverse possession under a written instrument (I.C. $9 5-207, 5-208), or under an oral claim of title (I.C. $5 5209, 5-210), and entered judgment quieting title in favor of the Standals.
The appellants have assigned as error various findings of fact and conclusions of law contending that the
findings were not sustained by the evidence &d that the trial court misapplied the law in its conclusions. In
summary, the appellants contend the trial court erred in holding,
(1) that the appellants failed to prove their claiin of adverse possession to the land under a claim of
a written instrument of title; and
(2) that the appellants failed to prove their claim of adverse possession of the lands by an oral claim
and exclusive possession in excess of five years.
The Teaters purchased their property from Mr. and M s . Farnsworth, receiving a deed in 1951. Previously, in
1949, the Teaters and Stella Farnsworth had entered into a written memorandum whereby it was agreed the
Fmsworths would sell the Teaters a tract of about one acre of land on a knoll. The purchase price was minimal
and the Farnsworths were unwilling to have it surveyed. In January 1951, a deed was executed by the
Farnsworths to the Teaters describing the property as

"A part of Lot 3, Section 21, Township 6 South Range 13 E.B.M., laying west of U.S. Highway
30 consisting of approximately 213 of an acre and described as: Commencing at a point where U.S.
Highway 30 crosses the south line of Section 21, thence west 250 feet; thence approximately North
134 feet, thence in a Northeasterly direction 108 feet to the west line of U.S. Highway 30, then
following the west side of U.S. Highway 30 South to point of beginning."
This property was along the old highway from Bliss to Hageman, and lay west of the highway and east of a
break or rather abrupt drop to the Snake hver.
The Teaters commenced construction oftheir home on this property. During the course of construction,
building materials were being pilfered, and in 1955 they constructed a 6 foot chain link fence topped by barbed
wire to protect their property as is shown on the sketch, supra, as Tract A. The property was protected on three
sides by the fence and on the west side by the break or drop-off.
In 1953, the Teaters had a survey made of their property and a new description prepared. They testified that
the surveyor
---"-----"-,"-
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established the southeast comer of their property on the west boundary of the highway with a marked rock. This
point, Point C on the sketch, supra, was 267.3 feet southerly from the point where the south line of the chain
link fence intersected the west boundary of the highway. Teaters claim that from this Point C they own all the
property westerly to the break or drop-off, some 72 feet as they claimed, and then northerly from that line to the
west end of the south line of their chain link fence (Tract B, sketch, supra).
The Teaters testified that they had made improvements in the claimed area by planting trees and maintaining
the land in its natural rustic state. They also testified that they maintained an existing fence surrounding that
area (Tract B).
Mr. Teater is a well-lmown artist, and he used the property south of the chain link fence in his work as the
basis for painting, exemplifying the natural state of the area.
In 1970 the Teaters constructed a fence along the west and south side of the property they claim (Tract B).
Standal testified that after the fence was built he pulled and stacked all the fence posts and rolled up the wires.
Be testified that in the area claimed by the Teaters he had hauled gravel out of a pit and sold some 3,000 yards
of gravel to another person.
[ l , 2 ] First, considering Teaters' claim to the disputed property based on adverse possession under a written
claim of title (I.C. 9 5-207, 5 5-208), the trial court did not e n in denying this claim. Their deed called for
property situate in Section 21. The evidence clearly established the section line crossed their property between
their home and the chain link fence to the south. Nowhere in the record does there appear any "written
instrument" setting out any foundation for the Teaters' claim to the property lying south of the section line. The
description set out by the surveyor in 1953 did not fit within the claim urged by the Teaters, or within the
description contained in their counterclaim. The subsequent 1970 survey could not be used for any basis of
adverse possession under a written claim. I.C. 3 5-207. The Teaters, who claim the property by adverse
possession, had the burden of proof to establish their claim. Hamilton v. Village of McCall, 90 Idaho 253,409
P.2d 393 (1965). See, Smith v. Smith, 95 Idaho 477,511 P.2d 294 (1973); White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 615,
428 P.2d 747 (1967). The appellants failed in this regard.

As concerns appellants' claim as to Tract B under an oral claim of title, LC. $§ 5-209(fnl) and 5-210,(fn2)
the trial court denied this claim, first because the Leaters failed to establish payment by them of any taxes
assessed against property situate in Section 28, and secondly, they failed to establish that it was protected by
any substantial enclosure. The trial court found that the barbed wire fence was down. The record fully sustains
the trial court's determination that the barbed wire fence the Teaters contended bounded the area claimed by
them was down and cattle could cross and recross

the area. This finding, supported by substantial, competent, although conflicting evidence, will not be disturbed
by this court. Hafer v. Horn, 95 Idaho 621, 515 P.2d 1013 (1973); Enders v. Hubbard & Sons, Inc., 95 Idaho
590,513 P.2d 992 (1973). I.C. § 5-210 requires that to constitute an adverse possession, the person claiming it
must have protected it by a substantial enclosure. In this regard the Teaters failed in their proof concerning the
claim of enclosure by a barbed wire fence.

[3] However, it is the conclusion of this court that the trial court erred in not recognizing the Teaters' claim
to that portion of Tract A between the section line, southerly to the chain link fence. The record discloses that
the section line between Sections 21 and 28 was northerly of the chain link fence and that that area of Tract A
enclosed by the chain link fence encroached upon ground the record title of which was in the Standals. Mr.
Standal testified that at the time he purchased his property in 1962 he recognized that this chain link fence was
encroaching upon land owned by him, but that he did not want to do anything about it at the time.
This court in a number of cases held that a fence can delineate the boundary of property regardless
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location of the actual boundary when the other elements of adverse possession are present. See, Bayhouse v.
Urquides, 17 Idaho 286,105 P. 1066 (1909); M d e r v. Stands, 71 Idaho 22,225 P.2d 463 (1950); Calkins v.
Kousouros, 72 Idaho 150,237 P.2d 1053 (1951); Scott v. Gubler, 95 Idaho 441,511 P.2d 258 (1973). The
record is without dispute that the chain link fence was first constructed in 1955 and remained intact thereafter,
and that this fence was a substantial enclosure within the meaning of I. C. 3 5-210.
The trial court held that notwithstanding such an enclosure by the chain link fence, the Teaters failed to
show that they had paid any taxes upon land situate in Section 28. The tax assessor testified that initially the
Teaters were assessed for a portion of Lot 3 west of the highway in Section 21, and that in 1952 the closest he
could determine the acreage was .28 acres. The assessor testified that in 1953 the property was designated as
Tax Number 6, and that he determined it contained two-thirds of an acre, but that he rounded the acreage off at
one acre for assessment purposes. The record does not show that the assessor ever described this property by a
metes and bounds description, but only assessed it as "Tax 6, Sec. 21, T. 6 R. 13".
In 1973, in Scott v. Gubler, 95 Idaho 441,511 P.2d 258, this court had before it an issue concerning the
statutory requirement that taxes must be paid before a claim to land under adverse possession can be
established. h fairness to the district judge and counsel, it should be pointed out that at the time ofthe trial of
the instant case, none of them had the benefit of the decision in Scott v. Gubler, supra. In the Scott case this
court reviewed at length prior decisions of this court and approved holdings from the Supreme Court of Indiana,
and stated:
"[XJn the case of boundary disputes between contiguous landowners, where one landowner can
establish continuous open, notorious and hostile possession of an adjoining strip of his neighbor's
land, and taxes are assessed by lot number or by government survey designation, ratlier than by
metes and bounds description, payment of taxes on the lot within which the disputed tract is
enclosed satisfies the tax payment requirement of the Indiana statute. Nasser v. Stahl, 126 Ind. App
709, 134 N.E.2d 567 (1956); Echterling v. Kalvaitis, 235 Ind. 141, 126 N.E.2d 573 (1955). Several
Idaho cases have expressed approval of a similar theory. See White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho 615,
622,428 P.2d 747 (1967); Beneficial Life v. Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232,242,270 P.2d 830 (1954);
Cakins v. Kousouros, 72 Idaho 150,156,237 P.2d 1053 (1951); Mulder v. Stands, 71 Idaho 22,
26,225 P.2d 463 (1950); Bayhouse v.
m
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Urquides, 17 Idaho 286,297-298, 105 P.2d 1066 (1909)." 95 Idaho 441, 511 P.2d 260-261.
The rule quoted above in the Scott case is applicable to the factual situation here. In this case, since 1955 the
Teaters maintained a substantial enclosure around their land. The Standals recognized this was an encroachment
upon their land acquired in 1962. Over the years since acquiring their title the Teaters were assesesd only on the
land designated as "Tax 6" and not on land described by metes and bounds. It is our conclusion that the Teaters,
who paid all taxes on the property assessed to them over the years, as a matter of law did pay taxes on the whole
of land designated as Tract A. This conclusion is further buttressed by the case of White v. Boydstun, 91 Idaho
615,428 P.2d 747 (1967), where this court stated:

"* * * it should be noted that in the analogous situation concerning adverse occupation of land, next
to the boundary line between the property of the adverse claimant and his opponent, continuous
adverse occupation will extend a true boundary line beyond the occupier's express deed limits, so
that payment of taxes assessed on the deeded property is deemed payment of taxes on the lands in
the clainlant's possession. [Citations omitted.]" 91 Idaho at 622,428 P.2d at 754.
See, Scott v. a b l e r , supra; Hyde v. Lawson, 94 Idaho 886,499 P.2d 1242 (1972); Beneficial Life v.
Wakamatsu, 75 Idaho 232,270 P.2d 830 (1954); Mulder v. Stands,' supra; Bayhouse v. Urquides, supra.
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It is thus our conclusion that the Teaters are entitled to a decree quieting title to all property within the
boundaries of the chain link fence (Tract A), and that portion of the judgment must be reversed.
[4] A judgment defining rights to land must be precise in its description. Norrie v. Fleming, 62 Idaho 381,

112 P.2d 482 (1941); Hedrick v. Lee, 39 Idaho 42,227 P. 27 (1924). The record here fails to contain any metes
and bounds description of Tract A sufficient to properly describe the parties' respective tracts of land. Unless
the parties can furnish an agreed upon and adequate description of Tract A, the trial court shall order a survey
by a disinterested, qualified engineer in order to obtain the necessary data for a description of the property
sufficient for the purposes of this case. The costs of such survey shall be fixed by the court and be borne equally
by the parties. The parties shall be furnished the results of such survey and be given an opportunity to be heard
thereon. See, Lisher v. ICrasselt, 94 Idaho 513,492 P.2d 52 (1972). Thereafter, the trial court shall enter
amended findings of fact, conclusions of law and judgment in conformity with the views expressed herein.
That portion of the judgment quieting title in the plaintiffs to land other than Tract A is affirmed, but that
portion of the judgment concerning Tract A is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings. No
costs allowed.
SHEPARD, C. J., and DONALDSON, McQUADE and BAKES, JJ., concur.
Footnotes:
1. I.C. 5 5-209. "Possession under oral claim of title.-Where it appears that there has been an actual continued
occupation of land, under a claim of title, exclusive of any other right, but not founded upon awritten
instrument, judgment or decree, the land so actually occupied, and no other, is deemed to have been held
adversely.
2. I.C. 5 5-210. "Oral claim-Possession defined-Payment of Taxes.-For the purpose of constituting an adverse
possession, by a person claiming title not founded upon a written instrument, judgment or decree, land is
deemed to have been possessed and occupied in the following cases only:
1. Where it has been protected by a substantial inclosure.

2. Where it has been usually cultivated or improved.
Provided, however, that in no case shall adverse possessioll be considered established under the provisions
of any sections of this code unless it shall be shown that the land has been occupied and claimed for the period
of five years continuously, and the party or persons, their predecessors and grantors, have paid all the taxes,
state, county or municipal, which have been levied and assessed upon such land according to law."
O Lawr~terCorporat~onAll r~ghtsreserved.
The Casemakerm"Online database is a compilation exclusively owned by Lawriter Corporation. The database is
provided for use under the terms, notices and conditions as expressly stated under the online end user license agreement
to which all users assent in order to access the database.
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Lloyd GRIFFEL, Harshbarger Farms, Inc., Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. David REYNOLDS and Gogie 0.
Reynolds, husband and wife, Defendants-Third Party Plaintiffs, and Roy Stegelmeier and Trudy Stegelmeier,
husband and wife, Defendants Third-Party Defendants, Appellants.
[Cite as Griffel v. Reynolds, 136 Idaho 3971
Supreme Court of Idaho, Idaho Falls, May 2001 Term.
No. 261 15
Oct. 24,2001
Neighbors brought action against landowners regarding boundary dispute to property landowners had purchased
from former owners and surveyed, and landowners brought third party complaint against former owners for
misrepresentation and other claims. Following summary judgment granted to landowners in action against
former owners, the District Court, Fremont County, Brent J. Moss, J., entered judgment for neighbors. Former
owners, who had agreed to defend all claims against landowners, appealed. The Supreme Court, Walters, J.,
held that: (1) evidence was sufficient to support finding that farming lines had not changed over past 20 years;
(2) evidence was insufficient to support finding that disputed parcel of land contained 5.62 acres; (3) evidence
was sufficient to support finding of agreement between neighbors and former owners creating boundary by
acquiescence; and (4) landowners did not show compensable loss in misrepresentation action, as neighbors had
not quieted title to land.
Boundary by acquiescence affirmed; summary judgment affirmed in part, reversed in part
Smith & Hancock, Rexburg, for appellants. Jesse D. Hancock argued. McGrath Meacham Smith & Seamons,
Idaho Falls, for respondents. Bryan D. Smith argued.
WALTERS, Justice.
This case involves a boundary dispute, which arose when defendants David and Gogie
Reynolds' (Reynolds) prepurchase survey demonstrated that plaintiffs' farming lines encroached on the parcel
that Reynolds had purchased from Roy and Trudy Stegelmeier. The district court determined the location of the
boundary by appl$ng the doctrine of boundary by acquiescence. We affirm. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
In 1976, Stegelmeier entered into an agreement of sale with W.L. and Virginia Hargis to purchase several
tracts of land in Fremont County, Idaho, including a parcel described as the NU2 of the SE1/4, Section 24,
Township 8 North, Range 44 E.B.M. The following year, Stegelmeier cleared the land of trees and began
firming, which he continued until sometime in 1991 when he placed the land in CRP (Crop Rotation Program).
In 1995, Stegelmeier sold approximately forty acres of said parcel to Reynolds.
Prior to completing the purchase, Reynolds had the property surveyed. The description derived from the
survey was noted on the deed from Stegelmeier to Reynolds as the NW1I4 of the SW114, Section 24, Township
8 North, Range East, Boise Meridian, Fremont County, Idaho. The surveyed parcel was bounded on the west by
property owned by Harshbarger Farms, Inc. (Harshbarger), that had been farmed by Clifford and Alyce
Harshbarger since 1943, and on the north by property which was owned and being farmed by Lloyd Griffel,
who had purchased his land from Robert R. Litton. Reynolds began to set fence posts in 1996 along the
boundaries identified in the survey.
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Harshbarger disputed the location of the fence as the boundary and tore out the fence posts to access land it
had been farming for some time. Harshbarger brought suit against Reynolds, claiming a right to the land up to
and including the farming lines which extended beyond Reynolds' proposed fenceline. Griffel, who also
disputed his common boundary with Reynolds as shown by the survey, joined as a plaintiff in the suit to
adjudicate the northern and westerly boundaries of the StegehneieriReynolds parcel.
The plaintiffs alleged in their complaint that the boundaries between their properties and Reynolds' property
had been established for more than twenty years by both farming lines and fencing lines, and that these lines
claimed by the plaintiffs were visible and obvious, although they had never been surveyed. The plaintiffs
asserted title to the disputed premises defmed by the farming lines as they existed in 1999 under theories of
adverse possession and boundary by agreement andlor acquiescence. The plaintiffs obtained a temporary
restraining order enjoining Reynolds from erecting the fence on the disputed boundary that would impede the
plaintiffs from conducting their usual fa11 field farming work.
Reynolds filed a third-party complaint against Stegelmeier, alleging breach of the parties' real estate
agreement and warranty deed and misrepresentation. Subsequent to Reynolds' sumtnary judgment motion,
which the district court granted, (fnl) Stegelmeier agreed to defend all of the remaining claims against
Reynolds in the action. By the time the matter went to trial, the plaintiffs had abandoned their adverse
possession claims and proceeded only on their claims of boundary by agreement or acquiescence.
The district court, in its memorandum decision, found that the adjoining owners did not know the exact
location of the common boundary lines prior to the survey but that a11 parties had acquiesced in the farming
lines as boundaries for many years. Relying on the testimony of the plaintiffs' expert, the district court found
that the farming lines had not substantially changed for at least twenty years, thus providing a sufficient basis to
establish an agreed boundary with certainty. The district court, however, allowed compensation for a deviation
of seven feet in the fanning lines, pursuant to the expert's testimony. The district cowt entered judgment
establishing the boundary lines applicable only to the property actually farmed and not modifying "any
boundary otherwise described by deed that is currently located within existing patches of trees referred to
above." The district court fixed the boundaries as follows:
(1) between the GriffelReynolds parcel at a point seven feet

north of and parallel to the farming line existing during the
1999 farming year, and extending from the eastern boundary of
the Reynolds parcel to the farming line against the trees on
the west, and (2) between the HarshbargerReynolds parcel at a point seven feet west of and parallel to the
farming line as it existed during the 1999 farming year; that boundary extends north and south to the farming
lines against the patches of trees located on the north and south end thereof as reflected in Plaintiffs' Exhibits
1,2, and 3.
Stegelmeier, the third-party defendant, filed a *80 timely appeal from the judgment and from the district
court's order denying his motion to alter or amend the judgment. On appeal, he argues that the district court's
findings are not supported by substantial evidence, that the boundaries fixed by the district court are arbitrary,
ambiguous, and not substantiated by the evidence, and that the plaintiffs' failed to sustain their burden of proof
of acquiescence in the farming lines as the boundaries because the location of the farming lines from 1978 to
1999 was not shown with certainty. DISCUSSION
In Idaho, the phrase "boundary by acquiescence" is often used interchangeably with "boundary by
agreement," although the latter more accurately describes the doctrine. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898, 950
P.2d 1237 (1997), (citing Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37,40,794 P.2d 626,629 (1990)). To prove
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boundary by agreement, there must be an uncertain or disputed boundary and a subsequent agreement fixing the
boundary. The agreement need not be express, but may be implied by the surroundingcircumstances and
conduct of the parties. Id. at 41,794 P.2d at 630; Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho 359,262 P.2d 1006 (1953).
There is no dispute that the true boundaries between the plaintiffs' and the defendant's property were
unknown. The parties' deeds, which were admitted as exhibits, describe the boundaries in terms of the section
lines of Section 24 of the government survey, but none of the adjoining owners knew the true position of the
lines on the ground. Stegelmeier testified that he had never had any discussions as to the location of the
boundaries with the adjoining landowners, and until he could afford a survey, he farmed his property up to the
existing farming lines. Further testimony of the parties established that there was no express agreement
regarding the plaintiffs' common boundaries with Stegelmeier. Only when Reynolds set the fence posts along
the boundaries that he bad surveyed in 1995 did the parties learn the location of the true boundaries and the
plaintiffs' encroachment onto the Reynolds/Stegelmeier property.
On the element of agreement, Cliff Harshbarger testified that from as far back as 1943, he had fanned up to
a fence line, which he contended marked the boundary that he continued to obey. Lloyd Griffel also testified to
the existence of a fence line, which he asserted divided his property from Stegelmeier's property, and up to
which he had farmed even after the fence got caught in the disk and was removed. However, the plaintiffs
offered no evidence as to when the fences were erected, by whom, and for what purpose. They also presented
no evidence that Stegelmeier's predecesssor had agreed to treat either fence line as the boundary. Furthermore,
because the fences were no longer in existence when Stegelmeier purchased his land, the plaintiffs cannot rely
on the old fence lines to prove an agreement but must meet their burden of proof with other evidence.
Where no express agreement is shown, the agreed upon boundary "must therefore be determined from the
conduct of the parties, viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances." O'Malley v. Jones, 46 Idaho 137,
140,266 P. 797,798 (1928). A long period of acquiescence by one party to another party's use of the disputed
property provides a factual basis from which an agreement can be inferred. Wells, 118 Idaho at 41,794 P.2d at
630. Acquiescence is merely regarded as competent evidence of the agreement. Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112,
117,268 P.2d 351 (1954).
The record discloses that Stegelmeies never confronted Harshbarger and Griffel with objections as to the
location of their farming lines. No dispute existed until just prior to the commencement of this action in which
the plaintiffs sought to claim rights to the property defined by the farming lines. From this evidence, the district
court concluded that the parties had acquiesced in treating the farming lines as their boundary over many years,
based upon a finding that the farming lines had remained substantially unchanged since 1978. Stegelmeier
challenges this finding and that the disputed parcel contains 5.62 acres, claiming that the findings are not
supported by the evidence.
The plaintiffs' expert, Val Schultz, a cadastral surveyor, testified as to his interpretation of aerial photos of
the disputed area taken in 1978, 1987, and 1992, which he compared to the actual location of the farming lines
and identifiable features that he was able to observe on the ground in 1999 just before trial. He identified a berm
and an area marked by a three-foot difference in elevation, which showed the lines that the adjoining
landowners adhered to during the years that they farmed the property. His expert opinion was that the farming
lines of Harshbarger and Griffel had not substantially ohanged for more than twenty years, and that opinion was
admitted without contest. Accordingly, we uphold the district court's finding as to the certainty and permanence
of the farming lines in this case. We conclude that there was substantial, competent evidence to support the
finding that the farming lines bad remained substantially unchanged since 1978.
Schultz, however, did not measure the farming lines in relation to the surveyed boundary lines, nor did the
1995 survey admitted into evidence on the stipulation of the parties precisely locate the farming lines. The
description provided by the district court defining the boundary by acquiescence was not derived from a survey
illustrating the location of the farming lines. Unlike the metes and bounds description in Lindgren v. Martin,
130 Idaho 854,949 P.2d 1061 (1997), which was held to be supported by the record and deemed admitt d
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because it was not denied in the responsive pleading, the description constructed by the district court in this case
is without a sufficient basis in the evidence. Therefore, we cannot sustain the district court's finding that the
disputed parcel is 5.62 acres.
Next, Stegelmeier argues that the district court erred as a matter *80 of law in establishing boundary by
acquiescence, arguing that there was a failure of proof of an agreement. As earlier noted in this opinion, an
agreement fixing the boundary line, whether express or implied, is essential to a claim of boundary by
acquiescence. See Edgeller v. Johnston, 74 Idaho at 365,262 P.2d at 1010. An agreement can be "[ilmplied by
the surrounding circumstances and conduct of the parties, including erection of a fence or other demarcation,
possession of the property up to the fence, and a period of acquiescence." Morrissey v. Haley, 124 Idaho 870,
865 P.2d 961 (1993); accord Edgeller, 74 Idaho at 365,262 P.2d at 1010 (such an agreement may be presumed
to arise between adjoining landowners where such right has been definitely defined by erection of a fence or
other monument on the line followed by such adjoining landowners treating it as fixing the boundary for such
length of time that neither should be allowed to deny the correctness of its location). We are satisfied here that
the adjoining landowners tacitly accepted the farming lines as visible evidence of their dividing lines for a long
period of time. From the mutual recognition of the farming lines and the occupation and cultivation by each
party up to the lines, the district court properly found acquiescence from which it implied an agreement between
the parties. There are ample facts, therefore, to sustain the action of the district court holding the firming lines
to be the boundary by acquiescence.
We affirm the district court's order granting the plaintiffs boundary by acquiescence. Our decision, however,
does not avail the plaintiffs of quiet title that they also sought in their complaint but only revises the parties'
common boundary by operation of law. See Morrissey, 124 Idaho at 873,865 P.2d at 964 (oral agreement
uncertain or in dispute is
fixing boundary line between co-terminous owners where true boundary is -own,
not regarded as a conveyance but merely the location of the respective existing estates and the common
boundary of each of the parties); Edgeller, 74 Idaho at 366,262 P.2d at 1010 (holding that a finding, supported
by substantial competent evidence, of an agreed boundary line has the effect of extending or diminishing the
limits of the respective deeds to include and exclude the parcel of land in dispute).
Our decision does put into question the district court's order on Reynolds' summary judgment holding that
Stegelmeier shall reimburse Reynolds for the reasonable value of any property lost in the event the plaintiffs
prevail in their claims. Stegehneier makes the argument on appeal that he . should not be held to have conveyed
to Reynolds less than the property described in the warranty deed, making him liable for breach of the warranty
of title; and he asserts that boundary by acquiescence undermines the integrity of legal descriptions in all deeds.
Until such time as the plaintiffs successfully obtain quiet title in the disputed area that is bounded in part by the
newly-established boundary by acquiescence but as yet undefimed, we are unable to measure the amount of
property that Reynolds has been deprived of and the extent of any liability for said loss that Stegelmeier is
responsible for. Accordingly, we vacate that portion of the summary judgment ordering Stegelmeier to
reimburse Reynolds because it has not been shown that Reynolds has suffered a compensable loss.
CONCLUSION
The decisioil of the district court granting boundary by acquiescence to the plaintiffs is hereby affirmed.
However, we vacate the order on summary judgment in favor of Reynolds requiring Stegelmeier to reimburse
Reynolds for a loss of property, which has not been clearly proven. We do not award fees in that we cannot say
that the appeal was brought, pursued or defended hivolously, unreasonably or without foundation. Minich v.
Gem State Developers, Inc., 99 Idaho 91 1,918,591 P.2d 1078, 1085 (1979). Costs are awarded to the
respondents Harshbarger and Griffel.
Chief Justice TROUT and Justices SCEIROEDER, KIDWELL and EISMANN concur.
Footnotes 1. On summary judgment, the district court held that Stegelmeier must
reimburse Reynolds for the reasonable value of property lost in the event the plaintiffs prevail on their claims.
The district court also held Stegelmeier liable to Reynolds for reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred in
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Alonzo V. CAPPS and Nona Lee Capps, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. Robert D. WOOD and
William J. Smith, duly appointed and acting personal representatives of Thomas B. Burton, deceased, and Frank
C. Shirts, Jr., a single man, and Robert A. Shirts, a single man, Defendants-Respondents.
[Cite as Capps v. Wood, 117 Idaho 6141
No. 17257
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
April 11, 1990,
In action to quiet title, on remand from appeal on issues of adverse possession and
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exclusion of evidence, 110 Idaho 778, 718 P.2d 1216, the District Court, Third Judicial District, Washington
County, Dennis E. Goff, J., adopted judgment entered after initial trial court proceedings dismissing plaintiffs'
cause of action, granted summary judgment to defendants on plaintiffs' claim of prior settlement agreement with
defendants, and denied plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals,
Walters, C.J., held that: (1) plaintiffs were barred from urging the alleged prior settlement agreement with
defendant as claim for relief on remand under the doctrine of "law of the case"; (2) trial court had discretion to
determine whether the existing record was sufficient, or should be supplemented by new trial, in order to make
the required findings of fact and conclusions of law on remand; (3) plaintiffs' quitclaim deed was outside the
chain of title to the property in dispute where plaintiffs could not establish that person conveying quitclaim deed
owned the disputed parcel at time the property was conveyed; (4) case was one of adverse possession where the
complaint pled adverse possession in the alternative to fee ownership and the claim of fee ownership failed; and
(5) plaintiffs failed to prove adverse possession.
Affirmed.
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Massingill & Felton, Weiser, for plaintiffs-appellants. R. Brad Massingill argued.
Davison, Copple, Copple & Copple, Boise, for defendants-respondents Wood and Smith. Teny C. Copple
argued.
Burton & Kroll, Weiser, for defendants-respondents Shirts. Ira T. Burton argued.
WALTERS, Chief Judge.
This is an appeal by Alonzo and Nona Capps fTom a judgment entered on remand following a previous
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, Cupps v. Wood, 110 Idaho 778,718 P.2d 1216 (1986) (Capps I), in a quiet
title action. The district court held that the Capps had failed to prove they were entitled to the property in
question. The issues on the present appeal are whether the district court erred in ruling that the Capps were
precluded, on res judicata grounds, from seeking specific performance of an oral agreement to acquire title to
the land; whether the trial court should have held a trial de novo on the remand; and whether the Capps were
required to prove a theory of adverse possession in order to prevail on their quiet title claim. We affirm. 9 (. 7
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i The case comes to us with the following background. In 1978, the Capps brought this action to quiet title in
their name to a parcel of land in Washington County and to recover damages for alleged trespass and slander of
title. Named as defendants in the action were the personal representatives of the estate of Thomas Burton,
deceased; Frarlk and Robert Shirts, purchasers of the disputed parcel from the Burton estate; and Frank Davison,
attorney for the estate. Prior to trial, Mr. Davison was dismissed from the action. After trial, judgment was
entered in favor of the remaining defendants. The Capps appealed (CappsI), asserting that the trial court erred
in concluding that the Capps had failed to establish title to the disputed property on an adverse possession
theory; that the court erred in excluding testimony under I.C. 5 9-202(3), the dead man's statute; and that the
court erred in striking the testimony of a bookkeeper (an employee of Burton's certified public accountant) who
had testified concerning a rental payment made by Burton to the Capps in 1973.
(

In Capps I, the Supreme Court upheld the exclusion of testimony under I.C. $9-202(3) concerning an oral
arrangement between the Capps and Burton for the sale and purchase of the disputed property prior to Burton's
death. However, with respect to the testimony of the bookkeeper, the Court held that this evidence should not
have been disregarded by the trial court. The record in Cupps I shows that, afler the bookkeeper had testified,
the trial court became persuaded that the bookkeeper's testimony was a privileged or confidential
communication under I.C. 5 9-203A and would have to be excluded from consideration. The Supreme Court
disagreed. It ruled that I.C. $ 9-203A did not apply to testimony by the bookkeeper as lo an entry made in the
ordinary course of business, reflecting the purported rental payment by Burton to Capps. Noting that the Capps'
claim to title to the properly was predicated upon adverse possession for a five-year period (seeI.C. $ 5-206),
and observing that the Capps asserted they were Burton's landlord (Capps1, 110 Idaho at 780, n. 1,718 P.2d at
1218, n. I), the Court concluded that the bookkeeper's testimony about a rental payment made by Burton to the
Capps in 1973 "could have established the
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five-year possession." 110 Idaho at 782,718 P.2d at 1220. Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded the case
to the district c o p with directions to reconsider its findings in light of the admissibility of the bookkeeper's
testimony.
Upon remand, district judge Doolittle, who had presided over the trial, granted a motion by the Capps to
disqualify himself from proceeding Eurther with the action. The case was reassigned to district judge Goff. The
Capps then filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that a settlement agreement had been reached by the
parties in 1977, prior to filing the complaint in this action, in which the defendants had agreed to convey the
disputed property to the Capps. The Capps requested judgment for specific performance of the alleged
agreement. In response, the defendants maintained that no such agreement was ever made, that in 1977 the
property had already been sold by the estate to the Shirts, that no claim for specific performance of any
purported settlement agreement had been alleged in the Capps' complaint in this case and that such a claim was
precluded by res judicata because it was never raised until after the appellate proceeding in Cupps I was final.
By cross-motion, the defendants requested summary judgment in their favor on the settlement-agreement issue.
At the hearing on the summary judgment motions, the Court invited further briefing from the parties on the
question whether a new trial was necessary as a result of the remand from the Supreme Court. Eventually, Judge
Goff granted a summary judgment to the defendants on the settlement-agreement issue, determining that the
issue was barred by res judicata because it had not been raised in the proceedings resulting in Capps I. He also
decided that a new trial was not necessary. He issued an order modifying the findings of fact and conclusions of
law previously entered by Judge Doolittle following the trial. In this order Judge Goff made findings with
respect to the bookkeeper's testimony theretofore excluded by Judge Doolittle, and he reached the conclusion
that although the bookkeeper's testimony corroborated testimony that Burton may have been a tenant of the
Capps, the Capps still had not proven they had been in possession of the property for a five-year period, as
required by I.C. $5-206, before their action was filed in 1978. Judge Goff then adopted the judgment
previously entered by Judge Doolittle in favor of the defendants, without further modification or amendment. A
motion by the Capps to reconsider these rulings was denied and this appeal followed.
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We turn first to the issue concerning the alleged settlement agreement. In their complaint to quiet title and to
recover damages for trespass and slander of title, the Capps alleged that, on or about November 9, 1977, they
met with the parties who eventually were named as defendants in the action. The complaint recites that those
parties agreed to conduct a survey of a fenceline located on the property and, upon completion of the survey, to
give to the Capps a quitclaim deed to the disputed parcel. The complaint did not pray for specific performance
of the alleged agreement. During trial, the Capps presented testimony concerning the settlement averred in their
complaint. The defendants also presented testimony to refute the Capps' evidence. One of the defendants,
Robert Wood, testified that although the parties had attempted to negotiate a settlement in order to avoid
litigation, the attempt was unsuccessful. He stated that the estate had never agreed to give the Capps any deed to
the property in question. In his findings of fact and conclusions of law, Judge Doolittle determined that the
Capps had not proven any right to the disputed parcel of land. His decision did not expIicit1y refer to the
settlement agreement.

[I] When the Capps pursued their appeal in Capps I, no issue was raised with respect to the settlement
agreement. As noted by Judge Goff, the enforcement of that agreement was urged for the first
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time after the case had been remanded to the district court. Judge Goff determined that res judicata, resulting
from the failure of the Capps to assert enforcement of the agreement in their appeal in Capps I, precluded
consideration of that question on remand. We believe that Judge Goff erred by applying the doctrine of res
judicata. Instead, we conclude that the Capps were barred from urging the settlement agreement as a claim for
relief on remand, under the similar but related doctrine of "law of the case." Therefore, because the judgment in
favor of the defendants can be upheld upon another, correct theory, ihe result reached by Judge Goff will be
sustained. Andre v. Morrow, 106 Idaho 455,680 P.2d 1355 (1984).
[Z-51 Res judicata precludes the relitigation of a matter previously adjudicated. Aldape v. Akins, 105 Idaho
254,668 P.2d 130 (Ct.App.1983) (review denied). It is premised upon the entry of a valid and final judgment.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS 3 13 (1982). Here, the judgment entered by Judge Doolittle
was specifically reversed by the Supreme Court and the case was remanded to the district court. 110 Idaho at
782,718 P.2d at 1220. As a result, there simply was no final "judgment" that would stand as a bar under res
judicata to the assertion of new claims or theories by the Capps on the remand. However, under the "law of the
case" principle, on a second or subsequent appeal the courts generally will not consider errors which arose prior
to the first appeal and which might have been raised as issues in the earlier appeal.(fnl) See 5 AM.JUR.2d
Appeal and Error 5 752 (1962). This approach discourages piecemeal appeals and is consistent with the broad
scope of claim preclusion under the analogous doctrine of res judicata. We hold that the alleged settlement
agreement is not a viable issue in the present appeal because it was embraced by the judgment from which the
first appeal was taken yet was not raised in that appeal.

[6] We turn next to the Capps' contention that the district court erred in not conducting a new trial in this
action. As noted earlier, Judge Goff on remand simply modified the findings made by Judge Doolittle, after
taking into account the trial testimony of the bookkeeper contained in the transcript prepared for the appeal in
Capps I. A new trial was not mandated by the Supreme Court in its remand order, and Judge Goffs decision to
proceed without conducting a de novo trial was compatible with that order. We previously have held that it is
within a trial court's discretion to determine whether an existing record is suEcient, or should be supplemented,
in order to make the required findings of fact and conclusions of law on remand. Sherry v. Sherry, 11 1 Idaho
185, 722 P.2d 494 (Ct.App.1986). We find no abuse of that discretion in this case.
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Finally, the Capps argue that the district court erred by finding that they had not proved their claim of title to
the disputed property on a theory of adverse possession. The Capps contend that they in fact held a quitclaim
deed to the property and that the burden to show a claim by adverse possession should have rested with the
defendants and not with the Capps. We are not persuaded by their argument.
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[7] As to the Capps' deed, the trial judge ruled that it was "outside the chain of title" to the property in
question. The court's determination is supported by the following evidence presented at the trial. The property
in dispute consists of 11.42 acres of land located adjacent to and southeast of the Weiser River. At one time this
acreage lay northwest of the Weiser River. In 1958, the river was rechanneled some distance to the west by
Burton. As a result of the rechannelling of the river, the 11.42 acres here in question became situated on the
southeast side of the river. In 1968, ten years after the river had been moved, Capps acquired a parcel of land on
the northwest side of the river, with its described boundary at the centerline of the river. The Capps conveyed
that property to a Mr. Scott in 1970. Subsequently, in 1971, the Capps obtained a quitclaim deed from Scott to
the 11.42 acres lying east of the river. Scott testified that, although he signed the quitclaim deed at Capps'
request, he believed he did not own any property on the east side of the river.

[8] Clearly, unless Capps could establish Scott's ownership of the disputed parcel at the time the property
was conveyed by quitclaim deed from Scott to the Capps, then that conveyance would be extrinsic to the chain
of title to the property. Scott's source of title came from the Capps. Their 1971 deed to Scott, and the earlier
1968 deed to the Capps, "used the center line of the Weiser River as a starting point and conveyed property
situated 'northwesterly of the Weiser River."' Capps I, 110 Idaho at 779, 718 P.2d at 1216. The Capps asserted
no claim to the disputed parcel either by way of a theory of accretion or of avulsion.(fn2) Consequently, we
agree with the trial court's determination that the deed from Scott to Capps was outside the chain of title to the
property in question.

191 Nor was the trial judge incorrect in deciding this case on a theory of claim by adverse possession. In the
Capps' coinplaint, adverse possession was pleaded in the alternative to fee ownership. The claim of fee
ownership failed and no issue concerning it is viable in the present appeal. The case was thus m~arrowedto one
of adverse possession, as observed by our Supreme Court in Capps I. The Capps, as plaintiffs, had the burden of
proof on this claim with evidence showing the strength of their own title, rather than merely attacking the
defendants' title. It has long been settled that a party seeking to quiet title against another must succeed on the
strength of his own title and may not merely rely on the weakness of his adversary. See e.g., Pincock v.
Pocatello Gold & Copper Mining Co., 100 Idaho 325,597 P.2d 21 1 (1979).

[lo, 111 One of the findings made by the district court, which was not challenged on the appeal in Capps I,
was that the Capps never built or maintained any enclosure around the subject property. See LC. §$5-208(2), 5210(1). The court noted that the evidence showed a meandering barbed wire fence on the property, built by
employees of the defendants' predecessor, Burton, to separate livestock. It is well settled that persons claiming
title by adverse possession must establish-as one of the elements of such claims-that they constructed or
maintained an enclosure on the disputed parcel of land to indicate the extent of their claim. Loornis v. Union
Pacific Railroad Co., 97 Idaho 341,544 P.2d 299 (1975); Christle v. Scott, 110 Idaho 829,718 P.2d 1267
(Ct.App.1986). A fence erected by a neighbor for the purpose of containing livestock or to restrain livestock
from entering the neighbor's property will not suffice to satisfy the enclosure requirement for adverse
possession by a claimant adjacent to the neighbor's property. Here
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it is undisputed that Capps did not enclose the property in question. The district court's fn~dingis supported by
substantial evidence and is not clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a). Consequently, we uphold the district court's
conclusion that Capps failed to prove their claim of adverse possession.(fh3)

, ,

"

\

\

Finding no error in the proceedings below, we &m the judgment of the district court. Costs to
respondents; no attorney fees awarded.
BURNETT, J., and SMITH, J., Pro Tern., concur.
Footnotes:
1. In Shrives v. Talbot, 91 Idaho 338,421 P.2d 133 (1966), our Supreme Court mixed this ruIe with the rule
prohibiting consideration of issues on appeal that were not first presented to the trial court. The Court said:

In their second assignment of error the Shriveses contend rescission should have been denied
because of laches on the part of Talbols. This issue was not raised in the trial court, either in the
first trial or in the second trial, nor was it raised on the first appeal [Shrives v. Talbot, 88 Idaho 209,
398 P.2d 448 (1965)l or in the petition for a rehearing from the decision ofthe first appeal. It will
not now be considered by this court, having been raised for the fvst time on the second appeal.
91 Idaho at 346,421 P.2d at 141.
2. See generally, Aldape v. Akins, supra, 105 Idaho at 256, n. 1,668 P.2d at 132, n. 1; Nesbitt v. Wolfkiel, 100
Idaho 396,598 P.2d 1046 (1979). Although the movement of the river in 1958 would not have affected property
boundaries then existing, under the doctrine of avulsion, this would not necessarily imply that subsequent
conveyances referring to the "Weiser River" would be deemed to run to an old, previously existing river
channel. Neither has Capps presented any authority in support of such an implication.

3. The judgment dismissed the quiet title action brought by the Capps. The district court was not asked to
determine-nor did it determine-the rights of the defendants or of any other possible parties to all or any part of
the property in question.

-
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[**I] Appeal from the District Court of Lincoln county: The Honorable l o h n D.

DISPOSITION: Affirmed.
COUNSEL:

...
Representing Appellants: loseph B. Bluemel, Kemmerer, WY.
Representing Appellees: Gerald L. Goulding, Afton, WY.
JUDGES: Before LEHMAN, C.I., and THOMAS, MACY, GOLDEN, and TAYLOR,

* Retired November 2,

* 13.

1998.

OPINIONBY: LEHMAN
OPINION: [*304] LEHMAN, Chief lustice.

The descendants o f Rawsel Turner (Rawsel) are quarreling over 7.3 a c r e s o f family ground. Although the
7.3 acre parcel was homesteaded by Rawsel's son. Deloss Turner, it is enclosed within a fence erected
by Rawsei. Rawsel's successors i n interest sought to quiet title i n the property b y adverse possession or,
i n the alternative, asserted that the property boundary had been altered by recognition and
acquiescence. The district court rejected both theories, finding t h a t the fence was not a boundary fence,
but one of convenience. Because we conclude that the district court's finding is not clearly erroneous, we
affirm.
ISSUES

Appeilants presentfour issues for o u r review:

1. Whether the Court committed error i n granting the Plaintiffs only part of the disputed
property.
2. Whether the [ * * 2 ] Court committed error in finding that Plaintiffs did not meet the
requirements t o establish a boundary by impliedacquiescence.

3. Whether the Court committed error in finding that the Piaintiffs did not fulfill the
requirements for adverse possession.
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4. Whether the Court committed error i n finding that the fence i n question was a fence of
convenience.

Appellees accept the first three issues as stated b y the appellants-, b u t rephrase the fourth issue in this
manner:
Whether the trial court committed error in finding "that the facts and circumstances of this
case are not equivalent t o an express agreement t o make the fence the boundary line."

FACTS

I n 1915, Rawsei Turner received a United States patent t o 78 acres i n Lincoln County near Bedford.
Sometime between 1915 and 1920, Rawsel erected a fence in the vicinity o f the southern boundary of his
property. Actually, the fence was located beyond the southern boundary of Rawsel's land, and it
enclosed approximately 7.3 acres of iand which was then owned by the United States Forest Service. I n
1929, Rawsel's son. Deioss Turner, received a patent to the Forest Service iand immediately south of
Rawsei's. [**3] Since this time, the fence has been maintained i n the same location.
Over the years, the Rawsel and Deioss properties were passed down among theTurners. Rawsei's land
was eventually conveyed to his son Clifford Turner. Clifford and his wife Ruth have, i n turn, passed it on
t o their chiidren. I n 1983, Clifford and Ruth deeded an acre of iand i n the southwest corner o f their
property t o their daughter Carol Lucy [*305] Downes. Believing the fence t o constitute the southern
boundary. Mrs. Dowdes and her husband placed their home on the now disputed property. The
appellants in this case, Beverly Kimball (Clifford and Ruth Turner's oldest daughter) and her husband
George are fee owners of a majority o f the parcel homesteaded by Rawsel.
I n the meantime, Deioss' land was also passed down through the generations. The appellees, Lowell
Turner (Deloss' son) and his wife Opal currentiy own most o f the land homesteaded b y Deioss. When
Lowell and Opal decided to convey parcels t o their children for them t o build on, a survey was required.
At this time, around 1992, the surveyor noticed the fence was not located on the property boundary.
Other surveys followed, and the parties eventually learned that [**4] the fence enclosed 7.391 acres of
largely undeveloped land located within Lowell and Opal Turner's property description. The property in
question is partially forested and rises steeply to the east.
When Lowell and his son Kory Turner began erecting a fence on the true property line, the Kimballs and
Carol Downes instituted this action. They first requested, and were granted, a restraining order. At the
same time, the Kimballs and Downes sought t o quiet title t o the disputed 7.3 acres, claiming the
uroDertv by adverse possession. I n the alternative, they claimed that the fence had altered the boundary
"rider tlie doctrine of rc-cognition and acq~:escrn:e. ~ f t e ar bench tr ai, the distr:ct c o i r t r-?jectru ootn
theori,?~as thcv re ate to the Kimballs, f ~ n d i n gthat tire fence constitutes s fen1.e of conlentence.
However, the district court ruled i n favor of Downes and quieted title t o one acre of the disputed parcel in
her. The remainder o f the disputed property was quieted in Lowell and Opal Turner, the appellees. The
Kirnballs timely appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a fence is a boundary fence or merely one of convenience is a question o f fact. Hillard v.
Marshall, 888 P.2d 1255, 1260 (Wyo. 1995). [**5] This court will not set aside a district court's findings of
fact uniess the findings are cieariy erroneous or contrary t o the great weight of the evidence. Id.;
Sowerwine v. Nielson, 6 7 1 P.2d 295, 3 0 1 (Wyo. 1983); Stansbury v. Heiduck, 9 6 1 P.2d 977, 978 (Wyo.
1998). When reviewing the record, we keep i n mind the following principles:
The judge who presided a t the trial heard and saw the witnesses. He is i n t h e best position
to determine questions of credibility and weigh and judge the evidence, both expert and
non-expert. Thus, on appeal, it is a firmly established and oft-stated rule that we must accept
the evidence of the successful party as true, leave out of consideration entirely the evidence
of the unsuccessful party i n conflict therewith, and give t o the evidence of the successful
party every favorable inference that may fairly and reasonably be drawn from it.
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Hlllard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d a t 1260 (quoting Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d at 301). We review a district
court's conclusions of law de novo. Stansbury v. Heiduck, 961 P.2d at 978.
DISCUSSION

Adverse [**6]

Possession

To establish adverse possession, the claiming party must show actual, open, notorious, exclusive and
continuous Dossession of another's oroDertv which is hostile and under claim of riaht or color of title.
Stansbury v: Heiduck, 961 P.2d at 979; ~ i l l a k dv. Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1258; ~ u t a r j a r m s& Livestock, Inc.
v. Fuss, 651 P.2d 1129, 1132 (Wyo. 1982). Possession must be for the statutory period, ten years. Wyo.
Stat. Ann. 5 1-3-103 (Lexis 1999); Hlllard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1258; Connaghan v. Elghty-Eight Oil Co.,
750 P.2d 1321, 1323 (Wyo. 1988). Where there is no clear showing t o the contrary, a person who has
occupied the land for the statutory period, in a manner plainly indicating that he has acted as the owner
thereof, is entitled t o a presumption o f adverse possession; and the burden shifts t o the opposing party
t o explain such possession. Hillard v. Marsha//, 888 P.2d at 1259; Meyer v. Ellis, 411 P.2d 338, 342 (Wyo.
1966); City ofRockSprlngs v. Sturm, 39 Wyo. 494, 517, 273 P. 908, 915-16 [*306] (1929). However, i f a
claimant's [**7] use of the property is shown t o be permissive, he cannot acquire title by adverse
possession. Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1259; Meyer v. Ellis, 4 1 1 P.2d a t 344.
I n some circumstances, enclosing land in a fence is sufficient to "raise the flag" of an adverse claimant.
Meyerv. Ellis, 411 P.2d at 343; Doenz v. Garber, 665 P.2d 932, 936 (Wyo. 1983); Hiilard v. Marshall, 888
P.2d at 1259. However, a fence kept simply for convenience has no effect upon the true boundary
between tracts of land. Sowerwine v. Nielson, 671 P.2d at 297; Hiilard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1260. This is
so because a fence of convenience creates a permissive use, and a permissive user
cannot change his possession into adverse titie no matter how long possession may be
continued, in the absence of a clear, positive and continuous disclaimer and disavowal of the
title of the true owner brought home to the latter's knowledge; there must be either actual
notice of the hostile claim or acts or declarations of hostility so manifest and notorious that
actual notice will be presumed in order [**8] t o change a permissive or otherwise
non-hostile possession into one that is hostile.

Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d a t 1261 (quoting Stewartv. Childress, 269 Ala. 87, 111So. 2d 8, 13 (Ala.
1959)).
After a bench trial, the district court found that the fence erected by Rawsel was a fence of convenience
and ruled that the Kimballs had not established their claim for adverse possession. n l I n making its
ruling, the district court could have followed either of two routes. Hlllard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d a t 1260.
First, it could have concluded that the Kimballs had not made a prima facie case of adverse possession
because the convenience fence was an explanatory circumstance t o the contrary; or, second, it could
have found that the Kimballs had made out a prima facie case but concluded that the evidence that the
fence was one o f convenience rebutted the presumption of adverse possession. Although the record
does not reveal which of these means the trial court employed t o arrive at its decision, it does not
matter. Under either scenario, the district court's decision would stand; if the evidence that the fence
1**91. t o establish that fact in the first lace. then it is sufficient to
was one of convenience is sufficient .
rcbJt the pres~mption.H.lla,d /. Marsi~ali,888 P.20 at 1260. Tnuj, the questior~for this ccurt 1s nhctner
the d strlc! c o ~ r t ' sflnd n i l of a cunven elice fence s clearly erroneous. We conclLdr it is not.

n l Because adverse possession cannot be acquired against the government, we are only concerned with
circumstances that followed DelossTurner's acquisition of his property from the United States Forest
Service. Porter v. Carstensen, 40 Wyo. 156, 160, 274 P. 1072, 1073 (1929).

- - - - - -.- - - - .End Footnotes. .- - - - - .- - - - - The district court summarized its findings in this fashion:
rlie pnysicsi appearance of the fence. . . c.?ariy di.rncnstrates that it coula riot na.e tieen
c o n s t r ~ r t e das a b c ~ n d a - yfence. To ca. ihe structure 3 leiice is generous. I t consist%gf 3
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wires meandering between trees, bushes, and fence posts i n an irregular fashion. I t appears
from the physical appearance that someone waiked in the east-west direction stringing
barbwire from [**lo] tree t o tree, placing fence posts when trees o r bushes were not
available. The irregular course of the fence clearly indicates that it was not constructed on a
section line, a quarter section line, or any other line of a U.S. governmental subdivision
parcel. Even to a casual observer, it is obvious t h a t whoever built the fence never intended
to strictlv follow the straiaht
- line demarcation of a U.S. Government subdivision descriotion.
CI?aily, the fence .vas corlsirucied by Ransel as a c o n ~ e n : e n way
t
of separ;lt:ng h:s
~ l o m e s t e t diro,n the flubl.c d o m j i n . The (:o>rt .s n r ~able
t
to t ~ n dat.? c o n c ! ~ d othat Kahse.
constructed the fence as a boundary.

Besides these findings, which are supported b y photographs and testimony, the district court's decision
is buttressed by testimony from Lowell Turner. Lowell, who has been around the Turner land ail his life,
provided insight into how Rawsel and Deloss viewed the fence. Lowell testified that Rawsel and Deloss
never treated the fence as a boundary fence. Instead, it was simply used t o separate Rawsel's and
Deioss' cattle. I f cows [+307] escaped, the owner would simply retrieve them.
Even after Rawsel and Deloss had passed the property on, both the [ * * I l l north and southTurners
went back and forth freely on the now disputed property. None o f the Turners asked permission to use
the property because the land was seen as "family ground." Lowell aiso testified that his father, Deioss,
had always said the fence was "off," meaning not on the property line. One o f Lowell's sons, Kory
Turner, testified that he had also been told a l l his life that the fence was off. Besides the manner in
which the fence was constructed, the manner i n which theTurners treated t h e fence and the now
disputed property supports tile district court's finding that the fence was n o t intended t o serve as a
boundary fence. See Pilgrim v. Kuipers, 209 Mont. 177, 679 P.2d 787, 790 (Mont. 1984).
The Kimballs next contend that the district court's judgment is inconsistent because the district court
quieted title i n Downes, who had built a home on one acre of the disputed property, but not i n the
Kimballs. Relying on Kranenberg v. MeadowbrookLodge, Inc., 623 P.2d 1196 (Wyo. 1981), the Kimballs
argue that the facts that supported the finding o f adverse possession for Downes mandate a finding of
adverse possession for the entire disputed parcel. We disagree. [ * * I 2 1
We have previously rejected the Kimballs' all-or-nothing view o f adverse possession. A similar argument
was before this court i n Hillardv. Marshall. There we wrote:
Hillard argues that Kranenberg v. Meadowbrook Lodge, Inc., 623 P.2d 1196 (Wyo. 1981)
estdbilshes the rdie tnat aovirse possession is a r i ~ a ~ i - o r - r . o t hproposition.
r~g
tle ssse:ts tilst
sfrlce the possession of tile nine-acr? Lract droie o ~ oft the same set of clrcimstances as the
fourteen-acre tract, by adversely possessing one he necessarily had t o have adversely
possessed the other.

In Kranenberg, the adverse claimant had built a portion of his home on the defendant's land.
A contiguous tract of that land was aiso used by the claimant as a yard, including the

placement of a swing set, a sandbox, a barbecue and a root cellar. Kranenberg, 623 P.2d a t
1197-98. The district court found that the claimant had adversely possessed the portion
around the house but not t h a t portion which was utilized as a yard. Kranenberg, a t 1196. We
reversed, holding t h a t the continuous possession of the entire portion of the property for the
same puroose, residential use, was sufficient t o show 1**131 adverse possession. Since the
ceienaant had failed ~3 demonstrate a perm sslve usej ivc. c o n c l ~ d e dthat the clamant riag
ao\erseiy possessed iiie eritlre tract. Kra~~enherg,
623 P Z d at 1199-1200.
Kranenberg is distinguishable from this case. Here the land claimed is neither contiguous nor
was used for the same purposes. Hillard used the fourteen-acre tract mainly for farming,
while the nine-acre tract was exclusively used for grazing purposes. Further, the fact that the
two parcels are physically separate could mean there are different reasons for them being
fenced in, as the trial court found t o be the case here. Although the tracts were created a t
the same time, their non-contiguous nature and the different uses on each requires the
adverse claimant t o prove his case for each tract individually. Hiiiard failed t o do that.
Kranenberg is not applicable.

Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d a t 1261.

.
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Here, as in Hillard v. Marshall, the two parcels have not been used for the same purposes. Since Downes
moved her home onto the property in 1983, the acre quieted in her has been used for residential
purposes. I n fact, Downes' property is separated [ * * I 4 1 from the rest o f the disputed parcel by a fence
erected to prevent cattle from grazing on her land. The fencing and placement of structures upon land
belonging to another can give rise to a claim for adverse possession. State v. Moore, 356 P.2d 141, 146
(Wyo. 1960). Meanwhile, the balance of the disputed parcel has been used mainly for pasturage and
recreational purposes, consistent with the historical, permissive use of the family ground.
I n addition, by moving her home onto the property, Downes acted in a manner that changed the use of
the property from permissive to hostiie. Where, as in Downes' [*308] case, a parties' predecessor in
interest held the disputed property by permission and not hostilely, a claim of adverse possession must
fail. Miller v. Stoval, 717 P.2d 798, 805 (Wyo. 1986); Johnson v. Szurnowicz, 63 Wyo. 211, 230, 179 P.2d
1012, 1018 (1947). However, a permissive user may change his possession into adverse title with a
clear, positive, and continuous disclaimer and disavowal of the title of the true owner brought home to
the latter's knowledge. HjIJard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d at 1261; Miller v. Stovall, 717 P.2d at 805. [**I51
"There must be either actual notice of the hostiie claim or acts or deciarations of hostility so manifest and
notorious that actual notice will be presumed in order to change a permissive or otherwise non-hostile
possession into one that is hostile." Hillard v. Marshall, 888 P.2d a t 1261. Here, although the southern
Turners knew the fence was "off," they did not know how far off. Despite this, Downes' home was
located close enough to the fence that the southern Turners were on actual notice that she was building
on the now disputed property. Indeed, Lowell Turner admitted he was aware that Downes had moved
her home on the land. Bv ~ l a c i n aa home on the orooertv. Downes had unfurled her fiaa in such a
e s on actual notice'of her hostiie possession. ~ h & ,when she
manner that t h e ~ u r n e r a ~ ~ e l l ewere
moved a home onto the property in 1983, Downes changed possession from permissive to hostiie.
Finally, besides finding that Downes had adversely possessed the acre she claimed, the district court also
relied on an estoppel theory. Because theTurner appellees stood by and did nothing while Downes built
on the property, the district court ruled that they were estopped from [**16] asserting ownership to
Downes' oarcel. We conclude that the circumstances of Downes' claim for adverse oossession are
su~f!icientiyd fferent from those s.irroinding Kirnball's c i a m tna! separate tredtment IS :,arranted. The
dstrict court aid not err :n ruling in favor of Do:rnes b ~ aganst
t
the Kimballs.
Recognition a n d Acquiescence
The Kirnballs also rely on the doctrine of recognition and acquiescence t o argue that the fence has
aitered the boundary. This court, per Justice Blume, first described this doctrine in Carstensen v. Brown,
32 Wyo. 491, 500-502, 236 P. 517, 520-21 (1925):

It is well settled that parties may make an express par01 agreement as to a boundary line.
But, t o have a basis for consideration, it must be in dispute or uncertain and not readily
ascertainable, and, to take it out of the statute of frauds, it must be followed up by
occupancy by the parties in accordance with such agreement, up t o the line agreed on. I t
would seem that the elements of mistake involved, both in estoppel as well as adverse
possession, are eliminated in a case when parties deliberately enter into an agreement
under such conditions, in the absence of special [ * * I 7 1 circumstances which would relieve a
party from a mistake, because want of knowledge of the true boundary, and uncertainty
thereof, is made the very basis of the agreement. The doctrine of recognition and
acquiescence would seem to be based primariiy, though not solely, upon the same principles
However. . . . an agreement to fix an uncertain or disputed
as an express agreement.
boundary need not be express, but may be implied, and may be shown by the conduct of the
oarties.

...

. . . The existence o f a division fence does n o t alone s h o w t h e requisite facts. I t m a y b e
k e p t up o n l y f o r t h e convenience o f theparties. But we think we may safely say that when
there is recognition and acquiescence of'the parties in a boundary line, uncertain or in
dispute in the first instance, for a period equal at least to the prescriptive period, under facts
and circumstances which should be considered equivalent t o an express agreement, and the
land on each side of the line is occupied by the respective parties as their land, no good
reason exists why the parties should not be bound to the same extent as though such
express agreement had been made and carried out, particularly [ * * I 8 1 when facts exist

a

9i

n
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which wouid make any other holding inequitable.

(Citations omitted; emphasis supplied.)
The Kimballs complain that the district court improperly applied the doctrine of recognition [*309] and
acquiescence by requiring the Kimballs t o prove an express agreement that t h e fence wouid be
considered t h e boundary. They correctly point out t h a t such an agreement need n o t be express, but may
be implied from the parties' conduct. Moreover, "iong practical acquiescence is regarded as the equivalent
of an agreement." Carstensen v. Brown, 32 Wyo. a t 501, 236 P. at 521.
We disagree with t h e Kimball's assertion t h a t the district court denied this claim soiely because there
was no express agreement. While the district court recognized that n o express agreement was reached,
it also concluded that "the facts and circumstances of this case are not eauivaient t o an exmess
dyrecnient r o irldke rhe fer~celilt?b o ~ n > a r y1 . n " Tor rhe i o i o f i~g reascns, Ne interprzt this i d n g ~ 3 g e
to b? a in J ~ n utlldt there has r.o i i i ~ u l , e daqreerilent thdt t le fence oc a b o i n d a r v . F.rst, rn:s f ~ n dng
- or'.
the district court was preceded by a'paragraph in which the district court found n o express [**I91
agreement t h a t the fence be a boundary. I f the district court had, as t h e Kimballs claim, required them to
prove an express agreement, nothing further need have been said. However, t h e court went on to make
a finding t h a t the facts and circumstances o f the case were not theequivalent o f a n express agreement.
I n making this finding, the district court tracked language found in Carstensen v. Brown that discusses
impiied agreements. I t is clear that the district court made a finding that no implied agreement existed;
we, therefore, reject the Kimballs' ciaim that the district court required them t o prove an express
agreement.
~

~

I n any event, the district court's decision is supported by more than one ground. I n ruiing on this issue,
the district court also reiied on its previous finding that the fence was not a boundary fence, but a fence
of convenience. As Carstensen v. Brown teaches, "the existence of a division fence does not alone show
the requisite facts. It may be kept u p only for the convenience of the parties." 32 Wyo. at 501-502, 236
P. a t 521: Johnson v. Szumowicz. 63 Wvo. 211. 229-30, 179 P.2d 1012. 1018 (1947). This was the case
here, [**20] and the district court apbropriateiy denied the ~ i m b a l l ' sciaim based'on this ground. State
v. Vanderkoppel, 45 Wyo. 432, 438-39, 19 P.2d 955, 957 (1933).
Finally, Carstensen v. Brown indicates that the equities of the case piay a role i n determining a ciaim of
boundary by recognition and acquiescence. 3 2 Wyo. a t 502, 236 P. a t 521. On this issue, the district
court wrote:
There is nothina ineauitabie about ruiina that l t h e Kimballsl are t o retain t h e raw.
-nimproved, u n b e ~ e i o p e dproperty contzlined Mithin the;r pioperty uescr1p:ion; and that [rl~e:
3p&eiict.s] are to r e t a n [lie satn.2 k n d of prcpcrty contancd ~ l t l i l ntheir descrivt~on.

We cannot disagree. The decision of the district court on this issue is affirmed
CONCLUSION

"There is a critical distinction between a fence which establishes a boundary line, and a fence that mereiy
separates one side of the fence from the other. The former is a monument as well as a fence, while the
latter is merely a fence." Pilgrim v. Kuipers, 209 Mont. 177, 679 P.2d 787, 790 (Mont. 1984). In this case,
the district court's finding that the fence constitutes a fence o f convenience [**21] is not clearly
erroneous. This finding precludes both the adverse possession claim as weii as t h e claim that the
boundary had been altered by recognition and acquiescence. The decision of t h e district court is affirmed.
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tions exist, when in fact there are only six,
is a materially false assumption of fact.
Black's Law Dictionary defines "material"
as "important; more or less necessary;
having influence or effect; going to the
merits; having to do with matter, a s distinguished from form. Representation relating to matter which is so substantial and
important as to influence party to whom
made is 'material."'
Black's Law Dictionary 976 (Gth-ed. 1990). Under this definition, we cannot say that tlie district court's
mistake as to the number of felonies was
"material."
The district court did not consider the
exact number of felonies in the actual sentencing, instead finding generally that
Gawron was a repeat offender and likely to
offend again. The issue of the seventh
felony only arose in the context of the
denial of the motion for reconsideration.
In its order, the district court discussed
specific grevious offenses of which Gawron
had been convicted, but did not mention tlie
overturned 1980 conviction. Gawron lias
Failed to show that the sentence or reconsideration motion 1x"liablg would 1i:ive
turned out differenUg had ilie district court
realized U~erewere sis prior felonies instead of seven. Our indepcndcnt review o i
iiie rccord reveals inuthing tliat rvouid iiidieate tlie district cou;.t's belief that sevcn
prior felonies existed instead of six had any
material affect on either the sentence or
the subsequent motion to reconsider.
We therefore conclude tliat Gawron's
due process rights were not abridged either
by the statement5 made a t Xuck's sentencing, the statements made in Kuck's presentence report, the inispercegtion by the district court that Gawron lrad seven felony
convictions when in fact be only had six, or
the consideration by the district court of
prior unproven offenses.
111.
17,81 Finally, Gawron appeals tile sentence imposed and the dcnial of his motion
for reconsideration under I.C.R. 35. The
district court sentenced Gawron to a fifteen-year indeterminate term with nine
years minimum confinement. Initially, we

Cll. PP 1% Idsah0 629 (App)

a Rule 35 motion to reduce a sentence is :
governed by the same standard a s that 1,
applied in reviewing the sentence, i.e., an ?
abuse of discretion must be shown. State :
ho 903, 811 P.2d 513 (Ct.App.1991). If

[B, 101 We first consider the sentence
itself. If the sentence is not illegal, the
appellant has tlie burden to show that it is :
unreasonable, and thus a clear abuse of
discretion. Slalo v. Brovo?~,121 Idaho 385,

fiiiement is necessary "to accomplish the
pt.imiiry oijjective of protectinp society and
to achievc any or all of the rclated g-oals of

:

past history of burglary and theft. In addition to his history of criminal behavior,
the district court also weighed heavily the
need to protect society and the need to
punisli Gawron. We can find nothing that
indicates the district court abused its discretion in weighing these considerations.
Therefore, the seiitence imposed by the district court was not an abuse of discretion.

As for the denial of the motion to reconsider the sentence, no additional evidence
was offered with the motion under Rule 35
to indicate tiiat the district court abused its
discretion. Uecause we found the sentence
to be within the district court's discretion,
and because of the Pack of additional evidence a s to the motion to reconsider, we
find that the reconsideration was properly
denied. See Stale v. Caldurell, 119 Idaho
281, 805 P.2d 487 (Ct.App.1991).
The judgment and sentence of the district court is affirmed. The order denying
the motion to recuse and the motion lo
reduce the sentence is also affirmed.
WAL'IXRS, C.J., and LANSING, d.,
concur.

J., entered judgment quieting title and
awarding landowner compensatory, statutory, and punitive damages for trespass.
Adjacent landowner appealed. The Court
of Appeals, Walters, C.J., held that: (1)
evidence supported finding that deeds, conveying property to landowner and adjacent
landowner, included disputed strip of land:
(2) trial court employed correct measure of
damages for adjacent landowner's construction of road on landowner's property;
(3) evidence supported damages awarded
for removal of trees:. (4)
. trial court did not
err in awarding punitive damages: (5) adjacent landowner was not entitled to orescrilitive easement; and (6) landowner was
entitled to attorney fees.
Aff~rmed.
1. Appeal and Error 4=994(3), 1008.1(3),
3011.1(5)
Court of Appeals does not weigh evidence or substitute its view of facts for
that of trial court; it merely determines
whether findings are supported by substantiiii, even if conflictia& evidence in record.
Rules Civ.Proc., Rule 52(a).
2. Apr,c;il and Error ~ l t J 0 8 . 3 ( 1 )

statutory maxiinuln per
862 P.2d 321

s e n t e ~ ~ cimposed
e
under the Uni
probable duration
5 19-2513; Str~lev. Sanchez, 115 Idaho
776, 769 P.2d 1148 (CtApp.1989). Thus,
we view Gawmn's actual term of confine'
ment a s nine years. Gawron must estab i
lish that under any reasonable view of the.
facts a period of confinement of nine years
for the conviction for burglary and grand
t l ~ e f twas ;in abuse of discretion. ?]'is
court will not substitute its ow

In sentencing Gawmn, the
took into consideration Gawron's extenslv

Leslie Kent DUfilGARNER,
Plainliff-Itespondent,
Y.

Gary D. IIUMGAKNEIL, DefendantAppellant.
No. 19757.
Court of A1)peals of Idaho.
Oct. 4. 1993.
Landowner brought action against adjacent landowner seeking to quiet title and
alleging trespass and negligent idiction of
emotional distress. The First Judicial District Court, Kootenai County, Jam- Judd,
*24 b3.k

R**P

Standeld of deference on ;il)),cal to txia1 court's factual findings applies even
wliere cvidence supporting disputed finding
is entirely documenlary. Rules Civ.Proc.,
Rule 5%).
3. Appeal and Error @842(2)
Court of Appeals will exercise free review over trial court's conclusivns of law to
determine whether court correctly stated
:~pplicable law and whether lcgal conclusions are suslained by facts found.
4. Deeds -93
In construing deed of conveyance, trial
courl's primary function is to seek and give
effect to real intention of parties.
5. Evidence 9390(1)

If language of deed is unambiguous,
parties' intent will be ascertained from
iieed itself as matter of law, without resort
to extrinsic evidence.
:. - : . ' . :
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6. Deeds -100,

110

If deed language is ambiguous, interpretation of grantor's intent becomes question of fact to be determined from instrument itself and from all surroui~dingfact?
and circumstances.
7. Easements +14(2)

Phrase "less a strip of land twenty-five
feet wide on south side of said described
land which is reserved for purpose of giving passage or right of way for roadway"
in three deeds conveying equal portions of
described land was ambiguous; phrase
could mean either that grantor intended to
retain fee interest h~ strip or Lhat she intended merely to reserve riglit of easement.

a t width of 72 feet and other documents
indicating that grantor understood 'her in-:
terest in pro],erty to include strip and in.
tended to convey all interest in property,
including strip, to children, notwithstand.
ing testimony of grantor's attorney as to
his opinion that grantor intended to exelude
strip from conveyances.
10. Trespass -60

:

testified that adjacent landowner's bulldozing activities diminished property's market
value by cost of repairing and restoring
land, there was no competent evidence to
,how that value had not decreased as land~ w n e testified,
r
and fact Lhat value of property continued to appreciate did not negate
landowner's claim for damages.

owner removed 30 to 50 evergreen trees
from property, that approximately twelve
of thbse trees were between six and eight
feet tall, 20 were between four and six f e e t F >
tall, and rest were less than four feet t a l l . 4
and that adjacent landowner removed up-,ot
four birch clumps.

16. Evidence @474(18)

Cost of replacement is evidence of
itcm's "market value" for purposes of ealculating damages.
.,

Statute providing for treble damages
in actions for Lrespass applies only where
alleged trespass is shown to have been
wilful and intentio~~al.I.C. 5 6-202.
:

landowner was competent to .testify
as to diminished value of land as result of
adjacent landowner's trespass.

I I. Trespass QfiO

In action for timber trespass, measure
of actual damages is based upon amount of
trees taken and market value of trees in
that area a t time of taking. I.C. 5 6-202.

Where defendant wrongfully enters i
upon plaintiff's prolierty or cuts plaintiff's
trees, but defendant's trespass is neither
8. Easements -36(3)
Finding that ambiguous phrase "less a wilful nor intentional, plaintiff is entitled to :,
strip of land twenty-five feet wide on south recover his actual damages a t common law, :
side of said described land u4dcl1 is re- but lie is not entitled to have those dam- ?
served for purpose of giving passage or a g a trebled ]jursuant to statute. I.C. 5 G
right of way for roadway" i n original deed.^ 202.
conveying property was intended to include 12. Trespass -43(4)
strip and to reserrc only right of way over
Triai court did not err b)~ awarding
it was supported by cvideace that, aftw
actual
damages lo landowner for adjacent .,
original grantors conveyed projietty, cotinty assessor'^ office no longer b'cnted Llicrn I:~ndowner'strespass undw negligence theas ouwing any fee inkrest in pro],erty, tlial ory, wliicli bad not lbcen pled; trial court's
all suhseilucnL grantees \\,ere assessed Lax- findings of negligo~cedid not form basis of
cs on full property, including strip, and damages asiunrd, l~ut,,athe,; were directed
that it was only after institittion of lawsuit toward denial of Inadowner's claim for he- :
regarding ou~nersl>ipof strip that asses- blc damaces for wilful tresoass and toward 2
sor's office began to treat it as separate denial o~landowncr'sclaim for negligent
infliction of emotional distress. LC. G
parcel.
202.
9. Easements -36(3)
Finding that grantor intcnded by use 13. Trespass -50
of phrase "less a strip of land twentji-five
Where injury to land due to trespass i
feet wide on south side of said described temporary, owner is entitled to recover
land which is reserved for purpose of giv- amount necessary to repair injury and put
ing passage or right of way for roadway" land in same condition it was
in deeds conveying to her three children to im~nediaklypreceding injury.
convey three 72-foot wide i,ortions, calculated by including strip in prol,erty, rather 14. Trespass Q46(3)
than three 64-foot wide portions, reklining
Assuming that diininutioi~
fee interest in strip, was supr~ortodbv. evi- value establishes outar limit of
dence that prior deeds conveying property, temporary injury to land, damages au'a
which contained identical phrase, were in- ed by court, in amount needed to repair
tended to convey strip, and by notations in land, in trespass action arising out of adjagrantor's personal records that she gave cent landowner's construction
each of her ehildrenone third of property land did not exceed that limit;
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16. Trespass @52

17. Trespass -46(3), 52
To establish damages in timber trespass action, landowner is required to show,
with reasonable certainty, number of trees
taken.
18. Danxaps -6,

184

"Reasonable certainty" does not require mathematical exactitude, but only
that da~nngesbe Uken out of realm oi
speculation.
Sec publication \trol-rlr and Pbrases
for oll,er judicial consrtn,aionz and
deri~iiiionr.
19. Damagcs -184
Alere fact that it is difficult to arrive a t
exact amount of damages, where it is
shown that damages occurred, does not
mean that damages may not be awarded; it
is for trier of fact.to fix amount.
20. Damages *208(1)

In fixing amount of damages, it is for
trier of fact to determine credibility of witnesses, resolve conflicts in evidence, and
draw reasonable inferences therefrom.

4

22. Damagcs @188(2)

23. Trespass -52

Cost of repurchasing trees on open
market was appropriate measure of damages in timber trespass action, rather than
price landowner would have received had
i
d'
he sold them "on site."
24. Trespass '@45(6)
In determining damage award in landowner's trespass action arising from adjacent landowner's construction of road, trial
court could consider incident in which adjacent landowner enlarged existing road on
landowner's property, even though claims
lpsed on that i~icidentwere barred by s t a t
ute 01limihtions; after incident, landowner insti.iicted adjaeolt landort~aei.not to
build any loads, and incident was re1ev;int
to dclcnnioing adjacent la~~dowoer's
state
of mind when h6 decided to build road,
which was essential element of landowner's
claim for punitive damages.

'-'

25. Appeal and Error -1013

When trial court has made punitive
damages award, Court of Appeals' stan--'
dard of rcview is whether substantial evidence supports determination that requisite .-;
factual findings criteria have been satisfied.
26. Trespass -46(3)

Finding that adjacent landowner's COIIstruction of road on landowner's property
21. Trespass -46(3)
was malicious, outrageous, and unreasonFinding that adjacent landowner re- able, warranting award of punitive dammoved ton two-foot tall evergreen trees, ages in landowner's trespass action, was
ten four-foot tall evergreen trees, 17 six- supported by evidence that, when adjacent
foot tall evergreen trees, and three "birch landowner previously enlarged existing
Clumps" from landowner's property was road on landowner's property, landowner
supported by testimony that adjacent land- accused him of "raping" property and spe

632,
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cifically instructed him not to build any
roads or to change property in any way,
and that, when adjacent landowner requested permission to build road on property, landowner refused and again told adjacent landowner to leave property
notwithstanding adjacent landowner's testt
mony-that he built road for convenience of
landowner and that he had misinterpreted
landowner's previous admonitions.

31. Easements -5
In order to establish private prescrip.
tive right of easement, claimant must sub.
mit reasonably clear and convincing proof
of open, notorious, continuous, and uninter.
rupted use, under claim of right, with
knowledge of owner or servient tenement,
for prescriptive period of five years. 1.c.
g 5-203.

27. Damages -87(1)
Purpose of exemplary damages is to
deter defendant's misconduct, not to tompensate plaintiff for his losses.

32. Easements -7(.5)
If roadway's use was adverse for any
continuous five-year period, that use can
prescriptive right to use of road,
LC. 6 5-203.

28. .Damages -@87(1), 94
In ascertaining whether awards of exemplary damages are duplicitous, proper
focus of inquiry is not u.liether plaintiff
obtained double recovery, but whether defendant has incurred multiple penalties for
same wrongful act.
29. Trespass -56
Award of treble damages, pursuant lo
trespass statute, for adjacent landowner's
intentional and wilful removal of trees
from landowner's prope?ty d u g coastruetion of road 011 that property did not
preclude a\vartl of punitive damages for
adjacent laiidou~ner'sconduct in construct.
ing road; act of building road, underlaken
in defiance of landowner's unequivocal request that no road be built on his property,
wae act distinct from taking valuable trees.
LC. 5 6-202.
30. Appeal and Error -1052(5)
Any error in admitting hearsay testimony as to conversation in which adjacent
landowner allegedly contrived factual scenario, solely for purposes of landowner's
action against him to quiet title and for
trespass, to support his claim of owncrship
to disputed pmpcrty was harmless; trial
court found that defendant in fact believed
that lie owned property and refused to
award exemplary damages for trespass on
disputed property, indicating that it was
not nersnaded bv testimonv. Rules Civ.
103(a), 803(1).

38. Trespass -75

.i

39. Trespass -75
Party who successfully defends
against claim for treble damages in trespass action is not entitled to recoup his
attorney fees. I.C. 5 6202.
40. Trespass -75

Trial court did not abuse its discretion
in allocating one half of plaintiff's attorney
fees to his successful trespass action and
awarding those fees to him; substantial
amount of plaintiff's efforts were directed
at two claims on which ile did not prevail,
but some of legal work performed on those
claims overlapped with sueeessful claim for
trespass. 1.C. g 6-202.

34. F,aserncnts -36(I)
Presumption of adverse use and claim
of title applies where claimant of prescriptive easement has established his open, notorious, continuous, nninterrunted.
. . use for
prescriptive period, without evidence as to
how that use began.

UP~.)

ene, in Kootenai County, Idaho. The prope*,
known as the "Cottonwood Bay Prop
ertyt" originally was part of a larger parcel
owned by P.P. and Luciie Johnson, who, in
1926,. deeded it to A.M. Pratt using the
follOwing
-3
The north three and one-half acres of the 'd
east half of Lot (4) four, Section (4) four, N
Township Fortweden (47) North, Range p-(
(4) West of the Boise Meridian, less a
strip of land twenty-five feet wide on
south side of said described land which
is r m m d for t h ~purpose of giving
passage o r + l ~ t of way for a roadway.
(Emphasis added.)
By subsequent deeds of conveyance,
each containing the identical reservation
language, Leslie C. Bumgarner zed his
wife, Laura Bumgarner, acquired the Cottonwood Bay Property in 1947. Mr. Bumgamer died in 1963, leaving his interest in
the property to Laura. I11 1970, Laura
decided to divide the property equally
among her three children, Gary, Kent, and
Jean. Laura had deeds prepared conveying the north one-third of the Cottonwood
nav
to deiu,.
-." lot
~.~
...., the
~~~-south one-ihirrl
....... i
.n
.
Gary, and the middle one-tl~irdto Kent.
Each of thc deeds used identical language
Lo describe Uie lot being divided. Executing these deeds, Laura ttius conveyed to
Jean:
The North one-third of the followi~igdescribed property as measured along the
~

:

35. Esscment5 @31i(3)

Pitiding that adjacent landowner used '
turn-around road on landowner's property
u7ith landowner's permission, so that adjacent landowner was not entitled to pres::
criptive easement with respect to road, was :
supported by evidence that adjacent land- .:
owner used road after landowner acquired
property to access vehicles which landowner expressly permitted him to locate on
property. I.C., 5 5-203.
:

36. Costa *208
Where parties have succeeded on entirely segarate claims, those claims are ::
properly distillguished and should be analyscd separately in determining whether
attorney ices are avprouriate.
.. .

I

:

*194.16
Trial court is authorized to award ab

Trial court was required to award
,)laintiff full reasonable attorney fees attributable to his successful trespass claim,
even though defendant prevailed on some
trespass statute authorized court
to award fees only to plaintiff, and there
was
no statutory basis for offsetting award
or apportioning of fees between parties.
LC. 5 6202.

;

33. Easemenls @8(2)
Prescriptive right cannot be obtained if
use of servient tenement is by permission
of its owner, as such use clearly is not
ad~xerseto rights of owner. I.C. 5 5-203.

37.

---

"I.."

Cookc, hmaiina, Smith $ Cogs\seli,
Sandpoint, for deie~~dant-appelial~t.
D;lr
Cogswell argued.
hlichaei B. Kague, Coeur d'Alene, argued for plaintiff-respondent.
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WALTERS, Chief Judge.
This lawsuit stems from a property dispute between two brothers, Leslie Kent
Bumgarner ("Kent'? and Gary Bumgarner
("Gary"). Gary appeals from the judgment, entered against him, quieting title to
real property and awarding compensatory,
statutory and punitive damages for trespass. He also appeals from the district
court's award of attorney fees. For the
reasons explained below, we affirm.
Facts
The circumst;inces giving rise to this
ease involve the division and convevance of
approximately three and one-half acres of
real property fronting on Lake b u r d'Al-

The North three and one-half acres of
the East half of Lot (4) four, Section (4)
four, Township (47) Forty-seven North,
Range (4) West of the Boise Meridian,
less a strip of land twenty-five feet wide
on the south side of said described land
which is reserved for the purpose of giving passage or right of way for a roadway.
She conveyed to Gary:
Ttie South one-third of the following described property as measured along the
West line:
The North three and one-half acres of
the East half of Lot (4) four. Section (4)
four, Township (47) ~irty-seven.NO&,
Range (4) West -of theBoiae,Meridian,

~ s n

635
...
na- #?A Idaho 629 (Aps.3
for trespass in its construction. Gary also line he had insklled across Kent's properdenied Kent's claims for trespass arising ty, and to use the turn-around roadway in
from the construction the West Road, the middle of Kents lot. The parties' re- 20
which indisputably lies across Kent's lot. spective theories of deed construction are
p-i
He further asserted i~rescriptiverigllts to illustrated by the following skekh.
and maintain the septic tank effluent
.
hl
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less a strip of land twenty-five feet wide
on the south side of said described land
which is reserved for the purpose of giving passage or right of way for a roadway.
And she conveyed to Kent:
[The] South half of the North two-thirds
o f the following described property as
measured along the West line:
The North three and one-half acres of
the East half of Lot (4) four, Section (4)
four, Township (47) Forty-seven North,
Range (4) West of the Boise Meridian,
less a strip of land twenty-five feet wide
on the south side of said described land
which b reserved for the purpose of girring passage or right of way for a roadway.
I n 1973, a neighbor questioned the
boundaries of the Cottonwood Bay Propertv
and intimated
that he
>
.
....
... minht elaim a
right to use the twenty-five foot strip for
lake access. Troubled by aiis prospect,
Jean located P.P. Johnson, the original
grantor of the Cottonwood Bay Property.
Through Jean's efforts, Jotinson, in 1975,
gratuitously quitclaimed his interest in the
twenty-five foot strip to Jean, Kent and
Gary. In 1981, Jean and 1:ent quitclaimed
their iateiest in the skip Lo Gary, who held
titlo, to the south one-third of tlie CotLon.
wood Bay Property.
Laura died in 11181. In that same year,
Gary constructed a house on his lot, In the
process, he enlarged the already existing
turn-around roadway in the middle of
Kent's lot. When Kent, who was residing
outside the state a t the time, noticed the
change a year later, he confronted Gary
and accused him of "raping" his property.
However, reasoning that the damage had
already been done, Kent permitted Gary to
use the turn-around, but told him not to do
enything more to his lot. In June of 1986,
Kent wrote to Gary and Jean sj~ecifically
telling tlicm "not to change my lot in any
way; no roads, no tree or firewood removed, no beach cleaning, in short, no activity of any kind." That September, Gary
sought permission from Kent to build a
new road across Kent's property in order
to access the beach. Kent denied permis~~~~~

~~

~

~~~~

-~~~
~

~

sion and again told Gary that he wanted his
lot left alone.
In 1987, notwithstanding Kent's requests
to leave his lot alone, Gary constructed a
roadway across the west end of Kentzs lot
(''the West Road"). in the process, he d e
stroyed approximately thirtyseven fir
trees and several "birch clumps." Gary
also constructed a new road to the heach,
("the Beach Access &ad"), running in an
east-west direction, and in doing so r e
moved two or three pine trees. He also
erected a l~itcliingpost on Kent's lot, nea?
the shore. The Beach Access Road and the
hitcldng post are located on the south portion of Kent's lot, which, throughout this
litigation, both parties have claimed to own.

4

f'
X

:

U*.
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I'roecdural Background
In nlay, 1988, Kent filed this action
against Gary, seeking quiet title to a seventy-two foot lot which lie maintains he r e
,ceived as a result of Laura's division and
conveyance of all of tile Cottonwood Bay'
I'rollerty, incL%iling the twenty-five foot
strip, among her three children. He also j
alleged that Gary's construction of the two
roadways awoss 11;s lot constituted tres- -i
passes for which he was entitled Lo corn
pensatory, sl~itutoryand ijunitive demages.
Additionally, lie sought to recover damages .;
for the negligent infliction of emotionai
distress.
Gary denied all of Kent's claims and filed .
a counterclaim seeking to quiet title in him.
self to an eighty-nine foot wide parcel in :
the Cottonwood Bay Property. He alleged
that under the deeds of conveyance, Laura :
had divided the Cottonwood Bay Property,
czcluding the twenty-five foot strip, into
three sizlpJo~rfoot wide lots. He asserted that he lator acquired title to the twenty-five foot strip through the quitclaim
deeds of P.P. Johnson, dean and Kent, given io him in conjunction with a
but uncot~sum~nnted,
plan among his sib- . a
lings to redivide the entire Cottonwood Bay
Property. Based upon this factual scenario, he claimed that the Beach Access Road
was Ioeated on the northern portion of his
own lot, and thus he was not liable to Kent

LrkC
CDrw 0'Al.n"

<

.
caryCs meow of Deed construction

Both parties moved for,partial summary
judgment on the quiet title issue. Gary
asserted that Laura never meant to inelude
the conveyances to her children,
to divide the proper.
ty into three sixty-four foot wide lots. To
su!lport his assertion, he argued that the
grantor of the original deed in 1926 had
retained a fee interest in the twenty-five
,.:.,.,

. ~~.

foot strip, not merely an easement. Therefore, he argued, Laura had no interest in it
to convey Kent's position, on the oLlier
was that the
language
W ~ intended
S
reserve an easement or a
right-of-way over the twenty-five foot strip,
and tl,at in dividing and conveying the Cot.
tonwood B~~ property to her children, lau.
had included her fee interest in the

*trip.'
,
. . .

. , , ... . : .

636.
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After considering conflicting evidence on
the matter, the district court denied the
motions, holding that the deed language
reserving the twenty-five foot strip was
ambizuous and that extrinsic evidence
therefore would be admissible to interpret
Laura's intent. Followinr an eight-day trijury; the
al before the court without
district judge found that Laura had intended to convey, and did convey, to Jean, Kent
and Gary all of the Cottonwood Bay Prop
erty, including the twenty-five foot strip,
so that each of the children received a
parcel approximately seventy-two feet
wide. The court quieted title in Kent and
held tliat the Beach Access Road and the
hitching post were located on Kent's property. Eased upon these determinations,
the court awarded Kent $2,014.60 as tlie
costs to repair and restore the damage
caused by the Beach Acccss Road, plus
$201 for the pine trees removed in tlie
urocess. and $26 to remove tlie hitchine
bost. The couit further concluded tliat because Gary had believed he owned that
portion of the lot, his actions did not rise to
the level which would justify imposing exemplary damages.

BUMGARNEK v. BUMGAIlNEK
Ctlcsu I24 Idsho 629 (App.1

nance of the septic tank effluent line in.
stalled across Kent's lot.
Finally, the court determined that Kent
was the prevailing aartv in the lawsuit and
~.
awarded-him $5,ibi.41 in costs. The court
also found that because Kent had arevailed
on part of his statutory claim f i r treble
damages, he was entitled to attorney fees
under I.C. 8 6-202. The court awarded
$18,532.75 to him in attorney fees-the
amount it determined to be attributable to
the trespass claim upon which Kent had
prevailed. The court entered a final judgment in favor of Kent in the amount of
$36,689.87.
Gary appeals, chailetlging Oie court's d p
cision to quiet title to the disputed property
in Kent; the court's awards of eompensatory, statutory and put~itivedamages; and
the court's award of attorney fees.
Issues on Appeal

However, Gary had tiinde i ~ oclaim 01'
uwnersliip (a the west end of Kent's lot
over which Ile had constructed the West
Road. Eased upon Gary's t~cspass(a tlial
portion of Kent's lot, the court awarded
Kent 8816.50 to repair and restore the damage caused by the West Road, and
1 $6,190.44 for the value of trees Gary had
removed in the process. Pursuant to LC.
$ 6202, the court trebled the damages for
the trees to $18,511.37. Additionally, the
court awarded $15,000 in punitive damages
for the construction of the road, conduct
which the district court found to be "malicious, outrageous and unreasonable." The
court denied Kent's claim for neelilrcnt infliction of emotional distress. The court
also denied all of Gary's disputed clnims,
except that it granted him a prescriptive
right of easement for the use and mainte-

1. Did tile district court erroneously
conclude that the deeds by which Laura
divided and conveyed the Cottonwood
Day Property to her three children includc the twenty-five foot strip?
2. Did the courl erroneously award
~ c n dalnabrfs
t
for losses based on llfgligcncc, a tlicoh-y of recovery which was
never asserted in the pleadings?
3. Did the court err by awarding damages for temgorary injury to property
measured as the costs of repairing and
restoring the land?
4. Does the record lack sufficient evidence to support the court's award of
damages ior lhe removal of the trees
from the west end of Kent's property?
5. Did the court err in its award of
punitive damages? Specifically:
(a) Does the record lack substantial evidence l o support the award?
@) Did the court base its award on
causes of action barred by the statute
of limitation? and

tllc twenty-five fool strip. In 1981. Gary. Kent
and lean jointly eommissioncd another survey
ol the boundarier, which again showed the strip
to be included in the propeny thcy owned. A

commisrioned by Gay ~n Dccea.
ber. 1981-alter the commcncemcn! of this law.
ru#t+xcludcd the slrtr, from its dewn~tionof
the propny boundadk.

--

,,

IiiirJ runey,

:
:.

'4
.,

(c) Was the award duplicative of the
award of treble damages?
.
6. Did the court err by admitting hearsay testimony?
7. Did the court err denying Gary's
claim to a right by prescriptive easement?
8. Did the trial court erroneously award
Kent $18,532.15 in attorney fees?
Standards of Ileview .
[Is] In an appeal such as this, we are
presented with mixed questions of law and
fact. We will defer to factual findings
made by the district court, if they are not
clearly erroneous. I.R.C.P. 52(a). We do
not weigh the evidence, nor do we substitute our view of the facts for that of the
trial judge. Alumel v. Bear Lake Grazillg
Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812 P.2d 253, 256
(1991). We merely determine whether the
indings are supp&tcd by substantial, even
if confiictin~,evidence in the record. If so
supported, -sucli findings will not be
deemed clearly erroneous, and thus will not
be disturbed on appeal. S u n Valley
Slumvock Resou?.ces, Inc. v. Tmclcrs
Leasing Col~,., 118 Idaho 116, 118, 794
P.2d 1389, 1391 (1990). This same standard of deference on al)i)csl
eve11
. . aillllies
..
where the evidcnce rupl)ortirig the disputed
finding is entircly documentary. See Dew
Creek, Inc. v. GLav~ndonHot Spri71.9~
RancI~,Inc., 107 Idaho 286, 290-91, G
B
P.2d 1191, 1194-95 (CtApp.1984). However, we will exercise free review over the
lower court's conclusions of law to deter
mine whether the court correctly stated the
applicable law, and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the facts found.
B u m v. Aldeman, 122 Idaho 749, 75253, 838 P.2d 878, 881-82 (Ct.App.1992); Issak v. Idaho First Nnl, Bank, 119 Idaho
988, 989, 812 P.2d 295, 296 (Ct.App.lSSO),
affd, 119 Idaho 907, 811 P.2d 832 (1991).
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children a seventy-two foot wide lot, and
not a sixtyfour foot wide lot as urged by
Gary. This conclusion is based on the
court's construction of the phrase "less a v-4
strip of land twentyfive feet wide on south
side of said described land which is re- *-(
served for the purpose of giving passage
o r right of way for a roadway." (Emphasis added.)

<c

[ G I In construing a deed of conveyance, the trial court's priinary function is to
seekand give effect the real intention of
the oarties. Gardner v. Flieoel, 92 Idaho
167,'710, 450 P.2d 990, 993 (f969); Iiogan
v. Blakney, 1 3 Idaho 274, 279, 251 P.2d
209, 213 (1952); Phillips Industries, lnc. v.
Firkins, 121 Idaho 693, 696-91, 827 P.2d I
'
706, 109-10 (Ct.App.1992). Thus, if the
language of the deed is unambiguous, the d
parties' intent will be ascertained from the
deed itself as a matter of law, without
resort to extrinsic evidence. Lalhanz v.
Garner, 105 Idaho 854,857, 613 P.2d 1048,
1051 (1983); Gnvdncr, 92 Idaho a t 770-11,
450 P.2d a t 993-94. If, however, the dced
lnguage is found to be imbiguous, tllc
interprcb~tiotiof the grantor's intent becomes
a oucsLion
of iact to be detertnincd
. .~.
~
~
from the jnslrumcnt.j~selfand from all the
suwounding facts. and circumstances. Latha7n, 105 ldallo at 857, 673 p.2d at 1051;
Gardner, 92 Idaho a t 771, 450 P.2d a t 994.

[7] In the instant case, the district court
concluded that the phrase, "less a strip of
land twenty-five feet wide on south side of
said described land which is.reserved for
the purpose of giving passage or right of
way for a roadway," as contained in the
deeds from Laura, was ambiguous: the
phrase could mean either that the grantor
intended to retain a fee interest in the
strip, or that she intended merely to re1. The Trial Courl Did Not Erroneously serve a right of easement. In view of our
Construe the Deeds.
Supreme Court's decision in Gardner, 92
We turn first to the district court's con- Idaho a t 771, 450 P.2d a t 994, we uphold
clusion that Laura conveyed to each of her this threshold determination? Our task,
2. In (iilrdner, the Courl held that the phrase
Zers a strip of land 30 feet wide off the Eaa
side for madway war ambiguous: "On the one

-

hand it crpressa the inlent to retain the fee to
strip in the grantor. On the other hand it
ciprervr the Inten: lo create an eagmenr for

the

-
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then, is to determine whether the district
court erred in finding, as a matter of fact,
that Laura intended to include the strip in
her conveyances.

identical language to divide the property
among Laura's children, should likewise be
construed to include the twenty-five foot
strip. See Gnrdner, 92 Ida110 a t 770, 450
P.2d a t 993. Notwitlistanding the con.
[El We hold that the district court's struetion placed upon the prior deeds, Gary
finding that tl,e descriptive phrase was in- argues that contrary evidence demon.
tended to reserve an easement, only, is strates that Laura intended to ~ z c l u d ethe
amply supported by tire record. Although strip from her conveyances to her children.
the reservation clause in the deeds was In particular, Gary notes that the attorney
subject to r~ossibly conflictinp inter~reta- who drafted the deeds a t Laura's instruction;, the language nonethele& serves as tion testified that Laura did not intend to
grantors,
strong evidence that the original
..
include the strip with the conveyances.
the ~ohnsons,intended to reserve an e a s e Yet, a review of the trial transcript reveals
ment; there was no need to describe the that the lawyer's testimony was but ]>is
strip as being "reserved" for "a right of opinion, based upon his own interpretation
way" if they had intended to retain fee of the reservation language contained in
title. ~ c c o i dCusic v. Givens, 70 Idaho the original deed and his subjective belief
229. 231-32. 215 P.2d 297. 299-300 119501
.
.
that Laura urould not have wished to give
(holding that a deed c o n k i n g language Gary, her favored son, a lot encumbered by
"Except a strip of land sixteen feet wide an easement Nowhere did this witness
reserved for right-of-way for road pur- identify any statement froni Laura to indiposes" expl-esses an intent to convey tl,e cate either that she believed she did not
fee and reserve only an easement), o v c ~ own the stril~or that she owned it but
nbled on other glaunds, Cardenas v. wislled to retain it for herself. To the
Kuqjjuweit, 116 Ida!,o 739, 779 P.2d 414 contrary, the documeatary evidence admit(1989). Moreover, the evidence shows that ted a t trial amply demonstrates that Laura
after the Jol~nsonshad conveyed the prop. understood that her ownership of the Coterty, the c o u ~ ~ assessor's
ty
office no longer tonwood Bay Properly i?zelzded the tweiitreated (hem as o\iziiing any ice interest in
ty-five foot strip, and that slie iiilcnded to
that lot. All of the subsequent grantees,
convey to her children all of her interest in
including Leslie C. and Laura Bumgarner, that progert],, i?lcll~di?~;g
the st~.ip in queswere assessed taxes on the full property, tion. For exaniple, ia 1970, she wrote in
including the strip in question, during their her personal records "Gave Gary 'A lake
respective ownerships of the Cottonwood prop. 72." She made similar notations conBay Property. It was only a j l c ~the com- cerning the lots given Jean and Kent, each
mencement of this lawsuit that the asses. consistent with an understanding that she
sor's office began to treat the twenty-five owned the twenty-five foot strip and infoot strip as a separate parcel. Based tended to include it in her conveyances to
upon this record, we uphold the district her children, and inconsistent with Gary's
court's finding that the original deed of claim Oiat she ,had Intended to convey
conveyance was intended to include tlie three, sixty-four foot lots.
strip in question, and that the reservation
Gary further complains t l ~ a by
t its findlanguage was intended to reserve only a
ing that Laura intended to include the
right-of-way over it for a roadway.
twenty-five foot strip in her conveyances,
[91 In light of the construction placed the district court improperly rejected the
on the language -in the original deed of testimony offered by other witnesses.
conveyance, the later deeds, which used Tl~is argument is misplaced. As noted
rordwny over

tlw strip in favor of ,he graniai.
Such expressions a( intent are inronrincnl." 92
ldpllo 31 77&71. 450 P.2d a1 993-94. Contpore
Cuze v. Civenr, 70 Idaho 229, 231-32. 215 P.2d
297. 299-300 (1950) (holding ,hat a deed con.

tnining lanyagc '"Excepta sfrip of land sixteen
feet wide reserved for right.of.way for road purporn'' cxpresres an intent to convey the fee and
resene only an easement).

above, our role in reviewing contested find- puted southeast portion of Kent's lot.
ings of fact does not permit us to reweigh With respect to those trespasses, the court
conflicting evidence. We are limited to de- concluded that, because Gary had believed
termining whether the record contains sub- he owned the portion of land in question, -E'
stantial evidence to support the challenged his invasion of Kent's property rights was 4
findings.
The record before us in this ease not wilful and intentional, hut merely negli-..
is replete with such evidence, and the gent. Consequently, the court declined to 4
court's findings will not he disturbed. The award treble damages for the value of the
judgment quieting title in Kent to a lot pine trees removed. Similarly, the court
seventy-two feet wide, which is based upon refrained from granting punitive damages
those challenged findings, therefore. is af- for Gary's conduct, concluding that "Such
firmed.
negligence does not rise..to a level which
would justify the awarding of punitive
2. The Court Did Not Grant Recovery
damages," and thus awarded Kent only the
Under a Negligence Theory.
costa of repairing and restoring the southGary also assigns error to the district east,portion of his land. A reading of the
court's findings that he had "negliget~tly" memorandum opinion further reveals that
damaged Kent's lot by constructing the the court'sadditional reference to Gary's
' , ,
Beach Access Road and the hitching post, negligence was in its decision to deny
and by removing two trees, all wl~ichoc- Kent's claim f6r negligent infliction of emocurred on the portion of the property which tional distress. Consequently, we reject
both parties claimed to own. Gary main- Gary's assertion that the court's finding of
tains that these findings, and the damages negligence served as the basis of an award
awarded on tile basis of such findings, against him.
must lie overturned because the theory of
"negligent damage to property'' was never
3. The Court Employed thc Correct
pled or tried in this case, As exjilained
: nlcasure of Da~~iagesfor Injury
below, this argument miscl~aracterizesthe
to Property.
district judge's findings and conclusions.
[lo, 111 Althougl>not stz~tediii tlie sbi.[I31 Gary next asserts t l ~ a ttlie trial
ute, 1.C. 6 G-202 agplies only w11(?rc the court einploycd
improper measure in
alleged trespass is shovrn to have been assessing damages-resulting from the treswilful and intentional. Eavl v. Fo~dice,84 passes to Kent's land. Where, a s here, the
Idaho 542, 545, 374 P.2d 713, 714 (1962); injury to the land is temporarj. and not
Menasl~a Woodenware Co. v. Spokane permanent, the owner is entitled to recover
Int'l Railway Co., I9 Idaho 586, 594, 115 the amount necessary to repair the injury
P. 22, 24 (1911). Thu,, where 'the deien- and put the land in the condition it was at
dant wrongfully enters upon tlie plaintiff's
the time immediately preceding the injury. '-'
property or cuts his trees, but the defen- Smith v. Big Lost River In.Dist., 83
dant's trespass is neither wilful or i n t o Idaho 374, 385, 364 P.2d 146, 157 (1961), --.'
tional, the plaintiff is entitled to recover his cited i n Bradford v. Simpson,' 91 Idaho
actual damages a t common law, hut he is 133, 192 n. 1, 541 P.2d 615 616 n. 1 (1975);
not entitled to have those damages trebled. Raide v. Dollar, 34 Idaho 682, 683, 203 P.
McnasIia IVoodenware Co., 19 Idaho a t 469, 471 (1921); McLaugRlin v. Robi?lson,
594, 115 P. a t 24; see nlso Afococlc 7,. Pot- 103 Idaho 211, 216, 646 P.2d 453, ;158 (Ct.
latcl~C O ~ .786
, P.Supp. 1545, 1547 (D.lda- App.1982). Applying this measure, the dlsho 1992).
trict court awarded Kent $816.50 to repair
[I21 I t is clear from the district court's and restore the injury caused by the conmemarandum.oninion that the court's find- struction of the West Road, $2,074.60 as
ings of negligence were directed, in part, to the costs to repair and restore the damage
its denial of Kent's claim for treble d a m caused by the Beach Access Road, and $26
ages for trespasses occumng on the dis- as the cost of removing the hitching post.

-
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~

~

~
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[I41 Gary contends that the court erred
by allowing Kent to recover the costs of
repairing and restoring his land absent any
evidence that the property's market value
had diminished. Gary relies on Alesko w.
Union Pacific R.R. Co., G2 Idaho 235, 2.11,
109 P.2d 874, 877 (1941), wherein our Supreme Court stated that, "if the cost of
restoration exceeds the value of the premises in their original condition, or the diminution in market value the latter are the
limits of recovery!'
This limitation has not
appeared in the Supreme Court's more recent statements concerning the measure of
damages for temporary injury to real property. See, e.g., Bradford, 97 Idaho a t 192
n. 1, 541 P.2d a t G I G n. 1; Smitlb, 83 Idaho
a t 385, 364 P.2d a t 157; see also McLauglbl i n , 103 Idaho a t 216, 64G P.2d a t 458.3
However, assuming that diminution in market value does establish an outer limit of
recovery for temporary injury to land, we
conclude that the record contains substantial, competent evidence to show that the
damages awarded by the court did not exceed this limit.

[I51 As owller of the property a t issue,
Kent was competent to testify to its value.
S??tillb, 83 Idaho a t 386, 364 P.2d a t ,152.
ISe testified that Gary's bulldozing aclivities had diminished the .oro~~ertv's
. " inarket
value by the cost of repairing and restoring
the land. Moreover, there was no competent evidence to sliow that the value of the
lot Iiad not decreased as Kent had testified.
Contrary to Gary's assertion, the fact that
the value of the lake-front iot has continued to appreciate over the years does not
negate Kent's claim for damages. Finding
no error in the court's measure of damages, we uphold the court's decision to
award Kent the costs of repairing and restoring his property.
4. Sufiicicnt Evidence Supported
the Damages Awarded for
Rcmovsl or the Trees.
[I61 Gary also asserts that the trial
court's award of damages for the trees
taken from the west end of Kent's lot was
3. Of courss, even if this limitation has been
abandoned, recovery still-would be subject to
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not adequately supported by the evidence,
and therefore should be vacated. In an
action for timber trespass, the measure of
actual damages is based upon the amount
of the trees taken and the market value of
the trees in that area a t the time of the
taking. 1.c. Q 6-202; Mercer v. S/lea%~,
84 Idaho 536, 540-41, 374 P.2d 116, 719
(1962). I n this case, the court found that
Gary had removed from the west end of
Kent's property ten two-foot tall evergreen
trees, valued a t $240; ten four-foot tali
evergreen trees, valued a t $480; and seven.
teen six-foot tall evergreen trees, valued at
$1,224. The court also found that Gary
had removed three "birch clumps." valued
a t $4,246.44.
[I?-201 Gary complains that the testimony as to the number of trees removed
was sometimes so general, and sometimes
so conflicting, that it was insufficient to
adequately establish the amount of Kent's
ean~ages. We disagree. To establish his
damages, Kent was required to show, with
reaso~~able
certainty, the number of the
trees taken. "Reasonable cerhinty" does
riot require matl~ematical exactitude, but
only that the danlztges ire tsken out of the
realm of speculation. I f ~ e n e r 71. Ada
Coz~nly1 3 ~ ~ 1 ~f.ius t~, a .108
~ Id;lI~o170, 174,
697 P.2d 1284, 1188 (1985); Lewsslon IJ1.cMix Concrete, Inc., v. Rolzdc, 110 Ida110
640, 648, 718 P.2d 551, 559 (Ct.Ap11.1985).
The mere fact that it is difficult to arrive a t
exact an~ount of damages, where it is
shown that damages resulted, does not
mean that damapes may not be awarded; it
is for the trier-if-factto fix the amouilt.
S?nit/b v. Daniels, 93 Idaho 716, 718, 471
P.2d 571, 573. (1970). In fixing that
amount, it is for the trier of fact ta deteimine the credibility of the witnesses, to :.
resolve conflicts in the evidence, and to z
draw reasonable inferences therefrom. El- ~.
i o ~ ~ u l ov.s Ifondo Fanns, Inc., 102 Idaho :
915, 919, 643 P.2d 1085, 1089 (Ct.A1,p.1982). j
1211 The testimony in the record shows
that Gary caused U~irtyto fifty evergreen ;
trees to be removed from Kent's lot; that '>
principles of economic wane end avoidable
consCSuenas.

.

.
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approximately twelve of those trees were
between six and eight feet high: that approximately twenty were between four and
six feet talk and that the rest were less
than four feet tell. The testimony also
showed that Gary also had up to four birch
clumps removed from the west end of
Kent's property. The district court's findings as to the number, size and species of
the trees removed are consistent with this
testimony and the other evidence submitted, and thus are supported by the evidence.
[22,231 Gary also takes issue with the
court's valuation of the trees. Specifically,
he argues that tile court erred in valuing
the trees based upon evidence of tile cost
of repurchasing them on the open market.
He suggests that the court instead should
have calculated the value of the trees
based upon the price Kent would have received had he sold them "on site." It is
well established, however, that the cost of
replacement is evidence of an item's "mar
ket value!'
See Spa?zbauer v. J.R. Simplot Go., 107 Idaho 4 5 46, 685 P.2d 271,
275 (1984). Finding no error, we uphold
the district court's dccision concerniog the
valuation of trees removcd.
5. Punitive Damagcs.
Gary also cl~allcngesthe court's award
of punitive damages. Specifically, he argues that (a) the trial court based the
award on conduct for which recovery was
time-barred; (b) the evidence was insufficient to support the award; and (c) the
recovery of punitive damages duplicates
the award of treble damages.

(APP.)

641

way. In 1986, when Gary sought permission to build the road across the west end
of Kent's property, Kent refused and again
told Gary that he wanted his lot left alone.
Based upon these findings, the district
court concluded:
*-I
The constmction of the road on the west
end of Kent's lot was intentional, reck- 4
less and in knowing disregard of Kent's
property rights. For Gary, an individual
knowledgeable about tree farming and
who had previously been accused by
Kent of raping Kent's lot and told in no
uncertain terms by Kent "to please not
change my lot in any way; no roads, no
tree or firewood removal, no beach cleaning, in short, no activity of any kind" to
have constructed the west end road was
the height of arrogance. Such conduct
was maliciohs, outrageous and unreason- -i
able. Kent is entitled to an award of
punitive damages against Gary in the
sum of $15,000.00. Such sum is necessary to both punish Gary for his past
conduct and to deter such future conduct.
;Gary notes that any claims for damages
arising out his conduct in 1981, i.~., tile
cnlargetnent of the turn-around road and
the installation of the effluent line across
Kent's lot, are barred by tlie statute of
limitatirm, see LC.'$ 5-218(2), and were appropriately dismissed by the court prior lo
trial. Gary maintains,, however, that lie
cause the statute of limitation precluded
recovery for any damages incurred in 1981,
the statute likewise ~recluded the cour'
from considering the parties' conduct a-t'
that time when it evaluated Kent's damages claims arising in 1981.

a. The award was not Based upon timeI t is clear that the court's reference to
barred ciaims.
t11e 1981 incident goes to the fact that Gary
[241 In its memorandum opinion, the was, from that point forward, put on notice
district court found that in 1981, Gary had that any further damage to Kent's lot
enlarged the turn-around road on the west would not be tolerated. Thus, regardless
end of Kent's lot and had also installed a whcther Kent could recover for the damseptic tank effluent line across Kent's prop- ages he sustained in 1981, the parties' conerty. The court further found that when duct a t that time was evidence bearing on
Kent observed the changes to his lot, he Kent's claims for the trespass arising in
accused Gary of raping his land,'and later 1987. In particular, the evi'dence was r e l e
specifically instructed Gary. not to build vant to.determinine Garv's state of mind
any mads or to change hisproperty in any when ,he,decided to-bnlldbze a m a d aaoss

wJ
Lv
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the west end of Kent's lot, an essential
element of Kent's claims for punitive damages. See Clbeney e. Palos Verdes Inv.
Cow., 104 Idaho 897, 905, 665 P.2d 661,
669 (1983). At trial, Gary had protested
that his intentions in constructing the West
Road across Kent's land were innocent, if
not magnanimous. However, evidence of
Gary's previous conduct, including his actions in 1981, was relevant to refute this
assertion and tended to show instead that
his actions were malicious, outrageous, and
done with knowing disregard of Kent's
property rights. Hence, Gary's conduct in
1981 bore upon Kent's claims for punitive
damages, and was properly considered by
the trial court.
6. SzcOstantial evide?zce suppovts the
awa~d.
1251 Gary also contests the punitive
damages award on the ground that such an
award was not sufficiently supported by
the facls. Our Supreme Court has stated:
An award of punitive damages will be
sustained 01, appeal only wlien it is
shown that the defendant acted in a manner that was "an extreme deviation fron~
ieasonahle standards of conducl, and
that the act was performed by the defendant with an understanding of or disregard for its likely consequences." The
justification for punitive damages inust
be that tlie defendant acted with an extremely liarmful state of mhid, whether
that state bc termed "malice, oppression,
fraud or gross negligence"; malice, oppression, wantonness"; or simply "deliberate or willful." (Citations omitted).
Man?d?lg v. Turin Jklls Clinic & Hosp.,
122 Idaho 47, 52,830 P.2d 1185, 1190 (1932)
quoting Cfzeueg, 104 Idaho a t 905, 6G5
P.2d a t 669. Wlicn a trial court has made a
punitive award, our standard of review is
whether substantial evidcncc supports the
determination that the requisite factual
findings criteria have been satisfied. It.T.
N a i ~ mCo. v. Hulel, 114 Idaho 23, 29, 752
P.2d 625, 631 (Ct.App.1988).
[261 Gary complains that the court's

finding that Gary's conduct was "malicious, outrageous and unreasonable" was

erroneous in light of his testimony that his
only motive for bulldozing Kent's property
was "to further a family convenience for
both Kent and Jean" and that he had misin.
terpreted Kent's previous admonitions to
leave the property alone. The trial court
weighed Gary's testimony against the body
of evidence showing that Gary's actions
were done in wilful disregard of Kent's :
property rights. The evidence, although
conflicting, was sufficient to support the
trial court's findings that Gary's actions
were "intentional, reckless and in knowing
disregard of Kent's property rights" and
that his conduct was "malicious, outta.
geous and unreasonable." Compare R.T.
Nnhm Co., 114 Idallo a t 29,752 P.2d a t 631
(punitive damages award for trespass vacated on basis, in part, tliat property right !
infringed upon was uncertain until after
adjudication). Accordingly, we will not disturb these findings on appeal.

act of taking trees did not prevent the trial
court fmm awarding punitive damages for
Gary's conduct in constructing the West
Road. In granting this latter damages
award, the court found that Gary's aet of
?oad building-undertaken in defiance of
Kent's unequivocal request that no improvements be made to the lot, specifically
"no roadsu-was an act distinct from the
act of taking valuable trees. In denying
Gary's post-trial motion to amend Lhe findings, the district court again expressly
found that its punitive damages award was
not duplicative of its award of treble damages, but that it had based each award
upon distinct acts committed by Gary. We
further observe that each of these awards
is supported by the evidence, and thus neither will be disturbed on appeal.

p Tile award did no1 duplicate the

(301 Gary also takes exception to the
court's decision te allovr Kent to testify to
a previous conversation he had with Jean's
son, IIerb. The thrust of tllis testimony
was that Jean and Gary had conirived a
factual scenario, solely for purposes of this
lawsuit, to support Gary's claim of owner.
ship to the disputed southcrn portion of
to tlie teslimoiig
Kent's lot. Garv
. ob.iectcd
.
on the ground that it was hearsay. Ovcrruling the objection, the court admitted the
evidence under the "present sense impression" exception to the rule against hearsay.
See I.R.E. 803(1). We note, however, that
the district court expressly found that Gary
in fact helieved he owned the disputed por
tion of Kent's lot.' This finding, which is
contrary to Herb's reported story, indicates
that the court was not persuaded by this
hearsay testimony. Moreover, the court's
finding is consistent with its refusal to
award any exemplary damages arising out
of Gary's construction of the Beach Access
Road and the installation of the hitching
post. Hence, we conclude that any error in
allowing the hearsay testimony was harmless, a s it did not affect any substantial
right of the party, Gary, over whose objection the evidence was admit@ See I.R.E.
1031a); X.R.C.P. 61.
. .., . .. . .

a w a ~ dof slatut.o?y damages.
127,281 Pinall),, me consider whether
the court erred in granting boU1 punitive
damages and ti-ebk damages under the
statute.
Thesc allegedly duglicitous
awards were granted as cxcmplary damages, the purpose of which is to deter the
defendant's misconduct, not to compensate
the plaintiff for his losses. Soria v. Sic?-ra
Pac. Airlines, 111 Idaho 594, 610, 726 P.2d
706, 712 (1986). Hence, in ascertaining
whether the awards are duplicitous, the
proper focus of our inquiry is not whether
the plaintiff obtained a double recovery,
but whether the defendant has incurred
multiple penalties for ilic same wrongful
a c t Cf: 22 AM.JUR.2D D a n m e s D 817
(1988). . I t has been said that the imposition
of two penalties for llie same wrongful act
violates basic fairness and thus due process
of law, even though the theories behind the
cnuscs of action differ. See id., a t 864.
I291 The record in this ease reflects
that, a s required by I.C. Q 6202, the court
granted damages for treble the value of
the trees that Gary had intentionally and
wilfully removed from Kent's l o t However, this award of statutory damages for the
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6. Admission of Ifearsay Evidence Did
Not Constitute Reversible Error.

7. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Re-

fusing to Grant a Prescriptive Right
to the Turn-around Roadway.

-

U3

[31-331 Gary next asserts that thc
court erred in denying his claim of a prescriptive right of easement over the turn- hP
around road located in the middle of Kent's ~4
lot. In order to establish a private prescriptive right of easement, a claimant must
submit reasonably dear and convincing
proof of open, notorious, continuous, and
uninterrupted use, unde? a claim of right,
with the knowledge of the owner of the
servient tenement, for the prescriptive period of five years. LC. $ E-203; Chen v.
Conwa~,. 121 Idaho 1000, 1005, 829 P.2d
1349, 1354 (1992); West v. Smith, 95 Idaho
550. 557. 511 P.2d 1326.1333 (1973). 'If the
roadway's use was adverse for a n y eontinuous fiveyear period, that use can estab.
lish a prescriptive riglit to the continued
use of the road. Burnett w. Jayo, 119
Idaho 1009, 1012, 812 P.2d 316, 319 (Ct.
App.1991). However, a prescriptive right
catiuot be obtained if the use of the servient tenement is by jiermission of i t s ownui-, as such use clearly is not adverse to the
right3 of the owner. Slate ez rcl. Na?n(~?~li
h FOG 100 Idalio 140, 143, 594 P.2d 1093,
lO$G (1979); B ~ i n l sa Alderman, 122 Jdaho 749, 754, 83$ l3.2d 878, 883 (Ct.App.
1992).

---

-

In this ease, the district court found that
Gary's use of the turn-around had been
permissive. Gary takes issue with this
finding. He contends that his continued
use of the turn-around roadway between,._:
1970-when Kent first acquired title to the
lot-nd
1982, when Kent confronted Gary ._,:
about having widened the roadway, raised
the presumption of adverse use for the
prescriptive period and shifted the burden
to Kent to prove that tile use was permissive. Ile argues that Kent failed Lo rebut
tbis presumption, and that the court's finding therefore must be reversed. We are
not persuaded.
[34,35] The presumption from which
Gary seeks to benefit applies where the
claimant has..established .his open, notorious, wntinuous,:and uninterrupteduse. of
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the way for the prescriptive period, uithout &dence as to how that use began.
West, 95 Idaho a t 557, 511 P.2d a t 1333;
Bums, 122 Idaho a t 754, 838 P.2d a t 883.
In this case, however, the record contains
ample evidence detaiiing tlie Bumgarner
family's acquisition of the Cottauwood Bay
Property, the forging of the original turnaround road in the middle of that property,
and Gary's use of the turn-around between
1970 and 1973 to access vehicles which
Kent had expressly permitted him to locate
on his lot. Given this evidence, a presumption of adverse use and claim of title was
not appropriate. Moreover, the record is
devoid of any evidence to show that Gary's
use of the existing turn-around was adverse to Kent's interests, or that Gary had
ever asserted a claim of nonpermissive
right to use that roadway. Upon this r e e
ord, tlie court could properly find that
Gary's use of the turn-around after 1970
had heen with Kent's permission. Accordingly, we uphold that finding.

on entirely separate claims, those claims
are properly distinguished and should be
analyzed separately in determining wheth.
or attorney fees are appropriate. See
Ranzco v. H-I< Contractors, Inc, 118 Ida.
ho 108, 113, 794 P.2d 1381, 1388 (1990);
~ u v. mCounty ojBoundary, 120 Idaho
623, 625-26, 818 P.2d 327, 329-30 (Ct.App..
ISSO), modz3ed on othergrounds, 120 Ida. ;
110 614, 818 P.2d 318 (1991). We also note,
however, that the trial court is authorized
to award attorney fees only as provided by
statute or contract. I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l); see :
also Hellar v. C e n a m ~ s a ,106 Idaho 571,
578, 682 P.2d 524, 531 (1984). In this case,
the court based its award of iees on I.c.
8 6202. That statute, which applies to
claims for intentional and wilful trespass,
mandates an award of reasonable attorney
fees in an ?.tiion "brought to enforce the
terms of this act if the plaintiff prevails."
Id As applied to the case a t hand, this :
statute authorized the district court to j
,award fees only to Kent, "the plaintiff" in
that action, and then to awa1.d only those
8. Thc Attorney Fecs Award Does Not
fees reasonably incurred in prosecuting the
Represent xn Abuse of 1)iscrelion.
trcspass action upon which lie prevailed.'
1 3 ~ ~ 3 9 \+ie
1 ,lert consider
district lienee, even tIioug11 the court found that
a yi had
on some of the claims
award of auor,lc), fees. ~ . ' ~ l j ~G ~
, ~ prevailed
~
" ~ s e ~ t it
d ,found no skitutory biisis upon
tile district coi,rt,s issuiiIlce
findings
a costs biii wl~icli he would be entitled Lo any off?jent
w],icj, included $37,0(;5.50 in
fees. ~ e t t i l x award. ~onsequently, and conB~ its subsequeilt
decision trary to Gary's position, there was no basis
and order awardillg attorney fees, tiie dis. for the court to apportion fees between the
am,or. p e ~ t i e s . Rather, the court was required to
trict courtheid that
tionment of the total fees incurred in this award Kent his full reasonable attorney
sum of fee attributable to his successful trespass
matter to the trespass claim, is
$18,532.75," and awarded Kent attorney
fees in that amount. Gary does not dispute
[401 it is clear from
court's
that Kenes success on the statutory tresmemorandum opinion and order awarding :
pass
entitles
him
a mandatory attorney fees that the court considered the ,.:
award of attorney fees under LC. 8 6-202. fact
a suhslantial
of Kent#s :i
However, Gary contends that the trial eiiorts were directed at
upon which
court abused itq discretion in fixing Uie he did not
specifically citing Kent>s .
amount of the award, arguing Ll~at the elaim
tres13ass to ti,e bvacl,
his
court failed to 1)roperly consider the claims property and K~~~~~
for
:,
-upon whicli he, Gary, had prevailed.
distress. The court found, however, that
Gary is correct with respect to his asset- some of the legal work performed on those
tion that where the parties have succeeded claims overlapped with Kent's successful ,
4. Thus, a party who successfuily defenhF againa
I.R.C.P. 54(e)(l). Compare I.C. g 12-120(3)

district

a claim for tre6le damages is nor entitled to
recoup his fees under thcstatute. I.C. 5 6202:

(mandating attorney feer, in cettain cases, to
the

"prevailing pnrry.")
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claim for tresvass to the west end of his
Kt, and that ~ e n was
t entitled to recover
those fees. Accord Bubak v. Euans, 117
Idaho 510, 513, 788 P.2d 1333, 1336 (Ct.
~pp.1989). Based upon its findings, which
Gary does not dispute here, the court allocated one-half of all Kent's attorney fees,
or $18,532.75, to the prosecution of the
successful trespass claim. Upon this record, we conclude that the district court
acted within the boundaries of its 'discretion and consistent with the legal standards
applicable to its decision. We further conclude that the court reached its decision
through the exercise of reason. Finding no
abuse of discretion, we affirm the district
court's award of attorney fees. See Associo,tcs Norlizwesl, Inc. v. Beets, 112 Idaho
603, 605, 733 P.2d 824, 826 (Ct.App.1987).
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DEPARTMENT OF INSURANCE, c.1
State of Idaho, Respondent.
pi
No. 20152.
Court of Appeals of Idaho
Oct. 8, 1993.

Insurance agent appealed administrative determination that he had misappropriated premium trust funds. On rejnand,
119 Idaho 581, 808 P.2d 1326, Department
of Insurance 'again suspended agent's license. and arent again appealed. The
Conclusion
pour& ~udicia?Distri;t ~ o u & , ~ dCounty,
a
Deborah Bail, J., affirmed, and further apWe affirm the district court's judgment
Court of
peal was taken,
quieting title in Kent to a lot approximately
C.J,,
that:
de.
sevealty-Lwo feet wide. Additionally, we partment3s failureto sei,d a warl,ing letter
affirm the district court's awards of coni- before filing complaint againsl agent was
pensator?, statutory and punitive damages no$ jurisdictiooal error, and thus could not
against Gary. Finally, we uphold the dis. be raised for first time 011 appeal, and (2)
tricl court's a!vard of attol.ne)r fees.
,ircluiuins col]ected by agei~t,whether reBecause lic lias pre\,ailed in this appeal, ferrred to as "accoupl current premiums,"
Kcnt is enlitled to his costs on appeal. or "direct bill" business, were premiums
I.A.R. 40. We iurUler hold that Kent is held by agent in trust and thus could not
also entitled to an award of attorney fees properly be withheld from insurer.
on appeal pursuant to LC. 8 6-202. See
Affirmed.
Bubak, 117 Idaho a t 513,788 P.2d a t 1336.
The amount of attorney iees shall be determined as provided by I.A.R. 41.
1. Administrative Law and Procedure
-683
SWANSTROM, and CAREY, JJ., Pro
On appeal from administrative deterTem., concur.
mination, Court of Appeals reviews record
with the regard for, but independently of,
district court's review in decision.
2. Administrative

-_

Imw and Procedure
-786, 788
Reviewing court may not reverse findings of administrative agency where findings are clear, dispositive and supported by
'evidence in record; agency's finding8 are
binding even where there exists conflicting
.ievidenw~~1~:1.@~.~~67d21&4
- (1991).>.ne;.:.-:
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E. E. RAIDE, Respondent, V.DAVID H. DOLLAR, Appellant.
[Cite as Raide v. Dollar, 34 Idaho 6821
December 28, 1921
EVIDENCE - OPINION TESTIMONY - ADMISSIBILITY OF - REAL PROPERTY-DAMAGESTEMPORARY INJURY-INSTRUCTIONS-WHOLE CHARGE TO BE READ AND CONSIDERED
TOGETHER - RIVER - HIGH-WATER MARK.
1. Evidence examined and held sufficient to support the verdict and judgment.
2. Error cannot be predicated upon the admission of testimony of witnesses as to what in their opinion it would
cost to place certain land back in the same condition that it was before logs were dragged over it, where such
witnesses testified as to the nature and extent of the injury.
3. In an action for damages for temporary injury to real property, the owner is entitled to recover the amount
necessary to repair such injury and to place the land back in the same condition it was immediately prior to the
injury.

4. All of the instructions given in a case must be read and considered together, and where, talcen as a whole,
they correctly state the law and are not inconsistent, but may be reasonably
-"--"--,
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and fairly harmonized, it will be assumed that the jury gave due consideration to the whole charge, and was not
misled by any isolated portion thereof.
5. The high-water mark of a river, not subject to tide, is the line which the river impresses on the soil by
covering it for sufficient periods to deprive it of vegetation and to destroy its value for agriculture.
6. Held, that the record contains no evidence tending to show that the land claimed by respondent is below the
high-water mark of the north fork of the Coeur d'Alene River.
APPEAL from the District Court of the First Judicial District, for Shoshone County. Hon. William W. Woods,
Judge.
Action for damages to real property. Judgment for plaintiff. Aflrmed.
Robert H. Elder and C. D. Randall, for Appellant.
The court committed prejudicial error in not requiring witnesses to qualify before receiving their testimony.
(Jones on Evidence, sec. 363, p. 456.)
"If the land is temporarily but not permanently injured, the owner is entitled to recover the amount
necessary to repair the injury and put the land in the condition it was at the time immediately preceding the
injury, with legal interest thereon to the time of the trial." (Boise Valley Const. Co. v. Kroeger, 17 Idaho 384,
105 Pac. 1070,28 L. R. A., N. S., 968; Youngv. Extension Ditch Co., 13 Idaho 174,89 Pac. 296.)
d 9'>P
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"On navigable streams riparian rights do not extend beyond the high-water mark." (Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v.
Hirzel, 29 Idaho 438, 161 Pac. 854.)
"The title of the state extends not only to the land underlying that part of a navigable stream or body of
water over which navigation may be conducted, but extends to the entire bed, and in particular to the land which
is covered and uncovered by the ordinary rise and fall ofthe tide, stream or lake." (Churchill Co. v. Kingsbury,
178 Cal. 554,174

--~-------
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Pat. 329; Barney v. Keokuk, 94 U. S. 324,24 L. ed. 224; McManus v. Carmichael, 3 Iowa, 1.)

The defendant had the right to use the channel of the north fork of the Coeur d'Alene River at all stages of
the water (Idaho Northern Ry. Co. v. Post Fulls Lbr. Co., 20 Idaho 695, 119 Pac. 1098,38 L. R. A,, N. S., 114;
Mashburn v. St. Joe Improvement Co., 19 Idaho 30,113 Pac. 92,35 L. R. A,, N. S., 824), and it has been held
tliat such use, even when the water is above the line of mean high water, would not be a use of the adjoining
land. (Lownsdale v. Grays Harbor Boom Co., 36 Wash. 198,78 Pac. 904.)
McFarland & McFarland, for Respondent.
Where one instruction is ambiguous or incomplete, but taken with a11 the instructions correctly stales the
law, the decision of the lower courl will not be reversed on account of such incomplete or ambiguous
instruction. (Bruyman v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 31 Idaho 140,169 Pac. 932.)
BUDGE, J.-In respondent's complaint there are two causes of action alleged. In the second cause of action
respondent sought to recover damages sustained by reason of the destruction of his dwelling-house and personal
property situated therein and permanent injury to the land described in the first cause of action. The injuries
complained or and sustained by respondent in his second cause of action were found upon the trial by the court
to have been due to the act of God, and not to negligence or fault upon the part of appellant, but to an
extraordinary flood which occurred on or about the thirtieth day of December, 1917, in the north fork of the
Coeur d'Alene River, adjacent to which stream respondent's land is situated, the waters having suddenly risen to
an unprecedented height, causing logs belonging to appellant in large numbers which were upon rollways along
the bank of the river to be precipitated into the stream and carried down with large quantities of other logs
belonging to other parties, as well as stumps and debris, on to the lands of the respondent.

In his first cause of action respondent alleged, inter alia, that about four and a half months after said logs
had been permitted to lodge and jam upon and against his said lands and premises, appellant negligently and
wrongfully and without the consent of and contrary to respondent's wishes, with force and violence entered
upon respondent's lands and premises and particularly upon his meadow, with teams of horses, logging trucks
and devices, and proceeded to remove the logs of appellant from the premises, and in so doing cut up and
injured his meadow lands, causing numerous and divers roads and roadways to be made, on, over and across the
same, to his damage in the sum of $500, and negligently and wilfully cut down and destroyed two apple trees of
the value of $25 each, whereby respondent was further damaged in the sum of $50.
Appellant entered a general and special denial to the foregoing allegations contained in respondent's first
cause of action.
Judgment was entered upon the verdict of the jury in favor of the respondent, assessing his damages in the
sum of $500, from which judgment and an order denying a motion for a new trial, this appeal is prosecuted.

-
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Appellant assigns as error the insufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict or judgment; the action of
the court in giving and in refusing to give certain instructions; that the verdict is excessive and was rendered
under the iilfluence of passion and prejudice; and that the court erred in overruling defendant's motion for a new
trial.
The latter error assigned is not discussed in appellant's brief, and will not be considered upon this appeal.
In order to pass upon the question of the sufficiency of the evidence, it becomes necessm to review briefly
some ofthe testimony offered during the trial. It is admitted that respondent was the owner in fee, in the
possession and entitled to the possession of the premises described in his complaint. It was also established
beyond dispute that appellant went upon the premises and particularly the meadow

land of respondent and removed therefrom by the use of teams, trucks and other devices, a large number of logs
that had been deposited upon the meadow lands as a result of the flood, and that the same were dragged for
some distance over the meadow lands to the bank of the river and dumped into the stream for the purpose of
being floated down to the mills. It is insisted by appellant that there is no competent evidence to support the
verdict or judgment, and that no injury was done to the meadow lands by reason of the removal of the logs.
Respondent testified that in moving the logs, ditches were plowed into the meadow. Witness Neurmi for
respondent testified that some of these ditches were over a foot deep. Witness Wilson corroborated the
testimony of respondent and the former witness as to the condition in which the meadow was left after the logs
had been dragged over and across it.
The witness Neurmi testified that he saw the meadow before and after the logs had been pulled off it. He
further testified that he had known the meadow since 1916, that he had lived in that locality, that he owned land
adjoining, that he had experience in farming, that he knew the character and kind of land owned by the
respondent. Thereupon the following question was propounded to the witness, to which counsel for appellant
objected upon the ground and for the reason that the witness had not shown himself qualified to answer the
question: "Do you lcnow what the reasonable cost would be of putting that land in the same condition as it was
before any of those logs were hauled away on account of the scratching and the roadways you have testified
to?" to which question the witness made answer that he knew, and was thereupon asked, "How much would be
a reasonable cost for putting the land in the same condition as it was before any of the logs were hauled away?"
His answer was, "Between five and six hundred dollars anyhow."

-----
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The witness Wilson testified that he hgd lived on the north fork of the Coeur d'Alene River for twelve years;
that he had worked in the woods and had farmed; that he helped to remove the logs from respondent's place;
that it took three or four days with about seven men and three teams of horses; that after removing the logs the
land looked very bad on account of the logs plowing up the meadow; that some of the places made by the logs
were a foot deep. Thereupon counsel for respondent asked the witness the following question: "Do you know
what the reasonable cost would be for filling up these ditches and roads caused by the dragging of those logs,
and putting the land in the same condition it was before the logs were dragged off of it?" to which he made
answer that he did, and he was thereupon asked how much, whereupon counsel for appellant objected to the
witness answering the question upon the ground that he had not shown himself qualified. The objection was
overruled. and the witness answered that it would cost never under five or six hundred dollars.
The court did not err in overruling the objections and permitting the witnesses to answer. Their testimony
disclosed the nature and extent of the injury done to the meadow by removing the logs. It was for the jury to fix
the damages. The fact that the witnesses testified as to what in their opinion it would cost to place the land back
in the sane condition that it was before the logs were dragged over the meadow was not prejudicial to4aw~l!qnt,

-
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in view of the fact that the witnesses had testified to the actual conditions in which the meadow was left as a
result of the dragging of the logs over it.
1

In actions of this nature the principle of actual compensation governs and the damages awarded must be
confined to the actual damages sustained. We think the damages proven in this case were supported by
sufficient competent evidence to support the verdict. The meadow was not permanently injured as a result of
dragging the logs over it, but it was a temporary injury and the owner would be en-

-----
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titled to recover the amount necessary lo repair the injury and put the land in the condition it was in at the time
immediately preceding the injury. Whether it was necessary to replow and resow the meadow, or to fill in the
ditches made as a result of dragging the logs through the meadow, was for the jury to determine. Appellant was
entitled to recover a verdict sufficient in amount to repair the injury done or to place the land in the same
condition that it was immediately prior to the injury sustained, and such additional damage if any that may have
resulted by reason of appellant's failure to remove the logs from the meadow.
Appellant insists that the court erred in giving instruciion No. 3A, which reads as follows: "And you are
further instructed that if from the preponderance of the evidence you believe that defendant did so enter
plaintiffs land without his consent and contrary to his wishes with said teams and logging devices and did
therewith drive and drag logs over plaintiffs lands and premises and his said meadow, whereby said lands and
premises and meadow were cut up and injured and roads and roadways caused thereon by defendant in driving
and dragging logs over said lands, premises and meadow, by reason of which plaintiffs said lands, premises and
meadow were injured and damaged, you should find in favor of plaintiff and assess his damages against
defendant in such sum as it would necessarily cost to repair such injury, if any has been proven."
It is insisted that the foregoing instruction is indefinite and uncertain because it does not limit ihe liability of
appellant to such repairs as are necessary to put ihe land of respondent in the condition it was at the time
immediately preceding the injury, but leaves it open to the jury to find the total amount of damages done to
respondent's land, not only in removing the logs but also the damages caused by the flood, and said instruction
does not state the law. There is no merit in this contention. In instructions No. 1A and 2A, the court limits
respondent's right to recover to the injury sustained by the wrongful entry of

appellant upon respondent's premises, and expressly admonishes the jury that they should find in favor of
respondent and assess his damages against appellant in such sum as it would necessarily cost to repair such
injury, if any had been proven.
All of the instructions given in a case must be read and considered together, and where talten as a whole
they correctly state the law and are not inconsistent, but may be reasonably and fairly harmonized, it will be
assumed that the jury gave due con side ratio^^ to the whole charge, and was not misled by any isolated portion
thereof. (Brayman v. Russell & Pugh Lumber Co., 31 Idaho 140, 169 Pac. 932.)
It is next contended that the court erred in refusing to give instruction No. 6, which is as follows: "You are
instructed that the title to the bed of the north fork of the Coeur d'Alene River below the ordinary, or natural
high-water mark, is vested in the state of Idaho, for the use and benefit of all the people; that therefore, if you
find from a preponderance of the evidence in this case that the logs of the defendant were deposited on land
which is below the ordinary or natural high-water mark, the plaintiff cannot recover, and your verdict will be for
the defendant."
The high-water mark of a river, not subject to tide, is the line which the river impresses on the soil by
covering it for sufficient periods to deprive it of vegetation and io destroy its value for agriculture ( tg x re].
h*-.li.x-.mxr
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Citizens'Electric Lighting & Power Co. v. LongfZlow, 169 Mo. 109, 69 S. W. 374.)
In this connection it is urged that the land upon which these logs were cast was below the high-water mark
of the river at that point, and that the title to the land was in the state for the use of the public. The evidence,
however, fails to justify any such conclusion, but shows, on the contrary, that the land was under cultivation,
that hay, grain and vegetables were raised thereon, and that some twenty-five bearing fruit trees were then
growing upon the land.

While the evidence discloses that portions of this land were occasionally overflowed during spring freshets,
yet appellant's position that the land was below the high-water mark is untenable, in view of the finding of the
court that the logs were cast upon the land by an unusual and extraordinary flood. By the term "high-water
mark" is meant those points along the shore where water rises to such a height as may reasonably be
anticipated, but does not include such extraordinary freshets as cannot be anticipated. (Erdman v. W m b Rapids
Power Co., 112 Minn. 175, 127 N. W. 487,128 N. W. 454.)
The court did not err in refusing to give the instruction requested.
There is no evidence in the record that would justify this court in reaching the conclusion that the verdict is
excessive by reason of bias or prejudice. Neither do we think that the jury was confused in assessing
respondent's damages by reason of the flood and such damages as resulted by the removal of the logs.
Finding no reversible error, the judgment must be affirmed, and it is so ordered. Costs are awarded to
respondent.
Rice, C. J., aid Dunn and Lee, JJ., concur.
McCarthy, J., dissents.
Footnotes:
Publisher's Note.
2. Admissibility of opinion of witness as to amount of damages to realty, see notes in 3 Ann. Cas. 667;
Ann. Cas. 1912A. 191.

---3.

01%
cost

of restoration as measure of damages for injury to real property, see note in 17 L. R. A. 426.
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Neal K. POWELL and Dianne B. Powell, husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Counterdefendants-Appellants-Cross
Respondents, v. Kenneth W. SELLERS, a single man; Robert Sellers and Robyn L. Sellers, husband and wife,
Defendants-Respondents, and Orville Durrant and Fay Durrant, husband and wife; Duane Dwant, a single
man; Bobby Wayne Whitehead and Linda Ann Whitehead, husband and wife, Defendants-CounterclaimantsRespondents-Cross Appellants.
[Cite as Powell v. Sellers, 130 Idaho 1221
No. 22580.
Court of Appeals of Idaho.
May 5, 1997.
Landowner sued adjacent landowners, seeking declaration of terms of their stipulation concerning construction
of new drainage ditch. Adjacent landowners counterclaimed, alleging that landowner had negligently performed
his duties under stipulation resulting in damage to their property. The Seventh Judicial District Court, Bingham
County, Marvin M. Smith, J., made declaration, and after jury trial, awarded damages to adjacent landowners
and awarded attorney fees to both sides. Landowner appealed and adjacent landowners cross-appealed. The
Court of Appeals, Perry, J., held that: (1) instructions were proper; (2) erroneous failure to submit three
admitted exhibits was harmless; (3) appeal record supporting claim that several unadmitted exhibits may have
gone to jury was inadequate; (4) adjacent landowners were competent witnesses concerning value of their
property; (5) evidence supported damage award to adjacent landowners; (6) statute providing for attorney fees
to prevailing party in suit involving commercial transaction applied; (7) evidence supported jury's
apportioiment of 20% liability to adjacent landowners; and (8) neither side was entitled to fees or costs on
appeal.
Affirmed.

-----
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Ken Law Office, Blackfoot, for appellants. Robert M. Kerr, Jr. argued, Blackfoot.
Whittier, Souza and Clark, Chtd., Pocatello, for respondents-Sellers. John Souza argued, Pocatello.
PERRY, Judge.
In this case we are asked to review a number of rulings by the district court. After a review of the record and
applicable law, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURE
This is a consolidated case, that originated as four separate proceedings, and involves the owners of three
adjacent parcels of property. The parties agreed to settle their disputes through the construction of a new ditch
to service the properties. They entered into a detailed stipulation for the construction of the ditch, which was
accepted by the district court.
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The stipulation provided that Neal Powell was to provide certain equipment, move sand from the southeast
corner of the Durrant property to the northeast corner of the same property for use as the ditch pad, and
construct the ditch pad as described in the stipulation. After Powell constructed a ditch pad, Kenneth Sellers
was to construct a ditch on the pad provided by Powell and work with Bingham County for the placement of a
culvert. The Sellers(fn1) agreed to pay Powell $1000. The Durrants(fn2) agreed to provide an
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easement across their property for the ditch and to install two headgates. The Durrants also agreed to pay
Powell $500.
The stipulation provided that construction of the new ditch pad was to begin by December 1, 1993. The new
ditch was to be completed by March 15, 1994. An existing ditch was to remain in place and open until
September 15, 1994. The stipulation provided for attorney fees to the prevailing party in an action to enforce the
agreement.
In December 1993, Powell attempted to start the ditch pad project, but his tractor was not functioning
properly. On March 2, 1994, he began the job, but the tractor was still not functioning properly. Powell then
contacted Will Cagle and hired him to complete the ditch pad. Cagle finished placing the pad on March 7, 1994.
The equipment used by Cagle was much bigger and heavier than the equipment specified in the stipulation.
On April 28, 1994, Powell filed a petition for a declaratory judgment. Powell asserted that the Sellers and
the Durrants had failed to comply with the terms of the stipulation. Powell sought a declaration that the
stipulation was still in effect, and the parties, therefore, remained bound to comply with the terms of the
stipulation. Powell further sought a declaration that he was free to fill in the original ditch on his property after
September 16, 1994. On June 21, 1994, the district court declared the stipulation to be effective and enjoined
the Sellers and the Durrants from interfering with Powell's filling in of the original ditch on his property. The
district court noted that Kenneth Sellers had not constructed the ditch as of that date, but had adequate time to
do so before the September 15 date upon which Powell became authorized to fill in the original ditch. The
district court determined that whether the stipulation had been breached and whether damages should be
awarded were questions to be addressed in a separate proceeding. Powell's attorney filed a memorandum and
affidavit in support of an attorney fee award. Kenneth Sellers, personally, and the Durrants, through counsel,
objected to the requested attorney fees.
Meanwhile, the Durrants counterclaimed against Powell, alleging that Powell had damaged their property
while constructing the ditch pad and further alleging that the ditch had not yet been constructed due to Powell's
delay in placing the ditch pad. On September 26, 1994, the Durrants indicated that they were willing to
withdraw the issue regarding the delay in placing the pad. The property damage claim went to trial, where a jury
found that $5,000 of damage had been done to the Durrant property. The jury apportioned liability, finding that
Powell was 80 percent responsible for the damage and that the Durrants were 20 percent responsible, and
awarded the Durrants $4,000.
Powell moved for a j.n.o.v., or in the alternative for a new trial, and objected to an award of attorney fees.
The district court denied the j.n.0.v. and new trial motions. The district court awarded the Durrants attorney fees
attributable to the pursuance of the counterclaim and awarded Powell attorney fees related to the earlier
declaratory judgment proceedings. Powell appeals, claiming over thirty errors by the trial court, and requesting
attorney fees. The Durrants cross-appeal.

ANALYSIS

[I, 21 Over questions of law, we exercise free review. Kawai Farms, Inc. v. Longstreet, 121 Ida? plf;yl3,

,

-
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i826 P.2d 1322, 1325 (1992); Cole v. Kunzler, 115 Idaho 552,555,768 P.2d 815, 818 (Ct.App.1989). However,
we will defer to findings of fact based upon substantial evidence. Staggie v. Idaho Falls Consol. Hosps , 110
Idaho 349,351,715 P.2d 1019, 1021 (Ct.App.1986).
A. Interpretation of the Stipulation

Powell's first four issues on appeal involve the interpretation of the stipulation. The stipulation provided that
the new ditch was to run from point B-2 in the northeast corner of the Durrant property, as shown on a drawing
of the involved parcels, to point B-3 in the southeast corller. Powell claimed at trial that B-2 was on the northern
fence line of the Durrant property, while the Durrants

-----
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alleged that B-2 was actually at the Durrants' existing ditch. The relevance of this question arises because one of
the ways in which the Durrants claimed that Powell harmed their property was by destroying and filling in the
existing ditch in the northeast corner. Powell claims on appeal that the district court erred by failing to interpret
the stipulation. Powell argues that allowing the jury to interpret the stipulation, and therefore determine where
the new ditch was to end. was reversible error.
First, we note that the district court did interpret the stipulation. That interpretation was given to the jury
through instruction 15, which provided, in part:
You are instructed that the construction of a written instrument, stipulation or contract is a
question of law for the court to decide. . . .
Accordingly, the court gives you the following instmctions as to the terms and legal effect of
the stipulation made by the parties in August, 1993.

It was the intention of the parties, among other things, to change the route of the Sellers' water
to run through the Durrant/Sellers ditch from H-5 to the northeast corner of the Durrant property
then through a new ditch from the northeast corner of the Durrant property (0-2) to a culvert across
Tanner lane near the southeast corner of the Durrant property (B-3). . .

.

If Powell's equipment was inoperable Powell was under a duty to render performance that was
substantial.
It is for you to decide whether Powell's substituted service andlor performance was reasonable.
This instruction not only interprets the stipulation, but does so in strict compliance with Powell's demands.
The instruction provides that point B-2 was in the northeast corner of the Dunant property, as Powell claims.
The instruction identifies the issue for the jury as one of the reasonableness of Powell's actions on the property.
Included in this question was the reasonableness of Powell's decision to fill in the existing ditch. Powell's
assignments of error regarding the interpretation of the stipulation are without merit.(fn3)

B. Jury Instructions
[3,4] Powell claims that the district court made several errors in instructing the jury. The question of
whether the jury has been properly instructed is a question of law over which we exercise free review. Needs v.
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, Idaho 438,441,797 P.2d 146, 149 (Ct.App.1990). When reviewing jury instructions, we ask
whether the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. L & L
Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Boise Water Carp., 120 Idaho 107, 110, 813 P.2d 918,921 (Ct.App.1991).
[5] Powell claims that the district court should not have given instruction 17, regarding Powell's ability to
alter the portion of the ditch which ran across his property. Powell claims that the district court should, instead,
have given Powell's proposed instruction 15, which provided that Powell could alter the flow of the ditch on his
property, so long as it did not place an unreasonable burden on the Durrants. We agree that it would have been
preferable for instruction 17 to include the term "reasonable." As noted above, however, given instruction 15
clearly states that the jury was to determine the reasonableness of Powell's actions. Hence, the instructions,
taken as a whole, adequately cover this point. Further, the Durrants did not claim that the Powell's action in
raising his own ditch caused them damage. Rather, they argued that Powell caused damage to their property
while negligently moving sand to construct the ditch.

Powell claims that the district court erred in instructing the jury regarding the substitution of equipment,
rental cost, and crop loss. After a thorough review of the instructions provided, we conclude that the
instructions fairly and accurately reflect the applica-,-,---
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ble law on these points. Powell's assignment of error in this regard lacks merit.
C. Exhibits
Powell contends that the court clerk mishandled the exhibits. Specifically he claims that three of his
exhibits, which had been admitted, were not provided to the jury. Powell further alleges that the jury was
allowed to consider unadmitted exhibits, including three photographs, unmarked drawings by Faye Durrant and
Linda Whitehead, pictures of a drawing by Wayne Whitehead, and a set of interrogatories.
[6] Powell's admitted exhibits 31A, 31B and 33 were not provided to the jury because they were
inadvertently removed from the courtroom by Powell's own attorney. Each of these exhibits was an illustrative
aid. Exhibits 3 1A and 3 1B were portions of an aerial photographic view of the area in question. Powell's exhibit
3 1 is a copy of the same photo. Exhibit 33 is a rough depiction of the area and was drawn by hand. Powell's
exhibit 35 is a much more detailed drawing of a greater portion of the same area. After reviewing these exhibits,
we conclude that the error in failing to submit the three exhibits was harmless in light of the fact that other
exhibits adequately satisfy the illustrative purpose behind their admission.

[7-91 Powell asserts that several unadmitted exhibits may have gone to the jury. However, there is no basis
to support Powell's allegations regarding which exhibits were taken to the jury room. Powell cites to the
affidavit of his attorney, which was submitted to the district court ill support of Powell's post-trial motions, on
this point. In that affidavit, counsel specifically stated, "there was nothing to indicate which exhibits had been
taken to the jury room and those which had been retained by the clerk." Powell has failed to provide a record
adequate to support this claim of error. It is the responsibility of the appellant to provide a sufficient record to
substantiate their claims on appeal. Ckenowetk v. Sanger, 123 Idaho 189,191,846 P.2d 191, 193 (1993). We
will not presume error on appeal. Powell's claims of error regarding the publication of exhibits to the jury do not
provide a basis for relief on appeal.
D. Evidence Regarding the Amount of Damage Done to the Property
Powell contends that the district court erred in allowing testimony of the Durrants and their witnesses
regarding the value of the danlage done to their property. Powell contends that the evidence submitted
constituted conjecture and did not support the jury award.

-
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110-121 Damages, and the amount thereof, must be proven to a reasonable certainty. Wing v. Ifulet, 106
Idaho 912,919,684 P.2d 314,321 (Ct.App.1984); Eliopulos v. Kondo Farms, Inc., 102 Idaho 915,919,643
P.2d 1085,1089 (Ct.App.1982). "Reasonable certainty" does not require mathematical exactitude, but only that
the damages be taken out of the realm of speculation. Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,640,862 P.2d
321,332 (Ct.App.1993). In fixing that amount, it is for the trier of fact to determine the credibility of the
witnesses, to resolve conflicts in the evidence and to draw reasonable inferences therefrom. Id.
Two excavation professionals, McNeeley and Goodwin, testified regarding their bids for repairing the old
ditch which had been filled in and destroyed by Powell. The bid of McNeeley was admitted after the prices
were redacted because of problems with his computation. Goodwin's bid was admitted over objection. Linda
and Wayne Whitehead testified to the number of trees removed from the property, and to their estimate of the
trees' value. They also testified that they had to buy an extra four and a half tons of hay to feed their cattle
because the damage to the property, ditch and fence delayed the time when the cattle could graze in the pasture.
They further stated the amount paid for that hay. The Durrants, and several other witnesses, testified that there
was damage to the pasture. Linda and Wayne Whitehead testified that five acres had been damaged and that
their estimate for repair was $300 per acre for reseeding the pasture. Linda testified that she had reseeded the
property several times in the past.
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[13, 141 In an action for injury to land, where the injuiy is temporary, the owner is entitled to recover the
amount necessary to repair the injury and put the land in the condition it was at the time immediately preceding
the injury. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho at 639, 862 P.2d at 33 1. The proper measure for the value of the trees which
were removed from the property was the market value cost of replacement. Id. at 641, 862 P.2d at 333.

[IS,161 We are constrained to conclude that Linda and Wayne Whitehead were competent witnesses
concerning the value of their property. See Pocatello Auto Color, Inc. v.Akzo Coatings, Inc., 127 Idaho 41,44,
896 P.2d 949,952 (1995). In light of the Whiteheads' testimony and other evidence presented, the monetary
value of the damage done to the property was sufficiently established. Although Powell also contends that the
amount of the award was not supported by the record, we note that the total amount of the award was less than
Goodwin's bid for repairing the ditch. The amount of the award was well within the estimates for repair to the
entire pasture, and Powell's claims in this regard are not meritorious.

E. Post-trial Motions
1. J.N.O.V.
(17,181 In considering the district court's denial of Powell's j.n.0.v. motion, this Court is to determine
whether as a matter of law there was sufficient evidence upon which reasonable jurors could return a verdict in
favor of the plaintiffs; or, as stated by our Supreme Court, "there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that
reasonable minds could have reached." Quick v. Crane, 111 Idaho 759,764,727 P.2d 1187, 1192 (1986). If an
alternative motion for new trial is made with the j.n.0.v. motion, the trial court must rule on both motions
separately. Quick, I l l Idaho at 767, 727 P.2d at 1195.
The district court in this case analyzed the issues separately and independently for each motion. The district
court recognized the relevant standards and legal principles applicable to a motion for j.n.0.v. The district court
noted that it was surprised by the verdict, but that after careful consideration the district court determined that
the evidence was sufficient for reasonable jurors lo find for the Durrants. We agree. The jury's verdict is
supported by sufficient, competent evidence. Accordingly, we affirm the district court's denial of Powell's
j.1l.o.v. motion.

2. Motion for new trial

-
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theory that there was no contract for the relevant year or that the contract expired prior to the events at issue.
The court determined that the landholder was not entitled to an award of fees under I.C. § 12-120(3), because
the claim was based on the tort of conversion and was not based on the contract. Brooks, 128 Idaho at 78-79,
910 P.2d at 750-51.

i

(

In Brooks, the jury found that there was no contract in force at the relevant times. Here, the Durrants'
successful claim was based on the negligent performance of a contract, the stipulation. There is no dispute that
the stipulation was in effect when Powell damaged the Durrants' property. Although the claim is not a standard
breach of contract claim, we find that the nexus between the stipulation and the negligence claim in this case is
closer than that between the agistment contract and the conversion claim in Brooks. This case is distinguishable
from Brooks because the stipulation between the parties was still in effect and was the gravamen of the lawsuit.
The district court properly awarded fees on the statutory basis of I.C. § 12-120(3). We note that an award of
fees may also have been appropriate on the alternate basis of the attorney fee provision in the stipulation, as
suggested by the Durrants. The stipulation provided for an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in an
action initiated to enforce the agreement. The Durrants filed this action to recover for negligent performance of
the contract by Powell. We uphold the award of attorney fees pursuant to I.C. 9 12-120(3).

H. Cross-Appeal
[25,26] The Durrants claim that no substantial evidence supported the jury's finding that Powell was only
liable for 80 percent for the damage to the Durrant property. However, other than stating this issue as their
cross-appeal issue, they provide no argument or authority on appeal to support the issue. Further, the
determination and apportionment of negligence is for the trier of fact to

determine and will not be set aside if supported by competent and substantial evidence. Smith v. DavidS.
Shuutleff& Assoc., 124 Idaho 239,241, 858 P.2d 778, 780 (Ct.App.1993). Powell provided testimony at trial to
support the position that the ditch banks failed due to the Dwrants' use of flood irrigation, failure to install
headgates and poor maintenance. This testimony is sufficient to support the jury's apportionment of liability.
Accordingly, the Durrants' cross-appeal fails.

I. Costs and Pees on Appeal
[27,28] Both parties request attorney fees. Powell brought thirty issues on appeal, many of which were
without substance, eleven of which were not even the subject of argument and none of which were meritorious.
Accordingly, he did not prevail and is not entitled to costs or attorney fees on appeal. The Durrants were
successful in defending against Powell's appeal, and may have been entitled to costs and attorney fees for their
defense of that action. However, they brought an unsuccessful cross-appeal which merely asked us to reevaluate
the evidence and set aside a decision based on competent and substantial evidence presented at trial. An appeal
should do more than simply invite the appellate court to second-guess a finder of fact on conflicting evidence.
Krebs v, Krebs, 114 Idaho 571,576,759 P.2d 77,82 (Ct.App. 1988). See also Pass v. Kenny, 118 Idaho 445,
449,797 P.2d 153,157 (Ct.App.1990). Accordingly, we conclude that neither party was a "prevailing party,"
and we award neither party attorney fees or costs on appeal.

CONCLUSION
The jury instructions, taken as a whole, fairly and accurately reflect the applicable law. The instructions
further address, properly, the issue of the interpretation of the stipulation. Powell has failed to demonstrate
which, if any, exhibits that were not admitted during trial were published to the jury. Further, the exhibits which
were not provided to the jury, due to counsel's oversight, were cumulative of those published to the jury
,
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Sufficient, competent evidence supports the amount of the damage award. Powell's post-trial motions were
properly denied. The attorney fee award below is upheld. The cross-appeal is denied due to a lack of argument
and authority, and further because the jury's apportionment of liability is supported by substantial and
competent evidence. No costs or attorney fees are awarded on appeal.
WALTERS, C.J., and LANSING, J., concur.
Footnotes:
1. Kenneth W. Sellers and Robert Sellers and Robyn L. Sellers, husband and wife.
2. Orville H. Durrant and Fay Durrant, husband and wife; Duane Durrant; and Linda Ann Whitehead and Bobby
Wayne Whitehead, husband and wife, will hereinafter be collectively referred to as the Durrants.
3. We offer no opinion as to the correctness of this statement that interpretation of the stipulation is a question
of law for the trial court. However, it is not challenged on appeal.

4. An agistment contract is a particular kind of bailment under which a person, for consideration, takes animals
for care and pasturing on his land. BLACKS' LAW DICTIONARY 66 (6th ed. 1990).
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Max WEAVER, an individual, Plaintiff-Counterdefendant-Respondent,v. Frank D. STAFFORD, Sr.,
Defendant-Counterclaimant-Appellant,and Owyhee Village, Inc., an Idaho corporation, DefendantRespondent. Owyhee Village, Inc., an Idaho corporation, Cross-Claimant, v. Frank D. Stafford, Sr.,
Cross-Defendant.
[Cite as Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Idaho 6911
No. 25238
Supreme Court of Idaho, Boise, March 2000 Tern.
July 14, 2000.
Rehearing Denied Sept. 22,2000.
~ando'wnerbrought action against neighbor and against holder of deed of trust on landowner's property,
alleging trespass, breach of wairanty of title, negligent interference with appropriative water rights and
slander of title, and seeking monetary damages, injunctive relief, punitive damages and attorney fees and
costs. Neighbor counter-claimed for negligent and/or intentional interference with appropriative water
rights and alleged that he had acquired easement by prescription to maintain irrigation ditch on
laiidowner's property. Holder of deed of trust cross-claimed against neighbor, alleging that neighbor's
assertions that he had interest in landowner's property constituted slaider of title. The District Court,
Canyon County, James C. Morfitt, J., awarded landowner $5,000 in punitive damages on trespass claim,
and awarded holder of deed of trust $7,832.35 in attorney fees and costs. Neighbor appealed. The
Supreme Court, Trout, C.J., held that: (1) use of metes and bounds description to determine boundary
between landowner's property and that of his neighbor was warranted; (2) subdivision plat map was
insufficient to support neighbor's argument that he entered landowner's property under color of title; (3)
neighbor failed to establish prescriptive easement along boundary of landowner's property; (4)
neighbor's actions in filling in original dirt irrigation ditch running along boundary of landowner's
property constituted abandonment of any prescriptive easement neighbor may have acquired in ditch; (5)
no irrigation right-of-way by agreement existed which would have allowed neighbor to relocate
inigation ditch onto landowner's property; (6) neighbor could not bring cause of action against
laildowner under statute which prohibits alteration of irrigation ditch so as to impede flow of water; (7)
landowner's modifications to irrigation lateral did not constitute negligent or intentional interference
with neighbor's appropriative water rights; (8) neighbor's action warranted punitive danlages award; and
(9) holder of deed of tmst established that neighbor committed slander of title.
Affirmed.
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Lawrence G. Sirhall, Jr., Boise, for appellant, argued.
Uranga & Uranga, Boise, for respondent Max Weaver. Louis L. Uranga argued
Randolph E. Farber, Nampa, for respondent Owyhee Village, Lnc., argued.
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TROUT, Chief Justice.
This case involves an action for trespass, breach of warranty of title, negligent interference with
appropriative water rights and slander of title. Frank Stafford (Stafford) appeals from the district judge's
decision that he trespassed upon Max Weaver's (Weaver) property and slandered the title of Owyhee
Village, Inc.

Three parcels of real property are involved in this dispute. Stafford purchased the parcel at 4912
Laster Lane (the Stafford property) consisting of 1.39 acres on October 11, 1994. At the time Stafford
purchased the Stafford property, Max Weaver (Weaver) owned the parcel at 4920 Laster Lane (the
Weaver Laster Lane property). The Weaver Laster Lane property is southeast of the Stafford property
and is approximately 4.26 acres in size. On October 1, 1996, Weaver acquired the parcel referred to as
Lot 16, located southwest ofthe Stafford property, by a warranty deed subject to a deed oftrust in favor
of Owyhee Village, Inc. Lot 16 is approximately 5.25 acres in size.
A cement irrigation ditch (the cement irrigation ditch) runs along the northeast side of Lot 16 and
parallel to the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. The cement irrigation ditch has been
in place for many years and was previously used to irrigate the beet field which existed on Lot 16 prior
to 1969.
Before Stafford and Weaver acquired their respective parcels, there was both a fence and a dirt
irrigation ditch (the original dirt ditch) running northeast of the cement ditch. While Stafford believed
the original fence was the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property, there was never any
conversation or agreement with anyone froin Owyhee Village to that effect. Stafford removed the
origjnal fence and filled in the original dirt ditch sometime in the fall of 1994 or the spring of 1995.
Dunng the summer of 1995, Stafford filled ill all the imgation laterals w i n g from the original dirt
ditch that serviced his property. Stafford testified at trial that the original dirt ditch was located ten feet
northeast of the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16 and ten feet southwest of the boundary line between
Lot 16 and the Stafford property.
David Wilson, who resided at 4920 Laster Lane for approximately twenty-five years prior to
Weaver's acquisition of the property, testified that he regarded the original dirt ditch as the boundary line
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Wilson stated that there was an infonnal agreement among
neighbors, but no recorded easement, concerning a ten foot right-of-way to maintain the original dirt
ditch. Dorothy Bright (Bright), owner of the parcel directly east of the Stafford property, also testified
that she regarded the original dirt ditch as the b o u n d v between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Bright
testified that the former owners of the Stafford property used the original dirt ditch for irrigation. Greg
Slcinner (SkinPage 695
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ner), a licensed surveyor, testified that the original dirt ditch approximately followed the surveyed
boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property.
In the fall of 1995, Stafford erected a new fence northeast of and parallel to the cement irrigation
ditch on Lot 16. Stafford's testimony about the location of the new fence was not consistent. While on
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one occasion he testified that he placed the new fence in the location of the original fence, he also
testified at trial that he was unsure where he had placed the new fence in relation to the location of the
original fence. Stafford also testified that he did not measure the distance from the original fence to the
cement irrigation ditch. Weaver regarded Stafford's new fence as an encroachment upon Lot 16 and
demanded its removal. Stafford complied in the spring of 1997.
In March 1997, Stafford excavated a new dirt ditch which approximately followed the line of the
new fence. Stafford admitted at trial that the new dirt ditch was located on Lot 16 without Weaver's
permission. Stafford never used the new ditch.
Stafford's warranty deed contains the following relevant metes and bounds description of the
boundary line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property:
South 7' 0' East 366 feet to the center of an irrigation lateral; thence meandering
North 29' 50' West 23 feet;
North 43" 20' West 168.5 feet;
North 71' 20' West 92 feet; and
North 35' 20' West 228.4 feet along the center of an irrigation lateral to a point 36 feet
South ofthe North boundary of the aforesaid Southeast Quarter; thence ...
In April 1995, licensed surveyor Skinner performed a boundary survey on behalf of Stafford and
Weaver. Skinner established the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property based on existing
monuments. Skinner performed a second survey in November of 1996 for Weaver and established that
Stafford's new fence encroached upon Lot 16 from a minimum of 2.17 feet to a maximum of 10.2 feet.
On April 13, 1997, Skinner determined that Stafford's new ditch encroached upon Lot 16 by
approximately five to ten feet.
Weaver hired Chris Wildt (Wildt) to conduct an archaeological cross-section of the boundary area
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Stafford hired Dr. Mark Plew (Dr. Plew), aprofessor of
anthropology to evaluate Wildt's report and to perform his own cross-sectional analysis. Dr. Plew dug
three cross-sectional trenches starting approximately five feet from the cement imgation ditch on Lot 16
and extending northeast across the boundary line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Dr. Plew
discovered two features which were likely ditches. Feature 1 was discovered three meters north of the
cement irrigation ditch, which did not appear to have drawn water for any extensive period and may
have been used for two years or less. Dr. Plew concluded the second ditch, Feature 2, had been in use for
a very long time, was the larger of the two ditches and was older than Feature 1. Dr. Plew testified that
Feature 2 was close to the boundary line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property.
Licensed surveyor John T. Eddy (Eddy) also performed a survey of the Starford property at
Stafford's request. Eddy's October 1, 1997 survey established the boundary between Lot 16 and the
Stafford property along-a meandering dirt ditch, the same as Skinner's November 7, 1996 survey. Eddy
testified that Feature 2, as identified in Dr. Plew's report, coincided with the meandering ditch
referenced in Stafford's deed.
Water is provided to the Stafford property and the Weaver Laster Lane property by the Pioneer
Inigation District via Pioneer's South Branch Lateral 15.0, Gate 24. Water is provided to Lot 16 via
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Pioneer's South Branch Lateral 15.6, Gate 23A. Water for the Stafford property and Weaver Laster Lane
property historically flowed from Gate 24 in a northwesterly direction to a T-box located near the point
e
meets the southeastern comer ofthe
where the northwestern comer of the Weaver Laster L a ~ property
Stafford property. At the T-box, irrigation water flowed to the Stafford property via the original dirt
ditch between the Stafford property and Lot 16 or could be directed to the

northeast to irrigate apareel directly east of the Stafford property. Water from the South Branch Lateral
15.6, Gate 23A flows though the cement ditch in the opposite direction.
Weaver made several changes to the irrigation lateral which began at Gate 24 and continued across
the Weaver Laster Lane property. At the end of the lateral, Weaver installed a concrete collection box to
replace the T-box, and also installed a concrete slab in the collection box to block the outlet to the
Stafford property. That action lead to Stafford filing a misdemeanor criminal charge against Weaver
which was dismissed. A con&tion of the dismissal was that Weaver remove the concrete slab and install
a pipe from the collection box to the edge of Stafford's property. Weaver removed the concrete slab and
installed a pipe, but Stafford did not excavate a ditch to the pipe.
Tom Eddy testified as an expert in hydrology and stated that changing the grade of the pipe from the
collection box to the Stafford property would improve the flow of water to the Stafford property. Tom
Eddy also stated that without any change to the elevation of the collection box, water would travel from
the collection box to the end of the Stafford property.
During the 1995 and 1996 irrigation seasons, Slafford diverted water from the cement irrigation
ditch to irrigate the Stafford property. Stafford had no authorization nor permission to draw water from
the cement irrigation ditch or to divert water from that ditch onto his land. Weaver demanded that
Stafford cease diverting water from the cement irrigation ditch after purchasing Lot 16 and Stafford
complied.
Weaver filed a complaint against Stafford and Owyhee Village, Inc. alleging that Stafford had
committed trespass by erecting a fence and subsequently excavating a ditch on Weaver's property.
Weaver sought monetary damages, injunctive relief, punitive damages and attorney fees and costs.
Stafford denied Weaver's allegation and asserted affirmative defenses, alleging that he was entitled by
prescription or boundary by agreement to maintain a fence between the adjoining properties and that a
prescriptive irrigation right-of-way existed. Stafford counterclaimed that Weaver had negligently and/or
intentionally interfered with Stafford's appropriative water rights and that he had acquired an easement
by prescription to maintain an irrigation ditch on Weaver's property. Owyhee Village cross-claimed that
Stafford committed slander of title by alleging that he had an interest in Weaver's Lot 16. The district
judge entered an Amended Judgment on January 29, 1999, finding that Stafford had trespassed upon
Weaver's Lot 16 and awarding Weaver $5,000 ill punitive damages. The district judge also determined
that Stafford slandered the title of Owyhee Village and awarded Owyhee Village $7,832.35 in attorney
fees and costs. Stafford has now appealed that decision.

XI.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
[1,2] Stafford challenges the district judge's detailed findings of fact which were set forth in his
fifty-two page Memorandum Decision and Order. This Court does not set aside findings of fact unless
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they are clearly e m e o u s . I.R.C.P. 52(a); Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,679,946 P.2d 975,979
(1997). We will not disturb findings of fact which are supported by substantial and competent, although
conflicting evidence. Id.

III.
BOUNDARY BETWEEN LOT 16 AND THE STAFFORD PROPERTY
Stafford argues the district judge should have determined the imgation lateral, referred to in
Stafford's deed, was a monument and should have used this monument to determine the boundary line
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property, rather than utilizing the metes and bounds call in the deed.
The district judge clearly referenced the lateral and determined that "Feature 2" as identified by Dr. Plew
was basically in the same location as the lateral. The district judge noted the metes and bounds
description in Stafford's deed was consistent with an earlier conveyance involving the properties

--.
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and the Slcinner surveys of 1995 and 1996 which also placed the boundary line along the imgation
lateral described in Stafford's deed. The district judge further found that Feature 2 "follows the line of
the surveyed boundary to a rather remarkable degree." He therefore concluded there was no ambiguity
concerning the location of the boundary line between Lot 16 and the Stafford property and that the line
could be clearly identified using the metes and bounds description, incorporating the reference to the
lateral (Feature 2).
[3,4] Stafford asserts Feature 2 represents a monument and the district judge should have examined
whether the parties intended Feature 2 to be the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property.
Stafford argues the district judge erred by instead using the metes a$~d
bounds description to determine
the bouidary. The argument is unavailing in two respects. First, notwithstanding Stafford's color of title
and prescriptive easement arguments, the legal significance of Stafford's argument is unclear in that,
assuming Feature 2 was a monument and established the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford
property, Stafford still erected a new fence and excavated a new ditch on Weaver's side of Feature 2,
clearly outside of Stafford's property. Second, a monument is generally considered to be a permanent,
visible and identifiable physical feature. See Sun Valley Shamrock Resources, Inc. v. Tmvelers Leasing
Corp., 118 Idaho 116,119,794 P.2d 1389, 1392 (1990) (citing Achter v. Maw, 27 Utah 2d 149,493
P.2d 989 (1972) (monument must be a "tangible landmark," have physical properties such as "stability,
permanence, and definiteness of location"); Scott v. Nansen, 18 Utah 2d 303,422 P.2d 525 (1966)
(monument must be "definitely identified and located")). Feature 2 cannot be deemed a monument, for
purposes of resolving the boundary dispute between Weaver aid Stafford, because Stafford filled in
Feature 2 in the fall of 1994. The district judge was thus unable to utilize the actual imgation lateral
named in the deed because Stafford had destroyed it. The findings made by the district judge are
supported by substantial and competent evidence and support his determination that Feature 2 is located
where the original irrigation lateral was and allows an accurate determination of the boundary between
the Weaver and Stafford property utilizing the metes and bounds description in the deed. We therefore
hold the districtjudge did not err by using the metes and bounds description to determine the boundary
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property.

IV.
COLOR OF TITLE

.
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15-71 Stafford argues the district judge erred by requiring him to prevail on his affirmative defenses
of imgation right-of-way by prescription and boundary by agreement in order to succeed on his entry
under color of title argument. The argument is not supported by the circumstances of this case. The color
of title doctrine arises in the context of adverse possession and refers to an instrument which has the
appearance of title but is not in fact title. Fouser v. Paige, 101 Idaho 294,297, 612 P.2d 137, 140 (1980)
(citing Munkres v. Chatmon, 3 Kan.App.2d 601, 599 P.2d 314 (1979)). Color of title involves awriting
which purports to convey title, but does not have that effect and passes only the color or semblance of
title. Id. Stafford cannot maintain a color of title argument as he has failed to present evidence of any
written instrument which purportedly gave him title to the portion of Lot 16 which is the subject of this
action. Stafford offers only that the Owyhee Subdivision plot map reflects a twenty foot right-of-way
adjacent to the cement inigation ditch on Lot 16. The argument is unavailing to Stafford because the
Owyhee Subdivision plot map is not an instrument of conveyance and does not reflect a twenty foot
right-of-way north of the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16. Moreover, Stafford knew where the
boundary was, as his warranty deed contained a specific description of the boundary and the boundary
was subsequently established by the Skinner and Eddy surveys. We therefore hold substantial and
competent evidence supports the district judge's determination that Stafford did not enter Lot 16 under
color of title.

---
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PRESCRIPTIVE EASEMENT
[8] Stafford argues he had a prescriptive easement in that section of the original dirt ditch running
northwest from the T-Box on the Weaver Laster Lane property and along the boundary between the
Stafford property and Lot 16. The districtjudge determined Stafford did not have a prescriptive
easement in the original dirt ditch as Stafford failed to establish the open, notorious, continuous and
unintempted use of the original dirt ditch under a claim of right for five years. The district judge noted
testimony from prior owners of Stafford's property was inconsistent and that Stafford filled in the
original dirt ditch in the fall of 1994 or spring of 1995. The district judge further determined Stafford
failed to establish a prescriptive easement because the location of the original dirt ditch could not be
established with certainty.

19-12] A prescriptive easement requires the claimant to present reasonably clear and convincing
evidence of open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use under a claim of right and with the
knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement for the prescriptive five year period. Marshall v. Blair,
130 Idaho 675,680,946 P.2d 975,980 (1997). While there was testimony by people who had lived on
or around the Stafford property that they had imgated their property utilizing the original dirt ditch, the
testimony was conflicting as to where exactly the ditch was located. This testimony alone is insufficient
to establish a prescriptive easement in the original dirt ditch as it fails to establish the open, notorious, or
uninterrupted nature of any prior use of the original dirt ditch and does not address the knowledge of
such use by Weaver or any previous owner of Lot 16. Moreover, assuming Stafford did have a
prescriptive easement in the original dirt ditch, Stafford abandoned this right. Abandonment of a
property right must be evidenced by a clear, unequivocal and decisive act. Perry v. Reynolds, 63 Idaho
457,464, 122 P.2d 508,510 (1942) (citing Sullivan Constr. Co. v. Twin Falls Amusement Co., 44 Idaho
520, 526-27,258 P. 529,530-3 1 (1927)). Mere nonuse of an easement does not effect an abandonment.
Kolouch v. Kramer, 120 Idaho 65,67,813 P.2d 876,878 (1991). Here, Stafford testified that he filled in
the original dirt ditch in the fall of 1994. Stafford's act is sufficient to abandon any prescriptive easement
which may have existed in the dirt d~tch.We therefore hold substantial and competent evidence supports
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the district judge's determination that Stafford did not have a prescriptive easement in the original dirt
ditch.
VI.
IRRlGATION RIGHT-OF-WAY BY AGREEMENT
[13] Stafford asserted an irrigation right-of-way by agreement, located in the original dirt ditch, as an
affirmative defense. Stafford offered no evidence of an express or implied agreement between himself,
or his predecessors in interest, and Weaver, or his predecessors in interest. Moreover, it is difficult to see
the relevance of this argument. There is no question there was at one time an original dirt ditch between
what is now Lot 16 and the Stafford property. That ditch was destroyed by Stafford and he then sought
to relocate the ditch to a location on Lot 16. There is substantial and competent evidence to support the
diskict judge's determination of the location of the original dirt ditch and it is not in the same place
where Stafford sought to create the new ditch. While Stafford disagrees with the district judge's
determination, there is nevertheless sufficient evidence in the record to support it. At this point, it
appears Stafford simply asserts some right to put the new ditch in a location of his choosing and his
argument for an irrigation right-of-way is unavailing.
VII.
WEAVER'S INTERFERENCE WITH STAFFORD'S WATER RIGHTS
Stafford asserts Weaver made changes to the irrigation lateral which provided water to the Weaver
Laster Lane and Stafford properties. Stafford specifically alleges that Weaver tiled some portions of the
irrigation lateral, replaced the T-box with a new con-
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Crete collection box and installed PVC pipes to irrigate one of Weaver's fields with water fcom the
irrigation lateral. Stafford also alleges that Weaver changed the elevation of the ground around the
irrigation lateral, lowered the irrigation lateral, blocked the outlet from the new concrete collection box
which would have served Stafford's property and filled the area between the new concrete collection box
and Stafford's property with gravel, all of which prevented Stafford from receiving water. Stafford
argues the district judge erred by holding Stafford was barred from recovery under LC. 3 42-1207
because he did not have a ditch in place to receive water. Stafford also argues the district judge erred by
determining Weaver did not intentionally or negligently interfere with Stafford's appropriative water
rights.
A. I.C. $42-1207

[14] Idaho Code § 42-1207 prohibits altering an irrigation ditch in a manner which impedes the flow
of water or "otherwise injurers] any person or persons using or interested in such lateral ditch." Stafford
failed to introduce any evidence of the historic flow rate of water to the Stafford property before and
after Weaver's changes. Dorothy Bright, however, whose property receives water from the new concrete
collection box through an outlet at the same level in the collection box as the outlet to the Stafford
property, testified that she received more water after Weaver's changes. In addition, Stafford cannot
maintain that he was interested in receiving water from the irrigation lateral when, in the fall of 1994,
Stafford filled in the ditch that wouId have received water from the concrete collection box. Stafford,
therefore, cannot recover under I.C. § 42-1207.

B. Negligent interference with appropriative water rights
[IS] The elements of common law negligence include (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the
defendant to confonn to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of duty; (3) a causal connection
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injuries; and (4) actual loss or damage. Brooks v.
Logan, 127 Idaho 484,489,903 P.2d 73,78 (1995). Here, Weaver incurred a statutory duty to avoid
injury to Stafford when making changes to the irrigation lateral. Stafford fails to establish that Weaver
breached that duty.
(16) Stafford argues that, without a shutoff mechanism on the PVC pipes which Weaver installed
upstream from the concrete collection box, the concrete collection box would not fill to the top and
Stafford would not receive water. Evidence at trial, however, included photographs showing the
concrete collection box full to the top. Stafford also argues he was harmed by Weaver's installation of a
concrete slab to block the collection box outlet to the Stafford property. Weaver removed the concrete
slab and installed a pipe from the concrete collection box to the edge of Stafford's property. Stafford,
however, filled in the ditch which would have received irrigation water from the pipe and carried it
across Stafford's property. We therefore hold substantial and competent evidence supports the district
judge's determination that Weaver did not intentionally or negligently interfere with Stafford's
appropriative water rights.

VIII.
STAFFORD'S MOTION TO ADD CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Stafford argues the district judge erred by denying his motion to add a claim for punitive damages.
In support of the alleged error, Stafford reasserts his contention that Weaver intentionally or negligently
interfered with Stafford's appropriative water rights. The district judge denied Stafford's motion, stating
"[tlhe Court will allow such a motion to amend the pleadings if the moving party establishes ... a
reasonable lilcelihood of proving facts at trial sufficient to support an award of punitive damages." The
district judge concluded "tile evidence before the Court does not establish such a likelihood in this case."
(17-191 To support a motion to add punitive damages under I.C. 5 6-1 604, Stafford is required to
establish a reasonable likelihood
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he could prove by a preponderance of the evidence that Weaver acted oppressively, fraudulently,
wantonly, maliciously or outrageously. See Vaught v. Dairylandlns. Co., 131 Idaho 357,362, 956 P.2d
674, 679 (1998). The district judge's determination that Stafford failed to establish such a reasonable
likelihood is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id., 131 Idaho at 362-63, 956 P.2d at 679-80. The abuse
of discretion inquiry examines (1) whether the trial judge correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the trial judge acted within the outer boundaries of his discretion and consistently
with the legal standards applicable to the specific choices available to him; and (3) whether the trial
judge reached his decision through an exercise of reason. Sun Valley Shopping Ctr. v. Idaho Power, 119
Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993, 1000 (1991). It is clear from the judge's comments that he correctly
understood the discretionary decision to be made, applied the correct standards and utilized reason in
reaching his decision. We therefore hold the district judge did not abuse his discretion by denying
Stafford's claim for punitive damages.

IX.

WEAVER'S CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
[20-24) Stafford argues the district judge erred by awarding Weaver punitive damages for Stafford's
trespass because Sitinner's April 1995 survey did not establish the boundary between Lot 16 and the
Stafford property and Stafford believed he had title to Lot 16. We have stated:

An award of punitive damages will be sustained on appeal only when it is shown that the
defendant acted in a manner that was "an extreme deviation from reasonable standards of
conduct, and that the act was performed by the defendant with an understanding of or
disregard for its liltely consequences." The justification of punitive damages must be that
the defendant acted with an extremely harmful state of mind, whether that be termed
"malice, oppression, fraud or gross negligence;" "malice, oppression, wantonness;" or
simply "deliberate or willful." Highland Eizteus., Inc. v. Bauker, 133 Idaho 330,348-349,
986 P.2d 996, 1014-15 (1999) (citations omitted). Punitive damages axe thus appropriate in
a trespass action when the defendant acted in a manner which was outrageous, unfounded,
unreasonable, and in conscious disregard of the plaintifi's property rights. See, e.g., Walter
E. Wzlhite Revocable Living Tmst v. Northwest Yearly Meeting Pension Fund, 128 Idaho
539, 549, 916 P.2d 1264, 1274 (1996). Where a trespassing defendant has notice that his
activities constitute a trespass and nonetheless continues his trespass, the landowner
plaintiff may be entitled to punitive damages. See Aztec Ltd., Inc. v. Creekside Inv. Co., 100
Idaho 566,570,602 P.2d 64,68 (1979). We review an award of punitive damages to
determine whether the record contains substantial evidence to support the judge's finding of
extremely unreasonable and malicious conduct. Magic Valley Radiology Assocs., P.A. v.
Prof1 Bus. Sews., Inc., 119 Idaho 558, 561, 808 P.2d 1303,1306 (1991).

[25] Here, the record contains substantial evidence that Stafford's conduct was an extreme deviaiion
from reasonable conduct. For example, in the fall of 1994 or spring of 1995, Stafford removed the
original fence and filled in the original dirt ditch located between the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16
and the surveyed boundary line. Stafford made no measurements or any documentary record regarding
the location of the original fence and dirt ditch. In Aplil 1995, the boundary between Lot 16 and the
Stafford property was established by licensed sunley and was determined to be in the location of the
original dirt ditch. In the fall of 1995, Stafford proceeded to erect a new fence on Lot 16 which Skinner's
November 1996 survey established encroached upon Lot 16 from a minimum of 2.17 feet to a maximum
of 10.2 feet. In March of 1997, Stafford excavated a new dirt ditch on Lot 16 in approximately the same
location as the encroaching new fence. Stafford admitted at trial that the new dirt ditch was located on
Lot 16 without Weaver's permission. Stafford thus erected the new fence and excavated the new ditch on
Lot 16 with full lcnowledge of the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property, demonPage 701

strating willful disregard for Weaver's property rights. We therefore hold substantial and competent
evidence supports the district judge's punitive damages award to Weaver.

SLANDER OF TITLE
Owyhee Village alleged Stafford slandered its title to Lot 16 by falsely and maliciously asserting an
easement or ownership interest in Lot 16 which caused Weaver to withhold payment to Owyhee Village.
Owyhee Village also alleged it incurred legal expenses in defense of Stafford's claims to Lot 16.
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Stafford argues the district judge erred by basing his slander of title conclusion on Stafford's failure to
prevail on his affirmative defenses. Stafford asserts the district judge should have focused on Stafford's
reasonable belief that he owned the property up lo where he placed the new fence and that such belief
negated the malice element of slander of title. The district judge, however, did not rely solely upon
Stafford's failed affirmative defenses to find slander of title and instead set out the elements of slander of
title and articulated the substantial evidence in support of his finding.
[26-291 A cause of action for slander of title requires Owyhee Village to establish the following: (I)
uttering or publishing of slanderous statements; (2) when the statements were false; (3) with malice; and
(4) resulting in special damages. See Matheson v. Harris, 98 Idaho 758,760-61, 572 P.2d 861,863-64
(1977). Here, Stafford's pleadings assert an interest in Lot 16 and thus satisfy the publication element of
slander of title. Stafford's repeated assertion of an interest in Lot 16 was clearly false in light of the deed
which set the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property and Stafford's destruction of the
original dirt ditch which corresponded to the boundary. Moreover, Stafford admitted that he excavated
the new ditch on Lot 16 without Weaver's permission. Malice has been generally defined by Idaho
courts as a reckless disregard for the truth or falsity of a statement. See Bandelin v. Pietsch, 98 Idaho
337, 342, 563 P.2d 395,400 (1977). An action will not lie where a statement in slander of title, although
false, was made in good faith with probable cause for believing it. Stafford argues he believed the
original fence was the boundary between Lot 16 and the Stafford property. Upon removing the original
fence, however, Stafford did not make a good faith effort to record the location of the original fence or
to place the new fence or new ditch where the original fence had been. Stafford admitted the new fence
was where the original fence had been only in places. Stafford's conduct in erecting the new fence and
excavating the new ditch on Lot 16 thus belie any good faith belief in his ownership interest in Lot 16.
Finally, Owyhee Village has incurred special damages in the form of Weaver's refusal to tender payment
and the legal expenses incurred in defending Stafford's claims. We therefore hold the district judge's
slander of title determination is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
XI.

ATTORNEY FEES
1301 Weaver requests attorney fees on appeal under X.C. $ 12-121. Attorney fees are proper when the
appeal was brought frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho
244,249,985 P.2d 669,674 (1999). Although Stafford predoininantly raises factual issues upon which,
at best, there was disputed evidence before the dishict court, he does raise some novel arguments
concerning the meaning and use of the term monument for purposes of interpreting a deed and
concerning color of title as an affirmative defense to trespass. Stafford's appeal, therefore, does not lack
foundation and we decline to award Weaver attorney fees on appeal pursuant to LC. $ 12-121.

Owyhee Village requests attorney fees on appeal pursuant to I.C. $ 12-120, I.C. $ 12-121 and I.A.R.
41. We find no basis for an award of fees under LC. $ 12-120. As to an award of fees under I.C. $ 12121, we find sufficient merit to the question relating to slander of title to withstand an award of fees.

--
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CONCLUSION
The district judge's decision finding Stafford trespassed upon Weaver's Lot 16 and slandered the title
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of Owyhee Village is affirmed. We award costs on appeal to Weaver and Owyhee Village.
Justices SILAK, SCHROEDER, WALTERS and IUDWELL concur.
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Rayl v. Shull Enterprises lnc.;700 P.2d 567
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Bill RAYL, Plaintiff-Respondent, Cross-Appellant, v. SI-IULL ENTERPRISES, INC., a corporation.
Defendant-Appellant, Cross-Respondent, and Jaclc R. Smith, Defendant, Cross-Respondent.

[Cite as Rayl v. Shull Enterprises Inc., 108 Idaho 5241
No. 15030.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
July 25, 1984.
On Rehearing May 8, 1985.
Farm tenant filed action seekingjudicial determination that corporate landlord had not given him propcr notice
of termination of lease, asking that he be allowed to occupy premises in following year, and seeking to foreclose
labor lien previously filed upon property. Corporate landlord counterclaimed seeking eviction of tenant and
removal of lien, and also alleging slander of title. The District Court, Fifth Judicial District, Twin Falls County,
Theron W. Ward, J., entered partial summary judgment in favor of corporate landlord, finding unlawful detainer
of property and ordering tenant to vacate premises, but, at later trial to resolve remaining issues betwcen parties,
including damages, found that no damages had been proven on slander of title count, that irrigation system
removed by tenant was not a fixture, and that no waste was committed upon land. Both parties appealed. The
Supreme Court, Bakes, J., held that: (1) irrigation system was a fixture; (2) in view of fact that, but for slander
of title caused by filing of false lien, attorney fees directly attributable to removal of lien and cloud from title of
property would not have been incurred, special damages sufficient to establish slander of title were proven; and
(3) trial court erred in assessing interest on judgment awarded to corporate landlord at only 12% interest.
Reversed and remanded.
Shepard, J., concurred in part, dissented in part, and filed an opinion.
Bistline, J., dissented.
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John I-Iepworth, of Hepworth, Nungester & Felton, Twin Falls, for defendant-appellant, cross-respondent.
Lloyd J. Webb, of Webb, Burton, Carlson, Pedersen & Paine, Twin Falls, for plaintiff-respondent, crossappellant.
BAKES, Justice.
This case involves an appeal and cross appeal from a judgment attempting to settle a dispute between a
corporate landlord and a farm tenant over the termination of a lease of farmland. We reverse the judgment of the
trial court and remand for final determination and resolution in accordance with the views expressed herein.
Shull Enterprises (Shull) is a closely held family corporation owned by descendants of Nora Rayl. Bill Rayl,
respondent and cross appellant, is a minority shareholder in Shull. Beginning in 1962, Ray1 and Shull entered
into successive written leases of farm property (the Hollister farm) owned by Shull. The agreements provided
for a sharecrop arrangement, wherein rent was paid by crediting Shull with a percentage of the crops grown on
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the land by Rayl. The last written lease entered into between the parties was signed February 9, 1970. That lease
by its terms expired December 3 1, 1974. After 1974, however, Rayl remained in possession of the property by
apparent agreement of the parties, without a written lease, until 1981, when he was dispossessed by order of the
trial court.
t

In 1980, the corporation decided to sell the Hollister farm property. Rayl made at least two offers to buy the
farm, both of which were rejected. OnNovember 22, 1980, at a directors' meeting, Rayl was advised that his
lease would be terminated December 3 1, 1980, and the corporation would sell to an outsider if an agreement to
sell to Rayl could not be reached. Rayl was later served with two written termination notices, one served
January 6 , 1981, and the other January 12, 1981, asking that he vacate the premises by February 15, 1981.
On November 5, 1980, Rayl filed a labor lien against the property, seeking compensation for labor
performed such as clearing sagebrush, illstalling ditches, leveling the property, and installing fencing, all of
which was done between 1963 and 1967. On December 30, 1980, Rayl filed this action seeking a judicial
deternlination that proper notice of termination had not been given, asking that Rayl be allowed to occupy the
premises in 1981, and also seeking to foreclose the labor lien. Shull filed a counterclaim seeking eviction of
Rayl and removal of the lien. The counterclaim also alleged a cause of action for slander of title and sought an
accounting between the parties, and included an offer to compensate Rayl for his interest in a pivot irrigation
system located on the land.
On March 13, 1981, a partial summary judgment was entered in favor of Shull, finding an unlawful detainer
of the property as of February 15, 1981, and ordering Rayl to vacate the premises. The summary judgment also
found the lien to be invalid. The court reserved questions of damages for a later trial.
Rayl vacated the farmhouse on March 31, 1981, but did not remove his cattle from pastureland until late
April and early May and did not remove all of his personal property from the land until May. When Rayl
vacated the premises, he removed a pivot irrigation system in which he owned a two-thirds interest, with the
corporation owning a one-third interest. Removal of the system required the removal of underground electrical
cables and piping.

On September 25, 1981, by consent of both of the parties, Shull filed an amended counterclaim, realleging
the unlawful detainer (which by this time had already been decided by the court) and asking for reasonable
rental value as damages and, in addition, seeking treble damages under I.C. 5 6-301. The complaint realleged
the slander of title allegations, and the allegations of the necessity of an accounting. In addition, a new
counterclaim was added alleging conversion of Shull's interest in the pivot irrigation system and alleging that
the irrigation system was a fixture and that by removing that fixture Rayl committed physical and economic
waste upon the property. Shull also sought punitive damages, alleging that the actions of Rayl were willful,
malicious and intentional.

A trial was held to resolve the remaining issues between the parties, including damages. On January 4,
1983, the trial court issued Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, finding Rayl liable for the reasonable
rental value of the land only for the period of time after March 31, 1981; finding that no damages had been
proven on the slander of title count; that the irrigation system was not a fixture, and that no waste was
committed upon the land; and finding that no punitive damages, no treble damages, and no prejudgment interest
would be allowed. Shull has filed an appeal from this judgment, and Rayl has filed a cross appeal.
Numerous issues are raised on the appeal and cross appeal. These include: (1) whether the trial court erred
in finding that the pivot irrigation system was not a fixture; (2) whether the trial court erred in ruling that the
attorney fees incurred in seeking to remove the false lien from the real property could not constitute those
special damages necessary in proving slander of title; (3) whether the trial court erred in not allowing 18%
interest 011 the judgment; and (4) various other alleged errors, including the failure of the trial court to allow
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damages for prejudgment interest, unpaid rent, treble damages, punitive damages, attorney fees, and recovery
for improvements allegedly made to the real property. We fmd that the trial court did err in its treatment of the
first three items of the above list, but that no enor was committed as to those items listed under (4). We thus
reverse for consideration of additional damages due because of the errors noted.

We fist consider whether the pivot irrigation system was a fixture. Two center pivot irrigation systems were
purchased between the years of 1974 and 1976 for purposes of irrigating the farmland. At the time of the initial
purchase, Rayl paid two-thirds of the purchase price of each pivot, and Shull paid the other one-third. The
system was generally described by Rayl during his testimony.

"Q. All right. Would you explain to the court what that system that was then installed consisted of?
"A. It consisted of a pump and motor, electrical control box, underground pipe that went from the
pump to the pivot point, the electrical wiring that went froin the control boxes to the pivot point, a
quarter mile of overhead pipe that consists of the pivot.

"Q. And this system that you then acquired, it consisted of a busied pipeline three or four feet under
ground; isn't that true?

"A. Yes.
"Q. And then it came up, that buried pipeline, to this circle that was purchased in 1974 and used in
1975 into a big cement pad which handled the pivot around which the arm rotated; is that not right?

"A. Yes.
"Q. And that pivot was securely affixed to that property by means of a cement slab and bolts and
other means to securely fasten it to the real estate; isn't that right?
"A. It was-yes. It was fastened by bolts on the comers.

"Q. And then that circle, including the arm, were all tied together or coilnected

together to form one unit; isn't that true?
"A. Yes."

When the pivot system was installed, a gravity irrigation system, composed of a series of ditches, was removed
by pulling out cement checks through which the water flowed and filling in the ditches.
The trial court found that there had always been an u~derstandingbetween the parties that each of them
owned a portion of the pivot irrigation system, but that no system for reimbursement had yet been agreed upon.
Testimony of various officers of the corporation indicated that the corporation intended to pay Rayl for his
contribution to the system, but that he had refused payment at various times. Other testimony indicated the
possibility that the corporation had chosen not to conduct a reimbursemeilt program before this dispute began.

f
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The testimony is undisputed that Rayl,' removed the pivot irrigation system when he was ordered to vacate
the premises by the court. Removal of the system included digging up the main line and piping, which consisted
of plastic and steel water pipes and an electrical conduit, all of which were buried three to four feet under
ground, cutting the wires of the electrical conduit, and removal of the pumps and motors, including removal of a
cement slab that was buried in the ground.
The classification of a particular item as a fixture is a perpetual problem in the landlordltenant area. In
Idaho, tenants are generally allowed to remove fixtures from leased premises during their term if the removal
can be effected without injury to property, so long as the fixture has not become an integral part of the premises.
I.C. § 55-308. See also Beebe v. Pioneer Bank& Trust CO.,34 Idaho 385,201 P. 717 (1921). Generally, the
problem is resolved by application of t h e e general tests.
"[IJn determining whether a particular article has become a trade fixture, three general tests are to
be applied: ( 1 ) annexation to the realty, eitber actual or constructive; (2) adaptation or application
to the use or purpose to which that part of the realty to which it is connected is appropriated; and
(3) intention to make the article a permanent accession to the freehold." Pearson v. Harper, 87
Idaho 245,256,392 P.2d 687,693 (1964).
Other than the trial court's findings concerning the ownership interests in the pivot irrigation system and the
value of the system, the trial court made only one finding of fact concerning the system. That finding reads:
"When Rayl left the premises, he removed a buried pipeline and electrical system and took with him two
irrigation pivots." From that finding of fact, the trial court issued a conclusion of law that "the pivot irrigation
systems complete were not fixtures legally attached to the realty and instead had retained their character of
personalty." There is no indication that the trial court considered any of the three tests normally applied in
situations such as these to determine whether a particular object had become a fixture.

[I, 21 Normally, the determination of what is a fixture is a mixed question of law and ract. State, Dept. of
Revenue v. Boeing Co., 85 Wash.2d 663,538 P.2d 505 (1975). See also Thompson, Real Property, § 55 (1964).
However, application of the three-part test becomes a pure question of law when only one reasonable
conclusion may be drawn from the evidence. Wisconsin Dept. of Revenue v. A. 0. Smith Harvestore, 72 Wis.2d
60,240 N.W.2d 357 (1976). See also Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., supra 34 Idaho at 393,201 P. 717
("Applying the tests laid down in the above decision to the property in question, in light of the evidence, the
door to the bank vault was clearly part ofthe realty, and it would have becn proper for the court to have so
instructed the jury.").
[3] The first part of the test, that of annexation, is often considered in light of the actual relationship of the
object to the realty. In addition, a fixture may be constructively annexed to the real property. See Beebe v.
Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., supra.

"Even more importantly, however, the cases and authorities recognize that the annexation which
renders the object a fixture may be not only actual, but also constructive. Thus, constructive
annexation may be found where the objects, although not themselves attached to the realty,
comprise a necessary, integral or working part of some other object which is attached . . . ."
Seatrain Terminals of California v. County ofAlameda, 83 Cal.App.3d 69, 147 Cal.Rptr. 578,582
(1978).
Thus, in Wisconsin Dept. ofRevenue v. A.0. Smith Harvestore, supra, while noting that a large silo was
attached to a concrete foundation through the use of bolts, the court ruled that an annexation had occurred
because the silo was firmly attached as one unit. In Seatrain Terminals of California v. County ofAlarneda,
supra, the court ruled that large 750-ton cranes, although not themselves attached to the realty, were attached by
reason of their enormous weight to rails which were embedded in the wharf and thus, since the cranes,

1248

-

comprised a necessary and integral part of the rails, an annexation had occurred.
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The adaptation test is generally held to be met when the particular object is clearly adapted to the use to
which the realty is devoted:
"The question most frequently asked is whether the real property is peculiarly valuable in use
because of the continued presence of the annexed property thereon . . . . [Aln object placed on the
realty may become a fixture if it is a necessary or at least a useful adjunct to the realty, considering
the purposes to which the latter is devoted." Seatrain Terminals of California v. County of
Alameda, supra at 582 (emphasis in original).
[4,5] The test of the intention in installing the object is regarded as the most important of the three factors.
The intention sought is not the undisclosed purpose of the annexor, but rather the intention implied and
manifested by his act. Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust, supra. Thus, the intent should be determined from the
surrounding circumstances at the time of instal!ation, and not necessarily from testimony as to the subjective
intent of the installer and his frame of mind at the time of installation. See State, Dept. ofRevenue v. Boeing
Co., supra.

"[Tlhe inquiry is not strictly as to the intention ofthe person himself who annexed the chattel to the
freehold . . . . The inquiry is as to what intention must be imputed to him in the light of all the
circumstances, when tested by the common understanding of those familiar with the subject."
Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 34 Idaho 385,392,201 P. 717,719 (1921) (quotingJFomBoise
Payette Lumber Co. v. McCornick, 32 Idaho 462,186 P. 352 (1919)).
An Oregon court had the opportunity to consider a question very similar to that presented in this case. In
Johnson v. Ilicks, 51 0r.App. 667,626 P.2d 938 (198l), the court considered whether an irrigation system on
the plaintiffs land, which had been removed by plaintiffs former brother-in-law, was a fixture and thus had
passed to plaintiff by reason of a divorce decree declaring the real property to be plaintiffs. Certain statements
included by the court in its opinion are peculiarly applicable to the present situation.

.

"[Ilt is apparent that . . whoever installed the irrigation system on the farm, did so with a view to
enhancing the production of the farm, to increase the growth of vegetation thereon. Irrigation in a
semi-arid region . . . is the very life of the land. It is beyond compreheilsion that the system was
installed for any temporary purpose." Id. at 941 (quotingfrom First State, etc. Bank v. Oliver, 101
Or. 42, 198 P. 920 (1921)).
The court held that the irrigation system, although movable, was intended to have been annexed to the land for
purposes of irrigating the farmland, and thus could be classified as a fixture.

[6] All of these factors, when considered within the context of the present fact situation, can lead only to one
conclu-
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sion-that the irrigation system was a fixture permanently attached to the land. The system was annexed to the
land, either constructively or actually, in that it was bolted to cement slabs buried in the ground, and attached to
pipes and electrical wires which were buried three to four feet underground. Removal of the system necessitated
digging up these buried wires and pipes, which could only result in some damage to the realty itself. See I.C. Ej
55-308.
The irrigation system was also clearly adapted to the land. The purpose and use of the land in question was
that of farming. Irrigation is peculiarly necessary to a farming operation conducted in Idaho. This particular
irrigation system was adapted to the particular ground being farmed.
f
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Finally, there could only be one intent inferred considering circumstances surrounding the attachment of the
system to the realty. In this case, a farmer installed a necesscuy and integral irrigation system for the purpose of
developing and farming the land in the manner he had been accustomed to. The gravity system in place before
the present system was installed was destroyed, indicating that it was no longer necessary to have the gravity
system because of the permanent installation of another irrigation system.
This case is one of that type wherein the facts are so clear that only one result could be reached; thus, we
can determine as a matter of law that the irrigation system under consideration here was a fixture. It is clear that
error was committed in the trial court's conclusion that the system was not a fixture. Therefore, this case must
be reversed so that the trial court may determine what further damages, including possible punitive damages,
must be awarded because of the waste committed by the tenant in removing this fixture.

We next consider the slander of title count. After it became apparent that a sale of the farm was imminent,
Rayl filed a labor lien. This lien alleged an obligation on the part of Shull to compensate Rayl for fencing,
ditching, leveling and clearing of the land, all work that he performed from the time he began farming the
premises in 1962 until approximately 1967. Thus, this claim was allegedly for work performed some thirteen
years before this dispute arose. Clearly this was not a valid lien, and was declared invalid by the trial court.
Even Rayl's attorney did not seem sure of the validity of the lien, as he indicated in oral argument before the
trial court that:
"[Wle will agree to strike that lien or have the court strilce it. This does not mean that we have no
right to the claim that was attempted to be illustrated by the lien which frankly I had in mind more
or less as a lis pendens in the event that something could not be worked out between these parties.
And that possibility, of course, is still available unless the court totally dismisses this case. But at
least for our purposes right now I think there is no right to a lien against the property."
Thus, when Shull filed its counterclaim it alleged a slander of title had occurred because of a filing of the
labor lien. The trial court found: "All claims of liens filed by Rayl were barred . . . . The wrongful recording of
such patently unenforceable claims against Shull's realty constitutes slander of title." However, the trial court
also found that: "The slander of title, though established, is not compensable without damages, which were not
establislied." However, the trial court did allow Shull to recover as costs its attorney fees and court costs
incurred in attempting to remove the lien which constituted the slander of title. Thus, Shull alleges that a slander
of title had been proved, in that compensable damages, or special damages, were proven, and thus the trial court
erred in its basic premise that a slander of title, which cannot be established without proof of special damages,
was not preseut in this case.

[7] We have previously considered the elements of slander of title. In Matheson v. Harris, 98 ldaho 758,
572 P.2d 861
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(1977), we noted that there are four essential elements to the cause of action which include: "(1) The uttering
and publication of the slanderous words by the defendant; (2) the falsity of the words; (3) malice, and (4)
special damages . . . ." Id. at 759, 572 P.2d 861 (footnote omitted). Thus, special damages must be alleged and
proven before one can recover for slander of title. The trial court in this case found that all the other elements of
slander of title were proven. That finding is supported by substantial competent evidence and will be upheld.
However, the trial court erred when it ruled that the attorney fees and costs expended by Shull in its attempt to
remove the false lien from its property did not constitute those special damages required in a slander of title
action. As noted in Prosser, Torts, § 128, at p. 922: "Lilcewise it would appear obviously to include the expenses
of legal proceedings necessary to remove a cloud on the plaintiffs title, or other expenses to counteract the
disparagement . . . ." As noted by a New Mexico court, "In a slander of title action the plaintiff mu t prpv
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actual pecuniary damage, and proof of attorneys' fees and other costs of a quiet title suit to remove the slander
afesuch peuniaiy damages." Den-Gar Enterprises v. Romero, 94 N.M. 425,611 P.2d 1119,1124 (App.1980).
Although some courts have ruled that a slander of title action must be dismissed if it fails to allege the loss of a
particular pending sale, as urged by Rayl, see Shell Oil Co. v. Howth, 138 Tex. 357, 159 S.W.2d 483 (1942),
other courts have allowed maintenance of a slander of title action where the only special damage shown was t h
expense of removing the cloud upon a plaintiffs title. See Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, 655 P.2d 513
(Nev.1982). Thus, in Summa Corp. v. Greenspun, supra, after considering those cases where attorney fees
incurred were allowed as a special damage, the court said: "We believe the rationale of [these cases] is based on
reason and recognizes that but for the wrongful act of slander of plaintiffs title, the plaintiff would not incur any
expenses in removing the cloud from his title." Id. at 5 15. We agree wit11 the reasoning of the court in Summa
Corp. v. Greenspun, supm. It seems clear that, but for the slander of title caused by the filing of a false lien,
Shull would not have incurred the excessive amount of attorney fees directly attributable to removal of the lien
and the cloud from the title of the property. Thus, the trial court erred in ruling that no special damages have
been proven. Upon remand, the trial court should award those attorney fees and costs as damages for the slander
damages should be awarded based upon the
of title, and should also consider whether, in its discretion, p~~nitive
establishment of a cause of action for slander of title.
I

I

[8] Appellant also alleges that the trial court erred in assessing interest on the judgment awarded to Shull at
only 12% interest. This judgment was issued April 8, 1983. The statute governing interest on judgments was
amended effective June 30, 1981, to read:
"28-22-104. Legal rate of interest.- . . .

"(2) The legal rate of interest on money due oil the judgment of any competent court or tribunal
shall be eighteen cents (186) on the hundred by the year."

Thus, it seems clear that the trial court was required by this statute to award interest on the judgment at the rate
of 18%, instead of the 12% actually awarded by the court. Upon remand, the trial court is directed to correct this
error in this judgment.

We have considered all of the other errors alleged by both appellant and respondent, dealing with treble
damages, punitive damages other than as referred to in Paragraphs I and I1 above, further alleged rental
damages, interest, and attorney fees. We find that no error was committed by the trial court in its handling of
these subjects.

-
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Reversed and remanded for hrther proceedings consistent with this opinion. Costs to appellant.
DONALDSON, C.J., and BISTLINE and HUNTLEY, JJ., concur.
SI-IEPARD, Justice, concurring in part and dissenting in part.

I concur in parts I1 and I11 of the Court's opinion, but dissent as to part I.
I believe the majority opinion ens in part I wherein it fails to distinguish between the various portions of the

12'51

-

j;

Page 8 of 15
-irrigation system, but rather reasons as a matter of law that the entire system was a fixture and therefore Ray1
was not entitled to remove any part thereof when he was ordered to vacate the property. As aclu~owledgedby
the majority, Rayl owned a two-thirds interest in the irrigation system. The trial court ruled that the "pivot
In my view, that ruling is ambiguous, to the extent that it cannot
irrigation systems complete" were not fixt~~res.
be determined whether the ruling encompasses only the pivots which, by their nature and design, were mobile
and moved across the land in a circular manner being attached at one end or whether the ruling intended to
encompass also the underground piping and electrical systems which delivered the water and power to the
pivots. If the ruling of the trial court was meant to encompass not only the pivots but the underground portion of
the system, then I believe the trial court erred.
.,,,..

,

In my view, the irrigation pivots were, by their natme and design, personalty rather than fixtures. They were
designed to be and were in fact mobile. Utilizing the approach of the majority, one could as well argue that a
portable carousel or ferris wheel is a fixture, which would engender considerable surprise to operators of
portable carnivals.
I agree that the cause must be remanded in accordance with the majority's disposition of parts I1 and 111. As
to part I, I would remand that portion of the cause to the trial couri for a determination of that portion of the
irrigation system which actually constituted a fixture, excluding therefrom the actual irrigation pivots. In nly
view, Rayl had the right to remove the actual irrigation pivots, and the trial court was correct in attempting to
determine the value of Shull's interest (one-third) in those pivots. The trial court utilized the systems value of
$36,100 before its removal from the property and the value at $18,600 following the removal. Thereafter, the
trial court awarded Shull one-third of the $36,100, or $12,033. In my view, the trial court erred and Shull was
entitled to an award or only one-third of the $18,600, or $6,200. Obviously, Shull should therefore be awarded
the value of that portion of the irrigation system which constituted a fixture to the property.
ON PETITION FOR REHEARING
A petition for rehearing in the above entitled action having been granted and the cause reargued, the Court
has reviewed the record and considered the arguments presented by counsel. Chief Justice Donaldsou and
Justices Bakes and Huntley continue to adhere to the views expressed and the conclusion heretofore reached in
its 1984 Opinion No. 95, issued July 25, 1984. Justice Shepard continues to adhere to the views formerly
expresscd in his separate opinion.

Justice Bistline no longer joins the opinion of the Court, but separately dissents.
BISTLINE, Justice, dissenting.
The petition for rehearing emphatically stated:
What the opinion of this Court basically comes down to is that every irrigation system installed
upon a farm becomes a "fixture." In Idaho we no longer consider the relationship of the claiming
parties, the relative difficulty of removal, or the nature of the article annexed ....Nor do we
consider the previous rulings of this court. See, Duffv. Draper, 98 Idaho 379 [565 P.2d 5721
(1977).
Yielding to the admonition of that paragraph, Duffhas been revisited, but only after searching our majority
opinion to

ascertain what use we there made of it-a search in vain. The first noteworthy aspect of Duffis that it was a
unanimous opinion, and a second prime attribute is that it was authored by the same justice whose persuasion or
writing style in this case has produced an opinion for the Court that a farm sprinkling system automati a y
hi+n.ll~inxnri
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became part of the realty on which it was installed to sprinkle. When I read in Duffthat we unanimously held
otherwise, I blush in mortification. Compounding the error in our ways, it further appears that we applied Beebe
v. Pioneer Bank& Trust Co., 34 Idaho 385,201 P. 717 (1921) to go one way, but, a few years later, we now
apply the same case to go another. This flagrant insult to the science of jurisprudence causes me to repeat an
appropriate statement made by an attorney who shall go unnamed:
The most intolerable evil, however, under which we have lived for the past twenty-five years, has
been the changing and shifting character of our judicial decisions, by which we have been deprived
of the inestimable benefit of judicial precedents as a safeguard to our rights ofperson and property.
findings in Dufl supra, excerpted directly from the Clerk's Record, were succinct, not
The trial co~~rt's
elaborate:
In the late spring of 1968 Goff contacted defendant Draper who was in the irrigation equipment
business. The purpose was to obtain a sprinkler irrigation syslem for his lands which had been
renovated from gravity irrigation to syrinkler ivrigation.

The pump was attached to a fixture by bolts, and the outlet pipe was attached to the pump by
bolts. The lateral lines and their component parts were portable. None of the equipment in question
was sufficiently attached to the land as to become a part of it and thereby lose its character as
personalty. The equipment was not specifically designed for Goff's land but could be used on other
land and could be obtained by sample or catalog number. R., pp. 111-12 (emphasis added).
Scanty as those findings were, they were the findings of the trier of fact, they were adequate, and were upheld in
an equally scanty Supreme Court opinion:
The equipment in question consisted of an irrigation pump and "hand" or "lateral" irrigation
lines. The pump sat on a concrete foundation embedded in the ground. It was attached to the
foundation by bolts and could be removed from it by loosening the bolts and by removing its
coupling with an irrigation line. The "hand" or "lateral" lines were above ground lines which could
be removed from the property by uncoupling them from the sub-surface lines which supplied water
to them. Given these facts, there was evidencefrom which the district court could conclude that
thesepieces of equipment were not futures attached to the realty and had retained their character as
personalty and we uphold that finding. See Beebe v. Pioneer Bank & Trust Co., 34 Idaho 385,201
P. 717 (1921); Boise-Payette Lumber Co. v. McCornick, 32 Idaho 462, 186 P. 252 (1919). CJ: I.C. §
55-101; I.C. 5 28-9-313. Dug supra, [98 Idaho] at 381-82,565 P.2d at 574-75 (emphasis added).
In holding that the irrigation system was personalty, the Court ruled against a strong argument made by the brief
of the land owner's trustee in bankruptcy, the argument of which was IargeIy predicated upon Beebe, and its
three tests. The trial court judgment which the Court reverses today is virtually indistinguishable from Dufi
supra. To say that is not to say that the Court's opinions in the two cases are not readily distinguishable. In Duff
the factual findings of the trial court were set forth for public view, and declared to substantiate the ultimate
factual finding that the sprinlcling system was and remained personalty.
I

In this case the Court's opinion states at one place that the trial court found "that the irrigation systyem was
not a fixtureb'-andnothing more at that point-implying
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or at least leaving the impression that the trial judge was totally unaware of the Duffcase-which less than six
years earlier had been decided by another district judge in the same district.(fnl)
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The findings of the trial court here are found to go beyond the extent implied by the majority. There were
some additional findings which, in addition to lu~owingthe law as previously announced by this Court,
obviously influenced the trial court's ultimate findings. Perhaps, in this extremely complicated case, it would be
well to isolate the findings pertinent to the irrigation sprinkling system:
1. Shull Enterprises, Inc., is a closely-held family corporation owned by the children,
grandchildren and great-grandchild of Nora Rayl, Bill Rayl is a grandchild of Nora Rayl and the
son of Laura Lee Rayl Smith. Both Bill Rayl and Jack R. Smith are stockholders of Shull
Enterprises, Inc.
2. On February 9, 1970, Rayle entered into a written farm lease on the property involved in this
lawsuit, which will be referred to as the "Hollister Farm", with the said written lease to run from the
9th day of February, 1970, until the 3 1st day of December, 1974....

5. Rayl admitted that he was served with a written notice terminating his lease on January 6,
1981, and that he was served on January 12, 1981, with a second written notice to vacate the
premises on Febrnary 15, 1981 (Exhibit 26).

16. The parties bought the first pivot sprinkling system in 1974. It was agreed that the parties
would pay in the same proportion as they received the income, Rayl two-thirds, Shull one-third.
The same division was used on the 1976 pivot.
17. Although the parties had always recognized the interest of each in the two pivot systems,
they never set up a system for reimbursement or for depreciation.
20. After Shull determined in November, 1980, not to renew Rayl's lease, the directors agreed
that Shull should buy out Rayl's two-thirds interest in the pivot systems. However, as referred to in
Finding 19, they didn't know what the values were. The net result was that when Rayl was ordered
with his property to vacate the premises he still owned two-thirds of the two pivot systems. R., pp.
58-62.
Where the two purchasers of the systems, Bill Rayl and Shull Enterprises, are in absolute agreement that after
installatioil they own the systems together-which systems are located on corporate realty-this in and of itself
would seem to conclusively establish a lack of any intent on the part of the two participants that the installation
was intended as a permanent annexation. I had always thought that on an annexation of personalty to realty, the
owner of the fee in the realty became eo inslante the owner of that which was annexed-all one property. The
ultimate finding of fact, which, as I mention from time to time, is often called a conclusion of law, was so here
called by the trial court, and was:
1. The pivot irrigation systems complete were not fixtures legally attached to the realty and
instead had retained their character of personalty.
Predicated on that ultimate fact, the trial court proceeded in Conclusion of Law No. 2 to add that, "The removal
of the sprinkler systems by Rayl was justified and lawful and did not constitute either conversion or waste."
In Shull's post-judgment motion to amend the findings and conclusions, Shull sought the removal of
Conclusions 1 and 2 above, and requested a substitution as follows:
- - - "* - - -
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1. The pivot irrigation system complete was a fixture legally attached to the realty.
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2. The removal of the sprinkler system was not justified and did constitute waste.
The motion set forth no grounds or reasoils for so altering Conclusioil No. I, which rather strongly suggests
that all counsel were of a view that this Co~lclusionNo. 1, inore aptly a finding of ultimate fact, was, as in a trial
to a ju~y,simply a factual determination.
I11 arguing the motion, counsel for Shull realized that the factual determination had been made, mildly
expressed dissatisfaction with it, but did not suggest that evidence did not support it:
The second issue, of course, is the sprinkler; and that is a little more complex. And we are
simply asking the court to consider a matter that we felt deserved consideration and a matter that
proof really was offered on, although we, if the court remembers4 don't want to mislead the court.
We in our trial and in our brief that was submitted after the trial took the positioil that there was a
conversion of this property and that the sprinkler system was a fixture and part of the land. And the
court, of course, found that that was not the case and found that it was personal property and, I
think, relied on aparticular Idaho case that I am familiar with in that finding. And while I really
respectfully disagree with the findings at least with respect to the buried pipeline and those things
that were set in cement and firmly fixed, I am not arguing thatpoint for now.
What I am suggesting, however, is this, Your Honor, and that is that the court found that the
value of that sprinkler system in place while owned by Bill Rayl two-thirds and my client one-third
had a value of 36,100; that after its removal the value was 18,600. Well, that left the value lost in
destroying that installation at 17,500. Now, the court knows that the proof was undisputed that the
new systems cost $75,128; and the installati011value of that was $28,830. And our point is simply
this, Your Honor: I think that it is-it was well demonstrated during the trial that, and not disputed,
that when Mr. Rayl put on the sprinkler systems during the time he was in tenancy a11d when he
paid two-thirds and the defendant-or our client one-third that he took out and literally destroyed all
checks and all ditches and all means of irrigating that by gravity flow. And it was obvious that there
was no intention then or at any time that that system would be removed.
And I might also call the court's attention to the ilotice that was sent to him notifying him of the termillation
of his tenancy which contained a statement to him that our client, Shull Enterprises, was prepared to pay for his
interest in that sprinlcler system. And frankly, and I think there was testimony to the effect that they were
prepared to pay $40,000, which was substantially more than the system was worth. But we recognized too that
by his taking it off we had to replace it, and it was going to be even more expensive than that. But in disregard
with that and with no opportunity to even discuss that, he just ripped it out.
And what we are suggesting that the court-if the court finds that it is personal property, which you have, that
the proper way to value the damage to Shull would be to look at the cost of installation as well that they had to
incur as a result of what we think is an improper and an unjustified act in digging up that main line and tearing
out those installations. And what the arithmetic we went through is that the cost of that installation was
$28,230; that Rayl owned two-thirds of the 17,500, which was the installation value of the system he removed,
just using the arithmetic, the value after-or before removed less the value after removed gives you what the
installation costs would be. And then giving him credit for that, which would be $1 1,666.67, and that the net
cost of replacement, then, of that installation would be
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$1 7,163.33. And then suggest, then, taking the value of the pivots after removed and considering that Rayl-or
that Shull Enterprises had a one-third interest in that, which would be $6200, using the 18,600 value after
removal, and you add the two together and you come, for a total damage on that of $23,366.33.
And I simply respectfully submit, Your Honor, that this would put our client more nearly in t er
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position he should have occupied; but to give him less than that and apply-and totally disregard the
cost of installation and the fact that it was not intended that those be removed leaves our client
through no fault of its own in a position of suffering damage that he is not-or it is not being
compensated for.
Now, again, I have set this forth in our motion, Your Honor, and also in our brief; and we have
also done the calculations in those. And I would respectfully request, Your Honor, that the court
give consideration to that approach, which doesn't do damage and it doesn't question the decision
the court made as treating it as personal property.
There is in my mind a large question as to whether counsel can move the court to substitute one conclusion
for another (one ultimate fact for another), and then, after abandoning the proposition in argument before the
trial court, then raise and argue it for the first time on appeal. That is precisely what has happened. But it would
also seem to be unneedful of determination where, as here, the evidence, albeit it may have been capable of one
or more interpretations, does support the findings of the true finder of facts-a truism often declared and applied
by Justice Bakes, and by him applied in Duffv. Draper, with four justices joining his opinion.
Returning to my distinctions between the facts of this case and Duffv. Draper, in the latter the owner of the
land had no investment in the sprinkling system. Here, if I have it correctly, from the majority opinion, Shull
Enterprises owned 113 of the sprinltling system, and Bill Rayl was one of the corporate stockholders-all of
whom were related. Bill Rayl owned 213 of the sprinkling system-outright. That division of purchase price
flowed from the 113-213 share cropping lease.
The ownership is conceded, and equally conceded is the fact that Shull Enterprises full well recognized that
they were obligated to pay for Bill Rayl's two-thirds ownership if they wanted to keep the system. But Shull did
not do it, and as one of two parties owning personally as tenants-in-common, and having the larger interest, Bill
Rayl took the system with him when his lease was up after the family corporation obtained an eviction order
against him. Most, if not all, share-cropping tenants talce their equipment with them when they leave. Nothing in
the record supports any contention that the two systems would not work on two other parcels of land capable of
being sprinlcler irrigated.
Moreover, counsel for Shull, with commendable candor, in telling us at oral argument on rehearing that our
first opinion was a proper application of the Beebe test, third criterion, i.e. purpose, added, "That's not to say
lhat they couldn't be removed and installed somewhere elsefor the same purpose. "That counsel went on to add,
"But the fact of the matter is they were purchased for use on this particular property," adds or subtracts nothing.
After all, Bill Rayl was a tenant. A decision was made just as it was in Duffv. Draper to move away from
gravity irrigation to pump-powered sprinkling. In this case, moreover, the landlord, Shull, participated in this
decision, a decision involving a large amount of money. Moreover, Shull recognized its obligation to purchase
Rayl's ownership interest if Shull wanted to keep it. Bear in mind that under the law of fixtures, if annexation be
the sole or main concern, under the majority view Shull as owner of the real property, automatically becane the
owner of the sprinkling system. Yet Shull conceded otherwise, throwing a vast illumination on the question of
intent.
It is true, as counsel for Shull argued, that the systems that were purchased and
Page 536
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installed were designed and sufficient for the particular lands Rayl was [arming as share-cropper. Of course
they were. It is seriously doubted that Rayl or any one else in his right mind could involve himself and his
landlord in acquiring a system for some other farm. Nor would the average farmer purchase a system too large,
or one too small, for the particular job.

I

I
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Basically what the trial bench and bar will see here is that an esteemed trial judge faithfully applied this
Court's views espoused in Duffv. Draper, only to find himself reversed by reason of having done so. That the
trial court applied Duffv. Draper is apparent from the remarks of counsel for Shull at arguing the motion to
alter the findings and conclusions. Moreover, after not deigning the opportunity to distinguish for the trial court
the facts of this case from DufSv, Draper, counsel for Shull reserved that effort for this Court. The distinctioii
drawn, while it may or may not have convinced the majority, at least engendered enough energy to ignore the
trial court findings and fabricate a new set. At any rate, the effort at distinction was made, but it does not appear
iin the Court's opinion, as equally glaring as no mention of Duffv. Draper. The distinction, beginning at page 48
of appellant's brief, is this:
The irrigation system in Duffv. Draper, 98 Idaho 379,565 P.2d 572 (1977), was somewhat
different from the system in the case at bar. The system in the Dufcase consisted of a pump bolted
to a pad, a buried or sub-surface maill line and hatid lines or lateral lines which were merely
coupled into the main line. The hand lines were not bolted onto the main line nor were they
operated by a series of electrical switches and motors. The pivot system in the case at bar consisted
of the pump, and electrical panel, buried main lines, buried electrical lines from the electrical panel
which operated the switches and motors that activated the panels and connected to the electric
switch panel by the buried electrical lines as well as the buried main lines. In the Duffcase, the laid
was irrigated by uncoupling the hand lines and moving them by hand to a new location each set. In
the case at bar, the pivot was not unbolted or uncoupled at all. The electric switches were activated
and the electricity went through the buried electrical lines to activate the pivot system which then
moved around in a circle to irrigate the land. In the Duffcase, the hand lines, which were designed
to be uncoupled by hand for easy movement, were removed and the pump was removed. The
buried main line was le$ intact. There was no buried electrical lines connecting the hand lines to
any electrical panel, nor were the hand lines bolted down. The system could not be heated as one
unit, as it should be in this case.

It should be noted that this court did not hold that a pump which is bolted down could not be a
fixture. It merely held that under the facts of that particular case, evidence ilitroduced supported the
district court's finding that the pump had not become a fixture.
(Appellant's Brief, pp. 49-50).
Where this Court designedly did not adopt Shull's distinguishing of this case from Duffv. Draper, then at
the least, as a matter of downward judicial courtesy, it should at least explain to the district court the maliner in
which Duffv. Draper was misapplied. Instead, so it would seem, it was easier to factually redecide the case.
Even that endeavor was not well done. Whereas clearly stated findings of fact are required of lower courts, that
rule apparently has no application where the findings are made at this level.
For the most part, the redetermillation of facts was not done by "fiiidings," but rather by "indications."
Hence, "various officers of the corporation indicated that the corporation intended to pay Ray1 for his
contribution (not share of ownership) to the system...." "Other testiiilony indicated the possibility that the
corporation had chosen not to conduct a cost reimbursement program ..." And, importaiitiy, and an outrage to
the district judge, "There is no

indication that the trial court considered any of the three tests iiormally applied in situations such as these to
determine whether a particular object had become a fixture."
Having established by indication, or lack thereof, the true facts of the matter, the majority opinion
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that: "This case is one of that type wherein the facls are so clear that only one result could be reached; thus we
can determine as a matter of law that the irrigation system under consideration here was a fixture." In getting to
"that type of case" the majority necessarily is obliged to ignore the intentions of the parties in purchasing and
installing the system. This is handled nicely by resorting to Beebe, and as it quoted from Boise-Payette Lumber
Co. v. McCormiclc, by striking therefrom the word "strictly." Beebe is thus made to read: "The inquiry is not as
to the intention of the person himself who annexed the chattel to the freehold ...."
The striking of the word "strictly" is necessary to the majority's rationale on its factual redetermination, but
it is a disservice to the parties and does little to enhance any esteem for the Court. In this case the installation
was made by the two identities who purchased the system, and by both, or by the major owner with the other's
full consent and itnowledge. Only by striking the word "strictly" does the majority achieve the goal of
substituting its own findings for those of the trial court. Intent of the installers of personal property is a large
factor in making the factual determination as to whether or not an annexation took place.
The Court in Beebe stated that the third criterion was the "Intention of the party making the annexation to
make the article a permanent accession to the freehold-this intention being inferred from the nature of the article
affixed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, the structure and mode of annexation, and
the purpose or use for which the annexation has been made." Id, 34 Idaho at 391,201 P. 717. The Court went
on to add, continuing to quote from the early Ohio case, that "the intention with which an article was annexed
the consideration of paramount importance, id. at 391,201 P. 717, and then declared the first two tests as
"mainly important as evidence of intention." Id. at 391,201 P. 717.
What the Boise-Payette Lumber Co. case actually said, at p. 392,201 P. 717, was considerably different
than as editorially excerpted and set out in the majority opinion. In that case, where the contest was between an
attaching creditor and a mortgagee, on the left is what the Court's opinion quoted, and opposite it the majority's
version:

The portion omitted by the majority is: "Neither party was bound by the intention existing in the mind of the
owner." The quote in the majority opinion, as editorialized, makes the inquiry to "what intention must be
imputed to him in the light of ..." referenced back to the annexer, whereas the full text reads very clearly that:
"The inquiry is as lo what intention must be imputed to him (the owner) in light of all the circumstances, when
tested by the common understanding of those familiar with the subject." All of which had to do with a creditor
and a mortgagee who had nothing to do with the annexation, and a far cry from this case where the systems
were bought as commonly owned property, and the involved parties were not strangers dealing at arms-length,
but on the contrary had very good opportunity each to know the mind of the other as they together spent a great
deal of money which went into systems to be used by the tenant Ray1 who was at the time in possession of the
farm only by virtue of carry-over statutory provisions after his lease ran out.
If this Court is to malte amends, far better to set this case down for a third reargument than to stand on the
present majority opinion. Such would encompass one hour of this Court's time, which though an inconvenience,
would be far better than leaving this area of the law in a shambles. I close this effort as I opened it:
What the opinion of this Court basically comes dowi~to is that every irrigation system installed
upon a farm becomes a "fixture." In Idaho we no longer consider the relationship of the claiming
parties, the relative difficulty of removal, or the nature of the article annexed .... Nor do we
consider the previous rulings of this Court. See, Duffv. Draper, 98 Idaho 379 [565 P.2d 5721
(1977).

-

i
(' -:.
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1. The majority gratuitously impugns the district court in saying that: "There is no indication that the trial court
considered any of the three tests normally applied ...."Likewise, anyone reading DuSfv. Draper can say there is
no indication that the Supreme Court considered any of the three Beebe "tests," which go wholly unmentioned
in the Court's opinion. Beebe is mentioned, however.
"[Tlhe inquiry is not strictly as to the intention of the person himself who annexed the chattel to the
freehold. . . . The inquiry is as to what intention must be imputed to him in the light of all the
circumstances, when tested by the common understanding of those familiar with the subject."
Majority Opinion, p. 572
"Except in cases where, by contract or agreement, the intention of the party who made the
annexation determines the character of the article or machine as to whether it is a chattel or a
fixture, the inquiry is not strictly as lo the intention of the person himself who annexed the chattel
to the freehold. Thus, in the case at bar the contest is between an attaching creditor and a
mortgagee. Neither party was bound by the intention existing in the mind of the owner. The inq~liry
is as to what intention must be imputed to him in the light of all the circumstances, when tested by
the common understanding of those familiar with the subject. . . ."

Beebe, supra, at 392,201 P. at 719.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

-

COURTMINUTES

-

Jodi M. Stordiau
Court Reporter
Recording: J:3/2005-10-03
Time: 9:00 A.M.

John R. Stegner
District Judge
Date: October 3,2005
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. )
l-ttisbandand wife, and WEITZ & )
SONS, LLC, and Idaho limited liability )
company,
1

Case No. CV-04-WC8O

1

plaintiffs,

i
)

APPEARANCES:

)
)
)
)

Plaintiffs Gerald and Consuelo Weitz
present with Charles Brown, Lewiston

1

VS.

TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L.
GREEN, husband and wife, STEVEN R.
SHOOK and MARY E. SlLVERNALE
SHOOK, DANIAL T. CASTLE and
CATHERINE C. CASTLE, and U.S.
BANK, N.A.,
Defendants.
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L.
GREEN, husband and wife, STEVEN R.
SHOOK and MARY E. SILVERNALE
SHOOK, DANIAL T. CASTLE and
CATHERINE C. CASTLE,
~ou-tter-plaintiffs,

)
)

)
I

Defendants Todd Green and Steven R.
Shook present with counsel,
Andrew M. Schwam, Moscow, ID
Robert M. Magyar, Moscow, ID

$

1

1
)
)

1

1i

j

1

VS.
1
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. )
WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ & )
SONS, LLC, and Idaho limited liability
)
company,
1
\
Counter-Defendants. )

.................................................................
Subject of Proceedings: COURT TRIAL

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
m
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[On September 27, 2005, Court ordered the exhibits admitfed into evidence (Plainhfs'
Exhibit #I, and DeJendanfs' Exhibits A through N, inclusive) and the testimony adduced at the
Preliminary Injunction hearing conducted on April 15, 2005, incorporated into the Court Trial of
this matter.]
This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for trial to the Court, sitting
without a jury in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the parties.
Mr. Schwam informed the Court that on June 20, 2005, this Court granted the
plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint to include equitable estoppel, but the
Amended Coiiipiaint they filed just stated estoppel and other things had been changed as
well and moved that the trial proceed with equitable estoppel being the only amendment.
Mr. Brown argued in opposition to the motion. Mr. Schwam argued in rebuttal. Mr.
Brown argued in surrebuttal. Mr. Scl~wamargued further in rebuttal. Court denied Mr.
Schwam's motion, ordering that the trial would proceed on the plaintiffs' claims as
asserted in the June 10, 2005, Amended Complaint in paragraph 54 as asserted in the
proposed amendment. Mr. Schwam argued further.

Mr. Schwam presented the twelve original survey photographs which comprised
Defendant's Exhibit RR.
Court informed counsel that it had read the transcript of the April 15, 2005,
preliminary injunction hearing and stated that although Defendant's Exhibits J and K had
been offered and Mr. Brown had indicated that he did not object to their admission, it did
not believe that it had stated for the record that they were admitted. Court admitted
Defendant's Exhibits J and K.

Mr. Brown presented an opening statement on behalf of the plaintiffs.
Mr. Schwam presented an opening statement on behalf of the defendants.
Ronald Paul Monson was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's
Exhibit # 2 Monson Record of Survey, was identified.
Court recessed at 10:32 A.M., reconvening at 10:42 A.M., Court, couixeI and the
parties being present as before.

Mr. Monson resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the plaintiffs
on direct examination. Plaintiff's Exhibit #3, Priest Record of Survey, was identified,
offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit #4, aerial map,
was identified, offered and rejected after hearing objections from Mr. Schwam. Plaintiff's
Exhibits #5, aerial map; and #11, copy of Defendant's Exhibit N already in evidence;
Defendant's Exhibit W, Surveyor Monson's location of fence remnants on Weitz land;
Plaintiff's Exhibit #12, Application for a Preliminary Injunction; Plaintiff's Exhibits #13,

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
COT TRT h/lTiXTT TTFS
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legal description to Tract 4; #14, legal description for Track 1; #15, legal description for
Track 2; and #16, Priest's legal description as per red fence line describing Tract 4; were
identified. Plaintiff's Exhibits #36A, #36B and #36C, photographs, were identified, offered
and admitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination continued. Cross
examination by Mr. Schwam. Defendant's Exhibit W, notes from Priest's survey, was
identified. Cross examination continued. Defendant's Exhibit P, Monson Corner
Perpetuation and Filing Record, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence
without objection. Defendant's Exhibit S, State of Idaho Bearing Tree Marker for l/4 corner,
was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Cross examination
continued. Defendant's Exhibit W, Surveyor Monson's location of fence remnants on
Weitz land, was offered and admitted into evidence without objection.
Court recessed at 1200 Noon, reconvening at 1:02 P.M., Court, counsel and the
parties being present as before.

Mr. Monson resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the plaintiffs
on cross examination by Mr. Schwam. Defendant's Exhibits FF 1-9, photographs, were
identified. Cross examination continued. Defendant's Exhibit 0, Monson Survey, was
identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibits Q
1933 aerial photo; and R, enlarged copy of Q, were identified, offered and admitted into
evidence without objection. Cross examination continued. Plaintiff's Exhibit #37, series of
photographs, was identified. Plaintiff's Exhibit # 2 Monson Road Survey, was identified,
offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exlubit AAA, diagram
of property line, was marked for identification, offered and admitted into evidence without
objection. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. Plaintiff's Exhibits #30A and #30B,
photographs, were identified, offered and admitted without objection. Defendant's Exhibit
U, aerial photo with Priest overlay of items shown in Exhibit T, and Plaintiff's Exhibit #4,
aerial photograph, were identified. Redirect examination continued. Recross examination
by Mr. Schwam. Neither counsel wished to exainine the witness on the Court's questions.
Pennie Morgan, Ph.D., was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiff. Plaintiff's
Exhibit #52, cross section of a Ponderosa pine tree, was marked for identification.
Plaintiffs Exhibits #53, #54, #55 and #56, cross sections of Ponderosa pine trees, were
marked for identification.
Court recessed at 234 P.M., reconvening at 246 P.M., Court, counsel and the parties
being present.
Plaintiff's Exhibits #52, #53, #54, #55 and #56, cross sections of Ponderosa pine
trees, were offered and admitted into evidence without objection.
Ms. Morgan resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the plaintiffs
on cross examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. There being no objection
from counsel, the witness was excused.
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P

T TDT hA'mIT

TTPC - Z

Dana Townsend was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs Exhibit
#6, July 2003 calendar of Dana Townsend, was identified, offered and admitted into
evidence without objection. Direct examination continued. Cross examination by Mr.
Schwam. Defendant's Exlubits QQ2, QQ4, QQ5, QQ6, QQ7, QQ8, and QQ9 were
identified and offered. Mr. Brown objected to the offer of QQ6 Mr. Schwam withdrew his
offer of QQ6 QQ2, QQ4, QQ5, QQ7, QQ8, and QQ9 were admitted into evidence without
objection. Cross examination continued. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. No recross
examination. The witness stepped down.

Mr. Brown moved to be allowed to read Ritter and Landeck depositions. Mr.
Schwam had no objection to reading the Etter deposition but argued in opposition to the
Landeck deposition. Colloquy was had between counsel regarding the depositions.
Pursuant to the agreement of counsel, Court stated it would read the deposition of
Joshua Ritter this evening.
Court recessed for the day at 3:58 P.M.
APPROVED BY:

V

JOHN R. STEGNER
DISTRICT JUDGE

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
------..-..--"""

Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
324 Main Street
P.O. Box 1225
Lewiston, ID 83501.
208-746-9947
208-746-5886 (fax)
ISB # 2129

Cl1a1esABr0wn@cableone.net
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants.

IN THE DlSTRICT COURT OF l"kE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO
J. UTEITZ, husband and wkfe
and W I T Z & SONS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability
company,

1
1
)

1
1
)

Plaiiltiffs/
1
Counterdefendants, )
vs.

TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L.
GREEN, I~usbandand wife,
STBVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E.
SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T.
CASTLE and CATHERINE C.
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A.,

1
1
1
1
)

1
1

1

1
)

)

1

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
TO AMEND COMPLAINT TO ADD
CLAIM FOR ESTOPPEL

Case No. CV 2004-000080

1

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR RE,CONSIDERATION TO
AMEND COMPLAINT TO ADD
CLAlM FOR ESTOPPEL

Cllnrlcr A, !?TO-. h a .
P.O. Box 12251124 Mnin St,
Lcwisr~i~,Td:,ltu
83S01
209-74G-79471208-746-5886 (Pa)
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The plaintiEEs' Motion for Reconsideration of Order Denying Plixntlffss' Motion to
Amend Complaint to Add Clainl for Estoppel having been duly noticed for l~caring,but having come

before this C o w for m p n e n t in open court at the request of defendants' attonley Andrew M.
Schwam at the pretrial conference held on September 27, 2005, the plaintifl's having been
represented by Charles A. Brown and the defendants having been represented by Robert M. Magyar
and Andrew M. Schwam, and oral argument having been heard, and the (~OLW,
having reviewed the
file and record herein, hereby makcs the following ORDER:
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT said motion is hereby granted.
DONE IN OPEN COURT on this 27' day of September, 2005
DATED on this

3r4
day of

OAhC

,2005.

District Judge
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Charles A. Brown 208-746-5886
Attorney at Law
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Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
324 Main Street
P.O. Box 1225
Lewiston, ID 83501
208-746-9947
208-746-5886 (fax)
ISB # 2129
ChatlesABrown@cableone.net
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants.
IN 'ELI DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND .WDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TI-IE COUNTY OF LAThK

GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO
J. WEITZ, Itusband and wife
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC, an
Idaho limited liability
company,
Plaintiffs1
Counterdefendants,

)
)

)

1
1

VS.

1
1

TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L.
GREEN, husband and wife,
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E.
SILVERNALE SI-IOOK, DANIAL T.
CASTLE and CATI-IERINE C.
CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A.,

)
)
)

Case No. CV 2004-000080

1
1
AMENDED COMPLNNT

Plaintiffs GERALD E. WEIT%and CONSUELO J. WE]= (hereinafter refei~edto
as "WEITZES"), husband and wife, and WEITZ & SONS, LLC (all plaiutirfs are collectively

AMENDED COMPLAINT
$9 1-9

Z00'd

PPO-1

1
9889 9PL 802

Chnilcs A. arovn. Esq.
P.O. Box 12251324 Mein Sr
Lrrrirlcm, iddte 83501
208-746agA71206-7461886(firr]

referred to as "plaintiffs"), by

and

though their attorney, Charles A. I3rown, for claims against

defendants, and each of them, hereby dlege as follows:

JZrrUSDICTION

.

The Court has jurisdiction @fthe si~bjectmatter of this action pursuant to

Idaho Code Section 1-705 and jurisdicifon over the parties pursumt to ldaho Code Section 5-514.
Venue is proper in Latah County pursuant to Idaho Code Section 5-401.
2.

Magistrate Division.
The amount in eontrovexsy exceeds thejurisdiction oitl~e

PARTIES, CLAIMS, AND GENERAL FACTS
3.

The piaintiffs WEiTZES are husband and wire ~ n hold
d title in fee simple

absolute, founded upon a recorded written instrument, to the East 112 oftheNortheast 114 of Section
8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian in Latah County, Idaho ("E 112 NE 114" or

"Weitz property"). The plaintiffs WWEITZ & SONS, LLC, is an Idaho 1im.itedliability company and
holds title in fee simple absolute to the West 112 of the Northeast 114 csFSection 8, Tomship 40
North, Range 5 West Boise Meridian 1u7. Latah County, Ida110 ("W 112

1/4" or "LLCproperty").

(The Weitz property and LLC property are collectively referred to as "plaintifls' property.")
4.

Defendmts and their claims to real estate situate in the State of Idaho, County

of Latah, affected by this action, are as follows:
4.1

Defendants TODD GREEN and TONIA GREEN are husband and wife

(hereinafterreferred to as "GREENS") and claim title to the real property rnore particularly described

in Exhibit A, attached to this Amended Complaint ("Tract 4").
4.2

GREENS granted a deed of trust on real property they claim, including Tract

4, recorded December 16,2002, as instrument No. 47 1571, records of h t a h County, Idaho, to U.S.

Banlc Trust Company, N.A., as itustee, in favor of Defendant U.S. Bank N.A., as bei=ficiary.
4.3

Defendants DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATI-ERNE C. CASTLE (hereinafter

referred to as "CASTLES") are husband and wife and claim title to the real property more
to t h i s Amended Complain-t ("Tract 1").
particularly described in Exhibit B ~ttacl~ed
4.4

Defendants STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK

(hereinafterreferred to as "SHOOKS") are busband and wife and claim title to t l ~ real
e property more
particularly described in Exhibit C attached to this Amended Complaii~t("Tract 2").

Chorlcs A. Broun. Esq.
I'.O,Bnx 12251324 Mnin SL
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4.5

PfaintifFshave l a d e a diligent se.mclt for all others having a11 interest

this

action and have found none. Therefore, plaintiffs allege a claim to quiet title against all unlmown
owners andlor interest holders.
5.

Tract 1, Tract 2, andl'ract 4 (collectively "defendants' property ") lie adjacent

~
plaintiffs' property
to and south of ~laintiffs'property. The location ofthe shared b o u n d a ~between
and defendants' property is at issue in this case.
6.

Plaintiffs are successors in interest to Consuelo Weilz's grandfather, Fred J.

Schoepflin, who acquired the NE 114 of said Section 8 by Warranty Dead recorded December 13,
1929, under Instrument No. I 13310, records of Latah County, Idaho.
7.

Fred J. Schoepflin deeded the NE 114 ofsaid Section S to Consuelo Weitz's

parents, Howard and Constance ~ c h o e ~ f l iin
n , 1967.
8.

Constance Schoepflin subsequently passed away, and Howard Schoepflia

re-married. Howard Schoepflin and his then wife, Sylvia Scl~oepflut,deeded the E 112 NE 114 to
Weitzes in 1977. Howard Schoepflin and Sylvia Schoepflin deeded the W 1/2 NE 114 to
Sylvia Schoepflin's children ("Yeatts") in 2002. Yeatts deeded the W I r2 NE 1/4 to Weitz & Sons,
LLC, in February, 2003.

9.

Ail Scltoepflindeedsreferencedabove, conveyingthe E 1/2NE 114and W 112

NE 114, contained legal descriptions by division ofquarter sectiou rather thanby metes and bounds.
The Yeatts deed referenced above, conveying the W I12 NE 1/4, contained a legal description by
division of quarter section rather than by metes and bounds.
10.

A fence and ~Tencelinewere constructed no later than 1929 aidhave existed

in the same place since that time in the vicinity and nulning easterly and westerly over the entire
length of the quarter-section line between the NE 114 and SE 114 of said Section 8 (the "fence and

fenceline").
11.

GREENS employed Ronald P. Monson, pro'fessional land surveyor, who

performed a survey in 2002 of the SE 114 of said Section 8 (the "Monso~~
s~wey"). The Monson
survey determined that said fence and fenceline are located as little as approximately 75 feet, and as
mucl~as approximately 150 feet, south of the quarter-section line andnuming easterly and westerly
over the entire length of the quarter-section line between the NE 114 and SE 114 of said Section 8.
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12.

WEITZES claim ownership ofthe properly lying behveensaidquartcr-section

hne and said fence and fencel~neadjacent to the E I12 NE I/4, and W I r Z & SONS, LLC, claims
ownership of the properly lying between said quarter-section line and said I'ence and fenceline
adjacent to the W 112 NE 1/4. According to the Monson survey, tile property claimed by plaintiffs

collectively totals approximately X,57acres (colleclively the "Disputed Property").
13.

Fred J. Schoepflin and Howard Schoepflin (ct~llectively"Scl~oepflins")

consistently pastured cattle on the NE 1/4 of said Section 8 and the Disputed Property fiom 1929
through 1972.
14.

By 1967, a road had been consLmctedby Schoe1sflins -xithiri the Cisputed

. Property and no*rh of the fence and fenceline rulu~ingeasterly and westerly for the entire length of
the Disputed Property (the "road").

15.

The road has been continuously used and maintained by the plaintias and

Schoepflins since 1967 for hunting, hiking, motorcycling, snowmobiling, logging and vehicular
access to areas within plaintiffs' property and the Disputed Property.
16.

WEITZEShave harvested firewood from the Disputed Property on a frequent

and continuing basis since 1977.
17.

The Rogers f ~ l ("Rogers"),
y
predecessors in interest to defendants in the

SE 114 of said Section 8, never objected to

0%the above-described activities undertaken by the

Sclloepflins and plaintiffs on the Disputed Property.
18.

In the 1950's, Fred Schoeptlin selectively logged a portion of the NE 114 of

said Section 8 and the Disputed Property, to the fence and fenceline h d not southerly of the fence
and fenceline. In 1991, WEITZES selectively logged aportion of the N12 114 of said Section X and
the Disputed Property to the fence and fenceline and not southerly of the fence and fenceline. Neither
the Rogers nor any predecessor in interest to the Rogers, ever protested or disputed the SchoepLIins'
or WEITZES' selective logging operations within the Disputed Property.
19.

The SI.7 114 of said Section 8 was heavily logged at least twice since 1929 by

Rogers or their predecessor in interest to the fence and fenceline and not noherly of the fence and
fenceline.
20.

In November, 1963, Fred Schotpflin and his wife leased a site within the

Disputed Properly to Memll I-1a1tfor a "radio receiving and sending" station, for ten years, ptusuant
Chniles A. Brow, I?SL[.
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to a Lease Agreement recordcd in Boolr 14, Fago 389, lnsWu.inc~~t
No. 223359, records oFLat?tnh
Cotu~ty,Idaho. Mr. Hart concurrently thereto entered into an Agreement with Latah County and the
City of Moscow to construct said "radio receiving and sending" station for operation by the Latah

Counly Sheriff s Office and the Moscow Police Department, which Ag~ee~nent
was recordedin Book

14, Page 391, Instrument No. 223360, records of Latah County, Idaho. A shuctxre was then
constructed within the Disputed Property, north of the road, to houseand operate the "I-adioreceiving
and sending" station Remains ofthat structure are still visible within ihe heispnted Property and
north ofthe road. The Rogers never disputed the Schoepflins' said lease activity or the construction
of said "radio receiving and sending" station within the Oisputed Propety.

21.

In 1994, WEITZES installed a blue gate on il~eeastern boundaryofplaintiffs'

property and a connecting hoyrire fence that extended southerly along the eastern boundary ofthe
Disputed Proper& to its intersection 4 t h the fence and fencelineto keep intruders from trespassing
on the NE 114 of said Section 8 and the Disputed Property. The Rogers never disputed the
WEITZES' installation of the hogwire fence dong the eastern boundary vof the Disputed Properly.
22.

The "true," actual boundary between the NE 114 ~mdSE 114 of said Section

8 was unknown to any owners of the NE 114 a d SE 114 until the Monson survey was completed.

23.

On information and belief, some defendmts or their agents, at some time

during the month of July, 2003, damaged a significant portion of the fence and fenceIine by cutting
fhe fence wire approximately every twenty feet of its length, by desixoying some fence posts, and by
destroying rock piles that helped stabilize some of the fence posts.
24.

On information and belief, on or about Jaly 28, 2003, defendant

TODD GREEN trespassed on said NE 114 and the Disputed Property, while armed with a handgun,
and acted in an aggressive and threateniilg manner towad rn agent of the WEITZES.

25.

Defendants have asserted claims of ownership to the Disputed Prope~tyand

demanded fiat plaintiffs not enter upon Llle Disputed Property.
26.

Defendants' conduct has hindered plaintiffs planned forestry, agriculturd, and

other operations and uses on thc Dispr~tedProperly and continues to do so.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
Quict Title -Boundary by Agreement andlor Acquiosccnce

27.

Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if fidly set forth here.
P.O. Box 12251526 Maiiill ir.
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28.

Tl~ckue, actual boundmy line between tlieNNE I/4and SE 114 of said Section

8 was unkr~ownfrom at least 1929 until the Monson survey was completed in 2002.

29.

Said fence and fenceline were consm~ctedin approximately 1929. On

infomtatiotl and belief, there is no evidence as to the manner or circumstances of the original
location of the fence and fenceline.
30.

The fence and fenceline have long existed and been recognized by the

respective property owners as the boundary between plaintif&' property and defendants' property.

31.

Since 1929, the respective property owners Itave treated the fence and

fenceline as the property line or boundary between piaillt?ffs' propefcy and d & ~ d w ~ iproperty.
s'
32.

Since 1929, plaintkffs and their predecessors have exercised dornii~ionand

contxol over the entirety of the real property north of the fence and fenceline consistent with
ownership.

33.

Tl~eDisputed Propcrty belongs to p1ainti.E~by virtue of the doctriixe of

boundary by agreement, and the Court should quiet title in plaintiffs against all other interests.

SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION
Quiet Title

-Estoppel and Latches

34.

Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if hlly set forth here.

35.

For approximately 70 years, defendants and their predecessors sat idly by and

allowed plahtiffs and their predecessors to use the Disputed Property as their own and to maintain
stewardship of the Disputed Property at the expense of plaintips and their predecessors.

36.

For approximately 70 years, defendants and their predecessors treated the

fence and fenceline as the boundary betwmn tile NE 1/4 and SE 114 of said Section S.
37.

For approximately 70 years, dafendants and their predecessors took the

position that the Disputed Property belonged to the plaintiffs and their predecessors.
38.

At the time GFSENS, CASTLES, and SHOOKS purchased their respective

parcels, they had actual, constructive, or inquiry notice that the Disputed Property did not belong to
them, regardless of their respective deed language.
39.

It would now be unconscionable and inequitablefor the defendants to take a

contrary position to that previousiy taken by them and their predecessors and to act inconsistently
with such prior conduct.
Cliailcs A. Brow, Esq.
P.O. Bm 1225!326 Mnill Sr.
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40.

The doctrines of ost.oppe1, including

not limited to quasi-ostoppel and

equitable estoppel, and latches apply to prevent defendants from asserting owlersl~ipover, or any
interest in, tlte Disputed Property.

41.

The Court should quiet title to the Disputed Property in plaintiffs against all

other interests.

THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION
Prescriptive Casement
42.

Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if Mly set forth here.

43.

Plaintiffs and their predecessors have made open, notorious, contirxuous, and

uninterrupted use of the road withillthe Disputed Property as described above and have consistently
Logged and harvested firewood within the Disputed Property, for a period of inore than five yews.
44.

Plaintif% and their predecessors have made such uses within the Disputed

Property under a claim of right, with the knowledge of the defendants and their predecessors.
45.

Plaintiffs are entitled to a judgment confirming intheir favor a prescriptive

easement for continued use of ibe road and for logging and harvesting firc:wood within the Disputed
Prop.*.

e

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Trespass
46.

Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if Fully set forth here.

47.

As described above, on infohation and belief, defendant TODD GWEN

and/or some other defendant(s) a ~ d l otheir
r
agent(s) entered upon plaintiffs' property and, among
other damages, damaged plaintiffs' fence and fence improvements.
48.

Plaintfffs did not consent to such elltry.

49.

Plaintiffs were harmed by such entry.

SO.

Plaintiffs sieered damages by such entry in amounts to be proven at trial.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
Estoppel
51.

Plaintiffs restate the above allegations as if f~111yset forth here.

52.

That the defendants herein should be equitably and legally estopped and

prevented from setting forth any defense whatsoeser to Clle above-stated causes of action dae to ate

AMENDED COMPLAINT
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fact that the dclendmts havc drendy receivod compensntioil fiofn tl~oiu
predecessor in title in rcgwd

to ~e value of &e Disputed Property as set forth above. Thus, the defendants should be equitably
and legally estopped from again alleging or claiming any interest to the Disputed Property due to the
equitable and legal estoppel concepts in common Law or also due to the applicability of Idaho Code
section 61606.
ATTORNEY FEES

As a direct and proximate result of the defendants' conduct, plaintiffs retained the
services of Charles A. Brown to prosecute this action 011 their behalf, and plaintiEfs 11ave agreed to
pay said attorney areasonable fee for his services. PlaintiRs are entitled to an award of attorney fees
against defendants, some or all ofthem, pursuant to Idaho Iaw, including but not limited to Idaho
Code section 12-121.

RXGHT TO AMEND
53.

Plaintiffs reserve the right to amend this Amended Complaint as this inatter

proceeds.

WT3EEREFOl7E, plaintiffs pray for relief and dcmandj~tdgn~ent
againstthe defendants,
some or all. of them, individually andlor jointly and severally, as follows:
FIRST:

Quieting title to the Disputed Property in plaintiffs against

all other interests;

SECOND:

Awaxding compensatory and special damages, in amounts exceeding

the jurisdiction of the Magistrate Division, to be proven at Uial;
THIRD:

Ordering restitution of the Disputed Property to plaitltiPfs.

FOURTFI:

Declaring an easement by p~escriptionin the Disputed Property in

favor of plaintiffs.
FIFTH:

Enjoining defendants from entering the Disputed P~opertyandlor

damaging plaintiffs' fence or fenceposts

SIXT1-I:

Awarding reasonable attorncy Tees pursbmt to Idaho law, including

but not limited to Idaho Code section 12-121;

SEVENTH.

Awarding costs as allows by Idaho law;
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Childes A, IBi~owrr.Esq.
P.O. Box 12251.124 M l i n SI.
Lcwiston, ldnho83WI
205-7A'766-79A71208.766-iB86(fax)

EIGHl'H:

Granting such other relief as the Court deems just under the

circumstances.
DATED on this

aeday of

September, 2005.

Attorney for Plaintiffs

I, Charles A. Brcwn, hereby certie &at a true and correct copy of the fimgoing was:
by regular frrst cIass mail,
- mailed
and deposited in the United States

Post Office

to:

_)Lf

sent by f~c'acsimile,mailed by
regular first class mail, and
deposited in rl~eUnited States
Post Office

-

hand delivered

sent by Federal Express,
overnight delive~y

Robert M. Magym
Attorney at Law
201 Noxlh Main Street
P.O. Box 8074
Moscow, ID 83843
( m a i I on1 y )

Andrew M. Schwam, Esq.
Schwam Law OEce
514 South Polk Street
Moscow, ID 53843
on this

- sell1 by Facsimile only
to: 208-892-8030 -Magyar
208-882-4190 - Schwam

Y*,

day voZ September, 2005.

Cl>nOerA Brow,. Enq.
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A legal description for a parcel of land located in the SE% of Section 8, T40N.

R5W BM and being more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the northwest comer of SE% of Section 8; thence S 59'51'56' E.
1811.61 feet. along the north line of said SE% of Section 8, to the NW corner of
Tract 4 and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.
Thence, continuing along said north iine, S 8995"1'56"E. 825.00 feet to kine
NE corner of said Tract 4 and the NE comer of the SEX of said Section 8:
Thence S 1°09'40' W, 150.00 feet, along the east line of said SEK of
Section 8, to a point of intersection with a fence from the west;
Thence, S 8Q027'56"W, 832.31 feet, along said fence, to a point on the
west line of said Tract 4;
Thence, leaving said fence, N 3'41'52" E, 160.00 feet, along said west
line, to the TRUE POINT OF BEQINNING.

(END OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION)
total area in Tract 4 North of fence =2.95-acres.

A legal description for a parcel of land located in the SEX of Section 8, T40N, R5W BM

and being more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at the northwest corner of S f % of Section 8 and the TRUE POINT OF
BEGINNING.
Thence S 89'31'56"E. 800.00 feet. along the north line of said SE% of Section 8,
to the NE comer of Tract 1;
Thence S 4O45'08' E, 150.00 feet, along the east line of said Tract 1, to a point of
intersection with a fence from the west;
Thence N 84O38'17' W, 817.31 feet, along said fence, to a point of intersection
with the west line of said SEX of Section 8;
Thence, leaving said fen=, N 1°00'27' E, 75.00 feet, along said west line of SEX
of Section 8, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.
(END OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION)
Total area in Tract 1 North of fence 2.07-acres.

A legal description for a parcel of land louted in thc SEX of Section 8, T40N,

R5W BM and being more particularly described as follows:

Beginning at the northwest comer of SE% of Section 8; thence S 8Q051'56"E.
800.00 feet, along the north line of said SEX of Section 8, to the NW comer of
Tract 2 and the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.
Thence S 89'51'56" E, 1011.61 feet, along the north line of said SEX of
Section 8, to the NE corner Of said Tract 2;
Thence S 3°41"52" W, 160.00 feet, along the east line of said Tract 2, to a
point of intersection with an east-west fence;
Thence N 89016'21n W. 988.95 feet, along said fen=, to a point on the
west line of said Tract 2;
Thence. leaving said fence, N 4O45'00' W, 150.00 feet, along said west
line, to the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING.

(END OF LEGAL DESCRIPTION)
Total area in Tract 2 North of fence = 3.55 acres.

MAGYAR LAW FIRM
Robert M. Magyar #I667
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5
P.O. Box 8074
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 882-1906 Telephone
(208) 882-1908 FacsimiIe
SCHWAM LAW FIRM
Andrew Schwarn #I573
514 South Pollc Street
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 882-4190 Telephone
Atlomeys for DefendantsICounterplaintiffs: Greens, Shoolcs and Castles.

IN THE 3ISTRICT COURT OF TRE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TI-IE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO
J. WEITZ, husbahd and wife, and WEITZ
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company,

)
)
)

PlaintiffsICounterdefendants,

1
1
1

v.

)

TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN,
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOIC
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SNOOIC,
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANI< N.A.,

1

Case No. CV-04-000080

DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS'
SUPPLEMENT TO
TRIAL MEMORANDUM

)
)
)
)

1
J

Defendants/Counterplaintiffs.

1
1

Defe~~dantsICounterplaintiffs
submit the followiilg Supplement to their Ttirial Memorandum.

VII.

PERMISSIVE USE -WILD, UNENCLOSED OR UNIMPROVED LANDS.
Defendants/Connterplaintiffs are entitled to a pres~mptionthat the Plaintiffs' use of their land

was permissive because the land is wild, unenclosed or ~~nimproved.
DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS
SUPPLEMENTTO TRIAL MEMORANDUM - 1

SeeCoxv. Cox, 84 Idaho 513,373 P.2d929; Tmxnellv. Ward, 86 Idaho 555,389 P.2d221;
and Christle v. Northern Ventures, Inc., 110 Idaho 829,718 P.2d 1267; copies ofwhich are attached
hereto for the convenience of the Court, with relevant portions highlighted.

VIII. PRESCmPTIVE EASEMENT - USE IN COMMON WITH P U B I C ,
Plaintiffs can not acquire a prescriptive easement when their use is ih comnon with the
public.
See Simmons v. Perlcins, 63 Idaho 136,118 P.2d 740, a copy of which is attaclied hereto for
tl~econvenience of tlle Court, with relevant portions highlighted.

IX.

PRESECNPTIVE EMEMENT

- BURDEN OF PROOF.

A prescriptive easement requires the claimant to present reasonably clear and convinciilg
evidence of open, notorious, continuous, and ulllntexixpted use ~111dera claim of right and with the
Ici~owledgeofthe owner of the servient tenement for the prescriptive five year period,
See Wea-~e?y..Stafford,134 Idaho 691, 8 P.3d 1234, a copy of which is attached hereto for
the coilvenience of the Court, with relevant portioi~shighlighted. See also Simmo'ns, supra.
X.

EQUITABLE ESTOPPEL.

Piaiiltiffs/Counterdefendants claim for equitable estoppel does not satisfy the elements
reqnired to establisli equitable estoppel.
See Reeiovich v..First WeStern Igvestments, Inc., 134 Idaho 154, 997 P.2d 615, a copy of
which is attached hereto for the conveniellce of the Court, with devant portions higl~ligl~ted.
DATED this 4" day of October, 2005.

~ A G ,
Robert M. Magya#
Attorney for Defendants - Counterplaintiffs
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby terrify that on this 4"' day of October, 2005, I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM to be served on the foIIowing in the manner indicated below:
Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1225
Lewiston, ID 83501

( ) Overnight Mail
( ) U.S. Mail
( ) FacsilniIe

00 Hand DeIivery

hhS"L,*
Robert M. Magyar

I/
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Lewis A. COX md Ruth Cox, husbmd m d wife; m d Button Jones and Melissa Jones, husband a d wife,
Plaintiffs-Respondents9v, Ellie COX, Defendant-AppeBlmt~
[Cite as Cox v. Cox, 84 Idaho 5131
No. 9039.
Supreme Court of Idaho.
August 6,1962.
Action to enjoin defendant from using private madway and from allowing caktle to trespass on plaintiffs' land,
wl3ereisa defei1dmt sought injmctioa Po restrain plaintiffs from obstructing road and from allowing their cattle to
trespass on his lmd. The District Cow? of the Sixfi Judicial District, Binghm County, Ezra P. Monson,, J.,
enjoined both parties from aliowing their cattle to trespass and enjoined use of roadway by defendant, and
defendant appealed. The Supreme C o w 9McFadden, J., heid &at evidence sanshined findings that plaintiffs
built and maintained road, md, inasmuch as road that had not been 1ai.d out and recorded as !highway by order of
board of county commissioners, plaintiffs were entitled to injunction.

Kern & Williams, Blackfoot)for appellant.
lie it must appear that the plaintiffs have no adequate remedy at law, The
Befire am action in equity
cowts of equity will not lend their aid in preventing alleged wrongs or attempt to fabricate some kind of legal
machinery io edorce an injunction when the ordinary legal tribunals we capable of affording sufficient !relief.
Picotte 6:. Watt, 3 Idaho 447,31 P. 805; County of Ada v. BuUlen Bridge Co., 5 Idaho 79,419 P. 848, 36 E.R.A.
367; 19 A ~ . J w Sec.
~ , 100 and 102, legal remedy as affecting relief in equity.
lit is not necessary that ia highway be worked throughout its entire length, at public expense, to come within
the provision of section which declares that all roads used as such for a period of five y e a s which have k e n
worked and kept wp at public expense are highways. Gross, b a d Overseer v. McNutt34 Id&o 286,38 P.935.
The evidence is without conflict that the (roadway and bridge) were used by (respondent md its
predecessorc) mintemptedly md continuously for more thm the prescriptive period, which raised a
presumption that such use was adverse and under a claim of right (19 C.J. 959); m d there is no su1fficien.t
evidence ofparol license to overcome this presumption. Nofihwestem & Pacific Hypdheek Bmk v. Hobson,
59 Idd%o119,80 P.2d 793; Taylor v. O1CornelP,50 Id&o 259,295 P.247; Checkeas v. Thompson, 45 ;[d&o
715, 152 P.2d 5855; Hogan v. BRhey, 73 Idaho 274,251 P.2d 209; Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Wakm.atsna, 75
Idaho 232,270 P.2d 830; Sirnett v. Werelaas et al., 83 Idaho 514,365 P.2d 952.
Jay Stout, BiacBafioof h r respo~.dent.
Aa injmctiow may be grmted when it appears by the comjoiaint that the Plaintiff is entitled to the relief
demanded and such relief or my part thereof consists in re-

-

i
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straining the comission or contigwce of the act complained of either for a limited period or perpetualiy.
Idaho Code Section 8-LBBDZ(1).
W e r e gates are in existence across a road b m h g the passage thereof so that it is necessary to open said
gates in order to use such road, h e existence of such gates has always been considered as stmng evideimce that
the road was not a public road. Ross v. Swexhgen, 39 lId&o 35, at page 39,225 P. 102l,lO22; Peasley v.
Tros,mr9 103 MowQ.404,64 P.2d 109; Smithers v. Finch, 82 Cal. 153,22 P. 935; Board of County
Comissioners of Jackson County v. Owen, 166 P.2d 766 (Ok1.); Irion v. Nelson, 249 P.2d 10'9 (Okl.).
To acquke m easement by adverse possession over the real property of mother the use must be hostile and
e m o t be by acquiesmnse or consent. One asserting adverse possession as against the o m e r of red estate man4
prove each a d every element of adverse possession by clear and satisfactory evidence. Simmons v. Peie!cins, 63
Idaho 136, 118 P.2d 740; Brown v. Brown, 18 Idaho 345,118 P. 269; Pleasants v. !Hem, 36 Idaho '928,283 P.
565.

Plaintiff!! (respondents) Cox m d Jones me the owners of red property md holders of State leases of grazing
lands in the Wolverine me& Binghm County, Idaho; their lands and leases adjoin properties owned a7.d leased
t~
Ellie Cox, who is a nephew of plaintiff Lewis A. Cox. All parties to this action
by the d e f e n d ~ (appellant)
graze cattb on heir respwtive prope&ies. Thoughout the past severd yews there were numerous insances in
whkh the cattle of the parties became commingled and would be grazing on each other's property.
Access to respondents' properties is by the road that is the subject of the litigation here, taking off kom the
Wolverine Creek county road. This access road Peading south leaves the county road*traversing the propeuty of
the respondents Jones md Cox. A short d i s h c e off the
road a gate has k e maintained
~
for many yews,
m d in later years, adjoining the gate a cattle guard has k e n placed. Fwther south on the road, and near Jones's
cabin, mother gate is across the road.
This present action arises from difficulties be8891een these p d e s over the use ofthe road though
respondents' properties, m d &om the c o d n g l i n g of the cattle of the parties on each other's properties. The
respondents seek injunctive relief against the appellant to st010 him kom using the road hquestion and a1lowia.g
his caele to wespass on their propem and leased ground. The appellant by countec2laim alleged the road was a
public mad md sought an injunction, against the respondents born obstructing the road and from allowing their
cattle to trespass on his l a d and

leased groundasg. The trial cow$ heard the case .withoutaajanny md enter& judgment enjoining all parties from
allowing their cattle to trespass on the land ofthe others, determining that the road was n~otpublic, but a private
one*enjoinixng use by the appellant ofthe road in question and further enjoined any interference with the gates
maintained by the respondents on the roadway.
From this judgment, appellant appeals. While some twenty-thee assignments of emor me presented,
appellant s m a r i z e s the main issues before this cowl as follows: (1) whether a trespass should be enjoined
where respondents fail to come into c o d with clean hands m d when they have m adequate remedy at law; (2)
whether adme road in question is public or private; md (3) if the road is determined to be a private road, whether a
p ~ x r i p t i v easement
e
in favor of appellant *BbD the use of the road has arisen. Since appdlmt's citation of
authorities and argument in his brief axe primarily directed to these thee issues, h e assignments of enor
msuppofied by citation or argument will not be discussed. Koch v. Elkins, 7 1 ird&o 50,225 P.2d 457 Kn~BPaBl
v. Rimbal1983 lic3aI-10 12, 356 lP.2d 919.

!I] The trial c o w found that respondents have allowed their cattle to trespass on premises o m

fH?fn.jed
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by appellantne,
as wen1 as finding thka't the appellant has allowed his cattle to trespass on premises owned and
leased by respondents. This finding is Mly substantiated by the evidence. The country in which the property off
the parties is situate is mowtaimfious, with the inherent difficulties of fencing in such a rugged country. Some
fencing has been done by the parties7not wscons~mingencQoswes,but merely by way of "&ik fencess'.The
dria fences did not prevent the cattle from roaming onto the adjoining properties. The problem is created by &.e
normal tendency of cattle to move while grazing. That the trial court acted jdiciously and correctly in enjoining
both parties &om allowing their cattle to trespass on the other%property cannot seriously be questioned by
appellant, because by bis o m pleadings he charges that the respondents "l~avepermitted their cattle to trespass
upon the lease holds of comterir-cldmant(appellant) * * * causing severe and imparable damage to the cotug'derclaimant's lease nEQBlding."Appellant M e r &ages respondents with the intent to continue to pemit their cattle
to trespass airnd damage his holdings, and prays for an injunction against them.
I[%?]
Appellant contends that this action should not be maintained, first for the reason that before an action in
equity wiU lies it must appear that the plaintiff has no adequate remedy at Raw, m d that here respondents have an
adequate remedy at !aw; and

secondly %hatthe fmdmmtaR principle off equity that one seeking equity must do equity, or Uhat a person mmst
come into ah4 equity c o w with clem hmds, b a s h i s action. in regard to appellant's first contention, it is fully
mswered by Goble v. New Wodd Life Ins. Co., 57 Idaho 5B6,67 $28 280. Quoting from Staples v. Rossi, 7
lidah 618,626,65 P. 67,49, in discussing what is now 1.C. 4 8-402$it was there stated:

" 'This statute modifies the old d e s of chancery in regard to the issuance of injunctions. lit says
nothing whatever about the lack of m adequate remedy. We are therefore ofthe opinion that the
authorities cited by the appellants to the effect that, if m adequate remedy exists in behalf of time
plaintiffs$said injmction should be refused>have no application whatever to the case at bm, under
the shtute cited'."
i[3,4] As to the second contention, the maxim that one seeking eqdty must do equity, it must be pdnded out
&at both appemmt m d respondent have presented this action in the trial court on the theory that both were
respectively entitled to injunctive relie8 appellant by his cowterclaim seeking an injunction against respondents
fiom &lowing their cattle to trespass, also seeking an injunction against them for obstmcting the roadway, and
resp~ndentsseeking m injunction against appellant from allowing his cattle to & s p a s s,d kom using the road
in question. This action was tried on the issues iianned by the pleadings of &&parties,m d was tried in the
district cow4 on the theory that this w s an action for injunctive relief~The record fails to disclose where the
issue ofthe applicability of the doctrine of "dean hands" or of the maxim "That one seeking equity must do
equity", was ever presented to the trial court for consideration. The rule is firmly established that parties are
held to the theory upon which the action is tried, m d issues not raised in the trial cmnot be first presented here
on appeal. Smith v. Shim, 82 Idaho 941,350 P.2d 348; Shipman v. MRoppenbwg, 72 Idaho 323,240 P.2d E 151;
Wornward v. Taylor, 70 ~ d 450,221
& ~ P.2d 686.

As concerns the second issue mentioned by appdlant* i. e., whether the road in question was a public or
private road, 1.C. 4 40-103 p ~ ~ ~inipart:
d e ~
"Roads %aidout and recorded as highways, by order of the boad of comissioners~and all
roads used as such for a period of five years, provided the latter shall have been worked and kept up
at the expense of the public, or located m d recorded by order ofthe board of commissionew, are
highways. * * *"
This court in Ross v. Sweaingen, 39 Idaho 35,225 P. 1022, referring to the foregoing
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section stated in Bamgwge app~copriinteto the situation here:
"Appellants had the burden of establishing the existence of the public road described in the
petition. They failed to prove that the r o d had been laid out m d recorded as a highway by order of
the bomd of c ~ m i s s i o n e r osr~that it had h e n used as such for a period of five yews. R.S. $ 851.
Neither did they prove that the road had been Uaid out m d recorded as a highway by order of the
board of wmissioners, nor that it had been used as such for a period of five years, and that it had
been either worked md kept up at public expense or located and recorded by order ofthe bomd of
commissioners. C.S. 5 1304. There was evidence that the road had been used, but h was not
established that it had bean 'laid out and recorded' by order ofthe board of commissioners, or
'worked md kept up at the expense of fie public,' or 'located m d recorded by the order ofthe board
~ concluding that the #madwas
of comisioners.' The evidence was sufficient to just@ the c o u in
not a public road, but that it was one over which people had traveled at will, but on which Umd
owners through whose lands it extend4 had felt at Iikrty for many years to maintain md had
maintained gates."
See also: State v. Nesbitt, 79 Idaho 1 , 310 P.2d 787.
Concerning the principle question of whether this was a public road, evidence d a n y use prior to 1893 is
lacking. The trial coua found the road was not in existence between 11888 and 1893 (during which period Sec.
85 1, Revised Statutes existed in its original form, under which my r o d used for five years was a highway, with
no requirements it be worked m kept up at public expense). Other findings of the tirial c o w were that prior to
respondents building the road9various persons passed through the valley in which the road is located*using a
natural cattle trail, Respondent Jones9built a gate across the path of the present mad going to his cabin site in
about 1926, and later built another gate across the trail by his cabin. In A930 and R 93 1, the road was h i l t from
the county road to Jones' cabin, m d later the road was extended to the end of respondent C d s property. The
maintenmce ofthe mad was done by the re~apndents~
and the gates were kept closed m d at times locked. The
road was used by members ofthe public with consent and permission of the iespondents. Respondent Jams
paid! a comuy employee $20.00 to go over the road with a road-grader one time, but the money was not received
by Bingham County. On one occasion a county road-grader made one pass over

fie road to a mine being developed by Neison Cox, respondent Cox's b r o t h m d the father of appellantnne, but
there was m evidence 'chis work was done by Bingham County, but was done merely as a favor. There was a
c o r n o n custom in this area for county road crews to open up ranchers' roads to their yards, without charge ox
obligation on the p a ofthe rancher; the road has never been used as a public highway for a period of five
yems, m d it has not been worked or kept up at public expense.

[6]While appellant chanlenges many of these findings offact, asserting enor iin &at hey "me contray to,
md not supported by the weight of evidence submitted at the trial9"neverthelless there is substantia! evidence to
support them. Thus this court a m o t go behind such findings, and it is not the province ofthis couifi to say
whether they axe contrary to the weight of the evidence, that fiction being wholly for the trial couk Melton v.
h a r 983 ]Idaho 99,358 P.2d 855.
Q7]It is mcontroverted that this road has not been laid out md recorded as a highway by order of the Boad
of c o ~ t comisioners.
y
The @idwurt found on substantial evidence that the road had not been worked and
kept up at p2pbIic expense. This mad did not meet fiose requirements of I.@.5 40-103 to be classified as a
highway.

In 1952 fie BBinghrana County Comissioners wrote respndent Jones that it had been brought to their
attention fiat he, Jones, had fenced m d Uocked the gate across the road in question. In this letter it was sate&
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"A resolution has been passed by the Board &at you be notified to unlock this gate banad allow
stock and vehicles to follow this road imediately or it wil be necessq for us to take action to
condem the land md open a road though the property. However, we hope this action win9 not be
necessary."
While appellmt contends this is a recognition by the county coaruilnissioners that this road was a public road,
such conclusion is not justified, for in the letter itself$it is recognized that it may be necessary to condemn the
land, m achowRedgment ofthe rights of respondent Jones to the l a d in question. The %andover which the road
traversed was w t exempted from assessmea for tax purposes.
[8] Appellant points out that &is particular road is a continmtion of mother road with which it comects;
&at 'this comective road has been maintained at county expense over the yews m d hence the maintenance of
the com.ecting road constitutes maintenance at county expense ofthe road in question, thus making it a public
highway. Bt is appdiiant's theory

&at it is not necessary &at a highway be worked thoughout its entire lengthhat public expense, to come within
the preview of B.C. 5 40-103, citing Gross V. McNut~t,4 Idaho 286,38 P. 935. The holding in that case is not
applicable. Here the maintenance work done on the county road was done for the maintenmce of that road
alone. The record is devoid of evidence that it was done with the thought in mind it be considered as work on
the road in question. To so extend the rule of the Gross v. McNutt case (supra) would mean tinat by public
maintenmce on m y county roads antomatica~lyevery %meor road that touched or crossed such county r o d ,
would become a public one^ The road in question was not an integral p a of the county r o d . Access alone.to a
county road on which public maintenance is done cannot logidly be considered as sufficient to make
applicable h e holding of Gross v. McNutt, (supra).
[9j Witnesses for both parties concmed that gates had been maintained across the road in question for many
yeas, the only area of dispute being the time when the gates were first erected. Where gates are in existence
across a road b m h g the passage and making it n e c e s w to open them in order to use the mad3the existence of
such gates is considered as strong eviden~ethat the road was not a public road. Ross v. Swemingen, 39 Idaho
35,225 P.1021; Peasley v. Trosper, 103 Mont. 40%,64PP.2d109; Smithers vv.Fit& 82 Ca%.153,22 P.935;
Board of County Comissioners of Jackson County v. Owen, 96 Okl~538, 166 P.2d 766; Idon v. Nelson, 207
OCkl. 243.249 P.2d 107.

The @idcoautqsconclusion that this was not a county road and that appellant had no right to use it as a
public highway is %lUy sustained by the record.

[lqThe evidence fails to esbblish appellant's clai& to a prescriptive right in this road. To establish such a
pmscriptive right in a roadway it is essential that the use ofthe way must constitute some actual invasion orr
infringement of the right ofthe owner. Simmons v. Perkins. 63 Idaho 136, li 18 P.2d 1940.It is the contention of
appellant, however*that under the general d e that proof of an open, notorious, and mhtempted user for the
prescriptive period, without evidence of Inow it began9raises a presumption that it was m adverse use and under
a claim of right. He points to the fact that the roadway was used by himself md his father unintemptedly and
continuousEy for more thm the prescriptive period, contending &at such ~ n t e m p t e duse makes applbab1.e the
presumption in his favor that the use was hostile.

[In] As a general proposition appellant's contention concerning the presumption Wat arises from
&ntempted use of

an easement for the prescriptive period is correct. See: Sirnett v. WereBus, 83 Idaho 514,365 P.2d 952; Eagle
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Rock Corp. v. I h o n t Hotel Co., 39 Idaho 413,85 P.2d 242; Northwest & Pacific Mypotheekbadi v. Hobson,
59 Idaho % 19, 80 P.2d 793. Such a presumption, in Idaho, at least, has not been considered as inrefutable or
mnclusive presumption. Last CInmce Ditch Co. v. Sawyer, 35 Idaho 61,204 P.654.

[a]This general rule fixing the ppkesmpkion of adverse use is applicable 80 improved lands, and th.e Rands
cultivated md enclosed. However, when one claims an easement by prescription over wild or unenclosd 3mds
ofmother3merq use of the way for the required time is not generally sdficient to give rise to a p ~ s m p t i o nthat
the w e is adverse. Fullenwider v. Kitchens, 223 Ark. 442,266 S.W.2d 281,46 A..iL.R2d 1135; Clarke v.
Clarke, 133 CanBn. 667,66 P. 10;Todd v. Sterling, 45 Wash.2d 40,273 P.2d 245. Northwest Cities Gas Co. v.
Western Fuel Co., 13 Wash.2d 75, 123 P. 2d 771; The Mountaineers v. Wymr, 56 Wash.2d "71, 355 P.2d 341;
Hester v. Sawyers, 48 NaMex.497,7%P.2d 646, 112 A.L.R. 536; See also: Cases in the mno8ationii,46
A.L.R.2d 1140; 17A Am.Bw~683, Easements 8 '71;28 C.J.S. Easements 8 68 p. 734. See discussion in
dissenting opinion in Aguiwe v. Hmlin, 80 Idaho B 76, 327 P. 2d 349, in a dissenting opinion where the
majority opinion neither accepted nor rejected this mle, determining that case on other principles.
The underlying reason for this rule is well expressed in Fn'i~.enwiderv. Kitchens, supra, as follows:
"The reason for the rule that a passageway over anr&nclosedand wimproved land is deemed to
be permissive is sowd and a h easily eanade~s-dable~ * * HQ assumes thatthe owen of such land
in many instances will not be in position to readily detect or prevent others from crossing over Inis
Iand, md, even if he did, he might not enter my objection because of m desire to acco~modate
others m d because such usage resulted in no immediate damage to him. Also in such instances the
Rmdomei would probably have no reason to think the users off the passageway were atteimpting to
acquire any adverse rights. On the other hand there would be no reason or basis for such inferero.ce
of permission on the part of the lmdomer if someone tore down his fence or desbroyed his crops
by reason of such usage. These acts alone wound he cdcuiated to put the Smdowner on notice that
others were using his 1md adversely to his o m interest m d right of occupation."
**.

p3, lap The trial com's detemination that the w e ofthis road by otlhers with
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pemission of respondents, b 1k18ysubstmtiated by the record; under the law the use being permissive, no
prescriptive rights arose as to its use by appellmd.

Costs to respondents..

-SMTH, C. J., and TAYLOR, KNUDSON m d McQUADE, JB., concw.
,-----
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This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for resumption of the court
trial in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the parties.
Court informed counsel that it had a chance to review the deposition testimony of
Joshua Ritter and Ronald Landeck last evening.

Mr. Schwam informed the Court that Ronald Monson, the land surveyor who
testified yesterday, wished to correct his testimony from yesterday and requested leave to
call him between witnesses today. Court stated it would so allow.
Mr. Brown called Todd A. Green as witness and he was sworn. Mr. Scl~wam
objected to Mr. Green being caIIed as he was not identified as a witness. Since Mi'.Brown
did not comply with the pretrial agreement entered into between cou~selbefore this Court
at the pretrial conference by informing opposing counsel of the witnesses each intends to
call the night before they are called, Court sustained Mr. Schwam's objection, infor~niixg
Mr. Brown that he may call Mr. Green tomorrow.
Gerald Rockford Weitz was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. PlautFff's
Exhibit #30C, photograph, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without
objection. Plaintiffs Exhibits #31 and #32 photographs were identified, offered and
admitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination continued. Plaintiff's
Exhibits #33, $34, and #35, photographs, were identified and offered. Mr. Schwam
objected as to #35 unless it can be established when it was taken. Exhibits 833 and #34
were admitted without objection. Mr. Brown reoffered #35. Mr. Scl~wamobjected. Court
rejected the offer. Mr. Brown offered Plaintiffs Exhibits #21 through #29, inclusive and
were admitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination resumed.
Court recessed at 10:11 A.M., reconvening at 10:27 A.M., Court, counsel and the
parties being present as before.

Mr. Brown requested leave to make an offer of proof. Court so allowed. Mr. Brown
made his offer of proof as to what Mr. Weitz would testify to regarding the disputed fence
line and regarding the conversations he had with his grandfather regarding the property
boundary.
Gerald Rockford Weitz resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the
plaintiffs on direct examination. Direct examination concluded.

Mr. Brown requested leave to call a witness out of order. There being no objection
from Mr. Scl~wam,Court allowed the testimony of Mr. Weitz to be interrupted to call
Homer Ferguson.
Homer Ferguson was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross
examination by Mr. Schwam. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. Plaintiff's Exhibit #4,
aerial map, was identified. Recross examination by Mr. Schwam. There being no objection
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from counsel, the witness was excused.
Gerald Rockford Weitz resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the
plaintiffs on cross examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination.
James Henry Hagedorn was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross
examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. There being no objection from
counsel, the witness was excused.
Jack Freeland was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs.
Court recessed at 1201 P.M., reconvening at 1:02 P.M., Court, counsel and the
parties being present.

Mr. Brown requested that the Court consider Dusty Weitz's deposition rather than
have him called as a witness. Mr. Schwam requested that the Court consider the request
after the testimony of Mr. Freeland has been completed.
Jack Freeland resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the plaintiff
on direct examination. Cross examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination.
There being no objection from counsel, the witness was excused.

Mr. Schwain informed the Court that he had been told by Mr. Brown that Duane
Priest would be called in his case in chief. Mr. Schwam stated that he did not subpoena
Mr. Priest, so would like notice if plaintiffs are not going to call him so that he has time to
subpoena him for the defendants' case in chief.
Ronald Paul Monson was called, having been previously sworn, and testified out of
order for the defendants. Cross examination by Mr. Brown. No redirect examination.
Court questioned the witness. Mr. Brown examined the witness on the Court's questions.
Court questioned the witness further.
Nancy Flisher was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross examination
by Mr. Schwam. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. Recross examination by Mr.
Schwam.
James Edward Weitz was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross
examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. Court questioned the witness. Mr.
Brown examined the witness on the Court's questions. The witness stepped down.
Court recessed at 214 P.M., reconvening at 230 P.M., Court, counsel and the parties
being present as before.
Duane Priest was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Plaintiff's Exhibits
#13, #14, #15, and #16, property descriptions, were identified, offered and #16 was

Terry Odenborg
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admitted without objection. Mr. Schwam objected to the offer of Plaintiffs Exhibits #13,
#14, and #15. Mr. Brown argued further. Court sustained the objection to those three
exhibits. Direct examination resumed. Mr. Schwam examined the witness in aid of
objection. Court sustained the objections as to Plaintiff's Exhibits #13, #14, and #15.
Direct examination resumed. Plaintiffs Exhibits #17, #18, and #19, legal descriptions, were
identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination
resumed. Plaintiffs Exhibit #4, aerial photograph, was identified, offered and admitted
into evidence after hearing objections from Mr. Schwam. Plaintiffs Exhibit #5, aerial
photograph, was identified, offered and rejected after hearing objections from Mr.
Schwam. Direct examination resumed. Cross examination by Mr. Schwam. Defendant's
Exhibit W, Priest Data Collection for Weitz, was identified, offered and admitted into
evidence without objection. Cross examination continued. Defendant's Exhibits W, V2
and V3, legal descriptions prepared by Priest, were identified, offered and admitted into
evidence without objection. Cross examination continued. Plaintiffs Exhibit X, Priest
data, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Cross
examination continued. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. There being no objection
from counsel, the witness was excused.
Mr. Brown moved to have the Court consider the Deposition of Dusty Weitz. Mr.
Schwarn objected. For reasons articulated on the record, Court sustained Mr. Schwam's
objection.
Colloquy was had between Court and counsel regarding remaining witnesses.
Mr. Schwarn requested that the Court read the following portions of Consuela
Weitz's deposition: page 11, line 24 through page 12, line 23; page 19, line 2 through page
20, line 6; page 50, line 14 through page 51, line 18; page 58, line 10 through page 59,line 16;
page 65, line 2 through page 66, line 7; page 86, line 10 through page 87, line 18; page 89,
line 11 through page 91, line 3; and the follotving portions of Gerald Weitz's deposition:
page 10, line 23 through page 12, line 5; page 24, line 5 through line 25; page 26, line 10
through page 27, line 6; page 47, line 1through page 48, line 15. Court stated that it would
read those portions this evening.
Court recessed at 4:11 P.M., subject to call.
APPROVED BY:
_C

JOHN R. STEGNER
DISTRICT JUDGE
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This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for resumption of the court
trial in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the parties.
Court informed counsel that it had read the excerpts of Consuelo Weitz and Gerald
Weitz's depositions as requested by counsel.
Todd Green was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. On motion of Mr.
Brown the Deposition of Todd Green was published. Plaintiffs Exhibit #8, Road and
Boundary Agreement, Green to Castle, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence
without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibit #9, Road and Boundary Agreement, Green to Shook,
w-as identified, offered and admitted into evidence wifkout objection. Plaintiff's Exhibits
#lo, Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims between Rogers and Green; #44,
Affidavit of Todd Green; and #45, letter, were identified, and Plaintiffs Exhibit #45 was
offered and admitted without objection. Plaintiff's Exhibits #46, #47, and #48, letters, were
identified. Direct examination continued. Plaintiffs Exhibits #44, #46, #47, #48, #49, and
#50 were offered and admitted into evidence without objection.
Court recessed at 10:23 A.M., reconvening at 10:36 A.M., Court, counsel and the
parties being present as before.
Todd Green resumed the witness stand and direct examination by Mr. Brown
continued. Plaintiff's Exhibits #11, schematic drawing, and 812, schematic drawing, were
identified, offered and admitted into evidence after hearing objections from Mr. Schwam
as to #12. Direct examination continued. Cross examination by Mr. Schwam. Defendant's
Exhibits EE-19, photograph, and NN, photograph, were identified, offered and admitted
into evidence without objection. Cross examination continued. Defendant's Exhibit BBB,
copy of plat map, was marked for identification, offered and admitted into evidence after
hearing objections from Mr. Brown. Cross examination resumed. Redirect examination by
Mr. Brown. Recross examination by Mr. Schwam. Court questioned the witness. Mr.
Schwam examined the witness on the Court's questions. The witness stepped down.
Allen Drew was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. No cross exanination.
The witness was excused.
Court recessed at 11:59 A.M., reconvening at 1:03 P.M., Court, counsel and the
parties being present.

Mr. Brown informed the Court that Robert Brower was present pursuant to
subpoena, but that he does not intend to call him. There being no objection from Mr.
Schwam, Mr. Brower was excused from his subpoena.
Plaintiffs Exhibit #10, Settlement Agreement and Release of Claims, was offered
and admitted into evidence without objection.
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Walter Carlson was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross examination
by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. There being no objection from counsel, the
witness was excused.
Norman Clark was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross examination
by Mr. Schwam. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. No recross examination. There
being no objection from counsel, the witness was excused.
Curtis Wiggins was called, sworn and testified for the plainti€fs. Cross examination
by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examinaiion. There being no objection from counsel, the
witness was excused.
Consuelo Weitz was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Upon motion of
Mr. Brown, there being no objection from Mr. Schwam, the testimony of Consuelo Weitz
was interrupted to accommodate the next witness's schedule.
Dustin F. Weitz was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross examination
by Mr. Schwam. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. There being no objection from
counsel, the witness was excused.
Consuelo Weitz resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the
plaintiffs on direct examination. Plaintiffs' Exhibits #37 A-66 through A-71, A-65 and A-63
were identified. Plaintiffs Exhibits #37, A-66 through A-71, were offered and admitted
without objection. Plaintiffs Exhibits #37, A-62, photograph, was identified. Plaintiffs
Exhibits #37 A-1, A-2, A-3, A-4 and A-5, photographs, were identified and #37A-1 through
A 4 were offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Plaintiffs Exhibits #37 A5 and A-6, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into evidence without
objection. Plaintiff's Exhibits #37 A-7 through A-17, were identified, offered and admitted
into evidence without objection. Plaintiffs Exhibits #37 A29 and A-30, photographs, were
identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection.
Court recessed at 224 P.M., reconvening at 239 P.M., Court, counsel and the parties
being present as before.
Consuelo Weitz resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the
plaintiffs on direct examination. Defendant's Exhibit ZZ, photograph, was identified.
Direct examination continued. Cross examination by Mr. Schwam. Defendant's Exhibit
ZZ, photograph, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection.
Defendant's Exhibit Y, copy of check, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence
without objection. Defendant's Exhibit Z, Landeck billing, was identified, offered and
admitted into evidence without objection. Cross examination continued. Defendanfs
Exhibit AA, aerial photo, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without
objection. Defendanfs Exhibit WW, letter, was identified, offered and admitted into
evidence without objection. Cross examination continued. Defendant's Exhibit BB-1,
survey, was identified, offered and rejected. Plaintiffs' Exhibits #37 A-18 through A-28,

Terry Odenborg
Deputy
Clerk
---.--.
-..-7---

"

and A-31 through A-65, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into evidence
without objection. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. No recross examination. Court
questioned the witness. The witness stepped down.

Mr. Brown stated that he only had one or two witnesses left to call tomorrow.
Court recessed at 409 P.M.
APPROVED BY:

-

DISTIUCr JUDGE

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
- .
.
. .-

--
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SHOOK, DANIAL T. CASTLE and
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This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for resumption of the court
trial in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the parties.
Harold Osborne was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs. Cross
examination by Mr. Schwam. Redirect examination by Mr. Brown. Plaintiff's Exhibit
#40B, satellite photograph, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence after hearing
objections from Mr. Schwam. Recross examination by Mr. Scl~wam.Defendant's Exhibit
0 0 , photograph, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection.
There being no objection from counsel, the witness was excused.

Mr. Brown moved to amend plaintiffs' amended complaint to conform to the
evidence and argued in support of his motion. Mr. Schwam argued in opposition to the
motion. Mr. Brown argued in rebuttal. Mr. Schwam argued in surrebuttal. For reasons
articulated on the record, Court granted the motion to amend.
Plaintiff rested.

Mr. Schwam moved to dismiss.
Court recessed at 925 A.M., reconvening at 941 A.M., Court, counsel and the
parties being present as before.

Mr. Schwam inoved to dismiss the recently added claim of estoppel and the fifth
cause of action and argued in support of the motion. Mr. Brown argued in opposition to
the motion. Mr. Schwam argued in rebuttal. For reasons articulated on the record, Court
granted the motion to dismiss the fifth cause of action. Mr. Brown argued further. To the
extent plaintiffs have asserted an affirmative cause of action, Court granted the motion to
dismiss.

Mr. Schwam moved for dismissal of the second cause of action and argued in
support of the motion. Mr. Brown argued in opposition to the motion. Court granted the
motion to dismiss the second cause of action in the Amended Complaint.
Mr. Schwam moved for dismissal of the first cause of action with prejudice and
argued in support of the motion. For reasons articulated on the record, Court denied the
motion.
Mr. Schwam moved for dismissal of the prescriptive easement claim and argued in
support of the motion. For reasons articulated on the record, Court denied the motion.
Court recessed at 10:02 A.M., reconvening at 10:08 A.M., Court, counsel and the
parties being present as before.
Danial Castle was calIed, sworn and testified for the defendants. Defendant's
Exhibit QQ-1, photograph, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk

objection. Direct examination continued. Cross Examination by Mr. Brown. Defendant's
Exhibit DD, Declaration, was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without
objection. Cross examination continued. No redirect examination. The witness stepped
down.
Todd Green was called, having been previously sworn, and testified for the
defendant. Defendant's Exhibits EE-1 through EE-18, and EE-20, photographs, were
identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibits
HJ3-1 through HH-13, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into evidence
without objection. Defendant's Exhibits 11-1 through 11-5, photographs, were identified,
offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibits 11-6 through II10, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection.
Defendant's Exhibits 11-11 and 11-12 photographs, were admitted into evidence upon
stipulation of counsel. Defendant's Exhibits JJ-1 through JJ-4, photographs, were
identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination
continued. Cross examination by Mr. Brown. Redirect examination by Mr. Schwam. No
recross examination. Court questioned the witness. Mr. Brown examined the witness on
the Court's questions.
Steven Shook was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Defendant's
Exhibits KK, sequence of fifty-six photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into
evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibit LL, photograph, was identified, offered
and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibit MM, photograph, was
identified. Defendant's Exhibits PP-1 through PP-5, photographs, were identified, offered
and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibit MM, photograph, was
offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination continued.
Defendant's Exhibits QQ-3 and QQ-10, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted
into evidence without objection. Direct examination continued.
Colloquy was had between Court and counsel regarding scheduling.
Court recessed at 11:57 A.M., reconvening at 1:12 P.M., Court, counsel and the
parties being present as before.
Steven Shook resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the
defendants on direct examination. Defendant's Exhibits FF-1 through FF-10, photographs,
were identified, offered and admitted into evidence without objection. Defendant's Exhibit
GG-1 through GG-6, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into evidence
without objection. Cross examination by Mr. Brown. Plaintiff's Exhibit #9, Road and
Boundary Agreement, was identified. No redirect examination. The witness was excused.
Thomas Richards was called and sworn.

Mr. Brown objected to some of the defendants' exhibits that have not yet been
offered and Mr. Richard's proposed testimony. Mr. Schwam responded to Mr. Brown's

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk

objection. Mr. Brown argued further. Mr. Schwam argued further. Court overruled the
objection.
Direct examination of Thomas Richards by Mr. Schwam. Defendant's Exhibits R-1
through R-12, photographs, were identified, offered and admitted into evidence without
objection,
Defendant's Exhibit 'IT, Report by Northwest Management, Inc., was
identified, offered and adinitted into evidence without objection. Direct examination
continued.
Court recessed at 258 P.M., reconvening at 3:14 P.M., Court, counsel and the parties
being present as before.
Thomas Richards resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for
defendants on direct examination. Defendant's Exhibit UU, Supplemental Report by
Northwest Management, Inc., was identified, offered and admitted into evidence without
objection. Defendant's Exhibit XX, Northwest Management Report, was identified, offered
and admitted into evidence without objection. Cross examination by Mr. Brown. Redirect
examination by Mr. Schwam.
Court recessed at 5:01 P.M.
APPROVED BY:

DISTRICT JUDGE

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
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COME NOW the plaintiffs above named by and through their attorney of record,
Charles k Brown,and submit this memorandum in support of the claim that the defendants do not
PLAIMIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT
OF CLAIM THAT DEFENDANTS ARE NOT
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE
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meet the requirements for protection as bow fide purchasers for value. The facts presented in his
memorandum will be &lly developed at trial.

If it is determined that tliere was an uncertain boundary ihat was set by agreement,
(.he question becomes what is the impact on a subsequent purchaser.

Once a boundary line has been

fixed under the doctrine of agreed boundary, that boundilly is binding upon successors in interest
who purchase with notice of the agreement. Duflv. Seubert. 110 Idaho 865,870,719 P.2d 1125,

1130 (198G), citing Prwlcy v. Harris. 75 Idalto 112,117,268 P.2d 351,353 (1954). One buying
property in the possession of a tllird party is put 00 notice ofany claim ol'title or right of possession
by such third party which areasonable investigation would reveal. Paurlcy v. Harris,75 Idaho 1 12,
117,268 P.2d 351,353 (1954). In Reid v. Duzet, the Idaho Supreme Court stated that the district

judge found:
Although the Plaintiff was unaware of any marked property boundaries,
choosing instead to tely on the deeded description, even a casual observation
of the parcel would have revealed improvements in the area of the top hat.
Those improvements, i.e., fencing, pens, wood shed, driveway, garage, and
a home immediately east of the iron rod should have put them on notice tlmt
someone claimed an interest in this property, regardless of what the survey
later reveal&.
140 Idaho 389,393,94 P.3d 694,698(2004).

The court then went on to hold:
Idaho law provides that when two parties orally establish boundaries of
vroverty to be transferred from one to the other, and the subseauenf:written
deeddois not matchthose boundaries,the orall&greedupon bomdaries will
prevail. This oral agreement is binding upon all subsequentptucltaseri who
have notice of Uw agreement, or who are put onnol4ceat the time ofpurchase
that the property as described by the inaccurare deed is cIaimed bv sorrieone
other th;n the seller.

Thegeneral rule, then, is that onepunhiisiigpmpertyi s put on notice as to any claim
of title or tight of possession which a reasonable investigation would reveal. PmcrIey v. Harris,
supra. "One who reiies for protection upon the doctrine of being a bontc fide purchaser must show

that at the time of the purchase he paid avaluable consideration and upon the belief and the validity
of the vendor's claim oftitle without notice, actual or constructive,of any outstanding adverse Fights
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDW IN SUPPORT
OF CLAIM THAT DEFENDANTS ARE NOT
BONA FIDE PURCHASERS FOR VALUE
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ofanother." Imigv. McDonald, 77Idaho314,318,291. P.2d 852,855 (1955), citingRichlands Brick
Corporation v. Hwst Hardware Co., 80 W. Va 476,92 S.E. 685; Merchants Trust v. Davis, 49
Idaho 494,290 P. 383; Moore v. De Bernardi, 47 Nev. 33,220 P. 544; Davis v. Kleindienst, Ariz.,
169 P.2d 78; 92 C.Y.S., Vendor and Purchaser, $5 321, p. 214. Fwth~:r, "[ojne who purchases
property with sufficient knowledge to put him, or a reasonably prudent person, on inquiry is not a
bona fide purchaser." Id, ciringFroman v. Madden, 13Idaho 138,88 P. 894; Mangum v. Stadel, 76

Kw. 764,92 P. 1093; LaBrie v. Cartwrighf,55 Tex.Civ.App. 144,118S.W. 78$;SaZmn v. Norris,
82 App. Div. 362,81 N.Y.S. 892; Shcphardv. Van Doren, 40 NM. 380,60 P.2d 635. "One who
purchases or encumbrances with notice of inconsistent claims does not take in good faith, and one
who fails to investigate the open or obvious inconsistent claim cannot take in g o d faith."
Langroise v. Becker, 96 Idaho218,220,526 P.2d 178,180 (1974). ciling~fmerco,fnc.v. TulZor, 182

Cal. App.2d 336,6 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1960).
Therefore, ifthe Greens had sufficient facts to put thein on notice to inquire into an
inconsistent claim by the Weitzes, and they did not engage inany inveslig11tion~
then they cannot be
bona fide purchases for wlue- In Iferrmann v. Woodell, the court found that "A boundary marked

by a fence, with the land on the Hemnanns' side being grazed and cultivated would constitute
notice." 107Idaho916,921,693 P.2d, 1118,1123(1985). IrlHerrmnnn, the purchaser had walled
the land before purchase and had noticed the barbed wire fence and cultivation. In our case,

Mr. Green had also walked much of the area he ultimately purchased. Inhis deposition, Mr. Green
stated that he had been on the property numerous times from 1999 to 2002, and at the preliminary
injunction hearing he said 25 to 30 times. He testified that he traversed fllc perimeter road on his
ATV 3 to 4 times a year from 1999 to 2002. He saw the radio shack, but he did not make inquiry
of anyone concerning its history, owership, or purpose. I4e saw the blue gate and even used it to
enter upon the disputed property. Thus, he did not access the disputed property from the propetty he
intended to purchase but rather from the Bennett Lumby land then through the blue gate to the
disputed property. Mr. Green saw not only the blue gate but the hog wire fence Ieading from the
blue gate, which would have separated lrim &om &ectIy accessing the eastern end of the disputed
property. The hog wire fence nuts between the pinkstdce and the western bearing tree, both of which

Mr. Green allegedly remembers so well. Nobody bas argued &at the hog win?fence was not in good
repair in July of 2002, extending approximately 100 feet south ofthe blue gate down the boundary
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bdW'xn &a disputed property and Bennett Lumberpropc~ty.Mr. Green traversed the barbed wire
fence and fence posts of the disputed fence at the top of Tmcts 2 and 4 numerous times, even
noticing the yellow barrel with a fence post in it. ARer lais purchase, when Mrs.Weitz infonried

I~ that the Weitzes' land went to the fence, his reply of '%at old fenc.e?" indicated that lte knew
exactly what fence she was referring to.
With all this information, the Greens did not make inqtrjr to the Rogers as to ihc?
boundaries of the property. No inquiry was made of the Weilzes, or the Stnetanas, or the O'Neals,
or any residents ofthe Nearing Addition, same of whom were customers of Mr. Green's s W . Nu
inquj. was made into why there was a road, on land he thought he was purchasing, that did not
connect in any way to his land, and, in fact,only connected to other roads on the Weitzes' propeny.
No inquiry was made regarding the radio shack situated on the property he thought he was
purchasing. There was no &ujr into whether the fences marked the boundary of the Rogers' land
or any of Greens' few borders. After the purchase of the property, when the Greens were informed
by the W e i w of their ownership of the disputed property, the Rogers' acknowledged thal the
Weitzes pmbably did have a claim to tbe land. This shows that even a very casual investigation
would have revealed that there was an inconsistent claim to aportion of'the property they intended

-

to purchase. The Grew certainly had cnough facts to put them on not~cethat there was a possible
claim offight to aportion of the property, and they were under aduty to make inquiry. By choosiilg

not ta do so, they cannot now claim to be born Ede pun:)asers.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMTED this

day of October, 2005.

FA

LMI,
Charles A. Brown

/I

d

Attorney for Plaintiffs/Counterdefendm&
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Robert M. Magyar
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on this _h day of October, 2005.
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COME NOW the plaintiffs above named by and though their attorney of record,
Charles A. Browa, and submit thismemomdurn inopposition to the defendants' claimsof trespass
and slander of title. The facts presented in this memorandum will be fully developed at trial.
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANTS' CLATMS OF TRESPASS
AND SLANDER OF TiTLE
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A.

TWSPASS
Thedefendantsclaimthatthe plaintiffs have-

"Howevel;

one who holds property under a colorable claim of ownership is not subject to an action of trespass
by the true owner." WnlterE WilhiteRevocable Lfving TW

v. Northwest YearlyMeeting Pension

Fund, 128 Idaho 539,549,916 P2d 1264,1274 (1996). The Supreme Court was relying on the
general statement of Lbe law in W. PQC Keeton, et al., PROSSER AND KFEIQN ON THE LAW

OF TORE3 4 13 at 77 (5" ed. 1984). This section states that "The same poky of favoring
possession operates to protect the defendant, once he is in occupancy of the land for some
appreciable time under a colorable claim of ownemhip. He is then no longer subject to an action of
trespass on the part of the true owner, whoseproper remedy is in the form ofanaction of cjecmlent."

The plaintif&andtheirpredmcssom have beeniaposs&ionofthedisputedproperty
since at least 1929. They have heated the property as their own by maintaining a fcnce on lbe
boundary,logging, grazinganimals, buildingroads, granting leases,and recreation. Under the theory
of boundary by agreement, they have. at least, a colorable claim of ownership to the disputed
property. Therefore, under the law of Idaho, they m o t be liable to the defendants for trespass.
This d e applies to statutoxy trespass codified at I.C. 5 6-202. "Although not stated
in the statute, I.C. 9 6-202 applies only where the alleged trespass is shown to haw been wilful and
intentional." Bumgarner v. Bumgnmeer, 124 Idaho 629,639,862 P.2d 321,331 (Ct. App. 1993),
citing Earl v. Fordice, 84 Idaha 542,545,374 P2d 713,714 (1962); Menmha Woodenware Co. v
Spokane Inttl Railway Co., 19 Idaho 586,594, 115 P. 22,24 (191 1). See also, SeNs v. Robinson,

2005 'WL 153811 1 (Idaho, 2005). "Thus,where thedefendantwrongfullyenters upon the plaintiff's
property or cuts his trees, but the defendant's trespass is neither wilful or intentional, the plaintiff is
entitled to recover his a c h d damages at common law, but he i s not entitled to Imve those damages
Webled." Id, citing Menasha Woodenware Co., 19 Idaho at 594, 115 P. at 24, see also, Mock v.
Potlatch Corp., 786 F. Supp. 1545,1547 @. Idaho 1992). ff a person is acting under a colorable

claim of ownership, it is not possible that any removal of kees is done wilfully and i~~tentionally.
Therefore, them is no basis for awarding treble damages or common law actual damages.
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a,

Slander of Title

In Maheson v. H4wis, the Idaho Supreme Court noted that there are four essential
elementr to aslander of fitIe cause of action which include: "(1)The uttttring and publication of the
slanderouswords by the defendant; (2) the falsity of the words; (3) malice, and (4) special damages

....'' 98 rdaho 758,759,572 P.2d 861 (1977).
In the present case, %ere MI be no allegation that thc claim of an interest in the
property i s false. Ibe Weiitzes have a legitimate claim to the disputed property based on the theory
ofboundary by agreement. Further,there is no d i c e - the suit was brought to b i d e a boundary
dispute, "Malie has been generally defined by Idaho courts as a reckless disregard for the truth or
fdsity of a statement." See Bandelin v. Pielsch, 98 Idaho 337,342,563 P.2d 395,400(1977). "An
action will not lie where a statement in slander of title, although false, was made in good faith with
probable cause for believing it." Wernerv. Saflord, 134 Idaho 691,701.8P.3d 1234,1244 (2000).
As to specialdanages,althoughIdaho has foundthatincurring attorney's fees to clear

a titledoes constitute special damages, (see Ray1 v. ShllEnterprises, Im., 108 Idaho 524,700P.2d
567 (1984)), inthe present case defendants Greenhave actually made money by selling portions of
the property with this supposed "cloud" on their title. After the W e n s became aware of the
Weitzes' claim of an interest in the disputed property, they negotiated and sold property to the
Castles and Shooks. Both parties knew of the potential claim to a portion of the property they were
purchasing and yet the Shooks paid S4745.82 per acre and the Castles paid $4,000.00 per acre

-

both paying at least twicewhat the Greeps had paid for the propem. Inaddition, at least according
to defendants' allegations,theynegotiated4 received a payment fium Greens' sellers, the Rogers,
of $46,247.16 for them to defend the claim by the Weitzes. In no regard have the h e n s suffered
pecuaiary losses by the Weitzes' claim.
Finally, the Greens' slander of title claim must also be taken in the context of their
contractual duties under their Road and Botmdary Agreement with tile Shooks. In that agreement,
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tlte Greens must bring an action to quiet title vis-a-vis the Weitzes in the evcnt that the WcitLos do
not pursue a quiet title claim for the d i k e d property.

uL

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIEDthis -&day of October, 2005.
Charles A. Brown

Attorney for PlaintifiICountmdefendants
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Attorney at Law
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of October, 2005.
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Case No. CV 2004-000080
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COME NOW the plaintiffs above named by and through their attorney of record,
Charles A. Brown, and submit this memorandum in support ofthe claim for boundary by agreement.

The facts presented in this memorandum will be fully developed at trial.
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The doctrine of boundary by agreement is d established in Idaho. h Neidcr v.
Show, the wwt described the requirements, relyingon along history of cases. The eqxtslilted that:

Boundary by agreement requires: (1) an uncemin or riiiputed boundary
involving adjacentpropmlies, and (2) anagreementfixing, the boundary. Cox
v. Clanton, 137Idaho 492,495,50 P.3d 987,990 (2002). Tbageement may
be express or implied by the conduct of the parties. Id. Where a fence is
alleged to establish a boundary by agreement, and there is no evidence
regarding who built the fence orwhy they built it, the Gad that the fence
has been inexistence for a number of years strongly suggests it was put
in place as a boundary by agreement. Id; see also Johnson v. Newport,
131 Idaho 521,523,960 P.2d 1342,744(1998) (finding feuee inexistence for
sixty yearsestablished boundary by agceement);Dreherv PgweI2. 120ldaho
715,718-19,819 P.2d 569,572-73 (Ct.App.1991) (Ending fence in present
location for over sixtyyears established bouudary by agreement); Herrmnn
v. Woodell, 107 Idaho 916, 920, 693 PJd Zd 118, 1122 (Ct.App.1985)
(neighboringlandownersacceptcdfence as boundary for many years). Which
party pays property tax on the disputed land is irrelewt to determining a
claim based on boundary by agreement. Cameron v. Neal, 130 Idaho 898,
901,950 F.2d 1237,1240 (1997) (citing Tmppeft v. Davis, 102 Idaho 527,
633 P.2d 592 (1981)). Further, an agreed boundary binds successors in
interest who purehase with notice, actual or wnsmctive. Paurley v. Harris,
75 Idaho 112,117,268 P.2d 351,353 (1954).
138 Idaho 503,506,65 P.3d 525,528 (2003) (emphasis added).
"The doctrine is premised upon the assumption that long acquiescence between
neighbors concemingtheboundary line between theirproperty ought to preclude 'aconlroversy that
will involve rights that have been unquestioned for ageneration."'Dreher v. Powell, 120Idaho 715,
717-718,819 P.2d 569,571-572 (1991), citing Bayhouse v. Urquich, 17 Idaho 286,298, 105 P.
1066, 1070 (1909). In Dreher, the district court found that the fenee had been erected in
approximately 1900. Further, no evidencc was presented to show that either party or rheir
predecessors had actual bowledge ofthe location of the me boundary line, or that the Eelice was
not on that line. The appellate court stated:
In absence of any other explanation for the discrepancy in the location of the
fence, the district court inferred that the predecessors of Dreher and Powell
"were uncertain or did nOt know the location of the boundary line at the time
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the original fence was erected...." In the court's analysis, this starting poi*
which was followed by about sixty yearsof acquiescence by the owners, led
to tlie cow's conclusion thatthe fence had been established as the boundary
by agreement.

120 Idaho at 771,819 P.2dat 573.

nte Dreher case is similar to fhe present case in that the fence was in place as long

as myorx cm reme111ber. The Weims and their predecessars md the ~~' psa?decessorshad
always treated the fmce as the true boundary and had treated the land up to the fence as their own.
Therefore, absent any evidence that tht: true boundary was known, there is a presumption that thc
iocation of the hue bowdary line was &own

at the time the fence w:is erected.

Other Idaho cases have reached thesmne result. In Herrmmnn v. WoodeN. 107 Idaho
916, 693 P.2d 1118 (1985), there was no direct evidence of an agreement resolving a dispute,
uncettainty, or ignorance over the true boundary. The fence had been in place so long that no
witnesses wen; available to establish that an actual agreement to fix an unknown or uncertain
boundary had occmed. There the court stated:
However, "[sluch an agreementmay be presumed to arise between adjoining
landowners where such right has been definitely defined by erection of a
fence or othermonment on the line followed by such adjoining landowners
treating it as fixing the boundary for such lrmgthof time tlrat neither ought to
be allowcd to deny the comctness of its location" Edgeller v. .Johnston* 74
Idaho 359, 365,262 P.2d 1006, 1010 (1953) (citations omitted). Further,
"[flrom the long existence and recognition of the original fence as the
boundary, and the want of any evidence as to the manner c~rcucumstanccsof
its original location, the law presumes that it was originally located as a
Beneficial Life Inrurancc Company v.
boundary by agreement
Waknmatsu, 75 Idaho 232,241,270 P.2d 830,835 (1954); see alsoHnlcs v.
Frakes,600 P.Zd 556 (Ut& 1979); Baum v. Defa. 525 P.2d 725 (Utah 1974).
Fdermorc, the period of acquiescence is regarded as competent evidence
of the agreement. Paurley v. Harris, 75 Idaho 112,268 P.2d 351 (1954). In
addition, a specific time period of acquiescence is not required. Trappett v.
Davis, supra. h ins case, there is no evidence presented as to who
constructed the fence or what function the fence was c~riginallyto serve.
Acquiescence can then be relied upon to show that a settlement agreement

...."
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must have taken p l m sonutime in the past and was memorialized by the
placement ofthe fence. McKinneyv. Kull, 118Cal.App.3d 951,173 Cal.Rph.
696 (1981); Kraemer v. Superior Oil Co., 204 Cal.App2d 642,49 Cal.Rph.
869 (1966).
107 fdaho at 920,693 P.3d at 1122.
It & not required that the boundary be marked by a fence. EdgeIier refers to the

erectionof a fcnce or other monument whichis tkcnkx&d ar,the bound&?. In GriBlv. Reynolds,
I36 Idaho 397,34 P.3d 1080 (2001). a portion of the fence whlch had served as a marker of the
boundary wastemoved. There itwas foundthatabem with athrce foot elevation, whichhad served

as a fauning lime for more than twenty years, hadbeen agreed upon as the boundary.
Thus, when a fence has been in p l m for as long as anyotr can remember and there
is no evidence to show that the fence was not intended lo serve as a bouadary between adjoining
propeflies, the law will presume that there wasadspute or unmintyas to the location of the true
bounday and that rhe fence was erected in a location agreed to be the boundary.

Further, the agreement establishing a boundary may be express or implied fmm the

snrroundq circumstances. C m r o n v. Cox, 130 Idaho 898,901,950 P.2d 1237, 1240 (1997)
(citing Wells v. Williamson, 118 Idaho 37, 41, 794 P.2d 626, 630 (1990)). A long period of
acquiescence by one party to another party's use of the disputed property provides a factual basis
fiom which an agreement can be inferred. GrSfJeel,136Idaho at 400,34 P.3dat 1083 (citing Wells,

118 Idaho at 41, 794 P.2d at 630). In the present case, the agreement should be infened by the
actionsof the parties. The Weitzes and their predecessors leasedgonion~ofthe land, built roads up
to the fence lie, logged timber, grazed animals, and used& land for recreation without dispute for

many decades. The Greens' predecessors also used the land up to the fence Iine as their own.
Additionally, the period of acquiescence need not continue for the amount of time
necessary to establishadverse possession because acquiescenceis merely competentevidence of the
agreement. Trappert v Davis:102 Idaho 527,532,633 P.2d 592,597 (1981); see also PaurIey v.

Uarrr3, 75 Idaho t 12,268 P.2d 351 (I 954). Once there is an agreed qwn boundary, the parties to
the agreement are no longer entitled to the amount ofpropcrty provided for in their deeds and must
absorb the effect of any increase or decrease in the amount oftheir p r o m as a result of the new
boundary. Staffordv. Weaver, 136 Idaho 223,226,31 P.3d 245,248 (2001).
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In summary, when a fence &ga

b o d a r y has been in existence for so long that

no one remembers who erected the fence or for what purpose the fence. was placed, the law will
presume tllattherewas adispute over the location oftt~etrue boundary and the fence was placed in
the location as a result of anagreementto treatthe fence as the boundary. Further, acquiescence can

then be relied upon to show thata settlementagseementmust have takeuplace sometime in the past
was memorialized by the pIacement of the fence. Once the agmment as to the boundary exists,

the parties to the agreement no longer possess the amount of pmperty stated in their deeds. And
finally, an agreed boundary binds successors in intenst who pu~hasewith notice, actual or
constructive. The k t s of the present case fully support a findingof boundary by agreement: (1) a
fence has been in existence for as long as anyone can remember; (2) there has been use by thc
plaintiffs~dtheupredeoessors,andthe Greens' pfede~essors,up to the fence line; and(3) tltere was
a long period of acquiescence as improvementswere made on the plaintiffs' land. With these facts,
there should be apmumption that there was a dispute over the true boundary; and that a fence was
erected subsequentto an agreement to fix the boundary at the fence line. The yeasof acquiescence
should serve as evidence of the agreement, and there should be a finding that. as a result of the
agreement, the descriptionof theproperty in the deed is no longerbiiding and thc plaintiffs own the
property up to the fence.
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da50f October, 2005.

Charles k Br w
Altorney for Plainti.Ks/CounteKlefendm&
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I, Charles A. Brown, hcrcby o d f y that a atrue and conect copy of the foregoing was:

- sent by fac$mile only
to: 208-892-8030 - Magyar

mailed by reguIar fitst class mail,
and deposited in the United States '
Post Office

-

sent by facsimile, mailed by
regular first cIass mail, and

208-882-4190 - Schwam
.

- overnight
sent by Federd Express,
delivery

deposited inthe United States
Post Office

X hand delivered
to:

Robert M. Magyar
Attorney at Law
at Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843

Andrew M. Schwam, Esq.
Schvjam Law Office
at Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843

k

on this d

a

y o f October, 2005.
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Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
324 Main Street
P.O. Box 1225
Lewiston, ID 83501
208-746-9947
208-746-5886 (fax)
ISB # 2129
CharlesABrown@cableoneJlet
Attorney for PlaintiffslCounterdefendants.
IN TtIE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
1HE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TNE COUNTY OF LA'iAH

1
1
1

GERALD E. 'WEJTZ and CONSUELO
J. WEITZ, husband and wife
and WEITZ & SONS, LLC,an
Idaho limited liability
compw,

1
1

Plaintiffsf
Counterdefendants,

1
1
1
1
1

Case No. CV 2004-000080
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IN SUPPORT OF QUASI

1

ESTOPPELCLAM

VS.

TODD A. GREEN and TONLA L.
GREEN, husband and wife,
STEVEN R. SHOOK and MARY E.
SXLVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T.
CASTLE and CATHERINE C.
CASTLE, andU.5. BANKN.A.,
Defendants1
Cormterplaintiffs.
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COME NOW the plaintiffs above named by and through their attorney of record,
Charles A. Brown, and submit this memomdurn in support of the claim for quasi estoppel. The

facts presented in this memorandum will be hlly developed at trial.
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Equitable estoppel requires (1) a M$e representation or concealment of amaterial

fact made with actual or constructive knowledgeofthe truth; (2) that the party asscrting estoppel did
not and could not have discovered the mth' (3) an intent that the misrepresentation or concealment

be relied upon; and (4) W Ihe party asserting estop1 relied on the misrepresenSatioa or
concealment to his or her prejudice. Willigv. State, Dept ofHealth & Werfme, 127Idaho 259,261,
899 P.2d 969,971 (I995), cihng Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp. Bldg Corp v. Hamill, 103 Idaho 19,
22,644 P.2d 341,344 (1982). Quasi estoppel is distingnished &omequitable estoppel "in that no

concealment or misrepresentationof existing fscts on the one side, no ignorance or reliance on the
other, isa~xecessazyingrcdiont"
Evamv. Idaho State TmComm, 97Idaho 148,150,540 P.2d 810,

812(1 975). The dochine of quasi estoppel applieswhenit would be unconscionable to allow a party
to assert a right Much is inconsistent with a prior position. MitcheN v. Zilog, Inc., 125 Idaho 709,
715,874 P.2d 520,526 (1994). "The doctrine ofqwii-estoppel applies when a person asserts a

right inconsistent with a position previously talcen by him, with knowledge of the Eacts and liis
rights, to the deh-iment of the person seeking to apply the doctrine." Young v. Idaho Department of

Law Enforcement, 123 Idaho 870,875,853 P.2d 615,620 (Ct. App. 1993). "Quasiestoppel does

not require a W e represeatation. Rather, it is adoetrine designed toprevent one party from gaining
anuneonscionabIeadvantage by clmgingpositions." RocordSteel & Const, Inc v Martel Consf.,
I c . , 129 Idaho 288,292,923 P.2d 995,999 (Ct. App. 1996), citing Afitchell v. Zihg, Inc, 125

Idaho 709. 715, 874 P.2d 520,526 (1994); Young, 123 Idaho at 875, 853 P2d at 620. "Quasi
estoppel prevents a party fmm asserting a right, to the detriment of another party, which is
inconsistent with a position previously taken." C & G, Inc. v. Canyon Htghway Dist. No. 4, 139
Idaho 140,144,75 P.3d 194,198 (2003), citingfiloydv. Bd. of Com'rs ofBonnevzlle Cowty, 137
Idaho 718,726,52 P.3d 863,871 (2002) (citing E. Idnho Agric. Credit Ass'n, v. Neibuur, 133Idaho
402,410,987 P.2d 314,322 (1999)).
The facts of thiscase will show that the defendants should be estopped from makiig
a claim to the disputed property. The Greens contraced to buy 160 acres from the Rogers at aprice

of two thousand dollars an acre. After the p ~ h a s e but
, before the Greens sold secttons of the
~ a claim to a
property to the Shooks and W e s , the Greens were made aware that the W e i had
portion of the property (the disputed property.) With tius knowledge, the Greens decided to sell two
sections ofthe propew, both includingportionsofthe disputed propelty, tothe Shooks and Castles.
PLAINTIFFS' MEMORAWUM JN SUPPORT
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The Shooks purchaszd their gmpcriy for four thousaud, seven hundred and forty five dollars aud
e i g w t w o cents ($4,745.82) per acre, and the Castles purchased their property for four thousand
dollars ($4,000.00) pex acre. The Greens pmmised to continue with efforts to get clear title to the
disputed property wit11 the Rogers.
The Greens and the Rogers begannegotiationsthroughtheir attorneys. A letter from
G ~ e n sattorney
'
stated that an amount must be determined for ''teimbursing Greens' losses." The
proposal was for the Greens to be paid as follow: for Castles' loss of 1.91 acrt?s at $4,000.00 per

acre, for Shooks' loss of 3.66 acres at S4.745.82 p a acre. and for Greens' loss of 3 acres at
$4,745.82 ~ eacre
r (even though the Greens purclmed at $2,000.00 per acre.) There was also to be
additional sums for legal fees and aresurvey of the property, resulting in a total of $46,247.1 6 to be
paid to the Greens. The attorney for the Rogers countered that %2,000.00per acre would be fair
because that was what the Greens had purchased the property for. In the end, the G ~ B were
S paid
$46,247.16 and an agreement was signed releasing the Rogers from any flirther liability regarding
the property. It is clear Erern the kfters between the attorneys that the Greens were to be
compensated on aper acre bas^ for land that they did not receive in the original sale. The claim that
the Greens wre just relieving the Rogers of their duty to defend the title is not supported by any of
the correspondence. There would be no purpose in paying at a per acre rate if the true reason wcre
anticipated legal costs. This agreement was to reimburse the Greens for pmper~ythat they did not
receive in the original sale.
The above h t s , and additional facts to be proved at trial, support the claim for quasi
estoppel. It is clear that the agreement paying the Greens %46,247.16wa;r paymenifor the acres the
Greens did not receive in thew purchase of the 160 acres. lhey received a benefit much in excess
of the $2,000.00 per acre price they paid to purchase the land. To allow the Greens to now receive
the disputed property, which they have already been paid for, and quire the Weitzes to pay
additional amounts to the Greens is wwnscionable. The Greens should not be allowed to assert a
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right inconsistent with their previous position to the detriment o f the Weitzss. To allowotLeTW1se

would result in the Greens having been paid for the propesty,twice, and at a much inflated ratc.

6day of October, 2005.

mL

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITED on this

Charles A. Brown

Attonley for PlaintEsICwnterdefendants

I, Charles A. Brown,l~erebyc d f L that a true atid correct copy of the foregoing was:

- mailed by regular fist class mail,

and deposited in the United States
Post Office

- regular
sent by facsimile, mailed by
first class mail, and
deposited in the United States
Post office

X hand delivered
to:

Robert M. Magyar
Attorney at Law
at Latah County Courthouse
Moscow, ID 83843
Andrew M. Scltwam, Esq.
Schwam Law Office
at Latah County Cowtbouse
Moscow, ID 83843
/

on this

day of October, 2005.
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sent by facsimile only
to: 208-892-8030 - Magyar
208-882-4190 Schwan~

-

- sent by Federal Express,
overnight delivery
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Piercie T R W E L E and Cecil M. Trmeill, kmasband and wife, and Gerald T m e l l m d Doris Tmnnell,
husband and wife, Plaintiffs-Respondents, v. Glen WARD*Defendant-Appellmta

Glen WAND, Ben Ward, Admidsbator of the Estate of Fred E. Wad, deceased, m d Bva Wmd, the widow of
the deceased, Fred E.Wad, Cross-CompBainmts, AppeUlmts, v. Piercie TRUNNEILE and Cecil M.T m ~ e l l ~
husband md wife, and Gerald T m e 1 1 and Doris T m e 1 l , husbmd and wife$Cross-Defendants*Respondents.
[Cite as T r m e l l v. Wad, 86 Idaho 5551
No. 9284.
Supreme Court of Bddno.

Action for trespass to enjoin defendants from further crossing pl&ntiffs9property, wherein defendant cross
complained seeking a deteminafion of prescriptive easement across pl&ntiffsqland, a detemination of
ownership by adverse possession to certain land, and damages. The District Cow%,Seventh Judicial Dist&t,
Cmyon County, Charles Scoggin, J., entered judgment for plaintiffs md an appeal was !hken. The S8nprem.e
Court, McQutide, J., held that m easement by implication was not estabUished although there was unity of title
m d subsequent separation by grant of the domhant estate md apparent continuous use, in view off fact eviden.ce
sustained finding that the easement was not reasonably necessq to proper enjoyment of the dominant estate.

Bramerr & FulBer, CaldweBl, for appellants and cross-compl6ajnmts.
Actual, continued occnp8anjon of land, under a claim of title, is deemed to have been held adversely.
Bayhouse v. Urquides, 17 Idaho 286, I05 P. I066 (1909); Idaho Code, Title 5, Section 208 (1947); Idaho Code,
Title 5, Section 209 (4947); Bewficial Life Hnnsnrmce Compmy v. Wdkaaunatsu, 75 Bddnkno 232,241,270 P.2d
830 (1954).
Land is deemed to have been possessed and occupied where it has been protected by a substmtial enclosure
wid usually cultivated or i m p ~ ~ v m
e dd taxes thereon paid. HdAo Code, Title 5, Section 210 (1947); !Edgeller v.
Joh?ston, 741d&0 359,262 P. 2d 1006 (1953); Beneficial Life Bnswance Co. v. WAmatsu, 75 Idaho 232,
241,270 P.2d 830 (1954).
A presumption that use of m easement was under a claim of right and adverse arises from ardi~puteduse of
m easement for the period ofpresc~iption~
S m e t t v. Werelus, 83 I d ~ 514,522,365
o
P.2d 952 (1961);
Nog.8.hwestem& Pacific H y p t h e e k b d v. Hobson, 59 Hddnkno 119,80 P.2d 793 (1938); Eagle Rock Corp. v.
IdmoM Hotel Co., 59 Idaho 413,85 P.2d 242 (1938); Checketts v. Thompson, 65 Iddmo 715, 152 P.2d 585
(1944); 1 Thompson, On Real Proper&, Sec. 436, pp. 718-721; 28 C.J.S. Easements 8 68, p. 736.
An easement by implication tigises when a grantor transfers part of his estate that is benefited by an existing
n Gustafson, 49 Idad50 376,288 P. 427
right of way. Wilton v. Smith$40 Idaho 81,231 P. 704 (1924); J ~ h s o v.
(1930); E i s e n b d v. Delp, 70 I&o 266,215 P.2d 812 (1950); 28 C.J.S. Easements $31, page 687.

% 3 I :i7

?~~~o://w.~aw~iter.nen/cei-bidte~is/~eb/id~aselaw/+BMe38~3embmeZKuBeqG5~1,~~Hw.
I0/3/2005

-

I

I

Page 2 of 5

,-

Actual location of easement is determined by its practical location and use over the the prescriptive period.
Kirk v~Schultzg63 Idaho 278,289, 119 P.2d 266 (1941).
S. Ben Dudap and Herbert W. Rettig, Galdwell, for respondents and cross-defendmts.
~
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This general d e fixing the presumption of adverse use is applicable to improved lands, and lands euitivated
and enclosed. However, when one claims m easement by prescription, over wild or enclosed lmds of mother*
mere use ofthe way for the required t h e is not grounds sufficient "la, give rise to a presumption that the use is
adverse. Cox v. Cox, 84Idaho !5B3:,373 P.2d 929.
Alleged statements of witness Beaverr, defendants' predecessor, concerning the boundary line between th.e
two forty acre &xts are not binding on the plaintiffsB$. Beneficial Life Ins. Co. v. Waknmatsu, 75 ld&o 232,270
P.2d 830.
The bwden ofproving each a d every element of adverse possession by clew and satisfactory evideio.ce is
upon the party relying upon dtle by adverse possesion. Sec. 5-206, Id&o Code; Hogan v. B l h e y : 73 Idaho
274,251 P.2d 209; Pleasan~tsv. Henry, 36 Idaho 728,213 P. 565; Lason v.
80 Idaho 242,327 P.2d
775; Last Chance Ditch Co. v. Sawyer, 35 Idaho 61,204 P. 654; S i m o n s v. Perkins, 63 Idaho 136, 8 18 P.2d
740.
The mere proposition tinat a fence existed for the statutory period, or longer, does m t convert it into a
boonndw. Lmson v. Lindsay*80 Idaho 242,327 P.2d 773.
An open m d notorious occupation with hostile intent is 61 necessary constituent of an adverse possession.
Weither a hostile intent without such occupation, nor such occupation without such intent is sufficient. Hogm v.
Bldmey, 73 Idaho 274,251 P.2d 209, at local page 214.
The use of driveway in common wW the owner and general public, in the absence of some decisive act on
the user's part indicating a separate m d exclusive use on his part negatives any presumption of an individual
right therein in his favor. Simmons v. PerPCins, 63 Idaho 136, B 18 P.2d 74Q Cusk v. Givens, 70 Idaho 229 at
B
d page 23 1,215 P.2d 297.
McQUADE, Justice.
Plaintiffs-respndents Pkrcie T m e 1 1 and Cecil MFard.
T m e 4 %own the Nofibeast quarter ofthe Southwest
quater of Section eight?Tomship ffow Noirth, Rmge five, West of the BBoe Meridianarm,
Canyon Comty, of
which land respondents Gerald T m e l P m d his wife Doris T m e l Z are the tenants in possession. Defendantsappellants Fred Ward and Iva Wmd me the omers of anile adjoining Noahwest quarter of the Southwest qumter
of Section eight, Tomship four North, Wmge five, West of the Boise Meridiandaa, Cmyon County. Appellant
Glen Ward is the tenant in possession of &si Wmd property.
Both of h e properties are traversed by gr lmge irrigation ditch>the Plowhead Lateral, which flows gene~:aliy
firom east to west. Most of appellants' property is located on the north side of this lateral, however, there is
approximately 6.53 acres located

south there of^ For many years, appellants haveused a private road located on respondents' property in order to
reach &is 6.53 acres. In their cross complaiaaB, appellants alleged f i a t this private road provides th.e only means
of access for f m machinev and equipment to the 4.53 acre tract. They fixther alleged that they have

1318
h~~rp:ll~.lawiter.~e8/cgi-bias/texislweb/idcaselawl+BMe38g3emxbmeZKuBeqG5mFqHw..
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coniinuously, opedy, wintemptedly~actually and visibly used this private road for approximately eleven
years.
The road was built En 1929. Apparently, it was originally constructed for the purpose of l~aulinghay back
and forth to sheep which were corralled m d fed on respondents' property south afthe Plowhead Lateral. The
land over which the road crossed was unimproved. Respondents alleged that m y use that the appellants may
have made of this road neither h m e d respondents nor in my way interfered with use of their property.
New the b o m d q of the two properties and south of the Plowhead Later& there existed a fence:e.It is mot
clear when the fence was erected, however, it appeas that it had k e n in existence from 1948 (when gppellants'
predecessor purchased the property) until it was removed by the respondents in 1961. In their cross comm.plaint,
appellants alleged that the fence was originally constructed as a b o w d q between the two properties. They
contended itilaat they had used the property up to the fence line continuously, openly, mintemgstedly, actuaUy
m d visibly for approximately eleven years. They further alleged that their predecessor in interest had inforimed
&em that the fence was the bons~adqbetween the two properties.
At one time respondents o w e d the entire eighty acres involved in this cause. Their property was devoted
partly to farming and partly to the corralling of sheep. Respondents stated Gnat the so-cdled bouinndq fence was
in actuality part of a sheep corral which they had maintained south of the Plowhead Lateral. They ~furtlzerstated
that m area had been lefi between the corral fence m d the property line sheep in the corrals.
In 1940, the boundm disp~temose. Respondents biad a survey made wEch indicated that a very small par4
of h e property claimed by tihe appePPmts was within the respondents' property description. Subsequently,
respondents removed the fence south ofthe Plowhead Lateral md erected mother fence somewhat further to the
west in conformance with the line ofthe survey.
In 1959, respondent Gerald T m e l l informed the appellants that he was going to remove the road across
his property in order to cultivate that portion of his 1md. The road was destroyed in 1960,

m d in 19611 the area was planted m d corrugated. Shortly thereafter appellant Glen Ward crossed respoiodents'
property in order to gain access to his 6 3 3 acre tract. Respondents alleged that this action resulted in
considerable damage to their newly cultivated Bmd.
Respondents brought this action seeking dmages for trespass md to enjoin appellants from further crossing
the respondentsqproperty. Appe1~mtsfiled an mswer md cross claim asserting an easement across respondents'
propen& and adverse possession to that portion of f m l m d south ofthe Plowhead Lateral>between the
b o u n d q line and the old fence which respondents rennoved. Appdlaats also claimed dmages in that they were
unable to have ingress and egress for farm machinew to the 633 acre tract of land. Trial was had and
respondents were awarded $300 dmages and costs. Appellants were pemmently en@ined from entering or
crossing upon the lands of the nesmmdents. TKs apped is from the judgment and the findings of fact a d
conclusims of law entered in this cause.
Appellants assign error to the failure of the triad court to find that: 4. A prescripkive easement was
established across respondents' property by use thereof from 1950 to 1954; 2. inn easement by i ~ ~ p ~ i c a twas
ion
established across respondentssproperty by severance off the forty acres, part of which (the 6.53 acre tract) could
only be reached by a right of way across the imd retained by respondents; 3. Title by adverse possession was
established to the strip of Band south ofthe Piowhead Lateral, between the boundary line and the old fence.

[I] To establish a prescriptive right for m roadway it is essential that the use ofthe way mnst constitute some

actual invasion or inkingement oftk right ofthe owner. Simepns v. Perkins, 63 Idaho B 36, 4 l 8 P.2d 740
(1941). It is appellants' contention, however, that proof of an open, notorious, continued and ~ m i ~ n t e n u ~ p ~ ~
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for'the prescriptive period, withobi e a r n a t i n of how it began raises a presumption that it was am adverse use
and under a claim of right. Appellants point to evidence which shows that the roadway has been used by them
wintemptedly m d continuously for a period longer than is required by 1.C. 9 5-203. See Sirnett v. We1re1111~~
83
Idaho 514,365 P.2d 952 (1961). They argue that this court must presume that such use ofthe roadway was
hostile m d constituted m actual i.nvasion ofthe rights of the respondents.

[I21Appellants have comectly stated the general rule fixing the presmption of adverse use. See: Sinnett v.
Werelus, supra, Northwestern & PaciGc Hypo&eekba& v. Hobson, 59 Idaho 119,80 P.2d

-
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793 (1938), Eagle Rock COT. v. Bdmont Hotel Co., 59 Idaho 0B3,85 P.2d 242 (1938). As we recently pointed
out in Cox v~Cox, 84 Ed&o 5 B 3,373 P.2d 929 (1 962), however9the general m ~ ise only applicable to imp~~oved
nmds. In the instant case, the record shows that the land 6ver which prescription is claimed was unimproved
until 1961.When one claims m easement by prescription over wild or unenclosed %mdsof another, mere use of
the way for the required time is not generally sufficient to give rise to a presumption that the use is adverse. Cow
v. cox9supra.
1[3]FSWeheaasa~re~
the trial court fomd that my use that the apbelants made of the roadway was pemissive
m d acquiesced in by the respndents. S&skmtid and competent evidence exists to support this finding a d it
will not be disturbed on appeal. Cox v. Cox, supra, Sirnett v. Werelus, supra*S i m o n s v. Perkins, supra.

1[0?
51 In order to establish m easement by implication in favor of the dominant estate, thee essential
elements must be made to appear: 1. Unity of title a d subsequ&t separation by grant of the dominmt estate; 2.
Appment continuous use; 3. The easement must be reasonably necessq to the proper enjoyment ofthe
dominant estate. Davis v. Gowen, 83 1dd.o 204,360 P.2d 403, $8 A.L.R.2d 1192 (196 1). Two ofthe essential
elements appeax to be present here. The trial court found, however, that the easement was not reasonably
necessary to the proper enjoyment ofthe appellantssestate as there were other means of ingress md egress to
m d from the 6.53 acres. There is conflict on this point, but subs-tial m d competent evidence exists to the
effect that appellants possessed two other mems of access to this property.
Appellants rely strongly upon Eisenbwth v. Delp, 70 Idaho 266,215 P.268 812 (1950). In that case this court
held that where the owner of an estate consisting of several pmis so adapts them during his ownership that one
derives benefit ii-691~1the other9and thereafter transfers one ofthe parts with d l appwtenmas without mention
ofthe incidental burdens of one in respect to the other, an implied easement is created in the grantee of such
however, that the road
estate ofthe use theretofore eexrcised by the grantor. AppelBmts have failed to prove'&,
was designed to benefit the 6.53 acres. The evidence clearly establishes that the road was built to provide access
to the sheep corrals located in the southwestern section of respondents' propew. As was stated in Davis v.
Gowen, supra:
"The creation of easements by implication rests upon exceptions to the
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rule that wiaen instments speak for themselves, and because implied easements me in derogation of such
rule, they are not favored by the cows. The general m.anleis that the burden of proof rests upon the person
asserting it to show the existence of facts necessq to create by implication an easement appurtenant to hls
estate. * * *"
1[6,7] Relative to the question of adverse possession ofthe disputed pace8 of l a d , the evidence shows that

the old fence was originally constmcted m d m&ntained only for the p q o s e of sewing as a conral for the sheep
which were kept on respondents' land. A fence is not converted into a b o m d q merely because it exists for the
statutory period or longer. Lason v. Lindsaygi,
80 Idaho 202,327 P.2d 775 (1958). Furthermore, the triaE court
* r,nn

'

,
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found that the appellants were not in actual, ex~lusive~
open notorious, hostile, visible and adverse possession o:F
the prop* in dispuke. This finding is isupported by snn%stmtia&,
competent evidence and will not be disturbed
on appeal.
The judgment ofthe trial c o w is &finned.
Costs to wspondents.

--

KIWDSON, @. J., and McFADDEN, TAYLOR m d SMITH, JJ., concur.
w-pw----
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Peter K.CHRISTILE, Plaintiff-Cowter Defendmt-Respondent$v. Bmce A. SCOTT m d Ruby A. Scott,
v. NORTHEW VIENTUES,
husband m d wife, Defemr-Smts-ComterClaimants-Cross CBaimmts-Appellan1~~
INC., iara Idaho corporation, Defendmt-Cr0~9Defendant.
[Cite as Christie v. Northern Ventwes, Inc., 1 10 Hdaho 8291
No. 1578.2.
Co'oeaffs,of Appeals of ]Idaho.
May 6,1986.
Record o m e r brought action to quiet title to propexty. The District Court$Idaho County, George R. Reiohardt,
111, J., quieted title to disputed land in record owner, m d claimants appealed. The Court of Appeals held that:
(I) claimant was not entitled to prescxiptive easement across disputed property, m d (2) claimant was not
entitled to c e d n portions of lmd claimed mder theory of adverse possession.

William B.Taylor, Jr., GrmgevilIe9for defendmts-counter claimants-cross claimants-appellants.
,
pro se.
Peter K.C ~ s t i eKamiah,
Before WAILTERS, C.J., SWANSTROM, 4. md McFADDEN, 9.Pro Tern.

PER CUMAM.
This case is a quiet title action brought by Peter Chisde. ABer a non-jwy trial9the district court quieted title
to the disputed lmd in Ckistle. On appeal, the Scotts' assigment of errors can be conso~idatedinto two issues:
(1) whether the trial court erred in not granting the Swtts in presc~ptiveeasement across the Chistle property,
m d (2) whether the trial iawt emed in not grmting title to ihe Scotts to certain portions ofthe land they clainned
under the theory of adverse possession. We afirm.

I

A review of the record reveals the following facts. iln 1979, Christle purchased app~oximatelythirty acres of
lmd in Idaho County. Christie, living in Minnesota at the time of the purchase, miwed at his newly acquired
propem in 1980 to find that Scott, his neighbor, had bulldozed m d ckared an old road on the property. Scott
asserted &at he had m easement a r o s s CMstle's propee for access to his land which was adjacent to the
Ciwistle property. Scott claimed that he m d his predecessors in title had always used the road, md that he
intended to contime using it. Scott also chimed that a old fence which separated portions of his mdChistle's
property was the borndairy between the parcels of l a d . A survey showed the fence was not on the borndairy
line, a d that portions of Chistlets property were on the Scotts' side of the fence. CbistEe, disagreeing with
these claims, brought a quiet title action. Weer tdd, the district court found that the Scotts had no prescriptive
easement across Ckist.BBesslmd, that the fence was not the true bomdav between the parcels of lmd, and that
the Scot% had not adversely possessed any of Chistle's propee. The district court accordingly quieted title in
Clmistle.
The ScoUsqfirst issue on appeal concerns whether the court emed in not ruling that Scott has a presc~ptive
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roadway easement across Citanistle's Bmd. A cS&mantaB,
in order to acquire a prescriptive easement in Idaho$must
present clew m d convincing evidence of open, notorious, continmus, wintempted uses under a claim of right,
for a period of five yews, all with the how1edge ofthe owner ofthe servient estate. LC. 5 5-203; State ex rel.
Haman v. Fox, 100 Idaho 140,594 P.2d 1093 (19'79); West v.Smith, 95 Idaho 550,SB 1 P.2d 1326 (19'13);
Kaupp v. City ofMaike3 1 10 Idaho 337,7 15 P.2d

4007 (Ct.App.1986). A prescriptive right c m o t be obtained if use ofthe servbnt estate is by permission ofthe
owner. Haman 100 Idaho at 143,594 B.2d at 1096. The general rude is that where ~ a a pev;idence is presented to
establish how the use began, a presumption arises &at the use was adveme m d mder claim of right. West, 95
Idaho at 559,s I E P.2d at 1333. The owner ofthe servient estate mast then rebut that presumption by showing
h e use was " p e m i s s i ~ eor~by vime of a license, contract, or agreement." Id Howeven; if the Bmds ofthe
sewient estate are wild, menclosed, or mimproved, k is presumed that the use was permissive. West, 95 lnlaho
at 557 n. 32,51l P.2d at 1333 n.32.

[I] Here, no vidence was presented at trial as to how use ofthe disputed road began It was es&ab;lislhedthat
the Scotts' predecessors in interest had begm using the road possibly as early as the 1930's. The &ridcorn
fomd that the Ch~istieBmd was "unimproved1wild, md remdte." Accbdingly, there was a presumption of
pemissivehess. On appeal, the Scotts wge us to reverse that findin& However, fie r e ~ o cBearBy
~d
establishes
h a t such a cha~acterizationofthe lmd was accwate. We note that the trial judge in this case conducted an onsite inspection of the Imd, prior to characterizing the land-in his findings-as wimproved, wild, m d remote.
Findings by the $rid cow&if syported by subsstantiaP md competent evidence in h e record. will not be
disturbed on appeak 1.R.C.P. 526~1);Haman, I00 Idaho at 144,594 P.2d at 1097.
[2jIn addition to the presumption of permissive use, evidenm was submitted which supports a finding of
permissive use. For example, in response to questions from h e court, the defendant, Bmce Scott, testified that
he origindBy thought there was a recorded easement acmss the Chistle Rmd. He d s o testified ahat since he had
begm using the mad in 1944, he had never thought he was using the r o d in derogation of myone's dghts, t&rjat
he never thought that he was in my way trespassing on the property>and that his use had never inler~feiredin aEy
way with myo14e else's use ofthe Chisble property. Testimony by one of the Scottsqpredecessors in inaterest
indicated that he had asked md received pemission to use the disputed road and, as f a as he knew, &at was the
agreement handed down from yeax to yea. A former tenant ofthe ChxistBe property testified that Swtt never
asked him for permission to use the mad. He testified that he assumed the Scotts-;like other people who had
previously o w e d the Scoa property-were permitted to use the road. That same tenant testified &at he had at
one time put a lock on a gate into the prop"* to keep people out3but that he gave Scott a key to the ilock so
Scott codd use the road.
On Scoas' claim against Chistle's prop* by adverse possession, the record reflects similar evidence.
Obviot~sly,any claim of title under an adverse possession theory involves a showing of adverse use. The record
is devoid of m y evidence of adverse use ofthe Band. All parties agreed &at the fence was not on the true
surveyed b o m d w between the properties. Mr. Scott's agmeHn&was essentially that the fence had always k e n
tlmere, and therefore, that is whqre the b o w d m should be. ~ Q W B Wthe
~ ~evidence
,
indicated that the fence's
location was a matter of convenience, winding and meandering according to the lay of the lmd. For instance,
the fence at one point curved momd the comer separating the two properties. The evidence also shows &at the
~ is~n.o evidence
fence was used as a livestock fence raher &an as a b m d a v fence. In s m a there
whatsoevet that use ofthe imd by the Scoas or by their predecessors was adverse to ChistBe or his
predecessors in title.
The judgment is affmed. Costs to respondentPle, CbistBe. No attorney fees on appeal. See Curtis v. Caq~bekl,
105 Idaho 705,692 P.2d 1035 (1983).
-,"
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A. H.SIMMONS md F W C E S M. SIMMONS, Appellants a d C r o s s - r e s ~ d e n t sV.~LLOYD 11. PEN<INS
a d ALICE VllNIFED P E m m S , Respoadents m d Cross-appelnmts.
[Cite as S i m o n s V. Perkins, 43 Idaho B 341
No. 6875.
October 15,19141
Reheaing denied November 24,1941.
EASEMENTS-DEDICATION-ADVERSE POSSESSION.

I. In an action to quiet title to aneasement for driveway in middle of block fiom center of alley to street,
evidei;~ceestablished that there was m public dedication by property owner to city of such right of way.
2. Courts will not ligihtiy declare a dedication to public lase but m intention to dedicate upon the part ofthe
owner niust be pE&y manifest.
3. Where &e owner of real property consanVncts a way o w it for his own use and convenience, the mere use
thereof by others which in w way interferes with his use will be presumed to be by way of license or
permission.

4. The use of a hiveway in c o r n o n with the owner m d the general public$in the absence of some decisive act
on the uses's part indicating a sepmate m d exctnsive use on his pa4 negatives any presumption of individual
right therein in his favor.

5. Endividwls using 1md as a road in c o m o n with the public cmxot acquire a prescriptive rigJtn4 of way against
the omer.
6. A use carnot be considered adverse or ripen into a right by prescription unless it cons1itutes some actual
invasion or idringement of the rights of the owner.
7. To acquire aan easement by adverse possession over the red p o p e - i of mother, the use must be hostile sod
c m o t be by acquiescence or consent.

8. One asserting adverse possession as against the o w e r of red estate must prove each m d evey dement of
adverse possession by cEea md satisfactory evidence.

9.In action to quiet title to an easement for right off way in middle of block fiom alley to street, eviden.ce clearly
showing &at Lase of driveway by original owners was for their private use as a .means of ingress and egress in
camyirmg on their business md that the use by others was but a permissive use smt&ned finding agai.nst
prescriptive right of way.
APPEAL fmm the District Corn ofthe Third Judicial District, in m d for Ada County. Hon. Chas. F. Koeisch,
Judge.

/
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Action to quiet title to m easement. Judgment for defendmts. Afirmed.

J. M. Empert, for Appellmt m d Cross-respnda.
The dley or highway in question here became a highway wder ow statute by p~scription,and a highway
by prescription exists by virtue of user and not on the theory of a grant or dedication. (Gross 39. PAcNutd, 4 Idaho
286 at 300; Ross v. hewra'ngea, 39 Idaho 35; Ore. Shortline R. C. v. Caldwell, 39 Idaho 71.)
The strip of lmd in question here was used by the public for much more thm the shtutory perioQ snd was
kept in repair at public expense, thus esbblishing a highway by prescription. (Mesewey v. Guillfo~-d,14 Idaho
133.)
The st~ipof lmd involved in h i s proceeding was fenced off by the lmd owner from his other property; the
public

taavellng the s m e for more 8 s five
~ yews and the public thus has acquired a prescriptive right theretos and the
owner may not obstruct said road thereafter. (State v. Burg, 28 Idaho 724; WOE%
v. Costella, 59 Idaho 569 at
576.)
Delma & Delma, for RespoPn6nents m d Cross-appelRantsS
Proof of dedication must be strict, cogent md convincingang, m d the acts proved must not be consistent with
my cons$zlctio~a,other h m dedication. (18 C.J. 96, Sec. 107; 18 6.J. 99, Sec. 1B 1; CoIzdmbia & P4 S, R. Co. v.
City ofSeattle (Wash.) 74 Pac. 671; H d e y v. Riley, A4 Idaho 481,95 Pac. 68% Hardley v. Vemiilion (Calif.),
70 Pac. 273; City & County ofSan Francisco V. Grobe, 52 Pac. 128; 65 h.
St. Rep. 155; 41 L. ]I$. A., 335.)
WExre the owner of real prop@y cons&uctsa way over it for his o m use and convena;ience, the mere use
thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be presmed to be by license or permission. (18
Coup. Jw. 105, Sec. 120; Bradfordv. FuItz (Ia.), 149 9. W. 925; Burk v. Diers (Neb.)? 169 W. W. 263; Harhass
v. woodmansee Wt.), 26 Pac. 291; Howbardv. Wright (Nev.), 143 pat. 1184.)
BUDGE, C.J.-This action involves an alleged easement though a portion of Block 3 of An~old'sAddition to
Boise City which block is bound by Pueblo Skeet on the North9OB'lFmellStreet on the South, 1lth Street on the
West$ 10 Street on the East. An dley m s in a Northerly m d Southe~clydirection horn P~ebloStreet to O'Famell
$wee$ through the center of Block 3. The Noaheast qw&r of Block 3 is divided into thee lots facing 10th
Street. The southermost of these t h e e lob is the one on which apjpellants a d cross-resjpondends (bereinnafter
refemed to as 'appellants') reside. For convenience it will be called Lot 3. The easement wf~ichappejlants seek to
establish, r ~ mdong
s
the South side of Lot 3, in an Easterly and Westerly ddirectioan, fiom the center of the alley
before mentioned to 10th Street.
About 1893, George Bayhouse owned Block 7, m d sold

the No&east qtsmter of said Block to one Twogood who>in the course oX&e next five or six years, built thee
E~ousesthereon, one of which is on Lot 3, and now o w e d by appellants. At this time, 1893, there was $3.0 dley
t!oxough the Block. On F e b m q 15, 1906, George Bayhouse executed two instinuments to Boise City. One, a
deed to m alleyy,13 feet 7 inches in width, mmkg 81$ough the center of the Block from Pueblo Street to
OqFameBlStreet. The other9m easement for the laying o f a sewer line, d n g though $becenter off the Block
from 1Bth Street to 10th Street. This latier i n s m e n t conhirned the following p~iovision,"with the express
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mdersmding that the alley in said Block shall nana in a Northerly and Southerly direction * * * * That I shall
not be required to move my house, or houses, or buildings situate orn said block*by reason of said privilege &us
given to the City until fully ready to do so of my o m free will." The house occupied by the Bayhouses was
located directly across the al1ey granted to the City. This house was not removed until 1939 when the entire
alley was opened up from Pueblo Street to @FmelB Street. Prior to this time, howeverr, a p a t of the alley so
granted was opened up kom Pueblo Street m d connected witb the alleged dley to 10th Street.
Ajppellmts became the owners of Lot 3 in 1919 and used the alley here in controversy, as did Bayhouses
and others. In Apkl,l938, respondents m d cross-appellants (hereinafterr refened to as 'respondents') became the
omers ofthe land over which the alleged easement runs, md in September, 1939, they closed up this driveway
or alleged easement.

For a beaer mdens8andi;tag off the location dfthe alley from Pueblo to BBFmeR19the alleged alley or easement
fkom the center ofthe Block to 10th Street, the Bayhouse residence, and appellants' residence we will here
iosert a plat of Block 7.

The question therefore presented, as will appez fiom the above brief statement of facts, may be shted as
fomows. Is the strip of land, 12 feet 4 inches wide running from 10th Street westward to the center of Block 7, a
public alley either by prescriptive rig& or implied dedkation, or has it been used by others than the owners
merely under a permissive fight. There is no contention that there was an express grant.
The trial court found that appelBmts "do not have my interest or easement in, to or across my pa? .atthe
real

estate herein found to be the property" ofresponde~18~>
and concluded that respondents "are owners in fee simple
free from any lie& claim of interest or easement therein" of appellants in and to the real estate over which the
alleged alley m s .
Judgment was entered in favor of respondent^^ from which this appeal is prosecuted. The evidence as to
certain materid points is conflicting.
From the record it appears that on June 2, 1904, Boise City filed of record in the office of the Recorder of
Ada County, Idaho, Book 3 of Plats, page 100, m mended location of street centers in the Arnold AddWoa,
which plat was certified to by the then city engineer and the &en city clerk, showing m alley mming Noxthedy
and Southeriy though the Block 7, conesponding with the deeded alley.
It further appears that the deed to appellants as grantees described the real estate purchased by them fiom
Mary Glenn, by metes m d bowds as fo11ows:
"Ball that portion of Block Seven 479 of Dwight Arnold's Addition in Boise City, as follows: Connmencing at
a point 74 feet South ofthe NoAeast Cower of said Block Seven (7),and m i n g thence South 50 feet along
the Westerly line of Tenth Street, and running thence West at right angles to Tenth Street I B 5 feet to ihe alley,
Zl~esaceNorth 50 feet; thence East l 15 feet to 'Westerly line of Tenth Street a d place of beginning."
Appellants dso filed a Declaration of Homestead containing identically the same description. Neither
instrument makes my reference to or exception of an dley or easement across respondelfi.tslland. Respondent
Mr. Pe~kin.5testified that he searched the City records and consulted the City Engineer before purchasing the
properiy th~coughwhich it is sought to establish an easement and that there was no record or plat of my
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driveway tibereon.
Appellant Mrs. Simmons testified to seeing B i r d Bayhouse dwhg 1837 or 1838, and of endeavoring to
purchase fhom him a portion of the ground constibting the driveway from 10th Street to 'the centerr of the Block;
that M. Bayhoose advised her that there was a loan on the property m d that he would have to consult the mod-

---
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gagee; &at he later idornned her that he had seen the mortgagee, and had been advised not to sell any ofthe
property covered by the mortgage. Appellant Doctor S i m o n s also testified to having discussed with his wife
the purchase of some of the ground in the driveway here in question, and to his having talked with Mr.
Bayhouse relative to this same matter.
1Frlink Bayhouse testified to living in the Bayhouse residence on Block 7 beginning in 1879; that the
driveway out to 10th Street was used as their private driveway from the Bayhouse home and bans from R 879 to
1880, long before there were m y residences in the Block, other than the Bayhouse home, and before they
constmcted the Bayhouse Floral Company b~ildings;that then it was used as: a private driveway for the benefit
ofthe home and flora1 business, m d was regarded as "om private drivewayqP;
6hat it wm maintained by them;
that the City graded the alley leading out to Pueblo Street but did not grade the dley leading out to 10th Street;
h a t the driveway was never laid out or deeded as an alley; that they conshvcted and maintained tlhe b~ridgeat
the entrance of the driveway on 10th Street; that people coming in over the deeded dley from Pueblo Stre&
couid and frequently did turn around on tine Bayhouse property md go back out to Pueblo Street as they had
come in; tibat they hauled sand md cindeas. onto the 10th Street driveway m d had certain oftheir employees do
likewise.
It was stipulated at the trial that Wemy Bayhouse, Kcdled as a witness, would t e d i 6 as to the drivemy
leading out from the deeded dley to 10th Street, substmtially as dBM Frnnk Bayhouse.
Oher witnesses testified that they saw the Bayhouses put cinders a d gravel on the driveway but never saw
the City improve it. A number of municipal officials testified to the effect that the driveway from 10th Strceet to
the deeded alley was maintained by the Bayhouses. Where tibe driveway &om 10th Street crossed the sidewalk,
the cwb was not cut, but a bridge was built by the Bayhouses over which they passed from h e driveway on
10th Street to the center ofthe Block, or t~ their place of business. It appears that one Monarch, Stwet
Commissioner from 1926 to 1930, at one time sanded or filled

up holes in the driveway at the request of the Bayhouses.
Upon this pdnt of maintenance ofthe driveway there is a direct conflict in that certain witnesses for
appellants testified that tibe driveway was maintained by BBoe City in tibe same manner as were other alleys of
the City. There is &so some conflict as to the location o f a fence m i i n g along the South side ofappe1lmts' Lot
3. Certain shrubbery m d a chicken fence run dong the South side of this alleged alley, extending from the 10th
Street entrance about half way back to tibe Bayhouse Floral Company's office.

[I] It is clear that there was no public dedication by the property owners to Boise City ofthe right of way
Beading &om 10th Street to the middle of the Block. There is positive evidence that there was a dedication of an
alley though the center ofthe Block, m i n g Worth and South from Pueblo Street to 09FamellStreet, by the
original owners, wbicnicPn would negative the contention on the part ofthe original owners to dedicate m alley
from 10th Street to the deeded alley. Like-wise the evidence fails to support an implied dedication by the
original owners of Block 7.
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The question therefore arises, *as there such a pubtic use as to establish a prescriptive ~rigIntof way.

[a] In Village of Hailey v. Riley, 14 Idaho 4481,494,496,95 Pac. 486, the case of Cily & Coun@of,§'an
Francisco v. Grote, 52 Pac. 128, is cited with approvd9as folliows:
"It is m trivial thing to take another's lmd without compensation, m d for this reason the Courts will not
likely d e d a e a dedication to pubiic use. It is elementary law that m intention to dedicate upon the loart ofthe
owners m s t be plainly manifest."
Further on in the course of that opinion, the case of Hartley v. VermiElion, 70 Pac. 273, is cited as follows:
"The intention of the owner to dedicate is a vital ekrnent in every case, m d h t intention also .is a pwe
question of fact. A mere permissive user, by the owner, of the land for a highway never can amount to a
dedication. That is a user by license, m d n~&ingmore, and of itself never would ripen into a dedication, no
inaHer how long continued. * * * * As previously stated9in order to
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constitute a dedication of a highway by evidence in pais, there must be convincing evidence that the owner
intended to appropriate the Rmd to pubiic use."
[3]The m1e would seem to be that where the owner of real property constructs a way over it for his o m use
m d convenience, the mere use thereof by others which in no way interferes with his use will be presumed to be
by way of license or pemission. Narhess v. Woodmansee, 7 Utah 227,26 Pac. 291; Howard v. Wright, 38
Nev. 2s3 143 Pac. B 184; Bradfordv. Fultz, 164 Ia. 686,149 N. W. 925; Burk v. Diers, 102 Neb. 721,169 N. W.
263; Long v. Mayberry, 96 Tern. 378,34 S. W.1040; Parish a? Caspm, 109 9nd. 586, 90 N.E. 109; Null v,
Willwlson, 166 Hnd. 534,'78 N. E. 76; Gascho v. Lennert, 176 Ind. 6'77,917 N. E. 6; RiEburn v. Adams (Mass.),
7 Metc. 33,39 Am.Sec. 754; 18 C. J., sec. 120, p. 105.

[0]The use of a driveway in manamon with the owner and fie general public, in the ne:b~en~e
of some
decisive act on the user's part indicating a separate m d excluive use on Inis p& negatives my presumption of
individual right therein in his favor. Clarke v. Clarke, 133 Cal. 63 1, 66 Pac. 10; fiena8.n v. Bevans, 5 1 Cal. A.
277,196 Px.802; Bradfo~dv.F u h , 147 la. 686,149 N. W)31.
925; Pirman v. Confer, 273 N. Y.357,7 N.E.2d
242,264.

[qAn individual using land as a road in common with the public c m o t acquire a prescriptive right of way
against the owner. Thornley Land & Livestock CQ.v. Morgan Bros., 81 Utah 3 17,17 P.2d 826; Pirman az
Con&r, 273 N. Y . 357,7 N. E. 2d 242; 111 A. &. Ri$.,
Extended Amnotation, p. 221.
[6] The rule is well established that no use c m be considered adverse or ripen into a right by prescription
unless it constitutes some actual invasion OF inifiringement ofthe ~ightsof the owner. Thomas v. England 741
Cal. 456, 12 Pac. 491; Monarch Real Estate Co. v. Frye, 77 Ind. A. 119, 133 N. E.156; 19 C. 9.887, sec. 52,
Citations, Note 44.

[9]To acquire m easement by adverse possession over the real propem of anothe~the use must be hostile
m d carnot be by acquiescence or consent. 19 C. J. 886, sec. 51, Citations, Note 64; 9 R. C.8.778, sec. 37,
Citations under Note '7.

[8] One asserting adverse possession as against the owner of real estate must prove each and every element

of adverse possession by clea m d satisfactory evidence. Brown v. Brown, 18 Idaho 345, 110 Pac. 269;

1329

-

Page 4 of 4

i

Pleasants 84 H g n y , 34Idaho 728,734,ZIP Pas. 565;1 R. C.%. 695,sec. 9;2C.9.262,sec. 585;I9 62.9.958,
sec. 1181.

[9]The evidence clearly shows that the use of the driveway by the original owners was for their private use
as a means of ingress and egress in carrying on their business and that the use by others was but a. permissive
use. There is no evidence in the record?as we view it, that establishes adverse posses~on~
on the p& of
appellants or the public, which was achmU, visible, exclusive?or hostile to the original owners of the lmd over
which the alleged driveway or alley m s , or to subsequent owners.
A
t therefore follows that the evidence is sufficient to sustain the trial corn's findings, conc4usions anid
judgment.
']Thejudgment is affirmed, md it is so ordered, with costs to respondents.

Givens>Morgan, Holden, and Aiiishie, JJ., concur.
Footnotes:

See 1 Parra. Jw. 925;17Am. Sw. 978.

24 C.J. S$.Dedication $ l 1.
- - - -m
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Max WAVER9m individual, Plaiatiff-Comterdefendant-Respondent>
v. lkIud6 B.~STAFFORD, Sr.,
Defeiadant-Comterclaimmt-Appellmtand Owyhee Village, lnc., am Iddao corporation, Defendmt-Respondent.
Owyhee Village$Tn~c.,am I&ao corporation, Cross-Clahmts v. Frank D. Stafford, Sr., Cross-Defendant
p
-.~@o

@@I ------.

[Cite as Weaver v. Stafford, 134 Iddao 6911
No. 25238,
Supreme Comt of Idaho, Boise, Mach 2000 Tern.

Rehearing Denied Sept. 2292000.
Lmdomer brought action against neighbor m d against holder of deed oftrust on lmdomer's property,
alleging trespass, breach of wmmdy off title, negliigent interference with appropriative water rights m d slander
of title>and seeking monekapt &magc%s, injunctive relief9punitive damages m d atto~theyfees m d costs.
Neighbor counter-cRaimed for negligent m&Ok i~litentiondinterference with appropriative water rights and
alleged that he had acquired easement by prescription to maintain irrigation ditch on landomer's propertygi.
Holder of deed off trust cross-claimed against neighbor, dleging that neighbor's assertions that he had inkrest in
lm.dower9sproperty constituted sladder of title. The Distxict Corn, Cmyon Cow@, James C. Mofi.tt, J.,
awarded Imdomer $5,000 ia punitive damages on Qespass claim, md awarded hokder off deed of trust
$7,832.35 in attorney fees and costs. Neighbor appealed*The Supreme Court, Troext, C.J., head that: (1) use of
~
landomer's property and'that of his neighbor was
metes and bounds de5~riptkonto determine b o m d between
wmmte& (2) subdivision plat map was insufficient to support neighbor's wgumemt &at he entered La~adomer's
property under color of title; (3) neighbor fkiled to establish prescriptive easement alasng b o m d q of
lmdowerqsproperty; (4)neighbor%actions iaa 6lliingin original dirt irrigation ditch raming dong b o m d q of
lmdomerqsproperty constituted abmdoment of &y pres2riptive easement neighbor may have acqui.red !n
ditch; (5) no irrigation rigbof-way by agreement existed which would have allowed deighbor to relocate
irr*igataQion
ditch onto landomer's property; (6)weigImbor couid not bring cause of action against landowner under
statute wh.ich prohibits aheration ofirfigatioh ditch so as to impede Wow of water; (7) laqdomer's
modifications 60 irrigation lateral &d not condtute negligent or intentional interference with neighbor%
approjpriative watef ri.ghts; (8) tmeighbrk action warranted punitive damages awaxd; m d (9) holder off deed of
@us$establ.ishedthat neighbor committed slander of title.
Affirmed.

Lawrence GI. SirhdB, Jr., Boise, for appellantaargued.
Wranga & Uranga, Boise, for respondent Max Weaver. Louis E.Urmga argued.
Randolph E. Fmber, Nampq for respondent Owybee Village, Bnc., argued.
TROUT, Chief j ~ ~ t i ~ e .
Thi.s case involves an action foir trespass, brewh of wmmty of title, negligent interference with
appropriative water rights and slander of title. IFra& S t a o r d (Stafford) appeals !from the district judge*
e,~...
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decision &hathe trespassed upon hdax WeaveIT(s(Weaver) projperty and slandered gne title of Owyhee Vi'tlage,
nnc.

Three parcels of i r e d property we involved in this dispute. Stafford pwc!nased the parcel at 4912 Easter Lane
(the Stafford property) consisting of 139 acres on October B 1, 1994.At the time Stafford purchased the
Stafford piiopenty, Max Weaver (Weaver) o w e d the pace1 at 4992 Laster Lxae (the Weaver Laster Lane
property). The Weaver Easter Lme property is southeast ofthe Sbflord propenty and is approximably 4.26
acres in size. On October 1, 1996, Weaver acquired the pmcel referred to as Lot 16, located southwest of fine
Staffford property, by a wamrnty deed subject to a deed of tirust in favor of Owyhee Village, Inc. Lot 16 is
approximately 5.25 acres in size.

A cement irrigation ditch (the cement irrigation ditch) mns along the ~aorthwstside of Lot 16 and parallel to
@meboundary between Lot 16 m d the ShTfoxrd property. The cement inrigation ditch has been in p k e for many
yeas and was previously used to irrigate the beet field whicB~,existed on Lot 16 p r i o ~to 1969.
Before Stafford and Weaver acquired their respective pwcels,'the~ewas both a ayence and a dint irrigation
ditch (the original dirt ditch) m . h g fiortheasi off the cement ditch. While Stafford believed the original fence
bfkken Lbt 16rnd the Stafford property, there was never any conversation or agreement
was the bound,a~
with myoune fmm Owyhec Village btP that effect. Stafford removed the or.igina1 fence and filled in the origind
did ditch sometime in the fall of 1994 or the spring of 1995;. During the s m b r of 1995, Stafford filled in &A
the imigation ~8ttmlsmming fiom the original did ditch &at serviced his proper@. Stafford testified at bid that
the miginall &kt ditch was Racated ten feet no&east ofthe cement irrigation ditch on Lot 14 and ten feet
southwest of the boundaw line between Lot 16and the Stafford property.
David Wilson, who resided at 49220 Laster Erne for app~oximatelyWegaty-five yews prior to Weaver's
acquisition of the propem, testified that he regarded the original difi ditch as the bouindary line bekeen Lot 16
Wilson stated that there was itnfomal agreement among neighborss but no
and the Staffford
recorded easemew4 concerning a ten 8008 rightbof-way $0mainbin h e original dirt ditch. Dorothy Bright
(Bright), o m e r off the parcel directly east ofdke Staffford property3also testified that she regarded the original
iirt sit& as the b o m d k between Lot 16 and the ~ b f f o p~oPefiy.
d
Bright testified that thi former omGrs of
h e Staffford propnty used the original & ditch for higation. Greg Skimer (Skin-

ner), a Licensed surveyor, testified that the original dirt ditch approximately folRowed the snilweyed bow~dary
between Lot 16 mad the Stafford property.
]in the fall of 1995, StdTord erected a new fknce northeast of md paallel to the cement irrigation dtch on
Lot 14, Stafford's testimony about the location of the new fence was not consistent. While on one occasion he
testified that he placed the newe;f
in the location off the original fence, he also testified at trial that he was
aansujre where he had placed the new fence in relatioh to the location of the original fence. Stafford also testified
that he did no&measure the distance fkom the origind fence to 'he cement irrigation ditch. Weaver regarded
Sihffo!f&snew fence as all e $ ; n l ~ r ~ a ~Upon
h e a ~Lot
t 16 and demanded i.ts removal. Sbff~lTd~ ~ ~ ~ n pinl 'he
ied
sprik9.g of 1995'.
In Marc81 1997, Sbfford excavated a new did ditch which a1pproximateQyfollowed the line ofthe new fence.
Stafford admitted at trian that the new dirt ditch was located on Lot 16 without Weaver's permission. Stafford
never used the new ditch.
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Staffor& w m m Q deed co~~tains
the foff lowing relevant metes m d bomds description ofthe b m d a v line
between Lot 16 and the Stafford property:
South 4" 0' East 366 feet to the center of an imiigatioii lateral; hence imemdering
North 29' 50' West 23 feet;
North 43" 20' West 168.13 fee&
North 7 1' 20' West 92 feet; m d
North 39' 20' West 2284 feet dong the center of an irrigation Raierali to apoint 36 feet Soutn of the
North boundary ofthe aforesaid Southeast Q&er; thence ...
in April 8995,l.icensed surveyor Skinner performed a boundw survey on behalf of Stafford m d Weaver.
Skimer establislaed the bolmndv between Lot 16 and the Stafford property based on existing monuments.
Skinner performed a second survey in November of 1996 for Weaver and established that SB&lffordrsnew fence
encroached upon Lot 16 &corna minimum of2.17 feet to a maximum of 10.2 feet On April 13, 1994, Skinner
determined that stafford's new ditch encroached upon Lot 16 by approximately five to t m feet.

Weaver hired Chis Wadt (Wild&)t~ conduct rn mchaeologicd cross-sectio~aof the bunundq area between
Lot 16 and the S8suffoild property. Sh@brdhired Dr. Mark Plew (Dr. Plew), a pmfessor of antlh~rwpologyto
evaluate Wildt's report a d to perfom his o m cross~sectiondmdysis. Dr. Plew dug thee cross-sectioililal
trenches s w i n g approximately five feet from the cement irrigation ditch om Lot 16 and extending noifiheast
across the born*
line between L Q 16
~ and the Staffford property. D r ~Plew discovered two features which
were likely ditches. Featme 8 was discovered thee meters north off the cement irrigation ditch, which did not
appear to have drawn water for any extensive period a d may have been used for two yeas or less. Dr. Plew
conciuded the second ditch, Featme 2>had k e n in use for a very Qmgtime,w a s the larger ofthe two ditches
and was older than Featwe I. Dr. Plew testified that Feature 2 was close to the bomdav line between Lot 16
and the Stafford propeity~
Licensed surveyor Job g.Eddy (]FAdy) also performed a s m e y of the Stafford property at Staffor&s
request Eddy's October 1,1997 survey established the boundary between Lot 16m d the Stafford property
along a meandering dirt ditch, the same as Skima's Novennber ir9,1996 survey. Eddy testified that Feature 2, as
identified in Dr. PleMi's repod, coincided with the meandering ditch referenced in St&rdqs deed.
Water is provided to the Skdfofd property m d the Weaver Laster Lane property by the Pioneer Irrigation
District via Pioneer's South Branch Lateral 1§B, Gate 24. Water is provided to Lot 16 via PioneePs South
Brm.c%iuLateral 1.5.4, Gate 23A. Watw for the Stafford property m d Weaver Laster Lme property historically
flowed ffom Gate 24 in a mfihWesterly ditection to a T-box ~ocatednear the point where the no~hwestem
comer of the Waver Laster Lane propetty meets the southeastern comer ofthe Stakford property. At the T-box,
irrigation water flowed to the Stafford property via the original dirt ditch between the Sbf'ford propfly and Lot
I6 or could be directed to the

northeast to intigate a parcel directly east ofthe Stafford property. Water i%omthe South Branch Lateral 15.6,
Gate 2318 flows though the cement ditch in the opposite direction.
Weaver made several clnmges to the irrigation lateal which began at Gate 24 and continued across the
Weaver Laster Lane property. At the end ofthe lateral, Weaver hstalled a concrete collection box to replace the
T-box, and also i9nsh1ld a concrete slab in the collection box to block the outlet to the Stafford projperty. Tlaat
action lead to Stafford filing a misdemanor criminal charge against Weaver which was dismissed. A c n itjq
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ofthe dismissal was that Weaver remove the concrete slab md install a pipe firom the cdPI1ection box to the edge
of Stafford's property. Weaver removd the concrete slab a d bostdled a pipe, but Stafford did not excavate a
ditch to the pipe
\

Tom Eddy testified as an expert hhydrology and stated that changing the grade of the pipe from the
w~.lectionbox to the Stafford prope&y would improve the flow of water to the Stafford propeHBy. Tom Eddy
also stated tI(dat without my change to the elevation ofthe collection box, water would travel @omthe collection
box to &e end of the Stafford property.
During the 1995 and 1996 irrigation seasons, Stafford diverted water from the cement inrigation ditch to
kidgate the Stafford pr~perty.St&ord had ana~authori%tion nor permission to draw water from the cement
irrigation ditch dgip to divert water from that ditch onto his lmd, Weaver demmded that Stafford cease diverting
water from the cement irrigation ditch after purchasing Lot 46 and Stafford complied.
Weaver filed a complaint against Stafford m d Owyhee Villages Irnc. alleiing that Stafford had corramitted
trespass by erecting a fence .and subsequently exavating a ditch on WeavePs property. Weaver sought
monetay damages, injunctive relief9lounitive damages md attorney fees and costs. Stafford denied Weaver's
allegation m d asserted affirmative defenses, alleging that he was entitled by prescription or b o m d w by
agreenment to maintain a fence between the adjoining properties and that a presc~ptiveirrigation right-of-way
existed. Stafford counterclaimed that Weavet had negligently and/or intentionally interfered with Staffod9s
appropdative water rights a d that he had acquired m easement by prescription to aaintain an imigation ditch
slander off title by alleging that he
on WeavePs property. O y h e e Village cross-claimed that Stafford ~~Imffditt~d
had an interest in Weaver's Lot 16. The districtjudge entered m Amended Judgmmet~ton Jmaary 29, 9 999,
Village $7$32.?5 in attorney fees m d costs. Stafford has now appealed &at decisi&

[I,21 Stxiford challenges ihe district judge's detailed findings of fact which were set forth in $is fifty-two
page EdIemorandm Decision m d Order. This Court does not set aside findings of fact mless they are dearly
ewoneous. B.R.C.P.
Marshall v. Blair, 130 llddoo 675,679,946 P.2d 975,979 (19973. We will not disturb
findings of fact which are supported by sabskntial md comp&nt, although wnfli~bjagevidence. Id

Stafford argues the district judge should have determined the irrigation lateral, refened to in Stafford's deed,
was a monument and sb.ould have used this monument to determine the b o m ~ d wline between Lot 16 and the
Stafford property, !rather tiinan utiliiing the metes m d bounds call in the deed. The dis&>ict
judge clearly
referenced the lateral m d determined that "Feature 2' as identified by Dr. Plwr was basically in the s m e
location as the lateral. The distnictjaadge noted the metes m d bounds description in StafforsB'sdeed was
conistent with an earlier conveyance invo1vin.g the properties

m.d the Skinner s ~ ~ v eof
y s1995 a d 1996 which also placed the b o m d q line dong tb.e irrigation j.ateraI
desc~ribedin Staffor& deed. The district judge fiwther fomd that Featme 2 "follows the line ofthe s~weyed
boundw to a rather remarkable degree." He therefore concluded there was m ambig~tityconcerning the
location ofthe 'boundary line between Lot 26 and the Stafford pmpe&y md that the line coal8 be cleady 13 .>
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identified using the metes and bounds description, incorporating the reference to the lateral (Featwe 2).

41 Stafhrd asserts Feature 2 represenb a monument m d the distiactjudge sk~ouldhave examined whether
the p&ies intended Feature 2 to be the boundary between Lot 16 m"Be SQRo?rdproperty. Stafford argues the
district judge enred by instead using the metes a d bounds description to ddemine tb.e boundary. Tl3.e mgu!m.ent
is unavailing in two respects. First, n~withshnding~tx~for&s
color of title and prescriptive easement
arguments, the legal significmce of St&ffor#s argument is m c l e a ~in that, assuming Feature 2 was a monument
and established the boundary between Lot 86 a d the Staffford prope~rty~
StaKord still erected a new fence md
excavated a new ditch on Weaver's side off Feature 2, clearly outside off StaRor#s property. Second?a
monument is generally considered to be a permanent, visible m d identifiable physical featwe. See Sun Valley
Shamrock Resources, IOC.v. '.ravelers LeasB'qg Corp., 188 Idaho 116, 119,794 P.2d 1389, 1392 (1990) (citing
Achter e4 Maw,27 Utah 2d 149,493 P.2d 989 (1972) (monment must be a "tangible la~drnark: have physical
properties suc11as "s~hbiliiy~
pemmence, m d definiteness of bcations'); Scott v. Hansen, 18 8 t h 269 303,422
P.2d 525 (1966) (rmoaument must be "defiaitely identified and locatefl)). Feature 2 c m o t be deemed a
monumen4 for p u ~ p s e oftesolving
s
the bowndmy dispute between weave^ and Stafford, because Stafford
filled in Featwe 2 in the fall of 8994. The distrkt judge was thus unable to uti1.i~
the actual irrigation lateral
named in the deed because Stafford had destroyed it. The findings made by the district judge me supported by
substantial and com~petentevidence a d support his dete~minationthat Feature 2 is located where the original
irrigation lateral wab and aRRows at accurate detemination ofthe b o m d w between the Weaver and Staffford
property utilizing the metes m d bounds description in the deed. We therefore b l d the district judge did nmt err
by using the metes and bounds description to determine the boundmy between Lot B 6 and the Stafford property.

[5-7] Stafford argues the districtjudge em& by requiring him to prevail on his aEirmative defenses of
irrigation right-ofway by prescription m d boundmy by agreement in order to succeed wa his entry under color
oftitie argument^ The argmerit is not supported by the circmsb.ces oifthis case. The color of title doctrine
arises in the context of advese possession &d refers to an instrment which has the appearanw of title but is
not in fact title. Fouser P? BPbaige, 101 I~d&o294,297,612 P.2d 137, 140 (1980) (citing Munbes v. Chaw~oa,3
Km.App.2d 601,599 P.2d 314 (1979)). Color of title involves a withag which puqmkts to convey title, but does
not have that effect m d passes only the wlor or semblance of title. Id. Stafford cannot maintain a color of titie
argument as he has failed to pte.sent evidence of any witten i n s m e n 8 which puupx=tedly gave him title to the
portion of Lot 16 which is the subject of this action. Stafford offers only that the Q w h e e Subdivision plot map
reflects a twenty foot right-of-way adjacent to the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 14. The argument is annavailiiag
to Sbffoird baause the Qwyhee Subdivision plot map is not an instrument of conveyance and does not reflect a
twenty foot right-of-way north of the cement irrigation ditch on Lot 16. Moreover9Stafford h e w where the
boundary was, as his wrsmty deed conhined a s1pecific d~~~~ijptioXI
ofthe boundary and the boundary was
subseque~atlyestablished by the Skinner m d Eddy surveys. We therefore hold substantial md competent
evider@cesupports the district judge's detemination that Stafford did not enter Lot 16 under color of title.

i(8]Stafford argues he had a prescriptive easement in that section of the original dkrt ditch
northwest
from the Tne-Box on the Weaver Laster Lane property md along the bou;admy between the Stafford property and
Lot 16. The district judge determined Stafford did not have a prescfriptive easement in the original dirt ditch as
Stafford failed to establish the open, notorious, conthuous and unircterrujpkd! use ofthe original dirt ditch under
a claim of right for five yews. The dist&t judge noted testimony froin prior owners of % f f o ~ d 'propef
~
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inconsistent and that Stafford 6lled in the original dirt ditcb inn the fall of 1994or spring off 1995. The district
judge haher determined Stafford failed to establish a prescriptive easement because t11e location of the original
dErt ditch could not be eshbRished with certainty.

[9-12,]A prescriptive easement requires the claimant to present reasonably clear and convincing evidence of
open, notorious, continuous, and uninterrupted use ~ d e iar claim of right and with the howledge of the o m e r
ofthe servient tenement for BIme prescriptive five year period. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Id&o 675,680,946 P.2d
975$980(19973. While there was testimony by people who had lived on or around the Staffford property that
they had imigated their jproperty utilizing the original dirt ditch, the testimony was conflicting as to where
exactly the ditch was located. This testimony alone is insufficient to establish a prescriptive easement in fie
original dirt ditch as it fails to estabnish the open, notorious, or win.tem3pted nature of my prior use ofthe
original dirt ditch md does not address Ufie lmowledge of such use by Weaver or any previous owner oELot 16.
Ndoreover, assuming Stafford did have a prescriptive easement in the original dirt ditch, Shfford abandoimed this
iriglat. A b a ~ d w i e nof
t a property right must be evidenced by a clear$unequivocal and decisive act. Perry v.
Reynolds, $3 Idaho 457,464, 122 P.2d 508,510 (19182) (cithg Sullivan Comsdr. CQ.v. Tvdin Fafls Amusermnf
Co., 44 Idaho 520,526-27,258 P. 529,530-3 1 (1927)). Mere nomse of an easement does not effect an
abandoment. Kolouch 89 Kramer, 120 Idaho 65,67,813 P.2d $76,878 (1991). Here, S h f W testified that he
filled in a e original dirt df.kh in the fall of 1994. Stafford's act is sufficient to abandon any prescriptive
easement which may have existed in the dirt ditch. We therefore hold $ubstmtia.Uand competent evidence
supports the district judge's determination that Stafford did not have a prescriptive easement in the original dirt
ditch.

ImGATION RIGHT-OF-WAY
BY AGmEMENT
[1l3]Stafford asserted m irrigation right-of-way by agreeme* located irfi the mighal did ditch, as an
awcirnnative ddense. Staxford offered no evidence ofan express d~ffiua~pli~d
apeement between himself3or his
predecessors in interest.>and Weaver1or his predecessors in interest. Moreover, it is difEcult to see the relevance
of this argument. There is no question there was at one tin.& an original dirt ditch between what is now Lot 16
m d the Stafford property. That ditch was destroyed by Stafford and he then sought to irelocate the ditch to a
location on Lot 16. There is sub$tzIimUial m d competent evidence to sujpport the diS$ict judge's detenmination of
the Ioc~tionofthe original dirt ditch m d it is not inthe same place where Stafford sought to c ~ a t the
e new
there is neveAeless sufficient evidence
ditch. While Stdfford disagrees with the district judge's detemin~tioaa~
in the record to support it. At this p i n t 9it appews Stafford simply asserts some right to put the new &tch ha
locaiion of E s choosing mid his argument for an imigation right-of-way is rmwailing.

W!EAVERvSIWTEWEWWCEWITH STAFFOmvSWATER P3aGHTS
Stafford asserts 'Weaver made chmges to the irrigation lateral which provided water do the Weaver Easter
Lane m.d Skblrd propetties. Stafford spedfically alleges tinat Weaver tined some portions oftlme irrigation
nateiral, replaced the Fbox with a BeW con-

crete collection box and installed PVC pipes to higate one of Weaver's 6eB.d~with wateir from the irrigation
lateiral. Stafford also alleges that Weaver changed the elevation of the ground around the irrigation lateral$
lowered the in:l"igation h e r d , blocked the outlet from h e new concrete co!!ection box which tvooid have served
Staffor& proioerty md filled the area between the new concrete colnection box and Skffor&s property with
gravel, d l wf wlnich prevented Stafford from receiving water. ~tzIfirordargues the districtjudge emed by holding
Stafford was bmed kom recovery uimder i[.C 4 42.1207 because h.e did not have a ditch in place to receive
..
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water. SMford dso argues the districtjudge erred by determining Weaver did not irm.tentiondly or negligently
interfere with Stafford's appropriative water rights.
1

I

p4g I&-o Code 4 4-1207 prohibits altering an irrigation ditch in a manner which impedes the flow of
water or "ot!mewise injureis] my Amrsonor persons using or interested in such lateral ditch." &afford failed to
i~tlf~d~ikace
m y evidence of the historic flow rate of water to the Stafford propemiy before and seer "Weaver's
changes. Dorothy Br.ight, however, whose propem receives water from the new concrete colnection box
thougln an outlet at the same level in the collection box as the outlet to the Stafford property, testified that she
received more water &deh Weaver's changes. In addition, Stafford cam06 maintain that he was interested in
receiving water from &e irrigation lateral wheh in the fdl of 1994, Stafford filled in the ditch that would have
rrecdved Water from the concrete collation b ~ xStafford$
.
therefore$cmmnot recover under I,@.8 42-1207.

lh3, Negiligemt BnnQrff@rennsewith appr~priativewater rights

[ngThe eleiments of common law negligence include (I) a duty, recognized by law, requirin.g the defeiadant
to conffotm iSGa a ce&ain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of duty; (3) a causal cosnraection between the
defendant's conduct m d the resulting injuries; m d (4) actual loss or damage. Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484,
4!,89,903 P.2d 73,78 (1995). Here, Weaven incurred a statutory duty to avoid i n j w to S,ta~Tfordw h making
changes to the inrigation lateral. Sttafbrd fails to establish that Weaver bwached that duty.

inla] Stafford argues that9without a shutoff mechanism on the PVC pipes which Weaver installed upsaream
fiom the concrete collection box, the concrete collection box would not f11to the too and Sitafford would not
however, included photographs s!nowing tine concrete colBection box full to the
receive water. IEvidence at trialE4,
top. Stafford also argues he was harmed by Weaver's inshllation o f a concrete slab to block the colliection box
outlet to the Stafford properr@. Weaver removed the concrete slab m d installed a pipe &om the conc~ete
collection box to the edge of ~taffordqs
propertysStafford, howe~ei~,
filled in the ditch which would have
received irrigation water from the pipe and cmied it across Shff~lCd'sproperty. w e therefore hold substmtid
and comjpetent evidence supports the district judge's &&mination that Weaver did not inteutiondb or
a~egligentlyinterfere with St&ord's apprropriative water rights.

STAPFOmvSMOTION TO ADD CLAIM FOR PUNITIVE DAMAGES
Sitafford arsgunes the district judge erred by denying E s motion to add a claim for pukitive damages. In
suppori of the alleged error, Skaiford reasserts his contention &at Weaver intentionally or neglige12tly interfered
with Stafirord's appropriative water rights. The district judge denied Sitdforas motion, ~8Bil~g
"[t]he @ou!rriwill
allow such a motion to amend the pleadings ifthe moving panty istablishes ...a reasonable likelihood of
proving facts at trial sufficient to s~pportan awmd of punitive damages." Th.e &stri;.ctjudgeconcLuded "the
evidence before h e Cmri does not establish such a likelihood in this case."

[n7-IB] To supponl a motion to add punitive damages wdei I.@. $6-1604, Stafford is required to establish a
reasonable $ikeBihood

---

Page 700

-

-

he could prove by a prepondermce ofthe eviden.ce that Weaver acted ~ p p l ~ e s ~ i vfuanddently,
~ly,
wmtonly,
m.aliciousAy or oueageously. see ra%gkdv. Dairykandl#z~.
CQ., 131 Idaho 357, 362, 956 P.2d 674, 679 (1998).
The distxid judge's determination tinat St&ord failed to establish such a reasonable likelihood is reviewed for
abuse of discretio~..Id., 131 Idaho at 33643,956 P.2d at 6798-80.The abuse off discretion inquiry exmines (1)
whether the trial judge coaectly perceived the issue a
som of discreti.on; (2) whether the trial judge acted w
37

"

I

the outer hmdwies of his discretion a d consistently with the legal smdmds applicabie to the speci.Sc choices
avainable to km; ad,(3) whether the trial judge reached his decision though an exercise of reason. Sun Valley
Shopping C'kB:84 Idaho Power, 119 Idaho 87,94,803 P.2d 993,8000 (1991). M is clear firom the judge's
cornmerats that he cotrect1y understood the discretbnq decision to be madeSapplied the correct stzmdacds annd
utilized reason rm
i reaching his decision. We therefore hold the district judge did not abuse his discretion by
denying Stafford's claim for punitive dmages.

WEAVERvSCILAilM FOR PUJNRTIIVE DAMAGES
[2@-24]Stafford argues the district judge e d by awarding Weaver punitive damages for St&fordqstrespass
because Skinner's April 1995 smvey did not establish h e bouiadxv between Lot 16 md fie Stafford property
and Stafford believed he had title to Lot 16. We have stated:
An awzrd of punitive damages wUI be sustained on appeal only when it is shown that the defendant
acted in a manner that was "anextreme deviation &om reasonable standards of conduct, and $hat
the act was performed by the defendant nl.vidHnm understanding of or disregard for its likely
consequences." The justificatioa of punitive dmages must be that the defendmt acted with%
an
extremely harmful state ofmindj whether that be temed "malice, oppression, fraud or gi:oss
negligence;" "malice, oppression, wa~mtomess;"or simply "deliberate or willful.s'
Ha'ghI~dB~tcrs.,
Bw. v. Barker, 133 Idaho 330,348-349,986 P.2d 996, 101.3-15 (1999) (cihtions omitted). Punitive
damages me thus appropriate in a trespass action when the defeinc$mt acted in a manner which was
outrageous, unfounded, ~ e a s o n a b l ae ~d in conscious disregard of the plaintiffs property rights.
See, eg., Walter E. Wilhige Resrocibbe Living Trust v. Northwest Yea* iMceting Pension Fund 128
Idaho 539,548,916 B.2d 1264, 1274 (1996). Where a trespassiarr;defendant has notice that his
p1aintiRmay
activities constitute a ttespass and nonetheless contisaues his treshss, the ~ando~mer
be entitled to ~ m i t i v dmages.
e
See Aztec Ltd. Bnc. v. Creekside Inv, Co., 100 Idaho 566.570.602
P.2d 64,68 (f979). We revGw a
n award ofpunitive damages to deternine whether the ricori
contains substmtid evidence to support the judge's finding ofextreme1$1measonable and
malicious conduct. Magic Valley Radiolog Assocs., PPA.sr. Profk Bug. Servs., Im., 119 Idaho 558,
561,808 P.2d 1303,1306 (1991).

U S ] Hete, the rewrd contaifis sunbstmtial evidence that Stafford's conduct was m extreme deviation from
reasonablle conduct. For exatmpk, in the fall of I994 epa spring of 1995, Staf~fordremoved the origina1 fence a d
filled in the origind dirt ditch located between the cement ili~igationditch on Lot 16 and the surveyed borndm
line. St&ford made no measwemefits or any documenky record regarding the location ofthe origiinal fence
m d dirt ditch, j[n ApdA 1995, the boundary k&%veen
Lo4 14 md the Stafford property was established by
licensed survey and was determined to be in the location of the origir~ddirt ditch. In the fall of 1995, Stafford
proceeded to erect a new fence on Lot 14 wlmich Skinner's November 1996 survey established encroached upon
Lot 16 from a minimum of 2.17 feet to a a.aximm of 10.2 feet. 1rr1March of 1997, Stafford excavated a new
dirt ditch ova Lot 46 in approximately the same 1ocation as the encroackuirng new fence. Stdhrd admitted at trial
that the new dirt ditch was located on Lot 16 without Weaver's permission. Stdfoird thus erected the new fence
and excavated the new ditch on Lot 44 with f d l howledge of the bowaday between Lot 86 a d the Stafford
property?demon-

strating willhi di.sregad for Weaver's property rights. We therefore !n.old substantial and compet&t evidence
sffi~pprtsthe district jtldgeqspunitive damages awwd to Weaver.

I

I
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SLANDER OF TITLE
Owyhee Village alleged ~bfforrdslandered its title to Lot 16 by falsely and m a l i ~ i ~asserting
~ ~ l y an
easement or omership interest in Lot 16 which caused Weaver to witM~.oEdpayment $0Owybee Village.
Owyhee Village also alleged it incurred legal expenses in defense of Stafforas claims to Lot 16. Stafford argues
th,e district judge emed by basing his slander of title conclusion on Stafford's failme to prevail on his affirmative
defenses. Stafford asserts the distrf.ct judge should have focused on Stafford's reasonable belief that he owned
the prrope~rtyup to where he placed the new fence md that such belief negated the malice element of sllandeir of
title. The district judge, however, did not rely solely upon Stafiford's failed affirmative defenses to find slander
of title and instead set out the elements of slander of title m d aticulated the substantial evidence in supjport of
his finding.
[%-29] A cwse of action for slmder of title requires Owyhee Village to establish the following: (U) uttering

or loublishing of slmderou$ statements; (2) when the statements were fdse; (3) with malice; aad (4) resultin@in
specid damages. See Matheson v. HarrZs, 98 Id&o 758, 760-62,572 P.2d 861,84343 (1977). Here, Stafford's
jpleadimgs assert a n iantsrest in Lot 16 and gnus satisfy the publication element of slander of title. Stafford's
repeated asseaion of an interest in Lot 14 was clearly false in light ofthe deed which set the boundw between
Stadford property a d Stafford's deswction of the original did diBn which corresponded to the
Lot 86 and
boundary. Moreove~Staflord admii3ed that he excavated the new ditch on Lot 14 without Weaver's pemission.
Malice !mas been geoerally defined by ygidaho courts as a reddess dis~egudfor the truth or fdsity of a statement.
See Bandeli@v. Pietsch, 998 B&o 337,342,563 P.2d 395,400 (1977). An action will mt lie where a statement
in slander oft&, al&ough false, was made in good faith with probable cause for believing it. Stafford argues
he believed the original fence was &:e boundaq between Lot I6 and the Stafford propew. Upon removing the
original fence, however, Stafford did not make a good faith eEoa to record the location of the original !fence orr
to place the new fence or new ditch where the original fence had been. Stafford admitted the new fence was
1
Qhffforbgssconduct in ereding &e new fence m d excavating
where the original fence bad been only i ~ places.
the new ditch on Lot 16 &us belie my god faith belief in his otwnership interest h Lot 16. Finally, O y h e e
Village bas incmed specid damages in the form of Weaver's refusal to tender payment md the legal expenses
incumed in defending Stafford's cl.aims. We therefore hold the district judge's slander of title determination is
suppogaed by snbskmtia~md competent evidence.

ATTORNEY FEES
i[3@1]
Weaver requests attorney fees on appeal under 1.C. 5 12-121. Attorney fees are proper when the appeal
was brought Ebvo1ously, umeasonaably, or without fomdion. Turpn v. Granie~i,133 %d&o 244,249,985
P.28 669, 674 (1999). Maough Stafford predominantly raises factual issues upon whcih8ncika, at best, there was
disputed evidence before the district court, he does raise some novel arguments concerning the meaning and use
of the term mormument for pwposes of inteqmting a deed and coacerniing color of title as an afGrmative defense
to trespass. Stafford's appeal, therefore, does not lack foundation md we decline to award Weaver attorney fees
on appeal pursuant to 1.C. 8 12-121.

CDwyhee Vllage requests attorneyfees on appeal pursuant to I.C. 12-P20,I.C. 8 12-121 m d I.A.R. 4%.We
find n,o basis for an award of fees under B.C. 5 12-120. As to an award of fees under B.C. $ 12-124, we find
sufficient merit to the question relating to slander of title to wid,hsnaWad an award of fees.

Page BO of PO
The district judge's decision finding Staay"ordtrespassed upon Weaveh Lo&16 and slandered the title of
Owyhee Village is affirmed. We award costs on appeal to Weaver a d OwyIniee Village.
I

j

Justices SIILAK, SCWROEEW, WAL'FERS and KlDWEILL concur.
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Bobbie EGJOVHCH9PlaintiffiAppellmt9v. FIRST WESTERN NVESTMENTB, JNC., an lddio Corporation
and Mmagement No~t7rnwest,Inc., a Washington Corporation doing business in the State of Ed&o, DefendantsRespondents, and Tbili$aRay$ess$Inc., a CaHifomda Coqpration doing business in the State of Idaho, Pewnie
Galland, Wayne Gallmd and Mike Froemming, d/b/a R & R Constmction, m d J o h Does I-EV, inclusively$
whose names are umhom, Defendants.
[Cite as Regjovich v. First Western lnvesments, Inc., 134 Tddfio 1541
No. 24444.
Supreme C o w of Idaho, Coew d'AR.ene, October 2000 Tern.

Pedestriaa who was injured in fall on sidewalk outside store brrought suit against numerous defendants,
iricluding related corporate entities which allegedly omed premises. The First Judicial District Court, Kootemi
County, J m e s IF. J d d , J, grated s m m a ~ j u d g m e nto
t defendants. Plai~ntiffappealed.The Supreme Court,
Schoedc, L,held that: (1) plaint,ifff lacked good cause for failure to serve s
ns and complaint on one of
defendants within six mon~thsof filing ofcomplaiaa&,as would preclude d i s ~ s s a without
1
prejudice as to that
defendmt; (2) plaintiff had ability with reasonable diligence to determine true o m e r of propedy, so that
defendad who did not in fact own property was not equitably estopped by insurer's representation as to
owfiership from asserting defense o f n o n ~ m e r s h i pmd
~ actud owaer subseque~atlyadded as defe~~da~7.t
was not
estopped from asserting limitations defense; m d (3) amended complaht addimg actual o m e r did not relate back
for h!rnitations pwoses.

Michael J. Verbillis, Coew dfAlene,for appellant,
Cosho$Hmphrey, Greener*& welsh, Boise, for respondents. ~ h i s t 6;'.~ Burke
p ~ argued.
~ ~
SCHROEDER, Justice.
Bobbie Redovkch (Redovich) appeals Byme district wwtqsgrant of s u m a v judgment on her chims against
First Western investments, hc., (FWH), Mmagemed Northwest, Inc., (IM3W)9and First Westen1 Deve8opment
Association of Washington V, L.P., (FWD-V). Regjovich alleged that she suffered personal injuries in a slipand-fall that occurred on the sidewalk outside the Payless Drug Store in Coeur dPAlene~The district court
concluded that F W b.ad no legal responsibiliq because (1) F W was not the o m e r ofthe real property inn
question, (2) F W was not estopped from denying property omer"p, and (3) IFWI owed no duty of care to
Regjovich. The district court dismissed Regjovich's cUaims against M N W m d FWD-V for failure to tirmely
sewe a complaint m d swmons within six months pursuant to Rule sj(a)(2) ofthe lddmo Rules of Civil
~rocedare(1.R.C.P). "re district court dismissed claims against ThiftyRayless, Hnc. (Tbrif?$JD5
Pennie Galhand,
Wayne Gdlmd m d Mike Froemming &/a R & R Consmction, for filuire to timely sewe the complaint as
provided by 1Kule 4Qa)(2), I.R.C.P. Redovich appeals the dismissal of the claims against FW9, W W , and
FWD-V.
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IIBmCKGROWDAND PWJIOR PROCEEDINGS
FWI, W W , m d FWD-V me business entities that shmed some cornon ow~rnershipam.oing tile pincipals at
the times that are relevant in this case. F w is an Idaho coporation whose sfhmeho~derswere George E.Barber
(Barber), Michael J. Hess (Hess), Scott S h d s (Shanks) and Mar!< 0.
Zenge~(Zer~ger)~
Zenger was president of
FWI. M W is a Washin@on copora~on.Prior to Mmch 1995, the shareholders of MNW were Bmber, Iirless,
Shanks, a d Zenger*After March 1995, the shareholders in MNW were Mack H.Debose (Debose), Hess, md
ShaisEhs. Since Mach 1995, the shareholders in W W have acted in various capacities as cowmate office~rsof
W W u iFWD-V
.
is a limited partnership organized mder Washington law. ~lneienem1partnirs of FWD-V were
Bwber. Hess. Shanks. m d Zenger. The limited owtuner was Debose. Wausau Underwriters Insurance Comomv
On December 220, 1996, Wegjovich filed a complaint n m h g FWl[?Thrifty, MNW, Pemie Gallad, Wayne
Gai1m.d and Mike Froemming &bdi W & W Cons&iructionmd John Does I-IV as defenda~~ts.
No summonses
*wereissued until May 20, 1997.

IFWI was sewed with process on May 21, 1997, within the six-month period provided by Ride 4(a)(2). MNW
was not s e d within the six-month period. FWD-V was not named as a defendant in the complaint but was
served with a John Doe summons on July 21,1997.
The district court granted summay judgments in favor of IFWII, MNW, and FWD-V, dismissing Repjovich's
complaint. Regjovich appealed the judgments entered against her.

11-31 Rule 4(a)(2) requires a panty to serve the s n m o n s a d complaint within six months of filing the
complaint. Unless a paty c m show good cause for failwe to sene within those six months, a coenirt must
dismiss the action without prejudice. I.R.C.P. 4(a)(2). A determination off whether good cause exists is a factual
one Nerco Minerals Co.v. Morrison Knudsen Coy.,
132 Idaho 531,533,996 P.2d 457,459 (8999).
Consequently, when reviewhg a decision dismissing a case mder the d e , "the appropriate standard of review
is the same as that used to review an order granting s u m q judgment." Werco Minerals Co.v. Morrison
K~udsenCorp., 132 1d&o 531,533,976 P.2d 457,459 (1999). However>''where timere is n.o dispute as to the
f a c u l circumstances, our review consists off ascertaining tine effect of applicable law on tile undisputed facts~"
Martin v. Hoblit,833 Idaho 372,987 P.2d 284 (1999).

THE DIISTWJICTCOURT'SDJECIISION TWAT WGJOWCH DID NOT SIBTOW GOOD CAUSE FOR
LATE SERVIICE OF TIRE SUMMONS ON M N W US SUPPORTED BY TIHE lRECOmo
The version o f ~ d Rules
~ o of Civil! Procedure 4(a)(2) in effect at the t h e IRegjovich filed her complaint
provide&
If a sewice of d3e smmons and complaint is not made upon 62 defendant within six (6) months
aRer eBnR filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such sembe was required c m o t
show good cause why such sewice was not made within that period, the action s B 1 be dismissed
as to that defendat without prejudice upon the court's o v i inGtiative without notice to such p a w or
upon motion.

-
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1.X.C.P. 4(a)(2).

f4jRegjovich filed the complaint on December 20,1996. Sewice of ~orocesson W W did !mot occur until
July 21, 1997. Regovich asserts that there was good cause for the late sewice of process on the basis o:F
negotiations with the hswance carrier p~ridprto the filing of the comp1aiint aimd the fact that she was medically
unstable, making settlement impractical until her find condition becme Pmom.
/[5]The relevant time in question is the six month period following the filing off the complaint. Idartin, 133
Idaho 372,987 P.2d 284; Sammfs v. Magne8elz; 130 Idaho 342$346,941P.2d 314,318 (1997). The settlement
negotiations &at took place before the complaint was filed are irrelevant in detem.injng good cause. !in Mmtin
v. BlobBit, 1133 Idaho 372,9819 P.2d 284, tiis Coua detemined that settlement negotiations between tilie parties
do not provide justifiwtion for delay of sewice and do not in and ofthemselves constitute cause for noncomplimce with Rule 4(a)(2). The settlement negotiations in this case that occmed prior to filling &?me
complaint
'do not constitute good cause for the late sewice of process.

The fact that Regjovic!n9smed.ica1wndition had not stabilized does not constitute good cause for failure to
serve the s u m o n s ad compU&nad. There was nothing in her condition that pswventedservice of process. The
question of whether resolution of her cBai,mshould await stabilization of h a medical condition was one that
couRd have been. a d d ~ s s e din h e litigation following service of process.

TWIE DLISTWllCTCOURT CORmCTLY DETEmIINED TIHIAT EQUHTABLE ESTOPPElL WAS NOT
APPLHCABLL
A,S~tamdardoff Review
[63jOn an appeal corn an order granting s m . g i judgment, this Count's sfan-

dard of review is &hesame as the standard used by the district court in ruling on a motion for SWEWTQJ
judgment. State V, WPzdbbermaid IBIZC.,
129 Idaho 353,355-56,924 P.2d 615,6119-618 (1996). The Corn must
liberally &onstmefacts in the existing record in favor of @qenomoving party and draw all reasonable inferences
kom the record ia favor of the nomoving party. RubbermaiGJ, 129 Idaho at 356,924 P.2d at 618. Ifthere are
conflicting inferences contained in the record?or if reawnable minds might reach diffwent conclusions,
s u m m w judgment must be denied. Bonz v.S u d ~ e e h %, 19 Idaho 539, 541,808 P.2d 896,878 (9981). Wwn
questions of law are presented, this Court exercises free review md 3s m t bomd by findings of the dist~ric?court
but is kee to draw its own concIusS?ionsfrom the evidence presented. Mutual ofEnumclsaw v. BoxX 227 lidaho
851,2352,908 P.2d 153, 154 (1995).

FWil was named in the complaint as the o m e r ofthe propee in issue but in fact was not the owner.
Coinsequently, FWI had no Iegd responsibility for Regjovicla's injuries unless FWI was estopped &om raising
the defense of non-omership~FWD-V, not FWI, was in fact the owner ofthe property in issue in this case but
was ]mot n m e d in the complaint m d was not sewed with process until &er the statute of limitations had mn.
Re&opnich mainta.ins &at FWP should be estopped fuom denying omership ofthe property and FWD-V should
be estoploed from asserting the statute of limitations defense because an employee of Wausau, w!~.ichinsured
both FW md FWD-V, told Regjovich &at FWI was the owner oftbe property. Relying on tb.is com.~rnunicati0~11,
Regjovich named P W in the complaint as the owner of the property and served F W with.in six months of filing
the complaint^

-. .
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[I@, 111Equitable estoppel isbased on the concept that it would be inequitable to dlow a 10erson to induce
reliance by taking a certain position and, thereafter, take m inconsistent position w h it becomes advmtageous
to do so. Ggf$e?r.dv. State, 127 Idaho 472,903 P.28 61 (1985). The elements of equitable estwppel we:
(1) a false representation or concealment of a material fact with actbd or coi~skmctiveknowledge of
the truth, (2) the party assenting estoppel did not BMImow or could ;lot discover the truth, (3) the false
representation or concealment was made with the intent that it be relied upon, asad (4)the person to
whom fie representation was made or from whom the facts were concealed, relied and acted upon
the representation or coii~cealmentto his [or her] prejudice.

[%2]The district court detemined that Wanmu made a ffdse representation in the letter to Regjovich on
March 14, i 995, and that hhe false repreentaeon was intended to be relied upon. Ei[owever, the district coM

conchnded &at "in &awing all reasonable inferences in favor of Regovich, I find &at had Re@ovicWsattorney
exercised reasonable diligence, he would have discovered that FW was not the owner off ]Lot 3A prior to P~..]
filing his Complaint on December 20,1996."
113, naj All factors of equitable estoppel we of equal importance, and there can be no estoppel absent any of
the elements. Tomneerep Y.Abbertsonk, IEC.,101 Idaho 1, 607 P.2d 1055 (1880) (overrufedon other grounds by
Harrison Y. Taylor, 115 Idaho 588, 768 P.2d 1321 (1989)) Iddm couxts haw long determined that one may not
assert estoppel based upon mother's misrepresentation if the one claiming estoppel had readily accessible
means to discover the truth. Consequmtky, if Redovich either h e w or had the ability with reasonable diligence
to determine the true owner of the propex4y3&e second element of equitable estoppel is lacking.

In this case the letter from Wausau to Xegjovich was dated March 14, 8995. The complaint was filed
December 20, 1896, approxhwnately twenty months later. There was over a y e a a d a half to discover the true
omerr prior to filing the complaint. The ownership ofthe property was a matter ofpub1ic record accessible to
Redovich. Para-

graph VjI ofthe complaint recognized that FWJ might not be the owner of the propem:
Defendant, J Q P i DOE, I, is nmed as a Defendant in the event the real property was not owned by
FIRST W S T I E N INVESTMENTS3WC.at times material. JOHN DOE I was the lawful owner
of the premises described in Paragraph HH herein.

[ngThe requiremer@tsof equitable estoppel were not intended to create a trap for the unwary. It is
troublesome that Waausaiaa misstated dRne ownership ofthe propeq, but. it is clear that Regjovich had the time nnd
means to discover the identity ofthe o m e r with reasonable diliggnce. The concern noted in the complaiiiat t d
iFWI might not be the owner ofthe propern required that a reasonable effort be made to determine the o m e r
prior to expiration of the statute oflimitatiom. An essential dement of equitable estoppel is missing.
1

TETLE DESTNCT COURT DID NOT ERR lIN D E W m G mGJOVICHvSMCDTUON TO AMEND TME
COMPLAENT AGAENST FWD-Vo

Redovich argues that the Co& shodd have &lowed amendment ofthe complaint to rime FWD-V as a
defendant wKnen she discovered that lFW was not the true owner. Pmrsuant to Rule 15Qc) am mendm.ent to the
complaint arising f m the same wnduct alieged in the compi*.int relates back b the date ihe o ~ g ~ ~ ; " f ~ u

-

/
i

i
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was filed if
witiiin the period provided by law for com~encingthe action against the p-,
the paT* to be
brought ia by mendmenr8 (8) has received such notice ofthe instinahion ofthe action &at the pa%y
will not be prejudiced h maintaiahg a defense on the merits, and (2) Emew or should have !mown
that*but for a mistake concerning the identity of the proper par@, the action would have been
brought against the party....

[ll6] The dist~tictcome concluded that since Regjovich failed to timely sewe FWD-V within the six months
as required by 1.R.QI.P.4(a)(2)9 that it need not address the motion to m e n d the complaint. It is correct rhat
FWD-V was not sewed within six months from the filing ofthe compl&i. However, if the men&nent to n m e
FWD-V were allowed, it is arguable that the six-month period for sewice from the filing of the complaint
would not cominnence at the time the initial complaint was Gled but at a later time. Consequentny, the Court will
address the issue of whether an amendment should have been allowed.
Re~ovichrnainRains that FWD-V had notice of the complaint prior to the expiration oif the statute of
limitations because Wausau h2ew that Regjovich was gohg to file a complai~mt.According to Regjovi~!8.~
since
Wausau was the insurance conanpamy for F W 9FWD-Vand lWNW, FWD-V must have been put on notbe about
the complaint filed on December 20,8996 However, the fact that the attorney for Regjovich advised the
adjuster for Wausau that he wodd file a complaint to protect the sbtwae of limitations D not s&ificient to put
PWD-V on notice that a complaint which might implicate it was filed later. 1t was not until the latter p& of
Feb~mxgr1997 that the adjuster for Wauaa leaned that a complaiimt had in fzict been f i l d This was after
expiration ofthe statute of limi&tions. Consequently, the conditions of Rule 15(c) were not met.

[I71This Court has allowed m exception to permit the
amendment of a complaint designating the 'me name of a fictitiously described pax@ bo relate back
to the GRinag of the original complaint nogltho@UmeUhg the reqairemmds ofRaaUe n5'fc)if it can be
established that the mending party procwded with due diligence to discover the true identity ofthe
fictitious paiy m d pmmptly rmoved to mend and sewe process upon the prev.iously fictitiousRy
described party.

Neuco Minerals Co. v. Morrison K8udu"enKRS., 132 Idaho 531,976 P.2d 459 (1999). BS$gjovic!~n'sclaim agai~st
FWD-V is 11638. saved by the exception in Nerco hfi~&i"dCo.
u" because Redovich did not proceed with due
diligence to discover the identity of the fictitious Job Doe paty she had designated as a possi3sQeowner ofthe
propem.

CONCLUSION
The decisions of the district c o d granting s u m w judgments to the respondents are affirmed. The
respondents we awwddedcosts. No attorney fees are duowed.

-Chief Justice ?TROUTm d Justices SIILAK, WAILTERS, and XJ;i[DmLlL, concur.
Lawriter Corporation. ABI rights resewed.

The Caswrnaker Online daWbase is a compilation exciaasively owned by Lawriter Corporation. The databas i
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
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COURT MINUTES Jodi M. Stordiau
Court Reporter
Recording: J:3/2005-10-06
Time: 10:47A.M.

John R. Stegner
District Judge
Date: October 7,2005
GERALD E. W E E and CONSUELO J. )
WEITZ, husband and wie, and WEITZ & )
SONS, LLC, and Idaho limited liability )
company,
?

Case No. CV-9490080

Plaintiffs,
APPEARANCES:
Plaintiffs Gerald and Consuelo Weitz
present with Charles Brown, Lewiston

TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L.
GREEN, husband and wife, STEWN R.
SHOOK and MARY E. SILVERNALE
SHOOK, DANIAL T. CASTLE and
CATHERIm C. CASTLE, and U.S.
BANK, N.A.,
Defendants.

Defendants Todd Green and Steven R.
Shook present with counsel,
Andrew M. Schwam, Moscow, ID
Robert M. Magyar, Moscow, ID
)

1

-------------------------

TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L.
GREEN, husband and wife, STEVEN R.
SHOOK and MARY E. SILVERNALE
SHOOK, DANIAL T. CASTLE and
CATHERINE C. CASTLE,

1

Counter-Plaintiffs,

)

)
)

1
VS.

GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. )
WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ & )
SONS, LLC, and Idaho limited liability
)
company,
1
Counter-Defendants. )

.................................................................

Subject of Proceedings: COURT TRIAL - DAY FIVE

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk

This being the time fixed pursuant to order of the Court for resumption of the court
trial in this case, Court noted the presence of counsel and the parties.
On motion Mr. Schwam, there being no objection from Mr. Brown, the testimony of
Thomas Richards was interrupted to call some witnesses out of order to accommodate
their schedules.
Harley Wright was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Cross
examination by Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. Court questioned the witness. Mr.
Brown examined the witness on the Court's questions. The witness stepped down.
Gerald Wright was called, sworn and testified for the defendants.
examination by Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. The witness stepped down.

Cross

Michael O'Neal was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Cross
examination by Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. Court questioned the witness. Mr.
Brown examined the witness on the Court's questions. The witness stepped down.
Court recessed at 11:38 A.M., reconvening at 11:41 A.M., Court, counsel and the
parties being present as before.
Willemina Kardong was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Cross
examination by Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. Court questioned the witness.
Neither counsel wished to examine the witness on the Court's questions. The witness
stepped down.
Court recessed at 12:12 P.M., reconvening at 1:22 P.M., Court, counsel and the
parties being present as before.
Linda Fox was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Cross examination by
Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. The witness stepped down.
Thomas Rogers was called, sworn and testified for the defendants. Cross
examination by Mr. Brown. No redirect examination. Court questioned the witness. Mr.
Brown examined the witness on the Court's questions. Court questioned the witness. The
witness stepped down.
Thomas Richards resumed the witness stand and continued testimony for the
defendants. Mr. Schwam resumed his redirect examination of Mr. Richards. Recross
examination by Mr. Brown. Court questioned the witness. Mr. Schwam examined the
witness on the Court's questions. Mr. Brown examined the witness on the Court's
questions. The witness stepped down.
Court recessed at 3:00 P.M., reconvening at 318 P.M., Court, counsel and the parties
being present as before.

Terry Odenborg
Deputy Clerk
n-r

in- r rrr i r -0

I,

Mr. Schwam requested that the Court take judicial notice of the Affidavit of Susan
Ripley. Mr. Brown objected. Court sustained the objection.
Susan Ripley was called, sworn and testified for the defendants.
examination. The witness stepped down.

No cross

Defendant rested.
Steven Ely was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs in rebuttal. No cross
examination. The witness stepped down.
Dean Balcamp was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs in rebuttal. Cross
examination by Mr. Schwam. No redirect examination. There being no objection from
counsel, the witness was excused.
Tory Eugene Lawrence was called, sworn and testified for the plaintiffs in rebuttal.
Cross examination by Mr. Schwam. Court questioned the witness. Neither counsel
wished to examine the witness on the Court's questions. The witness stepped down.
Plaintiff rested.
No surrebuttal.
Court stated that it finds briefing unnecessary.
In response to inquiry from the Court, neither counsel presented closing argument.
Court considered the matter as having been fully submitted and took the case under
advisement.
Court recessed at 408 P.M., Subject to Call.
APPROVED BY:

J ~ H R.
N STEGNER
DISTRICT JUDGE

Terry Odenborg
Deputy
Clerk
------.
*---.-%"
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THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. WEEZ,
husband and wife, and WEKZ & SONS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Plaintiffs,

1
)

Case No. CV-0400080

)
)

MEMORANDUM DECISION1

1

VS.
TODD A. GREEN q d TONIA L. GREEN,
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK and
MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T.
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE,
and U.S. BANI<, N.A.,
Defendants/Counter Plaintiffs.
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L.
GREEN,
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK and
MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK, DANIAL T.
CASTLE and CATHERINE C. CASTLE,
Counter-Plaintiffs,
VS.
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO J. WEITZ,
husband and wife, and WEITZ & SONS, LLC,
an Idaho limited liability company,
Counter-Defendants.

This Court is aware that Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) requires findings of fact and
conclusions of law in all matters "tried upon the facts without a jury." This Memorandum
Decision constitutes this Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law. Oftentimes, findings of
facts and conclusions of law are set out separately and distinctly even though they are not always
separate and distinct. Other times conclusions of law are set out after the findings of fact as if they
somehow flow from the findings. However, it is sometimes necessary to ascertain the law
applicable before determining the facts. This Court believes it preferable to intersperse findings of
fact and conclusions of law (and not necessarily in that order) to make the decision and analysis
more easily read and understood.
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This case involves a boundary dispute in rural Latah County. The property in
question constitutes a portion of what is c o m o i d y referred to as Moscow Mountain. The
dispute involves two adjoining quarter sections of land. The property in dispute lies
within the southeast quarter of Section 8, Township 40 North, Range 5 West Boise
Meridian. Todd and Tonia Green purchased the quarter section in question on August 1,
2002.

The quarter section to the north of the disputed property is owned together by

Gerald and Consuelo Weitz and Weitz & Sons, LLC. Gerald and Consuelo Weitz,
husband and wife, own the eastern half of the quarter section to the north of the disputed
property. The western half of the quarter section is owned by Weitz & Sons, LLC. The
members of Weitz & Sons, LLC, are Gerald and Consuelo Weitz and their two sons,
Gerald Rockford Weitz and Dustin Fr~drickWeitz. The Weitzes will be collectively
referred to as the Weitz family in this decision. (Attached to this Memorandum Decision
is a copy of Exhibit 0 which was admitted in evidence. The area in dispute has been
highlighted in yellow on that Exhibit.)
The Greens, after purchasing the property, subdivided it into four parcels. Three
of the four parcels border the Weitz family's quarter section and thus contain property
which is in dispute. The Greens sold one of the four parcels to Danial and Catherine
Castle (Tract 1 on Exhibit 0);
they sold another to Steven and Mary Shook (Tract 2 on
Exhibit 0).
The third parcel impacted by this boundary dispute was retained by the
Greens (Tract 4 on Exhibit 0).The Castles, Shooks and Greens are all parties to this
litigation.
Todd and Tonia Green purchased what they thought was a quarter section, or 160
acres, from the Rogers' Family Trust. The Greens agreed to pay $2,000 per acre for the
property.

Prior to purchasing the property, Todd Green spent considerable time

traversing the property. He had located a quarter section marker at the northeast corner
of the property, which had been placed by the Idaho Department of Lands in 1988. The
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property purchased by the Greens contains a trail, sometimes referred to as a road, which
runs generally east to west through the disputed property. The road was the subject of
considerable testimony at hid. Prior to the Greens' purchase in 2002, the trail was
capable of handling, for much of its length, a four-wheel, all-terrain vehicle. For at least a
year prior to the Greens' purchase of the property, the trail was partially blocked because
a tree had fallen across it. The tree blocked any motorized vehicle from driving the length
of the trail. In order to travel the length of the trail, motorcyclists and hikers had created a
detour by which they could bypass the tree that had fallen across the trail.
Following the purchase of the property, the Greens hired Ron Monson, a land
surveyor, to subdivide their property. Mr. Monson began his work in August 2002. In
the process of surveying, he hung surveyor's tape on the property demonstrating that he
was in the process of surveying the property. As an apparent result of the surveyor's
actions, the Weitz family sprang into action. Ed Weitz, a nephew of Gerald Weitz, went
up and cut out the log that had fallen across the trail, thereby enabling motorized travel
the length of the trail without detour. Gerald Weitz, the Weitz family patriarch, took his
Caterpillar tractor to the property and on at least two different instances bladed the trail
in such a way as to convert it from an overgrown trail to one which would allow a fourwheel-drive pickup truck to travel from one end to the other.

Mr. Green, believing the property to be his and his wife's, telephoned Consuelo
Weitz, the Weitz family matriarch, to find out why the trail bad been bladed without his
consultation or permission. Mrs. Weitz informed Mr. Green that she considered the
property to be hers and that she did not need permission to do what she considered to be
rightfully within her power to do. Mr. Green learned at that time that the Weitz family
claimed ownership of the northernmost portion of the quarter section he had purchased.
The claim of ownership extended from the northern boundary of the Greens' quarter
section to an old fence line that ran essentially the width of the property in an east-west
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direction and would, if acknowledged as a boundary, result in a little more than eight
acres being lopped off of the northern portion of the Greens' property.
The Weitz family claims ownership of the disputed property because of Consuelo
Weitz's family history and association with the property. Mrs. Weitz's father, Harold
Schoepflin, and her grandfather, Fred Schoepflin, previously ran dairy cattle on the
disputed property. It appears this was done until about 1975. Prior to that time the
Schoepflins treated the disputed property as their own. They graded the trail in question
at will and connected it with numerous other roads traversing their property to the north.
They maintained the fence, which encroached on the Rogers' property. During the 1970's
Homer Ferguson leased the Rogers' property from Inez Rogers, the Rogers' family
matriarch, to run cattle on it, Mr. Ferguson testified that Mrs. Rogers told him in the mid1970's that the fence, which borders the disputed property, constituted the boundary

1

.betweenthe Schoepflin's property and the Rogers' propeky. However, Mys. Rogers' son,
Thomas Rogers, undermined the testimony attributed &I his mother when he testified that
he doubted his mother had ever seen the fence in question. He also testified his mother
died in 2001 and he managed the property as the trustee for his family's trust following
her death. He also testified he considered the property boundary to be the quarter section
line, not the disputed fence.
After learning of the dispute regarding their property, Mr. and Mrs. Green made a
claim against the Rogers' Family Trust for the loss the Greens maintained they suffered as
a result of the warranty deed not conveying clear title to the disputed property. As a
result of the Greens' claim, the Rogers' Family Trust reduced the purchase price of the
quarter section Mr. and Mrs. Green purchased by $46,247.16. However, in negotiating
the sale of property to the Shooks and Castles, the Greens undertook an obligation to
convey clear title to the disputed property and, in the event the Weitz family did not

!
I

pursue a quiet title action to the disputed property, the Greens agreed to institute a quiet
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title action themselves. In addition, the Greens agreed to compensate the shooks and the
Castles for the loss of the disputed property in the event title was quieted in the Weitz
family.
The Weitz family seeks to quiet title in the disputed property by asserting a claim
of boundary by agreement. In order to establish a boundary by agreement, the Weitz
family must establish two things by clear and convincing e ~ i d e n c e . First,
~
they must
prove an uncertain or disputed boundary involving adjacent properties; and second, they
must prove a subsequent express or implied agreement fixing the boundary. Cox v.
Clanton, 137 Idaho 492,495,50 P.3d 987,990 (2002) (citing GrlTel v.Reynolds, 136 Idaho 397,
400,34 P.3d 1080,1083 (2001)).
Clearly there exists in this case a disputed boundary involving adjacent properties.
However, as to the express or implied agreement, the Weitz family's has failed to make
its case by clear and convincing evidence. In 1988, the Idaho Department of Lands put up
a marker on the northeast corner of the Rogers' property. That boundary marker
constituted notice that the true property line between the Weitz family property and the
Rogers' property was north of the fence in question. Thomas Rogers, the Rogers' family's
property manager, testified that the boundary was not the dilapidated fence, but rather
the corner established in 1988 by the Idaho Department of Lands. The only testimony
that the Rogers family agreed to the boundary was a thirty-year old statement attributed
2 When a party seeks to prove boundary by agreement, the majority rule is that the party must show the
agreement "by such a preponderance of the evidence, often designated as clear and convincing evidence, as
will entitle him or her to the boundary claimed." See 12 AM JUR20, Boundaries § 104 (1997) (citing, e.g., Davis
v. Mitchell, 628 A.2d 657 (Me. 1993)(clear and convincing evidence); Wojahn v. Johnson, 297 N.W.2d 298
(Minn. 1980) (clear, positive, and unequivocal evidence); Stone v. Rhodes, 752 P.2d 1112 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988)
(clear and convincing evidence); Knutson v. Jensen 440 N.W.2d 260 (N.D. 1989) (clear and convincing
evidence); Heriot v. Lewis, 668 P.2d 589 (Wash. Ct. App. 1983 )(clear, cogent, and convincing evidence)).
Because there is no definitive law in ldaho on the burden of proof on a claim of boundary by agreement, this
Court concludes that the majority rule of proof by clear and convincing evidence should apply. Also, as noted
at page 6 infra, the burden of proving a prescriptive easement in ldaho is clear and convincing evidence. It
would be incongruous to require a plaintiff seeking to establish a prescriptive easement to do so by clear and
convincing evidence, but require proof of a boundary by the lesser standard of a preponderance of the
evidence.
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to Mrs. Rogers, who apparently 11ad little familiarity with the property.
Todd Green, in trying to find property to purchase, located the corner that had
been placed by the Idaho Department of Lands. The fence, which the Weitz family relies
011,

was, in 2002, for all intents and purposes, non-existent. In the summer of 2005, when

this Court walked the length of the "fence," it would have been more descriptive to refer
to it as the remains of a fence than to refer to it as a "fence." It must have been many years
between the time this Court observed the "fence" and the time it served as a barrier to
roaming cattle. As between the "fel~ce"and the quarter section marker placed by the
Idaho Deparlment of Lands, the latter served as notice to the world where the true
property boundary lay; the "fence" would not have constituted notice of anything to
anyone. Consequently, the Weitz family's claim to a boundary by agreement fails.
The next issue that must be addressed is the claim by the Weitz family to a
prescriptive easement to the trail that traverses the disputed property. A prescriptive
easement must also be proven by clear and convincing evidence. Hodgins v. Sales, 139
Idaho 225, 232, 76 P.3d 969, 976 (2003). In order to prove a prescriptive easement, the
Weitz family must demonstrate that its use of the trail was as follows:

(1) open and notorious,
(2) continuous and uninterrupted,
(3) adverse and under a claim of right,

(4) wit11 the actual or imputed knowledge of the owner of the servient tenement,
and
(5) for the statutory period of five years.
Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675,680,946 P.2d 975,980 (1997) (citing West v. Smith, 95 Idaho
550,557,511 P.2d 1326,1333 (1973); I.C. 9 5-203).
While it may be true that the trail in question appears in the Weitz family's exhibits
to be part of a "seamless web" of roads on the Weitz family's property, it did not appear
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to be so at the time the Greens bought the disputed property. In 2002, when the Greens
purchased the property, the trail looked like a footpath or a trail for a motorcycle or a
four-wlieel, all-terrain vehicle (except where the log had fallen across the pathway and
necessitated passage by some other means). Prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had
been most recently bladed by Mrs. Weitz's father around 1994. For the eight years prior
to the Greens' purchase, the trail had fallen into disuse. It did not appear, on the ground,
to be part of a seamless web of roadways extending onto the Weitz family's property.
Prior to the Greens' purchase, the trail had not been used by the Weitz family in a
continuous fashion for the required five years. Although there was evidence the Weitz
family and their friends used the trail periodically during the period in question, the use
was not continuous. Consequently, the Weitz fainily has failed to establish the elements
necessary to establish a prescriptive easement to the trail.
An additional impediment to the Weitz family establishing a prescriptive easement

to the road is that they cannot establish exclusive use of that road. In Simmons V . Perkins,
63 Idaho 136,118 P.2d 740 (1941), the Idaho Supreme Court held: "[a]n individual using

land as a road in corn011 with the public cannot acquire a prescriptive right of way
against the owner." Id. at 144,118 P.2d at 744. Numerous individuals, unconnected with
the Weitz family, used the trail during the time in question. Because it is necessary to
establish exclusive use in order to prove a prescriptive easement, this is yet another
reason why the Weitz family's claim of a prescriptive easement must fail.
The next issue that needs to be addressed is whether the Greens were bona fide
purchasers. See Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Claim that Defendants Are Not
Bona Fide Purcliasers for Value. "One who relies for protection upon the doctrine of
being a bona fide purchaser must show that at the time of the purchase he paid a valuable
consideration and upon the belief and validity of the vendor's claim of title without
notice, actual or constructive, of any outstanding adverse right of another." lmig v.
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McDonald, 77 Idaho 314, 318, 291 P.2d 852, 855 (1955) (citations omitted). This Court,
having had the opportunity to physically'walk the fence line and hear the testimony at
trial, is persuaded that the Greens were bona fide purchasers of tlte disputed property.
Much testimony was elicited regarding the "fence," To characterize the remnants of what
once constituted a fence as a fence is a misnomer. The barbed wire has not held cattle for
thirty years. The "fence" has lain on its side for a significant number of years, if not
decades. It is more accurately referred to as the remains of a fence, not as a fence. The
trail on the property was really nothing more than a footpath. It would not have put a
reasonably observant purchaser on notice that someone other than the deeded owner of
the property claimed title to the disputed property. The Weitz family also made much of
an old shack on the disputed property as well as a sign placed on the property by either
Mrs. Weitz's father or grandfather. The shack is a dilapidated structure that has not been
used in decades. To the extent it was seen prior to purchase, it would not have put a
purchaser on notice of a contrary claim to ownership. Likewise the sign placed on a tree
with the word "LINE emblazoned on it would not have put a bona fide purchaser on
notice that the roughly eight acres in question were claimed by another. Consequently,
tlte Greens qualify as bona fide purchasers of the property.
The Weitz family also contends that the Greens should be estopped from asserting
title to the disputed property. The basis for this assertion is the fact that the Greens made
a claim against the Rogers' Family Trust and effected a reduction in price of the quarter
section in question because of the cloud on the title to the disputed property. The Weitz
family argues two forms of estoppel: equitable estoppel and quasi-estoppel.
In order to establish equitable estoppel, the Weitz family must establish the
following: (1)a false representation or concealment of a material fact made with actual or
constructive knowledge of the truth; (2) that the party asserting estoppel did not and
could not have discovered the truth; (3) an intent that the misrepresentation or
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concealment be relied upon; and (4) that the party asserting estoppel relied on the
misrepresentation or concealment to his or her prejudice. Willig v. State, Dept. of Health b
Werfare, 127 Idaho 259,261,899 P.2d 969,971 (1995) (citations omitted).
Equitable estoppel does not apply to these facts. The Greens have not engaged in
either a false representation or a concealment of a material fact. The fact that the Rogers'
Family Trust reduced the purchase price to the Greens as a result of this dispute has never
been concealed from the Weitz family nor has there been a false representation. Further,
there is no prejudice which has inured to the Weitz family, even if one were to assume for
purposes of argument that there has been a concealment of a material fact. The Weitz
family has not changed its position in reliance on anything the Greens have done. They
continue to maintain, as they did prior to the Greens' settlemeirt with the Rogers Family
Trust, that they are the rightful owners of the property. There simply is nothing in these
facts to establish equitable estoppel as a basis for the Weitz family to challenge the Greens'
purchase of the disputed property.
The Weitz family also argues that quasi-estoppel should prevent the Greens from
claiming ownership to the disputed property. "The doctrine of quasi-estoppel may be
invoked against a person asserting a right inconsistent with a position previously taken
by him, with knowledge of the facts and his rights, to the detriment of the person seeking
to apply the doctrine." Young v. Idaho Dep't of Law Enfo~cement,123 Idaho 870, 875, 853
P.2d 615, 620 (Ct. App. 1993). "Quasi-estoppel does not require a false representation.
Rather, it is a doctrine designed to prevent one party from gaining an unconscionable
advantage by changing positions." Record Steel b Const., Inc. v. Martel Consf., Inc., 129
Idaho 288,292,923 P.2d 995,999 (Ct. App. 1996) (citations omitted).
The essence of quasi-estoppel is unconscionability.

This Court is unpersuaded

that the actions of the Greens, in dealing with this dispute, should be construed as
unconscionable. While it is true that the Greens asserted a claim against the Rogers'
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Family Trust and obtained a sigiuficant reduction in the purchase price for the property
because of the cloud on the title, the Rogers' Family Trust had an unqualified obligation
to defend the Greens' title to the property, having given the Greens a warrangr deed.
The Greens did nothing more than assert their rights. While it may appear to some that
the Greens have obtained a windfall by being able to obtain a reduction of the price of the
property and, at the same time, get all they bargained for, it should be remembered that
the Greens have a contractual obligation to defend the titles conveyed to the Shooks and
Castles and, if unsuccessful, compensate the Shooks and the Casties for the corresponding
reduction in the value of their property. The Rogers' Family Trust, in an effort to control
its risk, essentially assigned its obligation to defend the Greens' title to the Greens for a
reduction in the price of the property. The Greens have assumed that risk and have not
engaged in any unconscionable behavior by undertaking that risk. It may be that the
Greens' decision was a good move lrom a business standpoint; however, that is not the
stuff of which unconscionability is made. Consequently, this Court concludes that quasiestoppel should not prevent the Greens from claiming title to the property.
The Castles, Greens, and Shooks also claim that the Weitz family owes them
damages for timber trespass. The basis for tl2s claim is as follows. After Mr. And Mrs.
Weitz learned that the Greens had obtained a settlement from the Rogers' Family Trust,
they hired an arborist, Dana Townsend, to replace the downed fence with one that would
create a barrier between their perceived property line and the property line of the Castles,
Greens and Shooks. Mr. Townsend cut down various trees of small diameter in order to
build a new fence. It is these trees that were downed, at the behest of Mr. and Mrs. Weitz,
for which the Castles, Greens and Shooks seek compensation. While there was testimony
from Mr. Shook, one of the property owners, that Mr. Townsend in effect created a
"utility easementNacross the property, that testimony was a gross overstatement of the
damage to the property. Dean Balcamp, a real estate agent, testified that the value of the
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properties had not been impaired by Mr. Townsend's timber trespass. Mr. ~alcamp's
testimony was far more credible than Mr. Shook's as to the damage to the properties.
While this Court concludes that the marketability of the parcels owned by the Castles,
Greens and Shooks has not been diminished by the arborist, that is not the measure of
damages. "In an action for timber trespass, the measure of actual damages is based upon
the amount of the trees taken and the market value of the trees in that area at the time of
the taking." Bumgarner v. Burngarner, 124 Idaho 629,640,862 P.2d 321,332 (Ct. App. 1993).
While the trees cut were not marketable in the sense that they could be milled and cut
into dimension lumber (with the exception of one tree), they nevertheless had some
market value. The Court concludes that the Castles, Greens and Shooks should each
receive $500.00 for the market value of the timber trespass by Mr. Townsend at the
request of Mr. and Mrs. Weitz.
The Castles, Greens and Shooks also seek treble damages for the timber trespass.
"Although not stated in the statute, LC. 5 6-202 applies only where the alleged trespass is
shown to have been willful and intentional. " Bumgarner v. Bumgarner, 124 Idaho 629,639,
862 P 2d 321, 331 (Ct. App. 1993) (citations omitted). This Court cannot find that the
timber trespass attributable to Mr. and Mrs. Weitz through Mr. Townsend was willful or
intentional. When Mr. and Mrs. Weitz hired Mr. Townsend, they reasonably thought that
the property dispute had been resolved by the Greens' settlement with the Rogers' Family
Trust Consequently, the trespass engaged in by Mr. Townsend is not subject to trebling.
The final issue remaining for decision is the claim by the Castles, Greens and
Shooks that the title to their property has been slandered by the Weitz family. There are
four essential elements to a slander of title action. These include: "(1)The uttering and
publication of the slanderous words by the defendant [sic]; (2) the falsity of the words; (3)
malice, and (4) special damages . . . ." Matheson v. Ham's,98 Idaho 758,759,572 P.2d 861,
862 (1977). Based on the evidence presented, this Court cannot conclude that the Weitz
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family was, in any way, malicious with regard to its statements. The Weitz family had a
good faith belief it had a valid claim to the disputed property. Consequently, malice has
not been shown.
Counsel for the Castles, Greens and Shooks are directed to submit judgments that
will quiet title in the disputed property to them and award $500.00 each to the Castles,
Greens and Shooks for the timber trespass they experienced. Judgment in these amounts
should be against Mr. and Mrs. Weitz since the evidence was that they hired Mr.
Townsend.

q TaY
of January 2006.

DATED this ___

.

District ~ u d g e
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I do hereby certify that a full, true complete and correct copy of the foregoing
MEMORANDUM DECISION was mailed to:

CHARLES A. BROWN
ATTORNEY AT LAW
P.O. BOX 1225
LEWISTON, ID 83501
ROBERT M. MAGYAR
ATTORNEY AT LAW
PO BOX 8074
MOSCOW, ID 83843
ANDREW SCHWAM
ATTORNEY AT LAW
514 SOUTH POLK STREET
MOSCOW, ID 83843

on this d?!a'y

of January 2006.
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5 14 South Polk Street
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Greens, Shooks and Castles.
Attorneys for DefendantsICo~~uterplaintiff~:

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
GERALD E. WEITL ancl CONSUELO
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ
&SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company,

)
)
)
)

'.

Case No. CV-04-000080

1
1

PlaititiffsICou~iterdefendants,
v.

..

DEFENDANTS'ICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS'
MOTION TO CLARIFY, CORRECT
AND RECONSIDER

)

1
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN,
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOIC
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOIC,
DAN1AL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A.,

)
)
)
)
)

1

1

Del'cndal~tsICounterpIaintiffs.

1

,.

by and throiigh tlietr attorneys of
COME NOW DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS,

1

record, and Move the Court to clarify, correct 'and ~xconsiderthe Court's findings of fact and

I

conclusions of law which appear in llle Co~irt'sMemorandum Decision filed January 9,2006.

!

MOITION 7'0 CLIIKIFY. C:OKRECT
AND RI~CONSIDl?lI

-

1

Because it is anticipated that this Memorandum Decision will be appealed, ~navantsalso
request that the Court render its final decision by enteringfindings of fact and conclusions of law, so
that all possible findings of the trial court at-e available to the appellate court, thus reducing the
likelihood the case will be rernanded for further findings.
Well prior to the hearing d t h i s Motion, DefendantsICounterplaintifswill .file with thecourt
their proposed findings of l~'actand conclusions of law. De'endantsICoui~terplai~~tiFfs
also expect to
file a short brief listing cases already provided to the Court. Defendants/Counterplaintiffs have
noticed this Motion for a hearing at which DeCeiidantslCounterplaintiffs will support this Motion
with oral argument. This Motion is made pursuant to I.R.C.P. I l(a)(2)(B),
DATED this 23'd day uf January, 2006.

&/"r~y-.%
Robert M. Magyar '4
Attorney for Defe~idantsiCounterplaintiffs

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this 23"' day of January, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy of the
rorego~ngMOTION TO CLARIFY, CORRECT AND RECONSIDER to be served on the follo\h/lng

in the manner indicated below:
Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1225
Lewislon, ID 83501

&fihRobert M. Magyar

MOTION TO CLARIFY, CORRECT
AND RECONSIDER

( ) Overnight Mail

U.S. Mail
( ) Facsimile
( ) Hand Delivery
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Robert M. Magyar #I667
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Moscow, Idaho 83843
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(208) 882-1908 Facsimile
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SCHWAM LAW FIRM
Andrew Schwain #I573
514 South Polk Street
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 882-4190 Telephone
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterplaintiffs: Greens, Shooks and Castles.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company,
Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,

)
)
)

1
1
1
1

v.
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN,
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK,
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A.,

)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-04-000080

DEFENDANTS'/COUNTERPLAINTIFFS'
MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF
REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES
INCLUDED IN THE MEMORANDUM
OF COSTS

1
\

COME NOW DEFENDANTSICOUNTERPLAINTIFFS, by and through their attorneys
of record, and Move the Court to award Defendants/Connterplaintiffs their reasonable attorney
fees to be deemed as costs. and included in their memorandum of costs.

MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES
INCLUDED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
- 1

This Motion is made pursuant to Idaho Code Sections 12-121, 6-202, and I.R.C.P. 54,
and for the following reasons.
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs assert that they are the prevailing party in this matter, and
as such are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees that they have incurred in
defending against Plaintiffs'

claims, and in prosecuting their own claims against

PlaintiffsICounterdefendants.
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs assert that Plaintiffs' case against Defendants was brought
and/or pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation.
DefendantsICounterplaintiffsassert that they have proved a timber trespass and slander of
title by Plaintiffs, and as such are entitled to an award of their reasonable attorneys' fees under
I.C. § 6-202 and as special damages resulting from slander of title.
DefendantsICounterplaintiffs have filed herewith their Verified Memorandum of Costs

and Attorney Fees in support of this Motion, including the affidavits of their attorneys of record.
DefendantslCounterplaintiffs have noticed this Motion for a hearing at which

Defendants/Countefplaintiffsrequest that they be permitted lo argue in support of this Motion.

DATED this 31dday of April, 2006.

Wly&

'

Robert M. Magyar
Attorney for l%fendants/~ounterplaintiffs

MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES
INCLUDED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
- 2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on this

day of April, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy of

the foregoing MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES
INCLUDED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS to be served on the following in the manner
indicated below:
Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1225
Lewiston, ID 83501

( ) Overnight Mail
( ) US. Mail
( ) Facsimile

00 Hand Delivery

mflfiRobert M. Magyar

MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF REASONABLE ATTORNEY FEES
INCLUDED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF COSTS
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MAGYAR LAW FIRM
Robert M. Magyar #I667
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5
P.O. Box 8074
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 882-1906 Telephone
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile
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SCHWAM LAW FIRM
Andrew Schwam #I573
5 14 South Polk Street
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 882-4190 Telephone
Attorneys for Defendants/CounterplaintBs: Greens, S11ooks and Castles
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE

STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH

G E M D E. WEITZ and CONSUELO
J. WEITZ, husband and wife,and WEITZ
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company,
PlaintiffsfCounterdefendants,

)
)

1
1

)
v.
)
)
TODD A. GXEEN and TOMA L. GREEN?)
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK
)
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK,
)
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERWE )

C CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A.,

Case No. CV-04-000080

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW SCHWAM

RE: ATTORNEY FEES

)

)

Defendants/CounterpIaintiffs.
STATE OF IDAHO

1

County of Latah

1

1

ss:

ANDREW SCHWAM, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am an attorney licensed to practice law in the State of Idaho.

AFFIDAVIT OF ANDREW SCHWAM RE: ATTORNEY FEES - 1

2.

I have practiced law for more than 30 years.

A copy ofthe comprehensivebill submitted to my clients in this case has been attached
3.
to and incorporated in the Memorandum of Costs filed in this case.
All services and disbursements listed in the March 3 1, 2006 comprehensive bill
submitted to my client were performed or expended and were necessary to properly represent my
clients.
4.

5.
With the exception of the Febniary 2004 work which was billed at flat rate, all other
work was billed by the hour at a rate of $150.00 per hour with a minimum billing interval of 1110th
of an hour. This hourly rate is reasonable considering the nature of the case tried and the fact that
my hourly rate is somewhat lower than the rates charged by many attorneys in this geographic area
with experience similar to mine.

It should be noted that in addition to the entries shown in the attachment to the bill
6.
at no charge with a 0.0 time or NIC, many of the entries were billed at less time than they took and
many interactions with clients, co-counsel, and witnesses were not billed at all. Thus the total hours
billed represent a minimum figure materially less than the total time actually expended.
DATED t h i s L day of

2006,

Andrew Schwam

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

1 ST

day of

P

,2006

&@I,L

t

h

Notary Public for &ago,
Residing at Y%~L~JCJI
LJ
.
,Idaho.
My Commission Expires: or-a)-- o r
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CERTIFICAE OF SERVICE
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I hereby certify that on this
of
/ao& c ,2006, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT to be served on the fdllowing in the manner indicated below:
Charles A. Brown
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1225
Lewiston, ID 83501

( )
( )
( )
@)

Overnight Mail
U.S. Mail
Facsimile
Hand Delivery

m & 'L

Robert M. Magyar 0
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MAGYAR LAW FIRM
Robert M. Magyar #I667
530 South Asbury St. - Suite 5
P.O. Box 8074
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 882- 1906 Telephone
(208) 882-1908 Facsimile
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SCI-IWAM LAW FIRM
Andrew Schwarn #I573
514 South Polk Street
Moscow, Idaho 83843
(208) 882-4190 Telephone
Attorneys for Defendants/Counterplaintiffs: Greens, Shooks and Castles.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LATAH
GERALD E. WEITZ and CONSUELO
J. WEITZ, husband and wife, and WEITZ
& SONS, LLC, an Idaho limited liability
company,

)
)
)

Case No. CV-04-000080

1
1

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M.MAGYAR

)

RE: ATTORNEY FEES

Plaintiffs/Counterdefendants,
v.

1
TODD A. GREEN and TONIA L. GREEN,
husband and wife, STEVEN R. SHOOK
and MARY E. SILVERNALE SHOOK,
DANIAL T. CASTLE and CATHERINE
C. CASTLE, and U.S. BANK N.A.,

)
)
)
)

1
1

DefendantslCounterplaintiffs.

STATE OF IDAHO

1

1
ss:

County of Latah

1

ROBERT M. MAGYAR, being first duly sworn upon oath, deposes and says:
1.

I am an attorney admitted to practice law in the State of Idaho.

2.

I represented Defendants/CounleyIaintiffs herein.

AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT M. IV1AGYAR
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i
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3.

I have practiced law in Idaho for more than 30 years.

4.

A copy of the coinprehensive billing history submitted to my clients in this case has

been attached to and incorporated in the Memorandum of Costs filed in this case.
5.

All services and disbursements listed in the November 22,2005 and April 1,2006

billing histories submitted to my clients were performed or expended and were necessary to properly
represent my clients in this matter.
6.

All work was billed by the hour at a rate of $125.00 per hour for out of court work,

and $150.00 per hour for in court work, with a minimum billing interval of 1110'~of an hour. This
hourly rate was charged pursuant to an Employment Agreement entered into with my clients. This
hourly rate is reasonable considering the nature of the case tried and the fact that my hourly rate is
somewhat lower than the rates charged by many attorneys in this geographic area with experience
similar to mine.
7.

It should be noted that in addition to the entries shown in the comprehensive billing

history at no charge, many of the entries were billed at less time than they took, and many
interactions with clients, co-counsel and witnesses, as well as trial and case preparation, were not
billed at all. Thus, the total hours billed represent a minimum figure materially less than the total
time actually expended on behalf of my clients in this case.

DATED this 3/LP day of April, 2006.

Lw4&fRobert M. Magyar
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SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this

&day of April, 2006.
P

!yb~'~n/
NO& y Public in and for the State of Idaho,
res~dngin Moscow, Idaho.
My Commission Expires: 05 I I 7&(0
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

3day of kpril, 2006, I caused a true and correct copy of the

foregoiilg AWIDAVIT to be served on the following in the manner indicated below:

Charles A. Browil
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1225
Lewiston, ID 83501

( ) Overnight Mail
( ) U.S. Mail
( ) Facsimile

@ Hand Delivery

M h ARobert M. ~

a

~

~
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